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Fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te.

EDITOR'S ANNOUNCEMENT

The Church Quarterly Review is a cooperative undertaking designed to promote sound learning and a deeper understanding of the Christian Revelation. Essays and reviews are invited for reading and consideration. Philosophy, Theology, and disquisitions relevant to the present intellectual and pastoral problems of the Church will be given priority. Literary and Historical studies, if of high quality and of current interest, will also be acceptable.

Articles exceeding 5,000 words in length cannot generally be published. But exceptions to this rule may be permitted if an article is of great interest.

As in the past, contributions will usually be accepted as given voluntarily unless a contract has been arranged. Every care will be taken with authors' manuscripts, but no responsibility can be accepted. Writers are strongly advised to retain a copy of every article submitted.

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EDITORIAL

A CHURCH IN ACTION

We commend to the close attention of the public an address, printed in this number, called "A Church in Action". The Bishop of Sheffield makes an accurate survey of some critical issues which confront the Church. These grave questions, both domestic and global, are not considered by many professing Christians, for whom religion is a way of escape from life rather than life itself. The masses "at present so dangerously out of touch with the churches" and the failure of churches "as staffed and operated" to impress the public are surely, for Christian adherents at least, an urgent crisis—tremendous in its implications. It is nothing short of "the failure of the Christian mission in Christendom". We see the form of a church, magnificent in conception, inspiring as a piece of history, famous for its thinkers, its devoted saints and scholars, beautiful in its monuments—many a pathetic witness to a greater past—but today little more than an enclave of old-fashioned piety surrounded by alien territory.

It is the Bishop's hope and prayer that we may see a change, a movement of clergy and laity comparable to the great religious reforms which brought the Franciscan and Dominican movements across Europe as a revitalizing force, "more fully identified with the life of the world than those religious orders could be, but fired by the same passion, love, courage, intelligence and power from on high". There is no time to lose, for the evil has gone far, and the rising tide of materialism, masked as it often is by scientific humanism, or even by forms of Christianity, is likely to carry all before it.

The Marxist creed, a religion now spreading even in Britain, has rejected Christianity as being "other-worldly". Marx and Engels failed to see that the essence of Christianity stems from an incarnation, and a criticism of life here and now. Marx thought that religion, as he knew it, was an opiate, a scheme to justify an unexamined life and an unjust social order. So it is in many homes. Marx was right up to a point. But the religion of Christ if genuinely held demands radical self-criticism, both individually, and socially.

It is much more searching than Marxism. But in a society in which Christianity has failed to retain among the masses of the population the active sincerity of a living creed there is an imminent probability that the teaching of Marx, a prophetic message disguised as economics, will take its place. Those who are impatient will turn to Communism. In a measure they will be excused, if they are told no more in defence of Christianity than we are offered today.

Dr. Hunter considers that the next thirty years will be decisive. "But if at the end of that time the Church has not woken up to its opportunity, God help England!"

These are solemn words. They would be confirmed by disinterested observers. But we fear it is more usual to hear complacent pronouncements than any recognition of the disturbing truth, that the Christian community is faced with a baffling problem, to resolve which only a group of able leaders, equipped with the highest qualities of heart and head, would suffice. Such men may be discoverable among clergy and laity, but it would be a difficult task to organise them. There is no other solution.

We have been recently told that the defence of the free world against Marxism involves a global strategy. It involves more: a message. A challenge requires an adequate answer. That challenge is essentially a philosophy—materialism. There is much else, but the denial of God lies at the root of the movement. Our world strategy must be based on a religion, understood and defended with conviction.

What, then, should be done in a situation which is really critical? Many sides of Church life must be developed. But one thing stands out. It is the issue of intellectual leadership. A deeply-felt and sincere conviction of the truth of the Christian revelation has in all past ages, and in the early centuries especially, placed Christian thinkers in the vanguard of intellectual progress.

We have lost the initiative and some correspondents of this editor write in bitter terms. A philosopher and teacher at a great university has referred to the purely "Biblical" attitude of some of our ablest teachers of theology. "It looks as if they were turning their backs on the problems which Christian thinkers ought to be considering." Many laymen would agree. They note—what a correspondent from Canada has noted—that "whilst we are lowering our intellectual standards to a large extent, almost every other branch of intellectual discipline has raised its requirements. This does not reflect very creditably upon the vision and wisdom of contemporary Anglicanism."

What these experienced observers in widely separated universities have said comes, also, from the Editor of Crockford. In the 1953 *Preface* he commented frankly on the fact that "not nearly enough of the Church's wealth of theological learning had much relevance to the nature of the modern challenge to all religious belief . . . far too much modern theology has little if anything to do with any question of *truth* in religious belief." That sums the position up.

We are living in a scientific age. There are Christian scholars—one thinks of names like Coulson, Price and Thouless—who have defended Christianity in the thought-forms of modern speculative inquiry. Their work, so essential, should receive more ecclesiastical attention. In them, alone, we see some hope for the Church. For although the intellect, unaided, will never lead to conversion, it is certain that the mind of man must be convinced before there will be any of that "passion, love, courage, intelligence and power from on high."

NOTES

THE EARLY CHURCH

Two important works have appeared which will become indispensable to serious students of the Apostolic and Patristic ages. *History of New Testament Times* by R. H. Pfeiffer[1] is a monumental work which will illuminate many aspects of the early development of the Christian Religion. No less important is *The Pattern of Christian Truth* (Bampton Lectures for 1954) by H. E. W. Turner[2]. The early formative processes of Christian thought are not only of great historical interest. They are very relevant to the scholar whose vocation it may be in our own day to defend the Christian Faith and propagate its truths. Indeed it may be doubted whether the Christian religion can ever be properly understood without a far better knowledge of the outlook and thought of the Graeco-Roman world than we usually meet in Churchmen today. Current tasks are not so alien to the thought of the early centuries as the uninstructed may be apt to suppose.

The unparalleled events in the Roman Empire which revolutionised life in the first century were accompanied by many of the customary marks of a religious and philosophical upheaval. In an age of great literary and intellectual activity wide conflict of opinion affected the lives of both commoner and patrician. Strange cults followed the army and the merchants into the great cities, and Christianity itself was gradually brought to an orthodox form in bitter controversy with schools of thought which came to be held heretical. A more general attention to the religious and philosophical phenomena of the first four centuries of our era would be salutary. There was so much in the history of the Graeco-Roman world which carries a lesson for the present time. Then, as today, we discern a society without a creed, full of superstition, a varied assembly of *déracinés* gathered from all parts of the Mediterranean and its adjacent countries, seeking a way of life and susceptible to every fresh doctrine.

In Professor Turner's monograph the reader is taken through the intricate pattern of Christian interpretation eventually crystallising in an orthodox creed. The growth of an orthodox theology came about in a long time through the mutual assimilation of diverse traditions and " the working out by the whole Church of the implications of her common subject-matter ". We form a conception of an extraordinary process, of great complexity, moulded by unique spiritual phenomena.

Although many Christians condemned the wisdom of this world, it is evident that philosophy could not be ignored, and in controversy with heretical teachers the Fathers expounded the Faith in terms of, and by methods of, current thinking. The educated gentleman in the age of the Antonines gave more of his thoughts to philosophical issues than has ever been customary here. And his outlook influenced Christian apologetic. The Fathers did not turn their backs on the absorbing process of current intellectual advance as many religious writers have done today to the great impoverishment of the Christian Church. To-day with the widespread and progressive advance of logical and metaphysical study, accompanied by amazing discoveries in physical theory, every intellectual discipline is changed. Theology alone remains mute.

The ordinary thinking man is puzzled. He sees a number of religious publishing houses continually putting forth literature of indifferent value on many subjects of historical, archaeological, or philological interest—usually of very secondary value. Such matter appeals to an inner circle. Christianity today deserves and might have better exposition than it ever receives. We decorate the superstructure and cornice of the building when it is the foundations that need underpinning.

[1] A. & C. Black.

[2] Mowbrays.

THE NEW TESTAMENT TIMES

It has been observed that in the study of religion we cannot attach too much importance to the outlook of the student. In the investigation of the origins of Christianity common sense requires a thorough examination of the beliefs, aspirations, language and culture of the Graeco-Roman world, especially in the Eastern provinces. Students without this knowledge are not likely to be very successful.

We are well provided with authorities. The time is past when Classical scholars confined their interests to the great age of the fourth and fifth centuries in Greek history—wonderful as those times were. We cannot pay too much respect and study to Plato, Thucydides, and the others, poets, scientists and philosophers of the classical period—the hey-day of Attic brilliance. But we are now beginning to know more about the fruitful cultures, Roman, Greek, Alexandrine, Arabic and others to whom the spread of the imperishable Greek language brought a knowledge of Greek thought.

The *Koine*, a language deserving respect (as Professor Moule is teaching us) became an important ambassador of culture throughout a wide area, including Palestine and the many centres of the Jewish dispersion. The Apostles used it and their hearers understood it. In consequence the ideas and terminology stemmed in no small measure from that great tradition of Greek philosophy, which not only affected current beliefs, but continued to mould the thought of the West, through Arabic influences, through Rome, Byzantium and through Renaissance culture even down to this day.

Translation is an endless and baffling task. To interpret the Gospel to this present age a knowledge of the background is vitally important. For this reason we have recommended *History of New Testament*

Times by R. H. Pfeiffer (A. & C. Black), an encyclopaedic study which will be found invaluable by both clergy and laity. The author is Professor of Hebrew at Harvard and of Semitic Languages at Boston University.

In his erudite account of Hellenism and of its effect upon later Judaism Pfeiffer throws valuable light upon the growth of Christianity. " Just as the gospel of Jesus had to be transplanted by Paul to the great centres of the Roman world before it became one of the pillars of modern civilisation, so the spread of Greek culture through the conquests of Alexander made of Hellenism the other pillar of our civilisation ". Both the gospel and the profundity and perfection of Greek literature passed through Rome before we received them. The universalism of Christianity must have been an idea which owed much to the Greek thought of the Stoics and the writers of the Alexandrian epoch.

CURRENT TOPICS

The Age of the Universe

In May 1953 the *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* offered a Prize for the best essay on " What is the logical and scientific status of the concept of the temporal origin and age of the Universe ". We suppose many, like the present writer, have thought about this subject when they were sitting in church, listening to the first Lesson proper for Septuagesima Sunday. What seems strange now is the indifference to such an enigma as the beginning of Time. It has been left to a group of scientists to draw wide attention to a matter which, one supposed, would engage the reflection of many.

The ancients were not so unimaginative on these basic questions. The Ionian Greeks speculated about cosmology, but without, we suppose, the aid of experimental science. But they were anticipated in Babylon and Egypt and from such sources came the cosmology of the Bible.

Any empirical calculation of the age of the known universe is interesting, but it presupposes a metaphysical theory about the meaning of " time " and of " universe ". This subject occupied both Plato and Augustine, but they were obliged to fall back on myth. Time said Plato is the moving image of Eternity. We cannot, said Augustine, conceive the universe without time.

The writers of the recent symposium consent to the view that the known universe probably goes back 4,000 million years. They make use of data gained from radio-active minerals, and from the history of the stars. But what is the metaphysical status of such calculations ?

A Philosopher of Spirit

" Give me matter and motion, and I will make the World ". The father of modern philosophy came before Bishop Berkeley. He had inherited the idea of matter from the Schoolmen. His erroneous assumption of the existence of an *indefinable* substrate, the basis of all physical experience, was challenged by Berkeley successfully. It will not stand. But the common man who has not thought about such questions is still a typical materialist, and a good deal of the more ordinary scientific and psychological writing is clouded with materialistic assumptions. Materialism has triumphed not only in those wide parts of the globe where a philosophical materialism has become a religious and political creed. This great error, and others which are deduced from it may be found constantly in the Press and in fashionable writers and preachers who have never read Berkeley.

It is regrettable that so many of us, charged as we are, with the responsibility of establishing a Christian mode of thought, and surrounded by an alien culture the devotees of which render at best nothing more than lip-service to religion, fail to see the importance of refuting materialism and the incalculable value of Berkeley's writings, couched as they are in elegant and pellucid English prose—prose which more than one critic has justly compared with the dialogues of Plato.

And yet materialism has never lacked weighty refutation in our literature. And only recently we have been granted a magnificent edition of the works of Bishop Berkeley whose genius gave us an enduring philosophy of *Immaterialism* so many years ago. In the fine Bibliographica Britannica Philosophica (Nelson) several volumes of the Works have now appeared under the able editorship of Professors A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop.

Berkeley's powerful intelligence was addressed to the leading philosophical question of his day, the problem of perception. But the bearing of his inquiry upon the position of Christianity was never far from his mind. The traditional doctrine of matter was incompatible with true religion and had become a mounting instrument of error and unbelief. Berkeley's clear and forceful writings furnish an admirable defence of the basic truth of Christianity. As Professor Luce, Berkeley Professor at Trinity College, Dublin, declares in his interesststing *Sense without Matter*: " If Berkeley is right, the materialist way of thought collapses, and with it, sooner or later, the materialist way of life ". Matter or Spirit—here is the conflict which today dwarfs all other problems. It is difficult to see how a much canvassed revival of Church life can ever be possible in a society which appears indifferent to materialism, and materialistic habits of thought. Matter is the enemy.

Marx

A work on Marx entitled *Marxism an Interpretation*, by Mr. A. C. MacIntyre is notable. This author, unlike many, does penetrate to the root of the matter, and uncovers clearly the relation between Christianity and the heresy—at once a philosophy and a religion—which stems from a Christian tradition.

The writer—who is a lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion—knows what he is writing about. " Only a religion which is a way of living in every sphere either deserves to or can hope to survive." A division of sacred and secular—so dear to the superstitious—is to recognise God's action " only within the narrowest limits ". " A religion which recognises such a division, as does our own, is one on the point of dying ".

These are not new sentiments. They were laid down, for instance, in 1846 by the Tractarian founders of the *Guardian*, and they also clearly regulated the outlook of the early editors of this Quarterly. (Some later editors, however, tended to make the *Guardian* " a house journal " which " recognised God's action only within the narrowest limits " and that led to its eclipse.) In our present journal we are trying to see the secular world (so-called) *sub specie aeternitatis*. Marxism has developed secularism further. " For only Marxism "—says MacIntyre—envisages the whole of life in terms that explicitly deny the God-given character of the world.

There is much in MacIntyre's book which illuminates the history of modern thought—Hegel, Christianity, Positivism and other topics. These *obiter dicta* might profitably be discussed, did space allow. Referring to Marxism as theory and as practice he says that the religious virtues and the religious vices alike found their home with the Marxists " and the lesson here is surely that it is only those who have seen these virtues and vices in their true contemporary, that is, Marxist form, who know the greatness that the gospel preaches, the degradation of the Pharisee whom it denounces ".

Mau Mau

Mr. L. S. B. Leakey was known as a competent student of Kikuyu customs and history in days when the recent Mau Mau movement had not been known. He has written since the outbreak two books which will be very useful to anyone who is conscious of his own responsibility in regard to African development. There is in Mau Mau something which can be considered as peculiar to the conditions in Kenya. But there is also much more which any lifelong student of African affairs as they have developed in contact with European influences will recognise as usual and inevitable. What we all chiefly need is more knowledge and insight. Nothing is more shocking and disheartening than the ignorance which in the past one found high colonial officers betraying now and again on the subject of native thought and aspirations. The present writer speaks from experience. One of the consequences of this crass ignorance on the very subjects which matter most in successful administration has been the general surprise and astonishment expressed by colonial governments whenever a grave disturbance occurs in territory under their jurisdiction. In the case of Mau Mau it is well known that some officials in Kenya knew nothing of the state of ferment which actually prevailed in sections of the African community. Where a colony happens to have a large population of white settlers the general habit of illusory complacency about the mind and outlook of the African is greatly strengthened. Self-interest prevails.

Dr. Leakey is at pains to show the inner meaning of Mau Mau. The movement has assimilated many ideas and practices which will have been already hallowed by religious associations. Some features, such as hymn-singing are derived from Christian sources. Others belong to the age-long religious beliefs which have sustained the morale of tribal life from time immemorial.

The most effective practice in the promotion of an African political movement such as Mau Mau is *initiation*. In most tribes throughout the wide African continent it is the law that juveniles should be initiated into what is regarded as a new life, the initiation being conducted by respected officers of the tribe to the accompaniment of very solemn rites. Dr. Leakey describes the ceremony of Mau Mau initiation which, of course, is really a travesty of customs normally and universally performed without any criminal purpose, and bearing the most solemn associations. Similar initiation rites, the significance of which for the stability and sanity of tribal society cannot be exaggerated, are found everywhere and, in spite of native secrecy, accurate descriptions have found their way into anthropological works.

When a new society is formed for purposes which are subversive or political, it invariably happens that the traditional ceremonies of initiation are perverted and adapted to the aims of the new movement with striking consequences. This has been long familiar in some of the lyncanthropic cults of West Africa.

Everything tends to show that here, as elsewhere, the gravest problems of human welfare are connected with religion. In Africa the number of sincere converts is negligible. In spite of the immense funds expended by the missionary societies the results are very disappointing. Dr. Leakey alludes briefly to some of the problems of Christianity. His views on this difficult question must be reserved for future discussion.

The writer of this note—speaking with many years' experience of native administration—hopes that Dr. Leakey's books will be studied. All our worst errors in Africa—and they make sorry reading—are due to ignorance of elementary facts about local conditions. Those facts should be made available by men on the spot, administrators and missionaries, but unfortunately men of either class seldom know the truth. They think differently from the natives, speak an alien tongue, eat an alien diet and live an alien life.

Hence the waste of £30 million by a Labour Government on the Tanganyika project for growing ground-nuts from an infertile soil in an uninhabited country. This scheme hailed as a piece of inspiration by an ignorant Press and not frowned upon by the Church ended in ignominy. (From its inception it had been attacked in the *Guardian*.) The money might have been better expended on African social research.

Spiritual Health

What is health? None of us yet knows. But the new St. Raphael Quarterly is mobilising a lot of dormant reflection on this subject. In the August and November numbers of the new series — obtainable from the Guild's Secretary, at 33 Wilton Place, S.W.1.—we can advise our readers to study two articles on the subject of health and the Christian Faith. They come from Professor R. K. Harrison, of Huron

College, Canada, who has the advantage—uncommon on this side of the Atlantic—of combining theological and medical insights. We are allowed by the courtesy of the Quarterly to quote the Editor's synopsis of the subject of Professor Harrison's two articles. It runs:

> In our last issue Professor Harrison—who adds medical science to his theological qualifications—proved that health is something more than the absence of pathological symptoms. "It is a proper adjustment of the whole individual to his environment and his Maker." Yet in many cases the real nature of the disease passes unnoticed amidst the welter of symptoms exhibited. He asked for an *intelligent* application of spiritual therapy. He demonstrated that psychosomatic medicine is an effort to approach the patient from a standpoint which has much in common with the Christian doctrine of man.
>
> In the present number Professor Harrison completes his thesis by examining in greater detail the way in which emotional tension, taking the form of fear, anger, anxiety usually results in physical and mental ailments. A mature emotional life is a priceless possession as a safeguard against disease. This cannot be too clearly stated. And for the edification of our readers (in order that they also may hope to acquire emotional maturity) we publish this essay. In this number our contributor shows that emotional maturity is never a happy accident of nature. It is rather "the product of a number of factors which integrate the personality and root it in time (i.e. environment) and eternity." The most important of such factors is the wish to "do justice, love mercy and walk humbly with his God." Our contributor declares that the best possible form of psychotherapy for a harassed world is that of a deep personal spiritual experience of conversion and sanctification by the power of Christ.

The content of this new series of the St. Raphael journal represents a definite advance in the study of those questions about which Harley Street and the Church are almost equally concerned.

Convocation of Canterbury

OCTOBER SESSIONS 1954

THE proceedings at this Group of Sessions were somewhat stultified by the fact that the Report of the Joint Committee on " Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Communion " (Report No. 680), which should have formed the main subject of discussion in both Houses, was, owing to various circumstances, only circulated four or five days before the Sessions opened. The Report itself, a short formal document and set of Resolutions, was accompanied by a lengthy " Schedule " entitled " Baptism and Confirmation To-day " produced by the Canterbury Joint Committee in collaboration with the York Joint Committee. Three Lower House members of the Canterbury Joint Committee, however, felt unable to agree to either the Majority Report or the Majority Schedule, and submitted both a Minority Report and a Minority Schedule. The Majority Report, Resolutions and Schedule were introduced in Full Synod by the Chairman of the Canterbury Joint Committee, the Bishop of Hereford, seconded by Canon F. C. Tindall, who has been secretary of the successive committees on Baptism and Confirmation since 1937. This Report represented the completion of the labours of these successive committees, though the present committee makes no claim that it in any way exhausts the subject, or represents a full consideration of every aspect. The Minority Report and Schedule were presented to the Full Synod by the Rev. Dr. T. G. Jalland, who pointed out that the divergence between the minority members and the rest of the committee was a matter of fundamental theology and particularly concerned the conflict between the view that the Holy Spirit is conferred at Baptism and the view that the Holy Spirit is conferred primarily at Confirmation. The majority of the committee accepted the former view, defended by Professor Lampe and Oliver Quick, while the minority adopted the latter view put forward by A. J. Mason and Gregory Dix. This theological difference naturally led to a difference of view on practical questions, and the minority desired a more stringent practice in regard to Baptism than the majority.

These three opening speeches were followed by a general discussion in Full Synod. It is the first time that such a general discussion has been permitted in Canterbury Convocation, and this new procedure was adopted by agreement between His Grace the President and the Standing Committee of the Lower House as the result of a Motion passed by both Houses at the last Group of Sessions. In the course of this general discussion the Dean of Winchester and the Bishop of Exeter pleaded that further consideration of the Reports and Schedules should be deferred to the next Group of Sessions, so that members might have time fully to study the documents. After one or two other speakers had intervened, including another signatory of the Minority Report, the Rev. J. D. C. Fisher, the President closed the Debate and referred the Reports and Schedules to the Upper House.

Before this Report was discussed His Grace the President had delivered his presidential address, in which he had referred to the Anglican Congress at Minnesota and the second Assembly of the World Council of Churches at Evanston. Having testified to the value of both these Assemblies, he explained the reasons which led the Assembly of the World Council of Churches to decide that the six former presidents of the World Council of Churches, of whom the Archbishop of Canterbury was one, should not be eligible for re-election for a second term of office immediately after the first. He made it clear that, nevertheless, he remained, as a member of the Central Committee, as closely concerned in the affairs of the Council as before.

His Grace then surveyed recent happenings in the secular world and pointed out that the settlement with Egypt, the success of the London Conference, the settlement over Trieste and other events indicated some real lessening of tensions, and said that "it is a grief beyond measure to us that just at this moment, when in many ways tensions are relaxing, all the portents in South Africa point to a relentless pursuit of a policy towards the native population there, which is regarded by almost all Christian opinion, outside the Dutch Reformed Church, as anti-Christian in principle and bound, in the long run, to be catastrophic in its affects". He also spoke of the consequences for the Church of the bringing of native education in South Africa under the Minister of Native Affairs and the strict limitation of it to what the Government thinks good for the Africans, together with the expropriation of the natives from their property in the Western Lands, and the limitation of the tenancy of church property to a year at a time, subject to cancellation "if, *in the opinion of the Government,* the activities of the church are such as to encourage or tend to encourage deterioration in the relationships between the natives and the Government". "That", said His Grace, "is totalitarianism, and differs not at all from the suppressions of civic freedom and church life in Communist countries". His Grace then expressed his conviction that the Church itself is going forward with renewed devotion and enthusiasm, held back only by the shortage of men suited for ordination to the Ministry.

The third matter discussed in the Full Synod was a Report on "Relations with the Church of Sweden", prepared by a committee appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury at the request of Canterbury Convocation. This Report, which set forth the history and present position of relations between the Church of England and the Church of Sweden, was presented by the Chairman of the Committee, the Bishop of Chichester. After speeches by the Master of Selwyn (Canon Telfer) and the Dean of Chichester, this Report was referred to the Upper House.

The Upper House began its business by considering this Report on the Church of Sweden, and finally passed a resolution that, in view of the very full consideration given to these relations, "this Convocation, without a new consideration, formally agrees: (i) That members of the Church of Sweden, qualified to receive the Sacraments in their own church, should be admitted to Holy Communion in ours; and (ii) that on suitable occasions permission should be given to Swedish ecclesiastics to give addresses in churches of the Church of England". This Resolution was subsequently considered in the Lower House and carried.

The Report on "Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Communion" was considered in the Upper House and the publication of the Minority Schedule "in a form allowed by His Grace the President" was approved. It was then agreed that further debate on the Report be adjourned to the next Group of Sessions.

In the Lower House, the Rev. H. Riley proposed: "That His Grace the President be invited to appoint, if possible in conjunction with His Grace the President of the Convocation of York, a Standing Liturgical Commission". This was carried unanimously in the Lower, and later in the Upper, House. His Grace the President expressed strong support for this proposal, and said that there would be no lack of work for such a Commission to do in considering liturgical reform and new forms of Service in the future.

The President put forward a suggestion in regard to a further modification of the Procedure of the Convocation, which he had discussed with the Standing Committee of the Lower House. As a result a Resolution was passed by both Houses welcoming "the proposal that on each day of a Group of Sessions, on which both Houses are sitting, the business should begin in Full Synod, when prayers should be said with the two Houses sitting together", and asking His Grace the President to put this proposal into operation in consultation with the Prolocutor. This daily joint opening in Full Synod, together with the modification already introduced at this Group of Sessions whereby a general discussion of any matter can take place in full Synod before it is referred to the two Houses separately, represents a considerable progress towards the carrying out of more business in Full Synod in Canterbury Convocation, following the practice already existing in York Convocation. It is generally considered that such changes will greatly improve the efficiency of the conduct of business in Canterbury Convocation.

In the Upper House the President referred to a debate which took place in the Lower House at the last Group of Sessions on the desirability of allowing the Celebrant to adopt the Westwood position at the Celebration of the Holy Communion, i.e. celebrating across the Altar, facing the people. After the matter had been discussed by the Upper House a statement on the subject was agreed and sent down to the Lower House; this in general considered that, while in certain cases such permission might be given, it should be regarded at present as exceptional and experimental.

In the Lower House the Archdeacon of Taunton submitted two parallel Gravamina, one asking that efforts should be made to ensure that the date of Empire Youth Sunday should be so arranged that this Sunday would not fall within the octave of Ascension Day, and the second asking that such steps should be taken by the Upper House as they consider wise to try to have the date of Remembrance Sunday fixed so that it should not fall within the octave of All Saints. Both these Gravamina were adopted as " Articuli Cleri " by the Lower House, and the Upper House will consider them at the next Group of Sessions.

The other business transacted in both Houses concerned the revision of the Canons Ecclesiastical, and consisted in the passing of a number of small detailed amendments recommended by the Canon Law Steering Committee to Canons already considered. Some of these were designed to meet suggestions made by the House of Laity and others to produce verbal agreement between the two Convocations. The most important of these concerned Canons 21 and 91. In Canon 21 a new Clause 2 was inserted, after some discussion, in the Upper House, that every Minister " as often as he shall celebrate the Holy Communion shall receive that Sacrament himself ": this was accepted by the Lower House without opposition. A new Clause 3, that " No person shall distribute the Holy Sacrament of the Lord's Supper to the people unless he shall have been ordained in accordance with the provisions of Canon 52, save that for urgent reasons the Bishop may authorize a Reader to assist in the distribution; such authorisation being given for a particular occasion or a limited period only ", although passed by the Upper House was only accepted by the Lower House after considerable discussion. In Canon 91 the new wording of Clause 2c, including among the duties of Readers " if specially authorised so to do by the Bishop of the Diocese, in accordance with Canon 21, Clause 3, to assist in the administration of the Holy Communion ", was rejected by the Lower House.

A. F. SMETHURST.

FROM THE CLASSICS

Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind, that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, to wit, that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit.

—Berkeley. PRINCIPLES, Sect. 6.

CREATION

A Dialogue of Elucidation between D. M. MacKinnon, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen, and A. G. N. Flew, Professor of Philosophy in the University College of North Staffordshire.*

A.F. "*In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was waste and void; and darkness was on the face of the waters. And God said, Let there be light: and there was light. And God saw that it was good; and God divided the light from the darkness. And God called the light Day and the darkness he called Night. And there was evening and there was morning, one day*".

And so it goes on: through the seven days of creation: one of the most majestic visions in all literature. I think we might begin from this picture. The first thing I want to suggest is that neither you, who are a Christian, nor I, who am not, hold that this tremendous story is literally true.

D.M. No, I wouldn't want for one moment to treat the narrative as literal: it's not that sort of thing at all. Only of course the order of the work of God is interesting, once you learn to take the word "day" with more than one grain of salt. In the Bible time-words like "hour" and "day" have varied and elastic uses. Even schoolboys see there is a difference between the day of the Lord and founder's day or parents' day or what day have you. Even someone reading St. John's Gospel for the first time realizes that when Christ speaks of his hour, he means something more than the mere revolutions of the clock.

A.F. This isn't just a peculiarity of the Bible either, for—perhaps ultimately owing to the influence of the Bible—we all talk of, say, the things that happened in grandfather's day: regardless of the fact that he had a great many days.

D.M. Yes, but to go on, you know as well as I do that a great deal of critical work has been done on the book of *Genesis* which has turned up all sorts of similarities between the creation myth of

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Genesis and, say, the Babylonian cycles. For instance, the tradition which sees Marduk subduing Ti-amat the Dragon of the Great Deep is said to be a kind of parallel to the breathing of God on the face of the water in *Genesis.* Even that it is the same thing said in other words. To argue out these issues would take a long time, but what I want to suggest is that if you take the *Genesis* narrative, together with the whole tradition of Israel of which the Old Testament is the classical expression, you find that for all the impact of Babylon on the Jewish people, finally they saw their creator God differently. They did not think metaphysically, but the absolute lordship of their God Jahweh over the world and, I would say, his authorship of *all* that was: these were axioms of their thought and judgement. And it is in the light of this that we should interpret the language of *Genesis.* As, in effect, asserting *creatio de nihilo,* creation from nothing.

A.F. Yes, indeed. But before moving on to that I think there are two points—on which I'm sure we agree—to be got out of the way. First: I'd like to emphasize how *different* the *Genesis* story is from any of those of its opposite numbers in other traditions which I myself have ever come across. Second: this notion of myth. Some tales which are not literally true are not what I want to call myths—but not all. (There are also, for instance, legends and works of fiction as well as myths.) A myth as I want to use the word in a more restricted sense than those of the dictionaries, may have point, and contain a great deal of truth. This is the case with the stories of the Social Contract in all their various versions. Social Contract theorists have been saying things about the *present* obligations of States and citizens, or about their present interests: but saying them in the mythological form of a story about a *past* contract: a contract having such and such terms and sanctions and supposedly made long ago by the remote ancestors of our present citizens. Some of these theorists have been unsophisticated, believing in the historical truth of their stories—for instance, Locke.

D.M. Yes, though Locke had the excuse that some things like social contracts were actually being made in America in his century.

A.F. Quite: and we know he had his eyes on American developments. But there were others—Rousseau and Hobbes, for example—who were the very reverse of unsophisticated about their use of myth. These recognized their stories as useful fictions. But all said things which matter—which could be said (though less interestingly) in a literal way—in the form of this myth of the Social Contract.[1] A story may be a myth: but not every myth is a *mere* myth. Now can we locate a literal core in the creation story in *Genesis*: what are the literal propositions which anyone who was to accept it, but as myth, would have to commit himself to ?

D.M. I must admit that I am very conscious of the critical problems *Genesis* raises. But I say quite confidently that if you take the *Genesis* narratives in relation to the Old Testament as a whole, what the Creation doctrine suggests is something like this: God is the author of the world: of all things. The Nicene creed speaks of things visible and invisible; what we see and what we don't see: whether by that we mean the laws of nature that we frame, or the vastness of universes unperceived and unsuspected. " All " is a little word, but here we try to measure up to what it speaks. " Nothing but by God ". Nothing: this has to be taken seriously: there is no suggestion of a stuff existent alongside God out of which he fashioned the world as a modeller may mould his clay to bear the impress which he wants. All absolutely come into being by God's will.

A.F. Just so: and this is one of the peculiar, perhaps unique features of the *Genesis* account, as against its opposite numbers.

D.M. Then when any sort of dualism has thus been ruled out. this " Nothing but by God " is further picked out by insisting on an absolute dependence. That's a difficult enough phrase. Archbishop Temple tried to interpret it by saying: God minus the world equals God; whereas the world minus God equals nothing at all. You might put it in another way by saying that the universe exists not of itself but only in relation to another whose existence is in himself.

A.F. Besides this insistence on absolute dependence and this rejection of any sort of dualistic account of the universe, there must surely be moral suggestions too. I think of Emil Brunner's statement that in recognizing God as " My creator and the creator of all things I become aware that I am . . . his servant, his property, because all that I am and have I have from him, because not only I but all that is has been created by him ". This insistence that this is God's world surely suggests that we should behave, as it were, as guests and borrowers: not as owners who have a right to do what they like with their own.

[1] See J. D. Mabbott *The State and the Citizen.* (Hutchinson, 1948.)

D.M. Yes. Aquinas says that to hold creatures cheap is to slight divine power. Others to-day, like Michael Roberts, warn us of the possible consequences of wanton and uncontrolled squandering of natural resources: finding in such improvidence a kind of irreverent disrespect of the order of creation.

A.F. We have now three elements which are essential to any interpretation of *Genesis,* which is to be an interpretation and not a travesty. First: the insistence on absolute dependence; second: the rejection of any really fundamental dualism; and third: the suggestion of certain conduct and attitudes as appropriate. Surely there is a fourth (which many would treat as the prime point)—the assertion that the world had a beginning ?

D.M. This is crucial, both theologically and metaphysically. I must go very carefully here. Aquinas thought that only by revelation did man learn that the world had a beginning in time. That the world was contingent was evident to natural reason. But the fullness of the doctrine of creation belonged to the data of the theologian. Now I think that in popular thought what St. Thomas so carefully and indeed painfully distinguished has often been telescoped. For the moment I want to fasten on this word " beginning ". What do we mean by the beginning and indeed by the end of the world ? Or, to raise something even more difficult (of which St. Augustine spoke) of the beginning of time? I want to venture an opinion here. Even if, as St. Thomas did, we invoke revelation to justify our speaking of the beginning of the world, we must find it very difficult to understand what we are saying. It is tempting to seek a way out of this by turning to the speculation of empirical cosmologists: who claim to date the world's beginning as a geologist might claim to date a rock. Similarly, those who are too sophisticated to accept the predictions of soapbox preachers as to the date of the end, are happy to use the second law of thermodynamics to establish the hour when the trump of doom shall sound.

A.F. Perhaps it would help to define two senses of the word " creation ". In the first, the popular, sense questions about whether the world was or was not created are questions to which the latest news from the science front is relevant. Because if the world was eternal and had no beginning; then there would be no room for creation, in this sense. In the second, the theological, sense, questions about creation are questions about an absolute ontological dependence to which particular scientific discoveries are simply irrelevant. This distinction is important: but difficult, because almost everyone — including St. Thomas — who has believed in creation in the second sense has also believed that the world had a beginning, and that it was in the first sense, also, created.

D.M. Yes, I think that one is always conscious in reading Aquinas here that he lived in an age before the distinction between the domain of the scientist and that of the metaphysician had been drawn. We live in a more sophisticated age. However, I think that a Thomist would say that there was a kind of fundamental understanding of one's creaturely lot that was independent of the movement of empirical discovery.

A.F. Creaturely ?

D.M. It is a matter of having a sense of being a created being. What I want to do is to get to grips with the meaning of this kind of language. Language whereby we, so to speak, take up the posture proper to us, indicate the sort of beings we are. *Either* we must use in these contexts words borrowed from the familiar transactions of experience, *or* we must say nothing at all. There is no escaping here the problem of giving some sense to talk of the creation of the temporal world by the eternal God. This is going to involve us in what I can only call a labyrinthine process of intellectual twisting and turning.

A.F. Am I right that it was from the moment that you used the word " creaturely " that we began to discuss creation in what I called the theological sense of the word ?

D.M. Even before that. I only mentioned St. Thomas's distinction between creation and contingency because I didn't want to have the discussion go off on to our old friends the cosmological argument. After all, the Epistle to the Hebrews says that it is by *faith* we know that the heavens were formed by the word of God. Certainly in the New Testament there is very much on creation that averts altogether from metaphysics.

A.F. And from science too.

D.M. Yes. It belongs rather to an imaginative vision of the world. It sees its every process as well as its history converging on a single centre which is at the same time their ground and origin. I say *imaginative* deliberately: for writing in the New Testament is poetry rather than prose. Yet for all that—to take up a much earlier point—the vision was offered to exclude, shall I say, nightmares. Fears, for instance, that human life was at the mercy of malignant forces which were not themselves subject to any control. The Gospel of creation as St. Paul, for example, in his later Epistles presents it, is a vision: but a vision that effectively took from men their fear of malignant powers.

A.F. Well: let me see if I have understood you. Is the idea that what we have is not a theory about cosmology—not a sort of Hebrew Fred Hoyle—but a picture ?

D.M. Certainly not a Hebrew Hoyle; no.

A.F. Yet a picture the use of which excludes certain nightmares about the nature of the universe. That the heavens were created by the word of God is not a piece of literal theory. Nevertheless the acceptance of this picture, on the one hand, excludes certain sorts of theory about what literally does go on; and, on the other hand, clears the way for other different sorts of theory about what literally does go on.

D.M. Yes ! that is right. Of course the issues with which Paul was concerned were religious issues, or put in religious terms: issues, that is, about man and God, the conduct of life, and of course about human destiny. But some people to-day would argue that the outcome of this religious struggle was not without importance for the development of modern science. I don't mean that there were any scientific issues involved: but, by clearing away all sorts of false and frightening views of the way the universe worked, Paul helped later generations to explore its secrets without fear of malign forces. And with confidence of success too; for its processes were no longer regarded as governed by their caprice.

A.F. Yes. Now I am sure that people like Michael Foster in his articles[1] and the late Professor Collingwood[2] in his books, who have said at length the sort of thing which you are suggesting, have been on to something of the very greatest importance: (Though I, for one, have found their way of presenting assertions about the theological and other presuppositions of science both apparently and arbitrary and mysterious.) Yet I myself feel also fairly sure that it is wrong to speak of the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature and of the Law of Causality—principles and laws which curiously find no place in science text-books—as the fundamental *presuppositions* or *assumptions* of science: as if all the work already done and fully confirmed in one field would collapse on to its undermined foundations if we found that in another field disorder reigned, and our present concept of, say, *cause* could not there be applied.[1]

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[1] See, for instance, *The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modern Natural Science* in *Mind* 1934.

[2] E.g. *Metaphysics* (O.U.P., 1940).

D.M. I confess I'm always on edge when the Law of Causality in capital letters is mentioned. Moreover this expression " Principle of Causality " slurs over a great many distinctions that should be drawn.

A.F. Yes this expression " Principle of Causality " seems too often—like certain others in philosophy—to be taken as the name of a solution when it is only the label of a problem. And the fact that these principles are so excessively difficult to formulate in words suggests that the word " presupposition " (which in spite of Collingwood suggests a *proposition* assumed) is in any case the wrong label. I think you gave us a clue when earlier you spoke of a *vision*. It seems to me that what is involved is something more like a *model*, an *image* or a *picture*. When Paul writes " In him were all things created in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and invisible, all things have been created through him and unto him": Paul was not, as we both agreed, to be taken as making a literal statement *à la* Hoyle; nor is he doing—rather lamely—scholastic metaphysics. He is offering us a *picture* in terms of which to think of the universe around us. And this picture encourages and justifies one sort of religious practice. And was, as you hinted, later to encourage the beginnings of scientific inquiry as we know it to-day.

D.M. Of course these struggles of Paul were about particular concrete superstitions; but the vision he evoked to deal with them proved remarkably fertile. You see, the gods and the devils had to be banished from the world if men were to begin to see its processes as capable of precise determination and description. If you thought that, for instance, the world had the sort of relation to God that a child may have to its parents: which is a view which Michael Foster finds deeply embedded in Plato's *Timaeus*—if you had this view (and if you had even a vague belief in God's existence) you might be reluctant to pry and probe into it. It's a paradox: but if there is anything in our argument here you could say that

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[1] *Vide* G. J. Warnock in *Logic and Language* (Second Series: Ed. A. Flew) and S. E. Tomlinson *The Philosophy of Science* (Hutchinson, 1953).

Christianity by encouraging men to think scientifically was digging its own grave. It thereby stimulated the rationalism which threatens to undermine its foundations.

A.F. This would make a parallel to Spengler's remark—which was directed only at the egalitarian ethical aspect of Christianity—that " Christian theology is the grandmother of Bolshevism ".

D.M. Quite: though I was not thinking of Stalin and Malenkov, but of the whole family of views loosely called scientific humanism. There is something in the attitude of Prometheus which the doctrine of Creation endorses and upholds. There are secrets which men are right to wrest from the multiplicity of phenomena, although, as we suggested earlier, there may be limits to the extent human interference can go without destructive consequences. After all, although in a profound sense men and women do not belong to, are not part of nature, yet they are themselves creatures whose lives are not in their own hands or of their own fashioning.

A.F. I can see how these are consequences of the acceptance of a certain picture of the world; and how people who do not accept that picture might not accept these. But where is our discussion going ?

D.M. Well, I plead that working out the consequences, even the historical consequences, of its acceptance may help us to see what the view is. A man might shy at the idea of broaching the doctrine of creation out of nothing, directly. Nevertheless he might be inclined to take seriously the intellectual differences between men who accepted it and man who accepted some other view.

A.F. Yes, I can see that. In the field of political thought, too, it seems to me that *one way* to see the implications of what Rousseau is saying is to study the political behaviour of his intellectual children and grandchildren. This may help to bring out that his ideas *do not* chime in with the toleration and civil liberty of liberal democracy, but rather with the nationalist statism of Mussolini's Italy and Kemal's Turkey.

D.M. And among those intellectual children of the believers in Creation I included some prodigal sons whose capital, inherited from their parents, is not yet exhausted.

A.F. A palpable hit, a very palpable hit.

D.M. But let's go back, shall we, to the doctrine itself? What have we unearthed about it? How is it to be understood? One thing has, I think, come out quite clearly. You can't talk about creation as the Deists did: that is, as the winding up of a cosmic watch by a cosmic watchmaker; who then sits back with his work done. To believe in creation is to see the world in a certain way: to have one's responses to its manifold being coloured in a certain style. That is part of the *content* of the doctrine, as Brunner well brings out.

A.F. Yes, the watchmaker-watch picture clashed, at more than one point actually, with their claims to believe in *creation*. But though seeing the world in a certain way may be *part* of the content of the doctrine, surely it can't be the *whole* of it. For surely any doctrine of creation worthy of the name must say *not merely* that for some reason this is the right picture to have of the world, *but also* that it is right mainly, if not entirely, because as a matter of fact there is a God, and his relations to the world can be best represented in this way.

D.M. Again, you are quite right. That brings us back to the question of the existence of God and the manner of his relation to the world. Actually, the recognition of God may be one with the acknowledgement of a Creator. That is, of one who stands to the world in that relationship. And what of that recognition? Or what of the language in which we make our confession of God's existence? What meaning can we attach to it?

A.F. Yes, I think that is crucial. For in any sophisticated theology God has to be conceived as a being beyond all finite human powers of understanding. (By the way, I do want to stress the word "*sophisticated*", which I do not here intend to have any emotional overtones favourable or otherwise. I want to stress it because it seems to me that many sophisticated people—especially among our professional philosopher colleagues—simply overlook the possibility of unsophisticated belief in something called God or in gods.) To return to the point, though: it does seem to me that if you are going to stress the enormous transcendence of God you are—to put it gently—in danger of undermining the possibility of saying anything intelligible about him. The theologian will find himself forever saying things about God by applying some analogy drawn from human experience. (For where else is a human being to get his vocabulary if not from this world we live in?) And then admitting that of course as God is transcendent, infinite, the ground of all being, and so on; this analogy breaks down in this and this respect. Again and again he is going—and I think necessarily so from the very nature of his project—to erode his promising analogy by qualifying it till there is nothing left. Till it has tacitly, or even explicitly, been admitted to break down not only in some but in all respects. His analogies are all going to suffer—if I may borrow a phrase I used in an earlier broadcast discussion—the death by a thousand qualifications[1].

D.M. Yes, writers on the " sovereign principle of analogy " insist that the thousand qualifications—the so-called " negative way " —precedes and preconditions the use of the so-called " way of eminence ". I suppose you could call the Negative Way a sort of putting to death. Penido, one of the modern masters of this doctrine calls it *épuration* (purging). Now, those who make play with the notion of analogy have much to teach us. They throw a lot of light on what I earlier called the labyrinthine windings of this sort of thinking. But the crux is their starting point. For their master, Aristotle, it was his scheme of categories of being—with Substance, Quality and Relation forming a kind of declining series pivoted on substance, *things*, for him, having being, *par excellence*. The schoolmen learnt vital lessons from him, but I don't think I misrepresent them entirely in saying that consciously or unconsciously they went for analogical thinking in a big way because they were theists; and analogical schemes helped them to work theism out. A theist isn't a dualist, as came out earlier; but he can't be a monist, either, for the *sovereign* lordship of God which Brunner so emphasizes is somehow necessary to him.

A.F. I'm sorry. But though I can see the enormous importance of thinking of the universe as somehow a unity and not, as you put it, as just—a—lot—of—things, I don't see *either* how thinking in this way gives independent authority to analogical thinking about God, *or* how this is going to provide a basis for meeting my difficulty about using analogies from the finite world to describe, what is (by definition) infinite: namely, God. The difficulty that what you say, as it were, out of one corner of your mouth, you necessarily deny out of the other.

D.M. You put it nicely. I suppose you see yourself really as a speech therapist trying to cure me of these oral contortions. But actually what I was saying just before, was that it may be that analogical language is the language the theist must speak, and its sole justification is that it is the only language he can use. Now, I agree it is an awfully difficult language to talk. Your jaws ache and your hearers accuse you of trying to have it both ways. Of using the familiar word but of referring to the ultimately unfamiliar thing. I think you've got me there. What am I to say ? I might say one or two things. That I am forced to enlarge the compass of my language to take in or to indicate what lies perhaps at the foundation of my experience. Or even—and this perhaps Paul and the New Testament writers did—because particular events in which they had been personally involved had commanded such an enlargement of their ordinary speech. I'd like to put a question to you: how are the horizons, the boundaries fixed ? That's what our discussion makes me ask you. (That's larger, I know, than the issue of creation).

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[1] The discussion in *University* on which this broadcast was based is shortly to be reprinted in a volume of essays in *Philosophical Theology* by the S.C.M. Press.

A.F. Yes, that seems to me a question as fair as it is fundamental. But we are at the parting of the ways: *either* we try to tackle this question *or* we get back to analogical thinking.

D.M. As you know, there was a lot of controversy among the schoolmen about analogy—the analogy of proper proportionality and the analogy of attribution. These are terrible terms, I know. I will give examples though of each. Geometry, I think, will do as an example of the latter, of the analogy of attribution. We all learnt Euclid's geometry at school, and in the history of the subject it came first. But now Riemann and Lobachevsky have devised new non-Euclidean Geometries. Why call them geometries ? Well, they stand in relation to Euclid, taken as the supposed standard of what geometry is. They borrow their name from this archetype. Now, when scholastics speak of God and creatures they think of God as Being *par excellence*, and creatures as being by his leave. God is the standard being. He sets the standard for existence. We don't come up to that standard, but in our little way we, too, *are*. With the analogy of perfect proportion it's different. There the line is: as A to B, so C to D. For instance, to get back to our subject, as God to world, so artist to his work. Now I must be dogmatic here, and I may be attracting scholastic thunderbolts to my brow. But it seems to me attribution is fundamental. For that gives you what you must take over into the latter—that is, the break in the line. What the schoolman calls *summum analogatum*. Which sets the analogical ball rolling, spinning down the scale of being. God isn't on a level with any of the others, for the infinite God isn't an artist: that is anthropomorphism. If I think of him on that image it is only after I have got hold of the break between his work and that of any other craftsman.

A.F. I begin to see now how the analogical statements can be made once one can get started. But my difficulty is to know how you can get started, how you know that there is the basic X, God, to which all the analogies are to be applied. How is it possible to say the sort of things you want to say, and particularly to say that God is, as it were, the standard of being ? Which was, as I understood you, the crucial move on which the development of the analogical thinking about God depends. And I must suppose that brings you back to the question you wanted to put to me: how are the boundaries of language to be found or fixed ?

D.M. We were discussing creation and we have gone on—as we must—to discussing the possibility of metaphysical and religious language. How does one know one has any right to speak of creation ? To frame the complex scheme of ideas it suggests. To articulate a language, the language which hails God the creator. How can one justify a chapter or a section of a chapter of language, the language of religion ? I suppose I can only answer, by what it makes possible, a view of the world that is fertile and illuminating, a posture for men under the sun that vindicates itself. Yes, and more. Shall I say the opening of doors on to the unseen? That is the difficulty, there in those last words, deliberately metaphysical as they are. Can forms of words help men to launch out, if I may quote Boethius, to launch out into the sea of being ? And what is such a launching ? I know I have failed in this particular matter of creation to do more than indicate some of the ways in which the language of religion works. I know I haven't given anyone who thinks its idiom improper grounds for changing his decision. But then what made the writers of the Epistles and the Gospels adventure into language as they did, and speak the mysteries of creation, was more perhaps the riddle of a life lived and a death died than any sort of arguments.

A.F. That seems to me climactic. Philosophers who study the jobs which different parts of (chapters of, if you like) language do are usually concerned with, and often prefer to concentrate on the chapters—and these are the majority—which they feel do not require serious justification. (To concentrate on these ensures a placid life.) Talk about tables and chairs—the usual equipment of our sparsely furnished philosophic studies—doesn't need justifying: because absolutely everyone uses and has to use this part of language; to say simple harmless, necessary, everyday things. Talk of a more theoretical and remote kind—the scientist's language of electrons, light rays, *gestalten*—isn't nowadays felt to require much defence: even though many of us are not scientists of any sort, and hence have little occasion to use it ourselves. Philosophers consider they have only to give an account of it, and to try to clear up the misconceptions which proliferate around it. Ethical language, perhaps, is rather more controversial. But still, on the whole, philosophers feel that if they can give an account of the jobs done by the moral words these will pretty well justify themselves as obviously necessary and proper jobs, essential to humans living together. And so on with most other elements in language. But religious talk, the religious chapter, is in a less secure position: it's a sort of appendix, an apocrypha in the book of language.

D.M. Now just why; surely not because it is merely different because *you* can't fit it into any of *your* permitted pigeon holes?

A.F. No, indeed. Not merely because it won't fit neatly into any of the other available categories. No, indeed; philosophy has seen too much of this "if-X-isn't-Y-or-Z-it-can't-be-allowed-to-be-X, but-must-be-junked-move." I think I can suggest two reasons—apart from my earlier argument about theological description being an attempt to say something with the vocabulary of the finite about something by definition infinite.

D.M. Sorry; I ought, you know, to have said something about the word "infinite", and now it's almost too late. But can I just say this? There's the mathematical "infinite" which Cantor and Co. discussed. There's the "infinite" of Newton: a sort of physical boundlessness. And there's the "infinity" of God. That means, I think, that he is not bounded or limited by anything outside himself, so the models we make of him need to be continually discarded: a sort of intellectual fulfilment of the commandment to have none other Gods before him. But in this riddle of Christ's life lived and Christ's death died we see through a glass darkly the infinite boundless love, love without condition, translated into terms of the finite and the bounded.

A.F. I agree entirely that this is the heart of the matter, and I will try to return here. But first I must give my two reasons for thinking that theological language has an insecure status. The *first* reason is that only some people find it necessary to use it. While others do not; perhaps positively rejecting it. The *second* reason is that theological talk seems so often not merely deceptively like, say, ethical or scientific talk: but as if it really was in some way failed science or fraudulent ethics. *Either* perhaps the result of a misguided attempt to do super-science; God as super-science about the Cause of Everything. *Or* as a mere failure to do proper science; God as exploded science about the cause of, say, the weather.

D.M. I have absolutely no sympathy with the suggestion that God can be invoked to underwrite our righteous causes. He is not a kind of stimulant for flagging hearts.

A.F. I'm sure that *you* yourself haven't. But then again, there is the " pretentious ethics " aspect. Talk of God adding force and appeal to the commands of duty. The two peculiar troubles about theological discourses are *first,* that theological language *as a whole* is controversial in a way in which scientific language is not: and *second, as a whole* it may appear either as a fraudulent way of doing ethics or as a discredited way of doing science. But it does seem to me that you said something crucial about this at the point earlier which I then agreed to be climactic. The heart of the matter is that the only satisfactory and the perhaps sufficient justification for the whole enterprise of trying to say things which it seems necessarily cannot be said lies just there; in Christ. " In the riddle of a life lived and a death died ".

D.M. Good. I'm glad there is agreement there. We began by talking about creation, the status of the language of *Genesis*: how much is literal and how much is myth? Then inevitably to the claims of myth sometimes to be taken seriously, and so on to the drawing of distinctions; between the popular idea of creation on the one hand (involving a beginning of the world) and the creation of the theologians on the other (a recognition of man's absolute dependence on God). Next we discussed the very interesting arguments of Michael Foster and Professor Collingwood about the influence of creation ideas upon the history of science. We agreed that it was wrong to think of these ideas as presuppositions, *assumptions* upon which the fabric of science rests. They are rather *pictures* excluding other pictures and encouraging—or discouraging—scientific confidence. But of course the metaphysical issue could not be burked. After some discussion of the traditional doctrine of analogy and the difficulties which it was designed to meet, we went on to consider the impulses behind theological language, and the peculiarities which make its justification at once so necessary and so hard. Finally, we agreed that among the most important of these impulses are questions raised by the person of Christ.

The New Philosophy and the Divines

By MEYRICK H. CARRE

ANYONE who scans the literature of the early seventeenth century may be arrested by signs of antagonism to scientific knowledge on the part of clerical persons. His glance may rest upon the eloquent passage in *The Advancement of Learning* where Bacon speaks of the discredit brought upon knowledge by the zeal and jealousy of divines.[1] He may light upon a less renowned utterance in which Bacon wrote of himself, " and generally he perceived in men of devout simplicity this opinion, that the secrets of nature were the secrets of God and part of that glory whereinto the mind of man if it seek to press shall be oppressed; and that the desire of men to attain to so great and hidden knowledge hath a resemblance with that temptation which caused the original fall ".[2] Another strikingly different witness to the same purpose is John Donne. It is true that numerous currents of thought move and collide in the poems and sermons; he has been claimed by contrary schools. The cosmology of Aristotle mixes with the helio-centric hypothesis. Indeed, in *Ignatius His Conclave* (1611), Copernicus is admitted into Lucifer's inner room among the bold innovators who " gave an affront to all antiquity and induced doubts, and anxieties, and scruples, and after, a liberty of believing what they would ", and " at length established opinions directly contrary to all established before ".[3] Passages such as these and many others at least recognise the new astronomy. But Donne's final mood is one of disillusionment and scorn. All coherence has gone, the world is a dry cinder, and human knowledge is corrupted at the source. There are well-known lines in which the poet recoils into the devout simplicity of which Bacon speaks; when he turns from human reason to the revelations of faith.

> When wilt thou shake off this pedantery
> Of being taught by sense and fantasy? . . .

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[1] *Of the Proficience and Advancement of Learning,* 1605, Works, edited by Spedding, Ellis and Heath, 1876, Vol. III, p. 264.

[2] *Filum Labyrinthi,* Works, III, p. 499.

[3] Donne, Complete Poetry and Selected Prose, London, 1942, p. 361.

In heaven thou straight know'st all concerning it,
And what concerns it not shalt straight forget.[4]

But are these representative testimonies? No doubt there ran, during the transition from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century, a strong vein among the clergy of pious aversion to secular knowledge. This cast of mind, contemptuous of profane learning, had always been present in the Church and continued to appear long after the scientific revolution, opposing revelation to reason and the Bible to natural inquiry.[5] A recent book by Mr. Paul H. Kocher, entitled *Science and Religion in Elizabethan England,*[6] has carefully explored this trend of theological opinion, and the manifold interplay between theological conceptions and natural knowledge during this period. In offering some observations on the attitude of divines and Puritan leaders at this critical time I gratefully acknowledge the detailed information presented in Mr. Kocher's book. I propose, however, to draw certain distinctions which do not seem to be clearly drawn in the book. It is necessary to distinguish the views of the Elizabethan and Jacobean clergy relating to secular knowledge in general, from their opinions on natural knowledge in particular. And it is further important to distinguish views concerning natural knowledge of the traditional type from ideas about the new astronomical and physical theories, which began to be discussed soon after 1600. It is that attitude of the divines to the revolutionary notions of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo which is the chief point of interest. To these great names we may add the doctrines of William Gilbert and his school concerning the magnetism of the earth. But I will make a few remarks about the other issues; and first about the attitude of clerical persons to knowledge in general.

In this age there were a number of obscurantist fashions of thought which, in their various ways, decried intellectual pursuits; and many clerical writers were affected by them. Attacks on learning reach back into the Middle Ages, to a society in which the knight had viewed the erudition of the clerk with contempt. The sixteenth century had revived the protests of men of action against the power of book-craft.[7] Other more rational movements reinforced the vogue for disparaging knowledge. The circulation of such books as Cornelius Agrippa's *De Incertitudine et Vanitate Scientiarum,* translated in 1569, promoted a despair of truth; and there was a revival of Pyrrhonic scepticism, which proclaimed the relativity of belief and the limitations of man's senses and reason. A powerful stream of pessimism, which swelled the mood of detraction, flowed from the widespread belief that the physical world was drawing near to its final collapse. The tide of foreboding culminated in Godfrey Goodman's *The Fall of Man, or the Corruption of Nature by the Light of our Natural Reason* (1616); the author was afterwards Bishop of Gloucester. Goodman surveys at length the accumulating miseries of mankind and adduces evidences of the decay and disorder of nature, and in the closing pages he draws a parallel between the corruption of man and the deterioration of the physical system. A number of divines took up the theme; George Hakewill,[8] who disputed Goodman's thesis in detail in *An Apology of the Power and Providence of God* (1627), observes that in his day " the opinion of the world's decay is so generally received, not only among the vulgar, but of the learned, both divines and others. that the very commonness of it makes it current with many without further examination.[9]" These bodies of opinion, the courtly disdain of knowledge, the philosophic scepticism, the alarming expectation of the end of the world, coalesced with religious ways of thought. They coalesced especially, with the disposition to exalt divine learning at the expense of human inquiry. Devout simplicity or dogmatic teaching was supported by arguments from the Greek sceptics or from the doctrine of approaching doom. Many passages can be cited from the divines, which recommend, with assistance from the ideas that have been mentioned, the naked acceptance of Biblical truth and the godly virtue of secular ignorance. A book that was much read was a translation, under the title of *The Wonderful Workmanship of the World* (1578) of a treatise by Lambert Daneau, a minister of Geneva. Daneau dismisses " the swelling and puffed arts" of the Greek philosophers, and he ignores modern theories of the earth and heavens. It is from God alone, the workman who has fashioned the world, that we can learn the causes and properties of things; and God has revealed them to men, through His instrument Moses, in a manner fitted to their capacity. It was a common view. There are many later warnings in the manuals of morality against vain curiosity and protestations about "prying into his secrets which belong not unto us". John Downame, for instance, in *The Second Part of Christian Warfare* (1611), declared that "this worldly learning is the mother of all dangerous errors and damnable heresies".[10] There were divines who sometimes wrote as though reason were the snare of the Devil, and the companion of pride and depravity.

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[4] *An Anatomy of the World; the Second Anniversary,* (1612). The poem appeared, however, two years before Donne was ordained.

[5] A defiant instance in the seventeenth century is the work of the notorious fundamentalist Alexander Ross, *The New Planet No Planet* (1646) in which he insisted that all scientific theory should be decided by the text of Scripture.

[6] *Huntingdon Library Publications,* San Marino, California, 1953.

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[7] On this topic see Ruth Kelso, *The Doctrine of the English Gentleman in the Sixteenth Century,* Urbana, Illinois, 1929.

[8] Hakewill was Archdeacon of Surrey.

[9] *Apology*—Third Edition, Oxford, 1635, p. 1. A full discussion of the literature relating to the belief in the decay of nature is contained in *All Coherence Gone* by Victor Harris, Chicago, 1949.

But I must not dwell upon these pious and often eccentric revolts from knowledge, for they do not represent the main disposition of the clergy. A large proportion of these men were pupils in the school of St. Thomas and his commentators, for whom reason is, in all human beings, the exercise of a divine gift; *ipsum enim lumen intellectuale, quod est in nobis, nihil est aliud, quam quaedam participata similitudo luminis increati.*[11] To many divines the noble pages of Hooker were familiar, in which he asserted the conception of a universe governed by the law of reason; and they concluded that because it was rational it could be understood, at least in part, by human faculties. The Puritan sects looked, through Calvin and Luther, rather to the teaching of William of Ockham, for whom God is primarily Will. Anglicans learnt from the perennial philosophy, acquired with their divinity, that God's will is ruled by reason and that this reason is the *lex aeterna* of morality and nature, both celestial and terrestrial. They learnt, too, that the acquisition of knowledge is a gradual process, moving from sense-impressions to the apprehension of universals. They did not, however, think of knowledge as an instrument for the improvement of man's conditions of life. All divisions of theoretical knowledge were divisions of philosophy, and the supreme object of philosophy was being in general, that is God.

Natural reason, the understanding of the creatures, requires to be supplemented by divine revelation, by knowledge which is offered to the acceptance of man's faith. The orthodox tradition,

[10] Quoted by Kocher, *op. cit.* p. 15.

[11] Aquinas, *Summa Theologica,* I, 84, 5 ad Resp.

of which men as different as Perkins and Andrewes and Laud were the heirs, acknowledged the work of natural inquiry in setting men on the road to the truths of faith, and they agreed that there was no need for revelation in matters that men are capable of discovering by their own capacities. There is a place, outside theology, for the sciences. The traditional distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge allowed theologians to accept the pursuits of physicists and astronomers. It is true that the taint of the Fall hung about these investigations, and that revealed knowledge encompassed much natural information. It embraced the cosmology of *Genesis* and a host of Biblical allusions to the movements of the heavenly bodies, to the shape and age of the earth, and to other physical matters. But in the sixteenth century the opinion began to be accepted that the descriptions of natural phenomena in the Scriptures were not to be taken as literally true, but as picturesque versions of the truth adapted to the capacity of simple men. This accommodating position was seized upon by the natural philosophers, both those who followed the doctrines of the schools and those who explored the new theories. The orthodox disciples of the medieval physics taught in the Universities, the less orthodox defenders of Paracelsus or Tycho Brahe, and the adherents to the new science, all resorted to this argument when their discussions appeared to conflict with the texts of the Bible.[12]

The theologians, then, were not, in the main, opposed to lawful curiosity, for it disclosed the wonderful workmanship of the creation. But in the earlier part of the period this complacency rested on confidence in the historic system of nature. The learning of the clergy was principally derived from the courses of studies at Oxford and Cambridge, and though there was freedom in the choice and arrangement of reading, the list of books prescribed by the statutes offers a guide to the education of churchmen. A reference to the regulations for the higher degree of Master of Arts at Oxford at the beginning of the seventeenth century will suffice. The candidate had to devote three years to a course of study which included the laborious perusal of ancient works on geometry, astronomy, physics and metaphysics. The basis of physical and astronomical theory was provided by the treatises of Aristotle in those fields, to which were added the *De Sphaera* of Sacrobosco (that is to say John Holywood) compiled about 1220, the *Perspectiva* of Vitellius, (Witelo of Silesia), composed about 1270, and the *Almagest* of Ptolemy, written in the second century A.D.[13] The natural science of the cultured layman and cleric was accordingly imbued with the theories of the third century B.C. and of the early Middle Ages. The statutes of the University of Oxford in 1586 condemned the reading of books " disagreeing with the ancient and true philosophy ". The voluminous commentaries and compendia presented little modification of the ancient doctrines. Richard Crackanthorp alluded to the current respect for the traditional authorities when he wrote in his work on logic, published in 1622, that in geometry, Euclid, in astronomy, Ptolemy, in medicine, Hippocrates and Galen, are still the masters. Over them all stands Aristotle, to whom, says Crackanthorp, no error can be imputed in any part of the field of logic, nor indeed in any of the philosophical sciences, that is to say, metaphysics, physics and ethics, save in a few trifling points.[14]

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[12] Edward Wright, in his Preface to Gilbert's *De Magnete* (1600) echoes this view of Scripture when he wrote, " It does not appear to have been the purpose of Moses or the prophets to announce any mathematical or physical subtleties, but to adapt themselves to the capacity and language of ordinary folk, like nurses with infants ". The same treatment of the Biblical texts is still being employed by John Wilkins in his *Discovery of a New World*, (1638).

Natural knowledge, as opposed to revealed truths, meant the knowledge of academic erudition. Neither the veneration for the medieval view of nature nor the training in syllogistic reasoning was calculated to breed minds who could adapt themselves easily to the novel theories of physics. It must be recalled, also, that educated opinion looked upon experimental inquiries as activities suitable rather to tradesmen, miners, mariners and almanac-makers than to scholars and gentlemen. The overriding feature, however, is that, by age-long habits of thought, Aristotelian conceptions of natural events had become united with Christian doctrine. That the focal point of the universe was the habitation of man; that there is a sharp division between the elemental region of change below the sphere of the moon and the heavenly region above it; that the processes of nature are fundamentally teleological, (for the form which organises the matter of each thing, from a pebble to a man, is an inward disposition to attain the perfection of the thing in its class); that all the substances in the universe are arranged in ascending degrees of nobility; these principles of the Aristotelian system had become principles of Christian natural theology. They had become merged with the teaching of the Bible and had received the sanction of the great doctors of the Church. By the consecration of reason, religion and tradition, the old conceptions of nature were embedded in the minds of clergymen of all sections of the Church in England. It is the Aristotelian and medieval scheme of things which they defended, in defending nature.

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[13] S. Gibson, *Statuta Antiqua Universitatis, Oxoniensis,* Oxford, 1931, p. XCVI.

[14] R. Crackanthorp, *Logicae libri quinque de praedicabilibus,* Fourth edition, Oxford, 1677, p. 347.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Copernican hypothesis and the new mathematical and atomic physics put a severe strain upon the philosophy of theologians. The Copernican astronomy abolished the vital distinction between the regions of earth and heaven; it vastly extended the area of disorder and corruption; and it undermined the cardinal belief in the special position of man in the divine scheme. At the beginning of the century moralists could speak of astronomy as " very instrumental and helpful to our salvation ". A few years later some of those clergy who were in touch with recent developments were seriously alarmed. Robert Burton, in his celebrated *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), expresses the common fears. Many of the new ideas he is willing to accept. The observations of Tycho and of Kepler have exploded a number of the Ptolemaic doctrines, and Galileo's glasses have disproved the belief in the solid spheres of Aristotle. But this was as far as a Christian could go. Burton cannot stomach the Copernican system. It may save the appearances better than other theories, but consider what follows from its acceptance. If the earth is one of the planets the other planets may be inhabited, and the moon also. And if there are creatures dwelling on the infinite worlds of the universe, what becomes of the position of man? May not some of these creatures occupy more important places in the scheme? May not the denizens of one of these worlds be the lords of creation? And, if this were true, where would be our glory? How could we believe in the redemption of man by Christ as the central event of the universe?[15]

Such fears are present in a number of sermons and moral pamphlets. Yet the remarkable feature of the references by divines to the new philosophy of the heavens is the variety of opinions concerning the consequences of the astronomical discoveries. Conclusions relating to the theological effects of these discoveries widely differed, and some clerics cautiously accepted the strange ideas, some expressed a suspension of judgment. The tension between the Christian-Aristotelian cosmos and the new notions appears vividly in the stream of pronouncements over the new stars and the comets. Mr. Kocher mentions a foreign work, translated in 1618 as *A Treatise of Blazing Starres*,[16] in which the writer pointed to the propensity among divines to attribute the new stars to a succession of miracles, wrought by God in order to admonish mankind. Certainly this is the interpretation offered by a number of clerical prophets after the appearance of the nova in Cassiopaea in 1572 and in connexion with the later new stars. Francis Shakelton's *A Blazing Starre* (1580) is among the earlier publications which proclaimed the miraculous nature of these apparitions, John Swan's *Speculum Mundi* (First edition 1635, further editions in 1643, 1665 and 1670) is among the latest. Behind the moral and personal interpretation naturally uppermost in the clerical mind lay principles of natural philosophy; for the miraculous explanation of these phenomena was insisted on in order to save the perfection of the Aristotelian heavens. But the work of Gilbert and his school, and now the revolutionary work of Galileo and of the Parisian men of science were destroying the old picture of the universe; and Aristotle and miraculous explanations which had been oddly associated, crumbled together. In face of the new science there were many adjustments. Some moralists attempted to revive the medieval attitude of the double truth and maintained that both the Biblical and the scientific accounts of the cosmos were true. There were many modes of compromise. Some preachers argued that the vast motions of the planets were controlled at every moment by the power and wisdom of God. Others accepted the new celestial mechanism but provided a region for the direct activity of God in the case of earthquakes, floods and spectacular storms. But what catches the eye is the number of clergy who, not only showed sympathy with the conceptions of science, but took a lively part in their advance.

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[15] Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy,* 1827 ed. Vol. I pp. 380-382. Burton added fresh material to this section in the edition of 1628 and subsequent issues. See R. M. Browne, *Robert Burton and the New Cosmology,* Modern Language Quarterly, Vol XIII, no. 2.

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[16] Kocher, *op. cit.* p. 107, referring to the work of Fredericus Nausea translated by Abraham Fleming.

In the opinion of Mr. Kocher the active association of the clergy with science is present before 1600. Out of fifty-five names of writers on various branches of science in the Elizabethan period he finds that twenty-four were members of the clergy.[17] I am here concerned rather with the new science that appeared after the turn of the century; and in these years remarkable scientific figures are met among the divines. Of the disciples of Gilbert there was William Barlowe, the author of *Magneticall Advertisements* (1616) in which original experiments on the loadstone are described. There was William Oughtred, rector of Albury for fifty years, who enjoyed an international fame as a mathematician. There was Nathanael Carpenter, author of *Geography* (1625). It is worth dwelling on this book for a moment, in order to illustrate the complexion of opinion relating to the new science among certain of the clergy. Many conservative traits naturally appear in this lengthy inquiry into the features of the earth. There is the usual array of ancient authorities, and, what is to our purpose, there is the customary deference to the text of the Scriptures on questions relating to the formation of the land and sea. The adventures of the Ark play their part in the theory. Aristotelian principles are woven into the account of natural phenomena. The writer believes in the influence of the stars on men's characters. But the old habits of thought are crossed by the new ideas. The new outlook on nature appears in his insistence on the place of mathematics in the study of the earth, and he illustrates this principle with excellent skill in the sections on the size of the earth and in the chapters on longitudes and latitudes, (Book I, Chapters XI and XII). He declares that in natural phenomena we must seek the efficient cause; " a curious searcher into Nature will hardly rest in a mere final cause ". He will content himself with the rule, " that when an immediate effect proceeds from an immediate cause, we ought not to search farther why such a cause should produce such an effect ". In such a passage the critical change of method introduced by the scientific revolution is indicated, the substitution of the question " How?" for the question " Why?"; or, in the language of the schools, a concern for the accidental properties of things in place of their essential natures. He is not, indeed, prepared to reject all the old ideas; " I only inveigh against their prejudicate ignorance, which ready to lick up the dust under Aristotle's feet, with a supercilious look contemn all other learning, as though no flowers of science could grow in another garden". Eschewing metaphysical explanations he likens the earth to "a clock, mill or such like great engine". We may take leave of this representative of the new scientific man of religion with a quotation from his discussion of Gilbert's theory of magnetism. "This new philosophy I dare not commend as everywhere perfect and absolute, being but of late years invented, and not yet brought to mature perfection. Yet it would savour of little ingenuity and judgment in any man perversely to deny all magnetical affections in the earth as are grounded on plain experiments and observations".[18]

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[17] Kocher, *op. cit.* p. 116.

"Plain experiments and observations". Carpenter is a disciple of Gilbert and of Bacon rather than of Galileo. We are drawing near to the meetings held in a tavern in Bishopsgate, to Boyle's invisible college and to the great achievements of early science in England. Experimental and mathematical technique gave strength and breadth to scientific theory. But the physics of Descartes and "the corpuscular and mechanical philosophy" of Boyle presented theologians with fundamental problems, which were as formidable as the old issue of astronomy. In this later phase, which leads to the Royal Society and to Newton, clergymen perform a notable part. John Wallis, John Wilkins, and Seth Ward are names prominent in experimental inquiries and mathematics; and two of these men became bishops. The manner in which Christian doctrine was adjusted to a system of mechanism and defended against the "modern atheistical pretender"[19] belongs to a later phase of the story.

No student of this period can offer generalisations about the attitude of the clergy as a body, with any sense of security. He must rely upon such evidence as he can find, and what he finds, even with the help of scholars like Mr. Kocher, is a meagre selection from the teeming reflection of the age. In a single year nearly three-quarters of the total of books published were works of a religious nature.[20] The huge volume of religious writing by the clergy, the devotional manuals, the sermons, the moral treatises, doubtless comprise numerous references to natural knowledge; and these allusions presumably express many points of view, for the Church was deeply divided. No historian has compassed all this evidence. It seems, however, safe to judge that there was never a united opposition to natural science among Elizabethan and Jacobean clergy. The attitude was extremely varied; ranging from antagonism to all mundane inquiries to active pursuit of the new science. All rational inquiry was conducted within a religious frame of thought, and religion interpreted natural processes in moral and personal language, in terms of instruction, punishment and design. Theology continued to look upon nature as a school for men, and in the earlier phase of the scientific movement the constant action of religious and Biblical ideas on knowledge tended to consign natural law and the mechanical explanation of natural sequences to the background. And this dramatic view of nature continued to prevail among the mass of the congregations whose intellectual beliefs depended on sermons and clerical instruction. But throughout the period there had been growing two dispositions. There was an increasing tendency to construe the texts of Scripture so that they were not incompatible with the Copernican theory and the new physics; and there was the more radical tendency to exempt the Bible from natural inquiry of any kind. The method of the Gordian Knot was recommended to the age principally by Bacon. He did not deny that it is possible to attain some knowledge of God by divine philosophy, that is, by relating a scientific study of the world to the omnipotency and wisdom of its maker; and this natural theology became greatly extended in the hands of his disciples, especially Robert Boyle. But Bacon also asserted that "it were a vain labour to adapt the heavenly mysteries of our religion to our reason".[21] Clergy interested in science did not take this as an invitation to blank fideism. Men such as Wilkins and Seth Ward wished to free religion and the Scriptures from scientific disputes in order to preserve them for their proper functions as lamps of faith and salvation. In the presence of Epicurean atomism and of Hobbes this convenient dichotomy could not be maintained. With these developments, as the Cambridge Platonists saw, appeared the real threats to the Christian cosmos; and the compromise between science and theology accepted by the leading thinkers resulted in a more remote Deity and a colder religion. These issues lie beyond my province. I have glanced at the complex and fluctuating concern of the clergy with natural knowledge and the new science during the first quarter of the seventeenth century. The record compares favourably so far with the story of the Church during the nineteenth century. Men like Carpenter and Wilkins appear more reasonable than the bishops and clergy of 1860, who refused to yield an inch over the Mosaic cosmogony and the special creation of man, and condemned those who accepted the conclusions of geology and biology as atheists. The framework of thought in the earlier century precluded for the majority of cultured men, any fundamental conflict between religion and science. The examination of natural processes declares the power, wisdom and goodness of the creator; and, as Boyle remarked " to hinder the progress of natural knowledge detracts from God's glory ". It is not surprising that a large number of men of science in that age were men of deep religious conviction, nor that many eminent divines were actively concerned with science.

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[18] Nathanael Carpenter, *Geography Delineated*, 1625, p. 45.

[19] An allusion by Ralph Cudworth to Hobbes.

[20] Jaggard's *Catalogue of English Books*, 1619, quoted in D. Bush, *English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century*, Oxford, 1945, p. 294.

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[21] *Advancement of Learning*, Bk. III, Cap. II, Works, IV, p. 342.

Christian Apologetic and Historical Fact

By C. B. ARMSTRONG

RECENT emphasis on Biblical Theology has encouraged some theologians to write as though the critical movement were now a thing of the past, and to ignore its present exponents. Criticism is assumed to have ended with the failure of Schweitzer's quest; Barnes represented a theology of 30 years ago, and so on. Thus Barthians and Catholics alike can disregard historical problems of the rise of Christianity, under the aegis of the " Word of God " and of the " Church " respectively. But among philosophical theologians an apologetic implicit in days of simple faith has recently become explicit, and seems to require some examination.

I can quote only three examples. Canon Richardson in his *Miracle Stories of the Gospel* argues that the question of miracles is not merely factual but also Christological—only capable of being answered as part of a total " taking of sides " with regard to Our Lord. " Is Jesus Christ " we are to ask ourselves " the sort of Person of whom miraculous action can sensibly be predicated?" We must start, he thinks, where the Bible starts, that is with Biblical, and not scientific assumptions.

Professor H. E. W. Turner (in *Jesus Master and Lord,* p. 181) supports this method of the " Christological Clue " to some extent by asking " Is Jesus the sort of person to whom such mastery over nature can reasonably be ascribed? Do we really know and can we dare to assign particular limits to the control which He might exercise in an area admittedly beyond what we know of nature? "

Thirdly Dr. Austin Farrer in a recent " appreciation " of a wordy controversy between Bultmann and his critics on " Demythologization " (*Kerygma & Myth,* S.P.C.K. 1953) writes " What Christians find in Christ through faith inclines them, at certain points, to accept with regard to Him testimony about matters of fact which would be inconclusive if offered with regard to any other man. The Christian who refused to take that step, he says, would in my opinion be pedantic and irrational, like a man who required the same guarantees for trusting a friend which he would require for trusting a stranger." The corollary is the same—namely that we may believe on inadequate *historical* evidence a statement of a "miraculous" type *if* it is about Jesus Christ. Where the evidence is inconclusive, Faith would lead Dr. Farrer to incline towards the miraculous interpretation on the ground that God does "bend physical fact into special conformity with divine intention." "It still ought to be taken for physical fact" he says "if God has made it into physical fact". It is of this line of apologetic that I try, with all humility, "to hint a doubt, and hesitate dislike."

Dr. Farrer argues, rightly enough, that there may be truth in statements about history which cannot be historically verified, if they are not illogical. But the question immediately arises "on what grounds are they to be believed?" And here there seems to be a weakness in the argument. A weakly documented or unverifiable historical statement may be believed if it can be logically deduced from other ascertained facts. But the three scholars whom I have quoted assume that it may be believed, not for logical, but for Christological reasons. Confident faith in Our Lord, they hold, can enable us to believe facts about Him for which the evidence is dubious, if they accord not with logical reasoning but with our conception of his divinity. And Dr. Farrer's conception of his divinity is that he was able, as God, in his incarnate life to "bend physical fact" or "to make physically incredible things into physical fact."

Even at the risk of being called pedantic and irrational I cannot feel satisfied. My trust in a friend enables me to trust my friend: it does not enable me to believe any story about him I know to be consistent with his character. There seems to be serious ambiguity in the argument that Christology may make credible what is historically dubious.

In the first place Christologies vary. The many divergent attempts to write lives of Christ are the result of differing Christologies, or conceptions of his Person. A testing of the historical truth of this or that incident by Christologies of today is too subjective. Further Christology develops; at what historical point are we to fix our *Kanon*? To fix Chalcedon as the eternal norm is arbitrary. The conception of Our Lord's divinity can scarcely be so static that we must have recourse to an early period when it was forever stabilised. If we take the simplest formula, *alethos theos* and *Teleos, anthropos* we are still faced with the question " what do we understand by *theos* "—or perhaps what does divine mean? Besides, the formulations of Christology were based on the scriptural records, so that logically we cannot use them to establish the truth of the records themselves.

If we take refuge in the general conception of Divinity prevalent among Churchmen of today, as this apologetic seems to do, we must further face the fact that our New Testament authors were themselves influenced by their own Christologies, which vary considerably. Their ideas of the kind of acts that proved Our Lord to be divine would not be the same as ours. Which Christology, theirs or ours, is to be the test? The rejection of the non-canonical books alone is sufficient proof that the mind of the Church was always critical of former Christologies; to talk of getting back to " biblical assumptions ", though valuable for understanding, is obscurantist when integrity of intellectual belief is at stake.

Many of the miracles, including the Resurrection itself, are consistent with a Christology of One Person in two natures " Alethōs Theos " and " Teleōs Anthrōpos ". Yet it must be remembered that the statement that Jesus Christ was incarnate as both God and man violates the principle of contradiction and is not therefore a logical statement, unless the meaning of " man " is changed. As orthodox theology holds that He was completely man, this is ruled out. So the statement must be in some sense symbolic, or at any rate non-logical. It may be incumbent on theologians to clarify a new logic of symbolism in which the law of contradiction is not needed as an axiom. An alternative that Jesus Christ was a man wholly possessed by God has been ruled out as adoptionist: it does however open the way to an understanding of miracles as being whatever acts are possible for man in perfect communion with God —a communion only once exemplified. The Christological clue, namely bringing in the Godhead to explain acts during the incarnation of which the manhood could in no circumstances be conceived as capable, seems to imply an Apollinarian belief that the Incarnate Lord was preponderantly divine.

Is there no alternative to this method of the " Christological clue " as Professor Turner calls it?

One might suggest as a first step that we should accept historical and critical disciplines tentatively in relation to recorded facts about our Lord. Results, so far, are by no means final and new attitudes, discoveries, and theories are constantly appearing to modify the total picture. We would thus, while not rejecting the scientific discipline of history, preserve an *epoche*, or suspense of judgement, on matters which we cannot yet judge. Secondly, while endeavouring to work out on Pauline lines a theology of *epignosis* transcending logical reason we would content ourselves meanwhile with the general formulations of the undivided church as a symbolic framework of our union in the body of Christian believers. That all are true symbolically or epignostically, to coin a word, would be generally agreed, and after all a creed is a symbolon or " token " of genuine Christian faith, by which Christians know one another and express their common attitude towards mysteries which can only be formulated in a mixture of history, philosophy, and typology.

Thirdly, we would recognize that the impact of Our Lord on his human associates was such that there were bound to be varying accounts and interpretations of Him, because He attracted to himself then, as He does still, all that his interpreters conceived as evidencing divinity. These interpretations were necessarily divergent. Some of those who first called Him Lord were naïve in their conception of the divine, some were philosophical, some were imbued with apocalyptic ideas, some with Messianic expectations, some with mystery conceptions. We should remember that every single thing we know about Him historically is mediated to us by human worshippers, and that elements of interpretation, which may of course be true, are necessarily woven into their accounts of Him. What is vital truth about the Incarnation—that God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself—must be distinguished from its setting in what is historical truth, namely what survives of the records and results of his historical impact on the world. In most cases the areas of vital truth and historical truth are empirically and logically consistent. But when interpretation or legend is blended with historical record, or when evidence is conflicting the areas do not coincide: so we maintain a reverent *epoche* on these parts of the tradition rather than force ourselves to believe them because we conceive them to be parts of an inviolable corpus, or consequent upon an inviolable Christology.

Mythology and the Incarnation

By ROBERT LEANEY

THE characterization of the forms in which the claims of the New Testament are made as myth raises a number of acute problems both for theology and for faith. The German scholar Bultmann has pleaded for a "demythologization" of the New Testament, on the ground that its statements are not history but are the expression of the beliefs of the early disciples of Christianity in terms borrowed from Judaistic Apocalyptic, Hellenism, and Gnosis. Bultmann has not adopted the method of the critics of the last generation, whose aim it was to peel away unhistorical accretions in order to find the kernel of truth, no doubt because he is acutely aware that this process succeeds only in mirroring the mind which thinks that it is cleaning away the cobwebs from the mirror: his method rather is to accept the New Testament as a whole, but to regard it as so mythological that the historical element becomes apparently irrelevant. I say "apparently irrelevant" because it would not be easy to decide if this were a just appreciation of Bultmann's position; it is certainly an evaluation which some would make on the ground that, even if it is not intended by Bultmann, this is what his position really implies. It is at any rate clear that he does not without very important qualifications regard the New Testament as history. Now, since this is what it claims to be, we have to try to understand both why the claim is made and also in what way we may rightly evaluate it so as to accept, reject, or entertain it.

Mythological thinking is obviously applicable to certain aspects of reality or of man's experience: for example, as a means of working out and expressing man's relations and attitudes within the microcosm of man and, in the macrocosm, towards God and the universe. It is not so obvious that the same sort of myth is applicable to historical events, yet it is doubtful if events which are expressed mythologically have any meaning at all unless they are also historical. For example, it has meaning to say of a man at a certain crisis in his career that he "was born again". This has meaning for psychology as for religion, but it cannot mean anything unless it is meant that some actual changes took place in that man's psyche, and the phrase would not be used in earnest unless the speaker, or writer, wished to convey actual fact: but not, of course, the fact which is described literally by the words. This rather obvious example is used to show the possibility of using clearly mythological language in connexion with a historical event; but we may remark in passing that a great many people would agree that the event so designated is described in a way most intelligible to the reader, and that this presupposes that the reader shares the mythological vocabulary of the speaker or writer.

There is another kind of myth, different from that which supplies current metaphors or jargon: the sort which we have just considered claims merely to indicate an event which is most conveniently expressed in mythological form because the speaker can rely upon his listeners knowing what he means through sharing his own metaphorical vocabulary, although the event could at any rate in principle be expressed much more literally: but there is another kind of myth which claims to state an event which happened thus in history, and which, if translated into another language, would lose accuracy—in some cases clearly lose historical accuracy—rather than gain it. The Bible is full of myths of this kind, the element of history implied by them being of varying degrees.

"God said, Let there be light, and there was light."
"God led the children of Israel out of Egypt."
"God spake these words and said . . . "
"The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto but to minister."
"Behold my servant . . . he was despised and rejected of men."
"Son of David, have mercy on me."
"He preached that Jesus was the Christ."

These statements or prayers, some of which are actual quotations and the rest of which are fair summaries of facts or beliefs found in the Bible, express or invoke a reality which is rooted in history. It is true that the creation of light might be regarded as something which cannot be included in history, and that this is a good example of myth as philosophers have used it; but the statement is rooted in history from the point of view of the writer because it is history which he is writing. When Plato writes myth he says so, and in a myth he conveys a belief or viewpoint. The Biblical writer may write myth, but he intends it as history, and for him that means that he intends it as a real statement about what he really believes. Even this example is then not wholly myth, because, while it conveys a fact which cannot be brought within history, this is not because it is unhistorical but because it does not belong to that order.

Again, we may believe or disbelieve in the part claimed to have been played by God in a tribal migration from Egypt at a date notoriously difficult to determine, but the statement about the exodus is not only derived from an event to which a date could in principle be given, but it is expressed historically as part of an historical belief. It records the belief that God was active in history, we are apt to say. But what it records is that God was active in history.

The Son of Man, brought into the presence of the Ancient of Days, is an allegorical prophecy of an event which was to be historical: namely, the inheritance of the kingdom by the saints of the Most High; and whatever interpretation may be placed on the Servant Songs of Deutero-Isaiah, they referred in the first instance to a person or community who did live and suffer in an actual historical situation. Here the interpretation, "The LORD has laid on him the iniquities of us all," we may regard as mythological, but it is intended as history. For the writer the sufferings and their vicarious efficacy are a fact, part of history, and to say that a nation suffered and that this may be construed as vicarious suffering is to say something quite different.

Once more, although the term "Son of David" becomes a title whose significance transcends its historical origin, there was a king David, there could be a descendant of David whose character was far better than those actual kings from whom the prophets turned in weariness and disgust; while no one in their senses would deny that the title "Christ", "the Anointed", is explicable historically or not at all. The king was closely associated with his people in his enthronement, and we know from our experience that, if the sovereign is anointed, the nation at this moment knows itself in him or her called by God and consecrated for a high task.

If these titles have become mythological, which is presumably part of what Bultmann wishes to say, they still began either (as in the one case) as an allegory of an historical event, or as actual titles whose explanation is to be found in history: in what men did, not in what they dreamt. No doubt there was dreaming too, but at any rate it ought to be clear that the titles like "Son of Man," and so forth, are of a quite different order from personifications like Europa, Herakles, or Prometheus. The titles which have been briefly considered are some of those which in the gospels are used to present the person of Jesus. Christology is explicable by the study of history, though it is true that it must be Biblical history. Even with that qualification it remains history and not myth, even if it does in fact contain legend. History is the category under which it must be judged, although, as I shall try to maintain, there are qualifications to be made on this point—qualifications, indeed, which must be made.

For it is obvious that, in insisting upon the historical character of the titles which are used to convey the incarnation in the New Testament, we must be careful not gratuitously to misstate the case. Take the example of the title, "Son of David". Here is a title which might be purely historical; it might be that Jesus was literally, and no more than literally, a son—that is, a descendant of David—but, even if he were, the significant thing about the title is not that he was physically descended from David: other men were, and there are presumably men alive today who are descended from David. But, to use a bold and violent metaphor and to turn the tables on the demythologizers, they are not "Jesuses".[1] The significant point about the title, and the reason why it is a title at all, is that Jesus is thereby claimed to be the expected ideal descendant of David, alone worthy to reign. But if the main point is to distinguish between one myth and another, it is also wholly relevant to observe that the historical Jesus, *Yeshwa bar Yoseph*, exhausts, transcends, and bursts asunder all these categories. This is the most striking thing about the Christology of the gospels: above all they claim to be about an historical person: they are not about a Prometheus, a Perseus, a Jason, but about a carpenter bearing a name common among his people, of whom his fellow-villagers said they knew perfectly well who he was; and yet about this historical person men, deriving their inspiration from his contemporaries, exhaust all their categories and then fail to capture him. Bultmann has drawn attention to some of the inconsistencies in the titles awarded him—the pre-existent Son of Man cannot be born as the Son of God—but has failed to draw the conclusion that since they are the titles of an historical person their formal inconsistency is a tribute. For it is preposterous to say that because there is formal inconsistency there is disagreement or evidence of non-actuality. It is well-

[1] I apologize for this ugly and irreverent sounding word, but do not see how else to make this point.

nigh impossible to reconcile the Dr. Johnson of Fanny Burney with that of Boswell, yet it is usually assumed that we nevertheless need both portraits to arrive at a picture approaching the truth. And that there is disagreement is, of course, not worth discussion when we remember that the books which convey very different impressions of Jesus the man (*Cf.* St. Mark, for example, with St. John) rub shoulders in the Bible. The author of the Fourth Gospel may have had the intention of correcting the synoptic tradition, but the outcome is finally that both are allotted places in the canon. It is perfectly legitimate to insist that, since we have no contemporary account written as we should wish it to be written so that we really knew the truth (and, by the way, how would that be written?), we must regard all the gospel accounts as equally mythical, but only if we give due weight to the tremendous fact which Bultmann neglects, that they claim to be history. Unless, therefore, we dismiss them all as vain fancies, and while we credit their authors with honesty, we must add that it is historical myth, or mythical history: thus we shall cease to mystify those who, when we say that the New Testament is myth, think—and think with justification—that we mean, that it has no basis in historical fact: with justification because although it may be a vulgar error to equate the word mythical with "invented", "false", "all my eye", etc., the noun and the adjective are generally used of stories which have significance, indeed, of a general character and are true, it may be, of human nature in general, but which are not about actual historical persons.

And it is about the historical Jesus that the gospels are written: about a Jesus who lived, proclaimed a kingdom, was executed, testified to that he had risen from the dead, that he had sent the Holy Spirit to his Church, has redeemed thousands and succours those who call upon him still. Of course at this point one may wish to call a halt abruptly, and point out that all this is mythology, or at best partly mythology and partly highly subjective interpretation. But if these claims are myth they are presented as history: there have been, and there are, those for whom these things are actually and without reserve historical; nor would they ever have been recorded or preserved, nor should we be considering them now, if men whom we so blandly accuse of mythologizing had not staked their lives, and given their lives, on their historicity. This is the objection, as I see it, to Bultmann and his followers: not that they are wrong to deny the historicity of particular statements in the New Testament, or to insist upon their being written in myth, but that they do scant justice to the fact that the events of the New Testament are recorded as history. If we think it is unhistorical in part or in mass, we have to explain why it was recorded (for we have abandoned the reasons given in the New Testament itself) and if we answer "Because its authors thought that what they were recording was historical", we must go on to ask "Why did they believe that?" And this is perhaps the fundamental question; for it is easy enough to see why *we* may believe that it is not after all historical: it is too full of events such as we have not ourselves seen, and which are abnormal: it does not cohere with our everyday experience. In such a case the New Testament authors are entitled to reply, were they to be given the opportunity, that it does cohere with their experience, and that as a matter of fact it was from their experience that they wrote. They might then ask if, making some allowance for the fact that their forms of thinking, their categories for naming, and so forth, are drawn from their own historical tradition, which is open for our inspection, what they have told us has a place in our account of history; and, if not, how as historians we are going to account for the manifold phenomenon of Christianity; and whether it will make sense to say, as it seems we are about to say, that the documents which it is common ground to say are the evidence for the origins of this undeniable historical fact, convey nothing but myths which express their faith.

Once again, it is true that the history is presented in mythological form. We may take one example which is crystal clear, because the Bible itself provides us with both a naturalistic and a "mythological" explanation: the behaviour of the apostles at Pentecost, which may be regarded as merely paranormal. There were those who saw it and said it was due to alcohol. The Church's interpretation is that the Holy Spirit was given in this particular instance of ecstatic prophecy, of which countless examples were known, and about which it had always been a question whether *this* instance was of God or not. The Church said *this* instance was of God, that it fulfilled a prophecy, that it was part of God's plan, an interpretation in terms of past, present and future events—historical events. And note that it is in the light of history that we have to decide whether the Church's interpretation is true or false. Had the apostles after this achieved nothing, we should probably have regarded it as false. In the light of what they did achieve it is open to us to regard it as substantially true.

Thus at least some of the themes presented by the New Testament are presented as history interpreted by history. The mythology is in such instances provided by history and presented as history: it may be history presented mythologically, but it is still history.

To return to Christology after this example: our plea is that Jesus is an historical person described in mythological terms derived from the history into which he comes, which as a man he inherits. The form of a servant is an historical form, both mythological and historical, but the mythology is historical just as the history is mythological. Disaster follows when we neglect either of these two facets of the evidence about Jesus. If we dissolve the myth to look for the history, we find ourselves looking into the liquid into which we have dissolved our material and in the pool see a dim reflection of ourselves. Or we may disown the myth as a category for our own understanding—and perhaps ascribe it wholly to Jesus himself, and thus obtain the Jesus of Schweitzer's interpretation, according to whom Jesus deliberately acted out in history what Bultmann would call a myth. Much has been written about Schweitzer, and no doubt much more will be written about a man who will be acclaimed as great long after most of his contemporaries are forgotten: but admiration for him ought not to blind us, any more than the strange Wagnerian picture which he has conjured up ought to blind us, to the strangest fact concerning Schweitzer and his theology: namely, that it is adequate as inspiration for the person presumably most convinced by it. The Jesus who was broken on the wheel and died in the lowest depth of despair, at his last moment convinced of the radical falsity of all his hopes, is a Jesus who "reigns" and can come to us as he came to the first disciples by the Galilean Lake and bid us follow him. Whither? On to the wheel or into the abyss of despair? We have but to ask these questions to see that the really important criticism of Schweitzer's interpretation is provided by itself: the Jesus whom it attempts to explain transcends the explanation as surely as the Jesus of the gospels—and there is no other—transcends the gospels. Thus the historical explanation of Jesus which seems to be the most fiercely uncompromisingly historical is revealed as no less a myth than any other account of him, and is revealed as a myth transcended even in its telling. The very sources which Schweitzer uses will tell him that if Jesus is broken on the wheel of history he is one with the force which moves the wheel. If he reigns from the Cross, he manifestly does not reign only there.

There are hearts in which he reigns, and it is from among those hearts that we derive the testimony that he rose from the dead.

We can indeed no longer postpone the claim which the subject of the resurrection makes upon one rash enough to write on the Incarnation and Mythology: the Agag-like approach which you will have noticed when we came near this matter hitherto was quite deliberate, because it seemed likely that the Resurrection would turn out to be central, and therefore would have to be considered by itself. It is, in fact, a very important matter for the controversy between Bultmann and his critics. Bultmann thinks it useless to try to recover the historical fact behind resurrection faith, and says of the Resurrection: "Is it not a mythical event pure and simple?" and holds with some justice that, in the New Testament preaching, Cross and Resurrection go together, and points out the well-known fact that the Resurrection is made known to us in the New Testament always as an event in the life of someone in close touch with the Lord, one who enjoyed a personal relation with him. And Bultmann would have us make the same existential affirmation as Thomas when he said: "My Lord and my God!" or as Mary Magdalen when she cried, "Rabboni!"

Now, this matter is vital not only to Bultmann but also to my argument because in Paul and the early chapters of Acts the Incarnation is based on the Resurrection: Jesus holds the unique place when he does hold in the world and love of the Christians by virtue of the fact that God has raised him from the dead. He does not hold that place because they affirm that he rose from the dead, although it would of course be fair to say that they affirm that he holds that place because he rose from the dead. That, Bultmann would say, is their myth, and they will stick to it. Let us, then, notice the historical nature of that myth. It might well be argued that the Thomas story is a very good example of myth: until Thomas felt for himself the marks of the crucifixion he could not know Jesus as risen. And the story occurs in the Fourth Gospel which Bultmann believes to have begun that process of demythologization which he wishes twentieth-century scholars to continue. It would be easy to preach Bultmann's existentialist Christianity with the story of Thomas as a text. But it is not presented as myth. It is presented as history, and if we wish to regard it as myth we must regard it as historical myth. Thomas in the story becomes convinced of the fact of the Resurrection only when he has seen the historical evidence.

It is, of course, true that the Lord's words are extremely significant, "Blessed are they who have not seen and yet have believed", and no doubt the evangelist wishes us to take them to heart, but by the very recounting of the story of Thomas he shows that he does not mean that they are blessed who accept the Resurrection without evidence, but that they are blessed who accept the testimony of those who are witnesses of, and therefore preach the Resurrection. Thomas had failed to do just that. He would not believe when his fellow-disciples told him that in his absence they had seen the Lord. Their testimony was founded upon historical evidence—they had seen the Lord. It was this which Thomas was asked to believe, with, of course, the consequence of that: that the Lord was alive. He was not asked to believe the Resurrection because his fellow-disciples preached it, but because they had seen the Lord and preached it.

Similarly, we may dispose of the other story in the supposedly demythologizing gospel, that of the appearance to Mary Magdalen. If this is part of the "mythical event pure and simple", it is again presented as history. Again, as in the Thomas story, the objective element is prominent. Mary supposed him to be the gardener, her unbelief, in this case due simply to her sloth of perception caused by her weeping. She was crying so she did not see who it was. This is a long way either from the self-induced wholly subjective experience of (for example) Goguel, or existential affirmation of Bultmann. You may believe it or disbelieve it, of course, but whatever you do, you have to admit that it is presented as history. It is certainly mythological history because the chapters in which the Resurrection in any of the gospels is narrated make abundantly clear that they are describing the Resurrection of the Messiah; and the Messiah is a mythological conception, but, as we have seen, a conception unintelligible apart from the history of the nation into which Jesus entered.

Both the writers and those about whom they wrote, in giving testimony about the Resurrection, were well aware of the natural opposition which they would encounter in giving this testimony: even the Pharisees, distinguished in part by their belief in a resurrection, had to be reminded that they believed in it, and were shocked at a particular example of their general belief. Some might have exclaimed with the young lady in James Bridie's play, "But this has nothing to do with religion: it is a matter of fact". Gamaliel pointed out that this might be a case where a religious belief had actually become fact, and that if they opposed it they might be opposing God. And this seems to me to be the precise point at which every person entertaining the claims of Christianity stands: he can see the feasibility of the belief put before him; it is not difficult to give in modern language some account of what Christians believe about the Incarnation, and that without offence to intellect, but the difficulty arises in connexion with the actual historical Jesus, and it is of course the fundamental claim of Christianity that in this historical person the myths came alive and true. The Athenians whom Paul addressed were used enough to hearing of various gods and demigods and heroes, but when they heard of the Resurrection of a man "some mocked". It was too big and actual. But if the Resurrection is vital to the doctrine of the Incarnation, as it is in the New Testament, and if we have to admit that, in however mythological a form, it is as history that it is presented, we are brought face to face with the fact that the Incarnation is presented as history. We have seen some of the ways in which it is historically presented in the New Testament, when we very briefly reviewed some of the titles which these earliest Christians gave to the Jesus about whom they claimed at the same time and most uncompromisingly that he was a historical person, with a mother, brothers, and sisters. The titles were said to be mythological titles, but derived from historical myth: in other words the writers of the New Testament claim that this Jesus fulfilled the ancient mythical, historical titles, but fulfilled them in history, as an historical person. Unless we believe this we cannot believe the Incarnation, and if we believe the Incarnation this is what we must believe about the titles given to Jesus in the New Testament: that he fulfilled them but transcended them. For in the New Testament the Incarnation is nothing but the actualization and transcendence of historic myth.

It may have seemed odd that no definition of myth has been given but the accident—for accident it was—is a happy one: for we have taken Bultmann as a starting-point and his definition of myth is "the use of imagery to express the other-worldly in terms of this world and the divine in terms of human life." But it is precisely this which Christians claim that God did in Jesus—Jesus the historical person: in his *history* God has given us a *myth*, but must we not add, "the myth became flesh and dwelt among us"? For that there *was* an historical Jesus is of course common ground. And it seems after all that we can agree with Bultmann: that Jesus is myth, if by this he really does mean that in him, in his image, the other-worldly is expressed in terms of this world and the divine in terms of human life.

A CHURCH IN ACTION

Contemporary Issues and Opportunities *

By The Rt. Rev. L. S. HUNTER

Thirty-five years ago, during the first World War, Baron von Hugel came one day to speak to the members of the Army and Religion Inquiry over which his friend Bishop Talbot of Winchester was presiding. He had read all the evidence supplied by the chaplains and others about the mind of the men serving. His comment was characteristically sympathetic, humorous, colourful, passionate;

> It is impossible to confine any adequate statement of the richness of life within any formula Tommy can understand: and if we do not get him to feel that the richness is there all round him and within him, we shall never have him, indeed it is not worth trying to have him . . . There are things beyond Tommy, and the minute he wakes up to this primary fact, we shall have a sign that he is saved.

The Baron would not for one split second have allowed you to conclude that therefore churchmen need not bother about Tommy and the masses, and that they could with a good conscience keep themselves to themselves and carry on just as before. God happens to care a great deal about the Tommies of this world, as he knew well. The Son of God came to preach a Gospel of life and redemption to the likes of Tommy in Galilee and Jewry, and it appears from the records that He cared more for the ordinary folk outside the ecclesiastical pale than for Caiaphas and Annas or the political V.I.P.s like Herod and Pilate.

So by way of introduction I would set alongside the sentences from the Baron, with which I fully agree, a paragraph from a recent address of mine:

" The concern I would share with you all is for the future trend of the industrial masses; at present so dangerously out of touch with the churches, and so little touched by the churches as they are staffed and operated. I have tried to show that we delude ourselves when we think the gap can be closed by a few well-written pamph-

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*The first of the Dean Starr Lectures delivered in September last at Trinity College, Toronto.

lets dropped as we pass hurriedly through ‘ down-town ’ by short-term ministries in industrial and missionary districts, by hot-gospelling or by expensive philanthropies. Equally we delude ourselves if we imagine communism can be shot down, ferreted out by politicians and police and so stamped out. It cannot even be argued down. It has to be lived down by being out-lived. Only the Christian Church at its best can do that. And we are slow at getting off the mark. The situation demands a costly identification with the lives of the men, women and families who form the base of the pyramid of industrial society, and the majority nowadays in every democracy. My hope and prayer are that during the next half century the Holy Spirit may inspire a movement and ministry of clergy and laity, men and women, which will do for our world what the Franciscan and Dominican movements in their early days did for the medieval world, more fully identified with the life of the world than those religious orders could be, but fired by the same passion, love, courage, intelligence and power from on high.”

The Baron, whom I knew and loved dearly, would have agreed, for philosopher and saint as he was he was deeply concerned at the apparent failure of the Christian mission in Christendom. In most respects the failure is even more apparent today, for neither Lenin nor Hitler had climbed into the saddle when he spoke the words quoted.

As I read the contemporary situation in England, if I may start from there, the issue which the Church of England has to face is whether it can become effectually the Church of the English people, imparting to statesman, industrialist, trade unionist, artist, educationist, scientist and journalist, to V.I.P. and ordinary folk, a working creed, a philosophy of life, a faith that makes the climate of thought and provides the spiritual dynamic without which a democracy cannot function well. If English Churchmen took their heads out of the sand and were willing to make their Church effectually the Church of the English people, they would be empowered by the grace of the Holy Spirit. For we still have the status and hold some of the keys. Think, for example, of the way in which the Coronation was set within the eucharistic worship of the Church, and the way in which the Church of England specifically took charge of the whole proceeding. Splendid indeed would it be if that event were an outward, visible sign of the actual relation between Church and people. Think also of such inherited traditions as the opening of both Houses of Parliament by family prayers to which no visitor is admitted, taken for the Commons by a priest of the Church of England and in the Lords by a Diocesan Bishop, and including a Seventeenth Century prayer which begins,

> We thine unworthy servants here gathered together in thy Name

and concludes by asking God to grant that

> the result of all our counsels may be to the glory of thy blessed Name, the maintenance of true Religion and Justice, the safety, honour and happiness of the Queen, the public wealth, peace and tranquillity of the Realm, and the uniting and knitting together of the hearts of all persons and estates (in the same) in true Christian love and charity one towards another, through Jesus Christ, our Lord and Saviour.

Think of the old custom whereby on the Sunday after his election the Lord Mayor or Mayor of a town invites his fellow councillors, civic officers and leading citizens to accompany him to the Parish Church. What a loss if these things became picturesque historical survivals, and so inevitably were to fall into desuetude, instead of becoming more and more vitalised, and a genuine sacramental expression of the relationship of Church and People.

Take account also of the parish system and the unique position of the parish priest, on whom is laid the care of the souls of "*all* the parishioners of the parish", and not just of the regular worshippers, together with the fact that 70 per cent. of the children born are baptised in the parish church, 50 per cent. of the marriages are still married there and the Church of England buries most of the dead.[*]

In England, the alternative to the Church of England becoming the Church of the English people and being, therefore, the spearhead of the revival of an operative and full Christian faith among them, is the spread of scientific humanism and of its political and economic counter-part, namely communism in some from or other. The issue is an open one, I believe, for the next thirty years; but if at the end of that time the Church of England has not woken up to its opportunity, God help England! Neither the Free Churches (I am not excluding, of course, the possibility of a measure of reunion) nor the Roman Catholics can make good a failure on the part of the Church of England to rise to the call of God.

While the situation in Britain, owing to its deep-rooted historical traditions, and all that ties with that, has it special character and opportunity, the situation is not dissimilar elsewhere in the world. In Canada and the U.S.A. the churches of the Anglican Communion are also confronted with a challenging opportunity. It has been my inestimable privilege this summer not only to attend the Congress at Minneapolis and meet members of our Communion from all parts of the world and in greater numbers from Canada and the States, but also to travel across the continent to the Pacific Coast and back and to see something of the life and work of our churches in San Francisco, in the missionary diocese of Oregon and in Vancouver. The differences between a congested island and a vast continent with many of its resources untapped and its wide spaces still unpopulated, are indeed great. None the less in America also our Communion has to decide whether to be content to be one of many competitive sects with its eye more upon the other competitors than upon the unshepherded population in the developing areas—or to be moved to become a strong missionary movement in these areas and to try to provide for great new countries a Christian climate of thought and a deeply Christian interpretation of national, political and economic life. If a fellow-churchman may risk an opinion formed from a limited range of observation, there is a clear call to our Church in North America both to give its missionary task first priority and also think out at a deep level and to articulate clearly a Christian view of society and of social responsibility which springs out of the soil and life over here and is relevant to it.[1] The Anglican Communion, because of its traditional association with the life of a nation in its greatest period of expansion, and even more because of its incarnational and sacramental view of life, is in a stronger position than other reformed churches, and for other reasons more than the Roman Catholic Church, to do this for the new world provided it has the vision, the determination and the man-power, clerical and lay. These issues are in all probability only open for a time. Opportunities in history do not stay open for long—certainly not in a world changing as rapidly as the world is changing in these times—and they rarely recur.

It is very difficult to see the contemporary scene and its trends. That has always been the special gift of the prophets in history. Clergy and ministers who have steeped themselves in the Bible so that our picture of the universe is unconsciously that of the Biblical cosmology, and whose devotion is deeply influenced by the language of the Prayer Book so that in our concept of society there are relics of feudalism, have to make a special effort to see society as it is. Our tendency, and that of most other people, is to think in terms of a social order that has passed away. It is important that we should try to look at the contemporary picture. If we do, what do we see ?

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[1] Is it impertinent to ask whether the title " Church of England in Canada " is not an anachronism and an increasing handicap ?

The psychological effects of mass production have become endemic in society; and propaganda and advertising have made people very suggestible. The sensationalism of press, film, and of much recreation have become their normal diet. The triumphs of science and technology—the brilliant achievement of making the American deserts blossom as the rose—coupled with modern trends in education make people receptive to scientific humanism and disposed to dismiss historical Christianity as no longer credible. The impact of Marx and communism is growing in strength, and the policy of the U.S.A. is helping rather than hindering this among intellectuals. At the same time changes in social habits, and in England the increase of the three-shift system and compulsory national service, crowd out the religious habits of former days, especially the traditional observance of Sunday, which at least provided time for religious instruction and assembly. All these influences seem to be lessening men's hunger for spiritual things and their capacity to listen and to attend to the Word of God. Consequently for many sons and daughters of a God-fearing ancestry great words like, " Whom have I in heaven but thee, and there is none upon earth that I desire in comparison of thee " *correspond with no personal experience.*

In Canada as in the U.S.A., many of those who have fought and won a livelihood and a very real sort of life, on the prairies, on the lonely ranches and in the lumber regions did so without being within reach of either the ministries or fellowship of a church. I was told that the percentage of the population in Oregon and Washington who had no church connection, was higher than elsewhere in the States, and of those who had some church connection many adhered to fancy religions, which can hardly be described even as Christian heresies.

Our anxiety should not be because some people become attached to semi-idealistic fraternities, or to political associations, but because so many, except for their family ties—and these get untied all too easily—are only interested in making money and in the things which modern techniques bring within their purchasing power. A limited life in which the love of God and the sense of social responsibility and moral obligation grow weak.

All this presents the Christian Church with a baffling problem for which there is no historical precedent. It is not surprising, therefore, that many clergy oscillate between escapism and defeatism according to their gifts, temperament and brand of theology. Neither state of mind produces the hopeful dynamic and the sure strategy of a Church militant.

There is another feature of the contemporary situation which churchmen ought to keep in mind, although we may not be able to do much about it. In the nineteenth century one of the causes of social revolution in Europe was the differing standards of life among the members of the same community. It cannot be doubted that the Bolsheviks in Russia and in other countries in eastern Europe have owed much of their success to the shocking inequalities and the absence of social justice between land-owners and peasants, industrialists and workers against which the Church in those lands, Roman and Orthodox, made little or no protest because they were so closely allied with those who exercised power and had great wealth. Similarly in France and Italy today the strength of the communist party is largely due to the poverty of the workers and the reactionary policy of industrialists which the Governments have supported.

While the under-privileged and many refugees are still with us in the cities and countries of the Western world, the mass of the under-privileged today are not white people, but the coloured races that inhabit Asia, Africa and the Indies. If as these peoples become politically more vigorous and socially more articulate, the white people, especially of the West, push up their economic standard of living regardless, and send up the cost of living for the rest of the world, which does not admire their way of life without qualification, there will be the devil to pay. A shrinking world in which there are great disparities in the standard of living, is bound to be a troubled world. It seems to me that the Christian Churches should be pointing these facts out with no uncertain voice. Sad indeed would it be if, in spite of their fine idealism and immense capacity for effective action, the U.S.A. should through a sort of adolescent impatience precipitate the very *dénouement* from which they sincerely wish to save themselves and the rest of the world.

The two-fold issue presented by shortage of food supply in the world and a rapidly increasing population owing to the conservation of life as a result of better medical service and sanitation requires discriminating moral and political decisions. In regard to it the members of the Christian Church should have a mind, a voice and a conscience. For if it is not wisely resolved, and in good time, it is likely to lead to a world conflict more fundamental and intractable than the rivalry of Russia and the U.S.A. It is the countries of the new world who are in the best position to prevent this from happening.

As the years pass, I value national churches more than pan-denominationalism. By national churches I do not necessarily mean established churches, either those like the Church of England or the Church of Scotland which receive no financial aid from the State, or the churches in many European Churches on both sides of the Iron Curtain which are partly or wholly maintained out of the taxes. It is noteworthy that for this reason many Scandinavian Lutherans are somewhat anti-pathetic to the pan-Lutheran movement, which owes much to American initiative and money, and value their contacts with the Church of England. There is, in fact, an affinity and an increasing friendship between the Church of England and the Churches of Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway which is not limited to matters of faith and order, but also springs out the fact that, with marked differences, they are national churches. Even in Roman Catholic countries like France and Spain, the Roman Catholic Church has strong national characteristics which are often resistant to the totalitarian policies of the Vatican. It has been disappointing, therefore, that the Vatican should have been successful in compelling the French hierarchy to call off the pioneering mission of the priest-workmen in France.

The kind of integration of Church and nation in the countries where there are these national churches obviously has its dangers—all good things are dangerous; such churches tend to an erastian temper and outlook, which must from time to time call out a prophetic protest such as characterised the Free Churches in England in their creative period. Provided, however, that the Church's freedom in matters of doctrine and worship and its self-government are safeguarded as they are in the case of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, and less adequately, though increasingly, in the case of the Church of England, the gain is great. It is an asset not to be lightly thrown away, as some Tory-minded Churchmen are tempted to do by their fear that the State might be captured by the parties of the left. The relationship, as I have already said, both expresses the partnership, the two-way traffic, the interplay between sacred and secular, spiritual and matter, and also strengthens it. "The natural is the basis and instrument of the supernatural," a recent writer in *The Times* has said, "and in experience the two do not subsist apart. Men have thought of the natural as the enemy of the supernatural when it is only its essential medium; anything in the natural that is in fact hostile to the supernatural is but a perversion of the supernatural itself." Anglican theology and liturgy have expressed the truth of that inter-action well, and more realistically than any of the reformed churches, and more spiritually than the Roman Church whose witness is corrupted by its unrepentant desire for political power. It also provides the key to the right relationship of Church and State and finds the prototype for this in their relationship in Israel.

In this connection a relevant question to ask and try to answer is, Why did God in His wisdom choose *a people* as the vehicle of His revelation and the instrument of His purpose in history—the Hebrew nation in its totality with its continued liability to apostasy and secularity—and not a religious group like the Nazarenes or Rechabites or the schools of the prophets or the priests and Levites? Is there also an indication of the Divine mind in the fact that according to accredited tradition the Redeemer was not born into a priestly family but into the line of the House of David ?

If one dared to make a quick and very generalised answer it might be that the Society to which the divine revelation was leading was not the Church, but the Kingdom. The Church fulfils its function in the divine purpose in preparing men for the citizenship of that Kingdom in which they realise that wholeness and fullness of life which is life eternal. Under temporal conditions that life is most fully realised in a community in which both secular and spiritual, civic and ecclesiastical, loyalties are demanded and have full play. In post-exilic Jewry, an attempt was made to substitute a church society—a theocracy—for the monarchy of former times. It was a splendid failure. From one angle our Lord's ministry was a protest against its assumptions and a reversion to the doctrine of the prophetic books. There was no compromise possible between His gospel of life and proclamation of the Kingdom and the Jewish ecclesia. In the Christian era, the great heresy of the Roman

Church, spacious though its halls be, is its identification of Church and Kingdom, while the " gathered " Churches within Protestantism in practice, though not in theory, tend to make a similar identification, albeit their halls are not so spacious for they tend to evacuate the Christian life and faith of that element which made Temple once describe Christianity as the most materialistic of the great religions.

The truth, I would suggest, is that Christians have to hold in tension, or to find a more complete synthesis between, the two citizenships of Caesar and of Christ. Both are of divine ordering. Both have their function in the will of God for the whole salvation of man. If they are not complementary and cooperative a man's life becomes schizophrenic. It is the tragedy of our times that a totalitarian state absolutely, and the modern state in other countries relatively, make such cooperation or complementary functioning difficult if not impossible. Such states fail, as fail they must, to exercise the function of church as well as their own, and they prevent the Church from exercising fully its complementary function in society, and would force it into too narrow a mould. Churchmen ought to resist every pressure which would limit the work of the Church to preparing men for a narrowly spiritual life in this world and the next, whether the pressure is exercised by communism, capitalism, pietism or the omnicompetent state. The secular life has its proper autonomies, but it cannot exercise them for the benefit of mankind unless the Church also is free to exercise its apostolic mission in the temporal as well as in the spiritual sphere of the life of man. It must be free to prophesy as well as free to exercise a priestly ministry.

In order to exercise such a ministry and mission, the Church requires not only freedom but also a corporate sense of vocation—its members a fellowship, clerical and lay, of trained, able ministers of the New Testament, on the one hand knowing their sufficiency to be of God, and on the other, having the understanding, the sympathy and the gift to communicate the Gospel to men. When a Church's organisation however is not too good, when clergy are in short supply, when the witness of the Church is weakened by the disunity of the Body of Christ into competing if not warring sects, it is easy for churchmen, especially the clergy, to become absorbed by the domestic affairs of their Church and not to look beyond its frontiers—a vicious and descending spiral which accounts for some of the decline in the Church's influence during the century. For in

Christianity there is dynamic relationship between the outward and the upward look. The God whom we adore cares for the whole life of man and not, as von Hugel once said, only for the part of it that can be directly labelled as religion.

Nevertheless, time and again pressures from without have driven the Church in upon itself and tempted churchmen to relinquish the world to the devil and to men of sin. It happened in post-exilic Jewry when the vocation of the prophets gave place to Pharisaic separatism and the Jewish Church became the congregation of the saved. Our Lord stood in the line of the prophets when He commissioned his followers to be apostolic, not separated but sent, not saved so much as saving—a Church in action.

Since the time of the Apostolic Church, churchmen have often reacted to those pressures by emphasising the separateness of Church and world. This has made them favour the conception of the Church as " a gathered " Church. Biblical Theology in some respects is pressing that way and so, for instance, within our own Communion are reformers who would virtually discard infant baptism. It has always been the peculiar temptation of the godly to be so moved by the elusive ideal of perfectionism that they strain out all the worldly gnats and leave us with some Pharisaic camels.

From outside there are dangerous political pressures today, operating on both sides of the Iron Curtain, which would make men afraid openly to speak the truth on the broad issues of social life for fear of being misrepresented and reviled. This is a growing threat both to democracy and culture and to the Church. The Church is more strongly and securely placed to resist it than any secular body, for it is empowered to denounce the temptation to quench freedom of thought and of prophesying as a sin against the Spirit of Truth and Love. The Church in all ages and countries is set in the world to continue the earthly ministry of the Incarnate Son, who is the Way, the Truth and the Life—and the Rock on which all false human policies and idealism will eventually break themselves in pieces. Fortified by His continuing Presence, the Church is the human instrument in the world of the Living God who wills that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth. In hope and with courage, its members must have confidence in their commitment.

The Anglicanism of Dean Church

By BASIL A. SMITH

RICHARD WILLIAM CHURCH was fifty-six years old and rector of an obscure country parish in Somerset when Gladstone brought him to London in 1871, much against his will, to be Dean of St. Paul's. He remained in this office till his death nineteen years later, the same reticent but authoritative force which his pen had already made him. Contemporaries as diverse as Acton, Morley and Matthew Arnold knew and appreciated his quality. Brilioth ranks him as " perhaps the most esteemed Churchman of his generation ". Scott Holland, colleague, disciple and acknowledged spokesman of Dean Church's more intimate circle, notes in him: " gentleness, delicacy, refinement, holiness . . . the perfected judgement of the older culture, with its firmness, its sanity, its exquisite truth . . . and the touch of a man who lived very near to God ". Above all, there was apparently a peculiar sweetness of personality. Even Mark Pattison, who was his unsuccessful rival for an Oxford fellowship, not only bore him no grudge, but paid a tribute in his *Memoirs* to Church as being " the type of the Oriel fellow ", and numbered him on a subsequent occasion among the few friends who showed him kindness. He continues to be, even in our demoralized century, a significant Christian figure, typical of the Anglican mind at its best.

Church's life, it should be noted, had in it elements calculated to freshen up the portrait features of a normal Victorian biography. To be born at Lisbon in 1815, with a mixture of Irish and Anglo-German as well as Yorkshire blood in the veins—to say nothing of discarded Quakerism in the family outlook — offers more than ordinary promise. Add to this a Florentine childhood between the ages of three and eleven, then two more years at Leghorn with a younger brother to go to school with and play about the harbour among the boats. Sailing ships at this period had not yet been displaced by steam. The Napoleonic wars were recent enough to make Southey's *Life of Nelson* and the battle of Trafalgar thrillingly vivid to boys whose uncle, General Church, in command of the King of Naples' troops, was still rounding up brigands and sticking their heads on poles along the roadsides of Apulia. Young Richard had thirteen years of such Mediterranean colour put into his experience before his father's death brought Mrs. Church back to England, where they settled at Bath. After five years' schooling in Bristol under Evangelical influences, the young man entered Wadham College, Oxford, in 1833.

Brains and friendship did the rest. Church, an unknown youth in days when the best of Oxford was reserved for those whom its society accepted, had the good fortune to be befriended by that lovable High Church eccentric, Charles Marriott, and so was introduced into the austere company of Mr. Keble and Mr. John Henry Newman. The personal consecration, intellectual vitality and charm of the Tractarian leaders changed the whole course of his life. He took a first, became Fellow of Oriel and was admitted—though a late comer—to the inner counsels of the Movement.

This is not the place to recount again the course of that extraordinary don's revolution which has remained vital to the understanding of Anglicanism ever since it happened. What concerns us here is its effect upon Mr. Church. He had come from a school where only a natural streak of scepticism had prevented his being indoctrinated with the arid and cocksure dogmas of Justification by Faith, Total Depravity and so forth in the approved manner of the time. With this background he had entered the theological storm-centre and fallen in love with a vision of the Church of England, as a group of gloriously inspired High Churchmen conceived it. They were men for whom strict views of Christian discipleship as a life of self-sacrifice engendered a fresh and serious curiosity about the origins of Church authority. A study of ancient sources made them aware of something anomalous in their religious inheritance. In particular it was soon realized that the Book of Common Prayer—as certain old-fashioned parsons had long been trying to point out—contained statements and connotations which could only imply that the worshippers who used it belonged to something more than a national Church. The baptized, in fact, were part of that primitive and divinely instituted fellowship, the Catholic Church of Christ. How was this to be reconciled with the spectacle which the Established Church then presented of an effete Bible Society in Erastian chains? What was the essential function of a clergyman and whence did his authority derive? There began, as everyone knows, a heated struggle within the university about the apostolical nature of the Anglican priesthood. The Tractarians, as scholarship was to prove, had a considerable weight of history on their side in urging the view that the Church of England possessed a fundamental Catholicity.

Church embraced this position with a fervent heart and (as usual with him) a dangerously cool head. Moreover, it so happened that the office of junior proctor gave him one dramatic opportunity to serve the cause. By agreement with his fellow proctor beforehand they pronounced their veto and stopped the proceedings of the February Convocation, 1845, when the university authorities were bent upon the censure of Newman and his party. Though but a temporary triumph, it was a courageous blow against the hidebound opponents of a great religious revival.

Readers of Dean Church's classic memoir of the Oxford Movement, written shortly before his death in 1890, can appreciate from its sensitive tone how much this cause and the friendship of Newman had meant to him. That the great and noble friend, who had been such an influence in raising his estimate of Anglican claims, should himself crumple upon the *via media* and seek refuge in Roman Catholicism must have been the severest blow of his life. Neither in 1845 nor later was there a word of bitterness between them; but it was a long farewell. " After the parting at the Observatory ", writes Mary Church, " fifteen years elapsed, during which no direct communication by word or letter passed between them. Within a few weeks of Mr. Newman's secession, a private sorrow came upon Mr. Church in the sudden death of his mother, to whom he was deeply attached; and the year which to him, as to many, had been one of peculiar trial and sadness, closed with a deepened sense of change and loss ".

The story up to this sombre and romantic point is familiar enough, but is none the worse for being retold. It is usual, however, after this stage to lose interest in Church and either pursue the much more popular figure of Newman, or else to regard him as just one of that faithful remnant of Anglicans who rallied round Keble and Pusey after the Tractarian débâcle. In the history of Anglo-Catholicism, for instance, Church tends to appear for mention mainly as the faithful parish priest who went out from a distinguished academic life to teach Catholic practices year after year to the villagers at

Whatley—rather in the heroic, unqualified manner of Stanton among Londoners at Holborn and Dolling in the slums of Portsmouth. Later, when he went to St. Paul's, we are told that he reorganized the cathedral worship with an eye to the beauty of holiness, while he was at the same time the unswerving friend of those incumbents who were imprisoned and persecuted for ritual's sake. All this is true, and the vigorous stand he made against certain bishops for the hounding of Anglo-Catholic clergymen into courts of law deserves to be remembered. Church to the end of his life was, without doubt, keenly loyal to the severe Catholic convictions of the Tractarians. His own standards, quietly maintained, were a constant rebuke both to slovenly churchmanship and also to vague, undogmatic vapourings from the pulpit. But he has, with all this, an outstanding importance of quite another kind. This may be sufficiently expressed by saying that, while Pusey and he had a mutual respect for each other and an equal love for the Church of England, the Anglicanism of Pusey and that of Dean Church were not always the same thing.

When the new rector of Whatley settled down with his bride in 1853 to the duties of a country parish, his vocation was to something more than that of an exemplary incumbent. This slightly-built man with the alert pensive face who spent so much time in his study, and who went with that long envelope to the village post-box each week, was already known to the editors of the *Christian Remembrancer* and the *Saturday Review*. Mr. Church, moreover, had had a congenial part in 1846 with Rogers, Mozley and others in the launching of *The Guardian*—to which in the course of his life he was to contribute more than a thousand articles and reviews. Though a clergyman he was not so much what they call a " clerical contributor " as a man of letters in his own right, however modestly he managed to conceal the fact. That is to say, there was in Church, besides scholarship, a competence to deal with matters which interest the book world generally and not just the ecclesiastical section of it. The scattered nature of what he wrote ought not to preclude a serious consideration of its value. It is among this material that we must look for the development of the peculiarly Anglican point of view of the man. How did he arrive at it ?

The break with Newman, painful as they both felt it to be, was an emancipation for Church. The days when he owed it to his religion and his friend to perform such hack-work as the translation of the Catechetical Lectures of St. Cyril of Jerusalem, were mercifully ended. For the future he was content to leave directly theological studies to men like Pusey and J. B. Mozley. He was glad, indeed, to lean his own not uncritical orthodoxy upon the best supports which their gallant efforts could provide. The forward-looking work of Maurice, both in the re-interpretation of the Bible and in the crusade towards a Christian sociology was something Church could appreciate perhaps, but never feel qualified to engage upon. The particular rôle which he found suited to his abilities was that of critic rather than prophet, and his critical interests—as we have said—were not bounded by his religious beliefs. Epictetus, Guicciardini, Montaigne and the rise of the Ottomans appealed to this omnivorous reviewer as subjects well worthy of the time spent upon their exploration. Much of Church's writing as time went on must have struck some of his religious friends as being somewhat unrelated to the urgent business of the world's salvation. Who needs to know about Cassiodorus or Spenser, and what has Christ crucified to do with the "Gifts of Civilization"? Here was a clergyman constantly bringing into view all manner of historical—as distinct from Biblical—considerations, as if to imply that the Christian intelligence required other revelation than the Church already possessed.

In view of this widening of Church's interests it is significant that he enjoyed, from 1853 onwards, a close friendship with Dr. Asa Gray, the famous botanist. They met in Oxford and began, after Dr. Gray's return, a transatlantic correspondence which lasted thirty-five years. Copies of the *American Academy* and various treatises of a similar nature reached Whatley Rectory as well as news of the war between North and South. When the professor was preparing to present his herbarium and library to Harvard no one was more keenly interested in the project than this English parson whose own amateur botanizing along the hedgerows of the parish was typically Victorian. Not so typical among the clergy, however, was Church's open-mindedness about the new discoveries of science. On the appearance of Darwin's *Origin of Species* he wrote to Asa Gray:

> I owe my first interest in the subject to the once famous *Vestiges;* and I remember thinking at the time it came out, that the line taken against it was unphilosophical and unsatisfactory; and that people

wrote against it in much too great a fright, as to the consequences of the theory, and answered him often more like old ladies than philosophers.

When Church is claimed, and rightly claimed, as a Catholic, it should be remembered that his was a Catholicism always qualified by respect for the ascertainable facts of nature and history. Over the relations between Church and State, for instance, he was implacably hostile to Erastianism; but the basis of his opposition was never merely doctrinaire. " I am ", he wrote to Lord Blachford in 1877, " sufficiently prone to scepticism to doubt all absolute theories as to right on either side. It has always been a matter of arrangement according to circumstances, and the force which each side had ". After 1845 the religious life, for him, had to take note of the realities of this world as well as of clerical theories.

But he remained the despair of Liberals, both theological and political—those " fruitless disturbers of what exists, for the sake of what is impossible ". It seemed to the facile and optimistic Stanley that in Church, his Oxford contemporary and fellow-ordinand, the Broad Church party ought to have a wonderful ally. If the Dean of Westminster and the Dean of St. Paul's could not together do something for London in the way of enlightened Christianity it would not be the fault of the former's enthusiasm. Church was certainly no enemy of critical thought nor of the attempt to re-state the Gospel—so long as it still remained the Gospel—in fresh terms. But he could not just sail straight into everything that came. The modernism of *Essays and Reviews,* when that volume appeared in 1860, made him feel—among the " great, and, as yet, almost unsounded questions " of Biblical criticism—" like a landsman giving advice on board a ship in a storm ". For Temple, one of the contributors, Church formed a very high regard; but with Stanley, however much as he found likeable in the man, he never could feel at one. " He seems to me in the position of a prophet and leader, full of eagerness and enthusiasm and brilliant talent, all heightened by success—but without a creed to preach."

In justice to Stanley and Jowett something needs to be said of the enormous tide of religious despair which they were seeking to stem. To them it was not a matter of wanting to throw dogmatic Christianity overboard, but of having to. As intelligent men they knew what had happened in Europe; while theological scholarship at Oxford was busy upon the "Library of the Fathers", a different class of scholars in the German universities had been burrowing about the very foundations of Biblical Christianity. In 1846 George Eliot gave English readers a translation of Strauss's consternating *Life of Jesus*. Every educated Christian on the Continent had already begun to ask himself what was really left for a man to believe. Renan, it is true, had a beautiful answer soon to offer, but it was not the same thing as the Gospel which Christendom—even divided Christendom—had everywhere known. When the Darwinian theory broke upon the world in 1859, even the average Englishman awoke to a chilly apprehension that science was proving that God had not created the world. How, said the Broad Church modernist, does theology propose to go on expounding the Christian faith in the teeth of such a blizzard of doubt? Would not the Church now have to reduce its teaching to the barest principles of moral goodness, state its convictions in very general terms, and enlist all the best support that enlightenment and goodwill might still provide? A clergyman, wrote Matthew Arnold, if he is intelligent is bound to feel shackled by the doctrines of the Anglican Prayer-Book. To escape this false position he may strive to "put the formularies of the Church of England on a solider basis". Or, he may "abstain from dealing with speculative matters at all: he may confine himself to such matters as Stanley does, or to pure edification, and then, too, he is in a sound position". To such men the Tractarian storm, memorable no doubt for its visions and heroisms, seemed a far-off academic affair of small importance. Jowett, for instance, had dismissed all that world. Among the tests he would apply to religious movements come these significant questions: "Did they divide or unite the world? Did they leave the minds of men clearer and more enlightened, or did they add another element of confusion to the chaos? Did they, seeing the difficulties in which religious belief is temporarily involved, drive men back from reason and history to take refuge in the emotions?"

Church was acutely conscious of all these questions as the years went on. He and Jowett, ordained men, were equally being pressed upon by the religio-scientific tensions of the age. But, in addition, he had accepted while at Oriel a cross and a glory which the Balliol man, for all his brilliance, did not quite appreciate. For Jowett there was one and only one problem: how to reach a *modus vivendi* between intellect and conscience in view of the discredited state of Christian dogma. For Church there had been the ordeal of seeing doubt cast upon the Communion to which he belonged before there came this second ordeal of finding the very truth of Biblical Christianity itself under fire. At some level of his being he may well have known that the two assaults were part of one and the same war of the spirit. Certainly he knew that the grace by which he was overcoming the first assault would be sufficient to enable him to survive the second. Just as, to faithful men under the Providence of God, the Church of England was being vindicated, so, in good time, the Gospel truth of the Bible would also be vindicated. In the meantime he instinctively distrusted the advocates of haste and humanism. " What is this nineteenth-century religion for which all things have been preparing and to which all good things, past and present, are subservient and bear witness? " Well-intentioned moral opportunism, combined with well-informed culture, might appeal to Stanley and Arnold as the best available substitute for a threatened theology. But Church knew in his soul that such a concoction was not Christianity. Traditional doctrine might need to be re-stated in the light of modern knowledge, but until it was truly re-stated he preferred to abide by it as it was. For the form taken by traditional doctrine, though rationally articulated at the hands of theology, is not in origin a product of reason. The vital essence within the hard shell of Biblical dogma is the personal faith by which the generations of men have come to know Christ in his Church. No one treated " reason and history " more seriously than Dean Church did. He stands, however, squarely opposed to mere liberalism on this conviction: it was not *certain* of the facts in the human situation that had to be reconsidered but *all* the facts available—including every man's faith and the context within which his religious life had brought it to him. The truth about God could not be divorced from the truth about his Church.

This must account for the modest but very stubborn adhesion to orthodoxy which marked Church's personal religion. Alongside all his readiness to meet new truth there remained an old-fashioned simplicity of heart where the Gospel was concerned. When someone approached him on the problem of pain he confessed it very difficult to avoid platitudes on such a subject. " I do not see where any novelty about it is to come from ", he wrote in answer to a correspondent, and went on to mention the Cross of Christ where—though "I cannot form the faintest conception of how"—"all human pain was borne and shared and understood ". Likewise the volumes of Church's *Sermons*, which go so cheaply nowadays on the second-hand bookstalls, contain perhaps too much plain Christianity to be palatable to the modern reader who prefers to have religion served up to him by novelists. But the preaching of such a man was never simply prosaic. Being a veteran of achieved steadfastness himself, he has some authority for urging us—as he does in one of these sermons—to hold on to the loyalties of the Faith. " We all of us know that there are loud voices abroad in the world—and, alas, calm and grave ones too—calling us in the name of Truth, to give up the one guiding light of the world. In the name of Truth we must follow where Truth leads us: but in the name of Truth do not let us, bowing before an intellectual tendency which is the accident of a time, be false to our deepest, most irresistible convictions, to our most solid, obstinate assurances both of mind and heart ". The congregations of St. Paul's did not find him tiresome, but flocked for places when the dean was down to preach. Nor was it simply the fame of his Tractarian connexion which caused Oxford undergraduates as well as crusted dons, many years after his leaving, to turn out specially whenever " Church of Oriel " delivered the University Sermons. They knew that in the fundamental things the man of God is never out-of-date.

No one should be surprised to find that his sermons take some colour from the influence of Newman, culminating now and then with an actual quotation. So far as one can ascertain, it was the preaching of the famous Vicar of St. Mary the Virgin on a certain occasion in 1836 which led to Church's ordination there about three years later. He never lost his love and admiration for the master whom God had made the means of igniting the flame of holiness in him. Fifteen years after their memorable parting the pair of them renewed a friendship which had meant so much at Oxford; and, from the time of the *Apologia* till Newman's death, the happy relationship was never broken again. In July 1870 they went over the great house at Longleat together when the future Cardinal was on a visit to Whatley Rectory. " He made himself quite at home with Helen and the children; with the children he compared notes about children's books which has ended in their sending him, and his heartily accepting, one of their books of nonsense, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, which he did not know, and they thought he ought to ". Here was mellowness and charity worthy of the greatness of both men. The host knew, and his guest must have known, that they were together not only because they believed in the same Lord, but because—religion apart—they were friends who shared the same world as civilized beings. They had the wisdom to acknowledge, tacitly, that there are occasions when life is the richer for leaving it at that.

The Anglican, however, was not disloyal to the spirit of this understanding when, in August 1890, not long before his own death, he wrote for *The Guardian* some final thoughts suggested by the passing of his friend. What, he asked, was the governing idea which had shaped Newman's course? What had made the Church of England intolerable to him? How had he fared after his change of allegiance? He was looking, wrote Dean Church, for " devotion and sacrifice, prayer and self-denying charity, in one word sanctity " in that absolute degree of which the New Testament is the measure. Newman saw these Gospel virtues reproduced among Roman Catholics, whereas the English Church " had exchanged religion for civilization, the first century for the nineteenth ". After joining the Roman obedience he never for a moment wavered in his loyalty. Nevertheless, says the dean, time compelled him to realize that the Papal Communion, is administered and governed by men of mixed characters, and the same sort of passions and faults as are found among Anglicans. " The Roman Church had to accept, as much as the English, the modern conditions of social and political life, however different in outlook from those of the Sermon on the Mount". In the ripeness of old age Cardinal Newman came to recognize a Providential beneficence about certain of the amenities of civilization which, in themselves, are not obviously necessary to Christian living. Thus he remained an Englishman and a product of Oxford as well as a Roman Catholic. There were, in short, good things which the new fold had not given him; and, withal, there was an ideal of Church life which no actual institution on this earth could give him. His quest had left him still with " a pathetic yearning for something which was not to be had ".

This view of Newman is worth quoting because of the light it throws upon Church's own convictions. He himself was not without much of his friend's burning thirst for holiness. However inferior to him in poetic genius and imaginative range, Church was quite as vital and profound in the moral apprehension of religious truth. But his sound judicious instinct brought him, before middle life, to the way of drawing clear mental lines between fact and vision. It may be that severe disillusionment had caused him to re-assess the possibilities of the Church of England after 1845. Yet how did he come through the whole of a long life apparently unscathed either by doubt or cynicism in reference to the Anglican position? Perhaps it was because, while he was re-assessing the Church to which he belonged, he also took a realistic measure of other Churches and noticed their need for some more satisfactory justification than the claims which their records so often belied. By grace he early formed the habit of surveying without despair and without rancour the mixed character of human nature as it is reflected in every kind of institution, sacred and secular alike.

What is the shrewd and earnest Christian to do in such a world? His answer was to keep a severe eye upon his own motives; and, after that, go forward year by year among books and people and affairs, trying to pick out, as the Spirit led him, the essential stepping-stones by which to save his mind from drowning amidst the nineteenth-century torrents. While taking a sort of fearful care privately that the talent entrusted to him should not, as St. Paul says, be "corrupted from the simplicity that is in Christ", he was singularly cool and fearless in the face of public alarms—particularly theological ones. There arose from time to time disappointments enough to tax an iron nerve, but pessimism had no place in his thinking. He came to regard the Church in which he had been placed as the strongest and most hopeful in Christendom, "with much excess and folly in it, as in all human things that have life, but growing into the only work for which a Church ought to live—reclaiming, consoling, binding up, teaching men to worship and rejoice in the unseen Goodness and Glory". Even as he wrote these words he was measuring the forces of pride and ignorance which threatened to make shipwreck of all this. But he could afford to take cognizance of unwelcome facts as well as note the living virtues of a Church which he had unwaveringly learned to understand, and serve and love. His religious constitution was tough enough to survive any fears with which a naturally sceptical mind is often confronted. The ground of his position was not the infallibility of the Church but the inexhaustible mercies of Christ at work both in the Church and, always besides, in an ocean of Providence reaching far beyond the safe harbour of an ecclesiastical outlook.

Spirit-Baptism or Baptism into Christ Jesus?

By G. W. H. LAMPE

THE reviewer of Dr. Thornton's recent book on Confirmation in the October-December issue of the *Church Quarterly Review* remarked on a current tendency to shift the ground of the controversy about Christian Initiation from the patristic and liturgical sphere to that of Scripture. This is all to the good, and it is interesting to find in the same issue of this journal that Mr. H. A. Blair insists on the very important truth that the patristic evidence, where it is obscure, must be interpreted by reference to the scriptures themselves, and, in so far as we may be able to determine it, by the teaching and example of the Lord.

Yet Mr. Blair's article[1], in which he seeks to find a pattern in St. Mark's Gospel which may throw light on the nature of baptism, serves to warn us how easily the appeal to Scripture may introduce still worse confusion into this difficult subject unless we can refrain from trying to impose a pre-conceived pattern upon the text of Scripture, and be willing instead to allow the biblical writers to speak for themselves. It also illustrates the danger of allowing the theologically unsatisfactory concept of " Spirit-baptism " to dominate our doctrine of Christian Initiation and produce a series of unnecessary complications into what should be relatively simple and clear-cut.

Mr. Blair points to the contrast between the baptism in water only which was administered by John and the baptism with Holy Ghost which was reserved for Christ. This is the essential distinction, and it is in this context, and probably here alone, that the term " Spirit-baptism " may properly be employed. John's baptism was a symbol of repentance, a preparation of sinners for the approaching judgement. The baptism to be bestowed by Christ is a baptism in which the ancient hope of an outpouring of the Spirit on God's people will be fulfilled. Mr. Blair goes on to show that both John and Jesus follow a common pattern in their ministries. They preach and invite, and evoke confession from those who resort to them. But on one point the parallel breaks down. John alone is said to have baptized, and in spite of the recorded promise that Jesus would baptize with the Spirit St. Mark never explicitly describes him as doing this. Mr. Blair is therefore driven to look for some implied or symbolical fulfilment of this promise, concealed somewhere within the Marcan narrative.

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[1] " Spirit-Baptism in St. Mark's Gospel ".

Now this is surely a mistaken and hopeless quest. The united witness of the Gospels, indeed of the New Testament as a whole, is that Christ's baptizing with the Spirit begins when his saving work of redemption is completed and not before. Only when that baptism with which he said that he had to be baptized had been accomplished at Calvary and he had risen from the dead to receive the promise of the Father, was the prophecy of Spirit-baptism fulfilled. His death and resurrection, as a single decisive act of redemption, are the sole ground of Christian baptism, which, in one of its aspects, is Spirit-baptism. It may be objected that St. Mark does not know the saying recorded in Lk. xii, 50 to which allusion has just been made; but the same thought is contained in the answer to the sons of Zebedee in Mk. x, 38. It may also be suggested, with Mr. Blair, that since St. Mark does not tell us about Pentecost he must indicate the fulfilment of the prophecy of Spirit-baptism somewhere within his narrative of the earthly ministry of Jesus. Otherwise, it is said, his story would be incomplete. His Gospel would be like a version of the story of Cinderella without any description of how the fairy godmother carried out her promise.

There is certainly an apparent difficulty here, but it is unreal. St. Mark is writing for Christian readers within the context of the life and worship of the post-Pentecostal Church. His readers know very well from their own experience how John's prophecy came true. If it had not been fulfilled there would be no Church for them to belong to—in Rome or anywhere else; they would not themselves have been baptized into Christ in that Church, and they would not now be listening to and understanding the subtleties of St. Mark. To use Mr. Blair's own simile, this is the story of Cinderella being told, not to a third party but to Cinderella herself while she is still in the first happiness of her possession of the fairy coach, gown and all. In these circumstances we can hardly expect the story-teller to feel bound, necessarily, to describe the happy ending in detail. St. Luke, for his own very proper reasons, did feel it right to do this, and St. John also describes the fulfilment; but St. Mark leaves his readers to fill in for themselves the full content of the implications of the angel's message to the women at the tomb. Until we realize that the whole significance of Christian baptism is Christocentric, and that it is grounded in the Lord's saving death and resurrection, we can never hope to understand this sacrament. οὔπω γὰρ ἦν πνεῦμα, ὅτι ὁ Ἰησοῦς οὔπω ἐδοξάσθη. This text is peculiar to St. John, but it is simply an explicit affirmation of a basic fact which the entire New Testament asserts by implication. We need not therefore feel that St. Mark has failed us when we find in his account of the earthly ministry no description of how Jesus baptizes with Holy Spirit. On the contrary, if he did show us Jesus baptizing with the Spirit before the Passion and Resurrection he would be contradicting an essential truth of the Gospel. It may still be true, nevertheless, that Mr. Blair is right in inviting us to see in the healing miracles of Jesus in Galilee a preliminary foreshadowing of the effects of the saving work which he was later to accomplish at Jerusalem. In the pattern of miracles in Mark, up to ii, 12, we certainly do find that Christ bestows exorcism, healing, purging and new life. All these blessings are aspects of the life of faith in Christ, the state of being, as St. Paul would say, " in Christ ". It is also true that the state of being " in Christ " is symbolized, and sacramentally made effective to the believer, through Christian baptism. Christian baptism is, furthermore, baptism with the Spirit. We may therefore follow Mr. Blair so far as to see in the pattern of the healing miracles an adumbration of the effects of the baptism which Christ's death and resurrection were to make possible. It is, however, going much too far to assert that in the miracle stories in Mark i—ii, " Jesus himself speaks to us about baptism ", and to draw inferences about the nature of the sacrament from these passages.

The inferences which Mr. Blair draws are, in fact, very surprising. The foreshadowing of salvation (exorcism, healing, restoration to life) revealed in the miracle stories is interpreted as signifying " Spirit-baptism ". But Spirit-baptism itself is said to be imperfect. It is a " preparation of the house for the Holy Ghost ", and although " Spirit-washing " requires faith on the part of its recipient, it does not demand or imply " whole-hearted surrender " to Christ. This is reserved for the personal response expressed in confirmation, which confers full membership of the Church and bestows a second gift of the Spirit for the salvation of others through the baptized person's " missionary " activity. The prototype of confirmation is found by Mr. Blair in the choice and commissioning of the Twelve.

He may be on the right lines in giving a " missionary " significance to confirmation, and we may perhaps be correct in thinking of confirmation as a commissioning for active evangelism. But to derive any authority for this view from the Marcan narrative of the appointment of the Twelve is wholly unwarrantable. It is equally illegitimate to try, as Mr. Blair does, to find in Mark a classification of men into three groups: the unconverted, those who have received Spirit-baptism but are still only half-converted, and the confirmed who have made their full surrender to the Gospel. This is an arbitrary interpretation forced upon the text and not read out of it. When Mr. Blair goes on to read this classification into the Parable of the Sower he is having recourse to the kind of allegorizing which may perhaps be occasionally permissible for homiletic edification (though no good preacher will venture to bend Scripture in this way to support the idiosyncrasies of his own private moralizing) but which is quite intolerable in what purports to be serious exegesis.

The problems of baptism will never be resolved by the appeal to Scripture unless those who make it are ready to refrain from fanciful allegorism which can " prove " anything. Any and every kind of pattern of Christian initiation can be " discovered " in the text by exegetes who have first, as it were, planted it in the text by the arbitrary use of allegory.

In this case the pattern so " discovered " is a strange one. Christian baptism, we are told, is " Spirit-baptism ". So far we may cordially agree. But " Spirit baptism is given to all who ask in faith. There is no excuse for 'rigorism' in administering baptism . . . What the minister is to demand for baptism is a genuine belief that the power of the Spirit will be received ". This is indeed remarkable. The term " Spirit-baptism " usually signifies a baptism through which the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit is conferred on the believer. Here it is used to denote a preliminary washing with the Spirit (whatever that may mean), as distinct from the full possession of the Spirit that is given in confirmation. Here is an old distinction confronting us in a new form. To Dr Mason the contrast was between a regenerating activity of the Spirit in baptism and his personal indwelling in confirmation. On this view confirmation, and not baptism, was the sacrament of "Spirit-baptism". The theory was characterized by Dr. Darwell Stone as meaningless and artificial. In its new form the distinction is between Spirit-washing in baptism and the Spirit's indwelling in confirmation: but this is no less artificial, and when Mr. Blair draws an implied contrast between "possession by the Spirit" and "reception of the power of the Spirit" his theory is certainly no more meaningful than that of Dr Mason. Were not the Apostles possessed by the Spirit when his power came upon them?

In confirmation there is a "gift quite distinct from Spirit-baptism". If this is to be interpreted as a special gift for the active service of Christ we may well agree. We may even see points of similarity between confirmation and the call of the Twelve—which is not to say that when St. Mark describes their call he is saying anything to us about confirmation. But Mr. Blair goes on: "Confirmation" (unlike Spirit-baptism) "demands a full response: in it and after it Christ is to be met in person and God in Christ". "Spirit-baptism . . . is a first step . . . by it God speaks to man and puts him in the way of salvation. At some point on that way . . . the Christian must inevitably meet Christ".

Here, if I may say so, Mr. Blair gives the game away. Here is the root cause of all his forced exegesis and twisted allegorizing. It all rests upon a foundation of bad theology. For Mr. Blair has not yet realized that baptism is the sacrament of incorporation into Christ's death and resurrection and so of membership of his Body, the Church in which, and in whose members, the indwelling Spirit is active for their own salvation and that of the world. What is left of the New Testament doctrine of baptism once it has become a "Spirit-washing" of men who have not yet met Christ in personal encounter? If "Spirit-baptism" is only a first step; if it is only *after* baptism that Christ is to be met in person, what has become of the baptismal union with Christ in death and in newness of life? New Testament baptism means coming to be "in Christ". How can this state be equivalent to half-conversion? How can baptism be rightly administered without the "rigorism" which demands a full personal response of faith? Mr. Blair seems to be taking infant baptism as the basis on which to work out his doctrine: but this will not do. If he wants to appeal to Scripture he must accept the full implications of the Scriptural view of baptism and this includes recognition of the response of personal faith as an essential element in the new relationship to God which baptism symbolizes and effects. How this essential requirement is to be reconciled with infant baptism does not now concern us. The answer is to be sought in the doctrines of Church and Covenant. But we must not evade the problem by evacuating baptism of its full meaning.

This meaning includes membership of Christ's Body. Mr. Blair's allegorizing of St. Mark implies that men can be Spirit-washed in baptism but not formed into a Church until a later stage; that baptism sets them on the way to salvation and yet that they do not become full members of the Church until they are confirmed. This is dangerous doctrine. If Spirit-baptism is Christian baptism, as Mr. Blair claims, then it is baptism into Christ; and we can neither be baptized into an individualistic relationship to Christ nor be "in Christ" without being members of the Body. Confirmation cannot make us any "fuller" members of the Church than we become when we are baptized into Christ, although it is true that in confirmation we become active and responsible members.

To try to depreciate the significance of baptism and to set up in its stead the chimera of "Spirit-baptism" is a popular undertaking among contemporary theologians. Before they continue their attempts to wrest the text of Scripture into conformity with their *a priori* theories they might well apply to themselves the Apostle's question: "Are ye ignorant that all we who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death?" A little meditation on that text might persuade them to abandon their misleading term, "Spirit-baptism", and replace it by the scriptural phrase, "baptism into Christ Jesus"; for we shall never get our theory or practice of baptism right if we allow artificial subtleties to obscure the full meaning of St. Paul's words in all their richness and their simplicity.

CORRESPONDENCE

CRANMER AND THE LITURGY OF 1552

Sir—Of his assessment of Cranmer's aims, Mr. Bourne fairly states in his article (C.Q.R., Vol. CLV, p. 389): "all this is speculation"; we hope that he has found the truth. He has, however, given a practical exposition of our eucharistic rite, and one which deserves attention, leading to action.

Between the *Sanctus* (can we not be rid of the anticlimax of the *Benedictus*?) and the *Gloria*, we have, as Mr. Bourne shows, a complete eucharistic action. With the Prayer of Humble Access as a preparation there follow the Prayer of Consecration, complete with *Anamnesis* (shortened, it is true, *vid.* T. A. Lacey: *Liturgical Interpolations*, 3rd ed., 1912, p. 27), the Communion, the Lord's Prayer, and the Prayer of Oblation, in which the people take part in their sacramental union with Christ. Mr. C. L. Berry has shown (*A Plea for the Prayer of Oblation* 1951, *passim*) that the first alternative post-communion prayer was almost universally used. But even if the Prayer of Thanksgiving is read, the idea of oblation is not entirely absent. We should think more of the Communion as being set in the action of the Canon, rather than of the Canon being "dislocated" (a favourite catchword).

The 1662 rite as we have it receives almost ceaseless adverse criticism. Surely this is mainly because it is almost never used, as it is printed, as a self-sufficient liturgy. It is taken as a framework for interpolations. Mr. Bourne wrote some years ago: "It is not Cranmer who has left us with a dislocated service; it is we who have dislocated it by our failure to realize what he was driving at. First by the insertion of an *Amen*, and in recent years by making a pause for the private prayers of the celebrant and communicants, we have made a break in the action at the very point where Cranmer carefully avoided one". (*The English Catholic*, Vol. 18, 1949, p. 97.)

The *Agnus*, *Pax* and hymns all destroy the movement, and the long silences strain the concentration of the members of the congregation. And is it not true that often the priest makes a silent, interpolated oblation, regarding the post-communion Prayer of Oblation, where it is then used, as of devotional value to the laity, but not as part of the eucharistic action?

The *Amen* at the end of the Prayer of Consecration has been there since 1662, so we must say it, but we should not regard it as the great eucharistic *Amen* of Catholic tradition (whether that is what St. Paul meant in I Cor., xiv, 16, or not). It must be taken as a response of assent by the communicants to the Dominical words of (N.B.) distribution, similar to the individual *Amen*, in the Scots Liturgy, at the reception of the elements by each communicant. The eucharistic *Amen* is that at the end of the Canon, after the doxology of the Prayer of Oblation, immediately before the *Gloria*.

Would it not be better for the whole of the Canon to be read in the natural voice? Even if there are no interpolated devotions, the change from the spoken voice to the chant of the *Paternoster*, and then, possibly, to monotone for the post-communion, helps to destroy the unity of the action. After all, the plainsong Lord's Prayer was not written for our rite, nor was Merbecke's tune, and the earlier nineteenth-century editions of Merbecke, when he was revived, did not include it.

Perhaps it is not too much to hope that some, at any rate, of the beneficed clergymen who read Mr. Bourne's article will make the experiment of using the 1662 rite as it stands, and judging it then, on its own merits, in its unity.

BRIAN TAYLOR.

TRANSUBSTANTIATION AND SACRIFICE

SIR,—I should like to comment on the references to my article which appear in your issue of October-December, 1954. With both Mr. Sharp's letter and Mr. Bourne's fine article I agree on most points so wholeheartedly that I chiefly want to try and correlate what they say more closely with what I have tried to express.

I readily accept Mr. Sharp's criticism that my final paragraph is less clear than the rest. I am glad at any rate that I have *not* produced the impression of having made the whole subject clear. There remained much to be said which space did not admit of, and I tried to hint at it in a way that would be provocative—of thought not of temper !

Certainly, " at every stage " of the Christian life there should be " a renewal of penitence ", just as it is " meet, right and our bounden duty at all times and in all places to give thanks ". But we cannot *say* at once everything that needs to be said; and the very meaning of the Eucharist demands that the liturgy should help us to follow that meaning by setting forth its facets in an intelligible order. If the liturgy were meant to be a penitential service for those still outside the sphere of the grace of Christ, it would suffice for it to remind us repeatedly of the deficiencies of ourselves as a sacrifice as contrasted with the perfect sacrifice of our Lord. But it is meant to do more: to lead and enable us to unite our sacrifice with that One Sacrifice. If we have examined ourselves by the rule of God's commandments, if we have confessed our sins and by God's absolution have been restored to the state of salvation conferred in our baptism, if as members of Christ we have offered ourselves anew to God and sought His sanctifying grace, if we have partaken of Christ's Body and Blood—is it not a denial of all this to turn and appeal for mercy to Him that taketh away the sins of the *world* ? Here the order of the clauses in the protasis, no less than the apodosis. justifies, I think, may perhaps too acidly expressed supposition "that what was omitted in its proper place has been stuck in afterwards as an afterthought".

To turn to Mr. Bourne's article, I regret I have no first-hand knowledge of Cranmer's writings outside his work on the B.C.P. But (without conceding that the order of our Liturgy is the best order) I would like to underline all that he has said—except his admiration for the displacement of the *gloria in excelsis* to the end. *Inter alia* it has long seemed to me that most R.C. popular devotion, and much R.C. theology rests on a belief, not so much in the transubstantiation of the bread and wine, as in the transaccidentation of the Body and Blood. And I feel that he is too modest in calling his reconstruction of Cranmer's intentions "all speculation".

Our liturgy (I said) has a structure of its own. Surely that is because (in Mr. Bourne's words) "Cranmer's primary design was to ensure that all its parts should be regarded as one continuous whole". But the question remains whether that whole is a Sacrifice of Praise and Thanksgiving (the most inclusive of all sacrifices), or predominantly (as I suggested) a Sacrifice Concerning Sin. At any rate, did Cranmer realise that his liturgy *was* a sacrifice (as it certainly is)? Did he not rather, holding the fundamentally false notion of sacrifice that he had inherited, think that he had made the service to be no longer a sacrifice except in a metaphorical and unimportant way? Did he not feel (here I speculate!) that the Lord's Supper is itself unintelligible, so that all we can do is to prepare ourselves, by devotional exercises in penitence, faith and charity, to open our hearts to receive we know not what? That at any rate has been the characteristic Anglican attitude ever since Cranmer's day:

"What that Word doth make it
That I believe and take it"

—a formula on which not only Low Church and High Church, but "Jews, Turks, infidels and hereticks" can agree—for it says nothing. Cranmer is not to blame if such was his belief; rather is he to be admired for the wonderful service that he composed by God's grace with the guidance of Holy Scripture and ancient liturgies imperfectly understood. But surely it is more humble and more reverent to believe that what Christ spoke He meant us to understand, and that we can make progress, even if slowly, in the understanding of it. (Here I criticise, not Mr. Bourne but the Anglican attitude above described.)

There is one sacrifice that God requires of every man—"the surrender of oneself to God to be changed by Him and made fit for His purposes". Not to offer that sacrifice is sin—and all have sinned. The Mosaic Law sets forth different facets of that one sacrifice under many specialised symbolical sacrifices in order to teach man what God requires of each. Christ did not offer many and diverse sacrifices. He offered one complete and perfect sacrifice—none other than what God requires of every man; and that not in order to exempt men from offering but to enable them in union with Him to make their offering acceptably. And so in place of the manifold and partial sacrifices of the Old Law, He ordained one (and only one) symbolical sacrifice, the Eucharist, to be the means whereby we may be enabled to accompany Him step by step along the way that led from the cross to the tomb, to the outpouring of the life-giving Spirit, to the outgoing into the world with new power, to the session at the right hand of God.

So all attempts to distinguish the Sacrifice of the Cross from the Sacrifice of the Altar in terms of the various kinds of sacrifices of the Old Law must break down. Whether we say one is propitiatory, the other expiatory; or the one a sin-offering, the other a thanksgiving; the one a finished event in the past, the other a present remembering and pleading; we are missing alike the essential completeness of each and the essential difference between them. *Sub specie aeternitatis* there is but one all-inclusive Sacrifice—that of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world. *In time* that Sacrifice was enacted on earth, not on the cross alone but in the whole human experience, from the incarnation to the ascension, of the Son of Man. *Now,* " all the days even unto the end of the age " Christ is gathering men into the People of God so that each one in the unity of that fellowship may tread the path that He has gone, and so participate with Him in His offering of the One Eternal Sacrifice. And these two modes of temporal enactment of the One Eternal Sacrifice are bound together sacramentally in Baptism and the Eucharist. The Eucharist is the " true ceremonial sacrifice " which symbolises the Eternal Sacrifice with a view to providing an occasion and help to achieve it in the lives of the People of God.

This brings us to a point left very much in the air in my article—the meaning of " is " in the words " This is My Body ". I suggested that it has the meaning implied in the Eucharist being a true ceremonial sacrifice. What is that ? Not the " is " of subsumption under a class, nor of simple identity, but rather of symbolic reference: " This *means* My Body ". What are ordinary bread and wine ? What do they mean ? What but man's knowledge and labour applied to God's natural gifts of the living wheat and vine, in order that they may serve for strength and refreshment to men's bodies for the work men have to do ? What do the Bread and Wine of the Eucharist mean ? Is it not Christ's work in and upon and through His humanity in order that It may serve for the strengthening and refreshing of the souls of His People for their work of proclaiming Christ's One Sacrifice in which they participate ?

By consecration the *accidents* of the bread and wine are not changed. Actually they are changing all the time but gradually and unnoticeably in the space of time required for their sacred use—of no consequence so long as they are still recognisable to sight and taste. But by consecration the *substance* is changed from what is temporal and corruptible to what is eternal and permanent—that is, their meaning, their value, their purpose, use and effect. In all these aspects they are for us the Body and Blood of Christ—and this, rather that the corruptible accidents, constitutes their truth and importance. They are " for us " the Body and Blood of Christ not in the sense that it is only our faith (or our imagination !) that makes them so, but rather because it is in our use of the Sacrament as Christ ordained it, not in our contemplation of the inert accidents on a remote altar or stored in an aumbry, that we can experience the operative presence of Christ. " Where two or three are gathered together in My name, There am I in the midst of them ". And when are we more definitely gathered in His name than when we meet to do what He has bidden us, for the furtherance of his work and for the glory of God ? It is the personal presence of our Great High Priest which makes the Eucharist more than a sacrifice as being also a Sacrament.

But notice here a significant change in the meaning of " substance " from that assigned to it in St. Thomas' philosophy. The Thomist " substance " is so extremely abstract that in effect it only attributes to a thing the possession of a name; it tells us nothing of why that name is given, or is fitting. St. Thomas only saves his doctrine from what is now called Zwinglianism by another doctrine, which (so far as I can remember) I have never found referred to in controversial writings on the subject—the doctrine of " *realis concomitantia* ", under which he contrives to restore those all-important aspects of Christ's presence and operation which the doctrine of transubstantiation had otherwise excluded (and for which I have preferred above to use the term " substance ").

For my part it seems to me that provided the theologian can avoid the confusions, perplexities and superstitions that have arisen from the misunderstanding of transubstantiation (chiefly by those who accept it, not a little by those who reject it), it matters little whether he expresses his faith in terms of scholastic logic or not. But for the ordinary Christian, unversed in the niceties of philosophical terminology, the less said of " accidents " and " substance " the better. For both alike the important thing is to be learning, by hearing the Word and using the Sacrament, what our Lord meant when He bade us deny ourselves, take up our cross daily and follow Him.

Yours faithfully,

F. C. Long.

GALATIANS iv, 6

Sir—I have no wish to make a general criticism of the Rev. F. J. Taylor's review in your last issue of *Confirmation*: *Its Place In The Baptismal Mystery*, by L. S. Thornton. I would only question what Mr. Taylor has written concerning " the true rendering of the Greek " of Galatians iv, 6.

An anonymous review in the *Church Times* had already cited a verdict on the meaning of this verse in *An Idiom-Book of New Testament Greek* by no less a person than the Lady Margaret Professor of

Divinity, but I take courage from the belief that in the democratic West great pundits never want their disciples to swallow their *ipse dixits* unquestioningly. Professor Moule suggests that "the true interpretation of the verse is not, '*because* you are sons, God sent . . .', but '(proof) *that* you are sons (is the fact that) God sent . . .'". In other words, if I were given to translate from English into Hellenistic Greek the sentence, "The proof that you are sons of God is the fact that God sent . . .", I could copy out Galatians iv, 6 from my Greek Testament and rely upon being clearly understood by any reader with a proper knowledge of the language as it was spoken. Possibly the professor is right, but he gives no other example of an ellipse of such words as "the proof of the fact that . . . is the fact that . . .". He merely adds that "the context clearly favours" the sense he gives to the words. But I submit that an argument from what the context seems to require is of doubtful validity in interpreting St. Paul. For instance, in I Corinthians vi, 19 we so confidently expect to read "your bodies (plural) are temples (plural) . . ." that we may even fail to grasp that what St. Paul actually wrote was "The body of you (i.e., the Church) is a temple . . .".

G. P. H. PAWSON, C.R.

BAPTISM

SIR,—As a Proctor in Convocation it is my business to try to understand deeply the controversy about Christian Initiation in preparation for the debate next May on the Majority and Minority Reports of the Archbishops' Commission. But I find in most writings on the subject a considerable confusion of thought, and this seems to me to centre around a sentence in F. J. Taylor's review of Fr. Thornton's *Confirmation: Its Place in the Baptismal Mystery* reviewed in your last issue of the *Church Quarterly Review*.

The sentence is, ". . . incorporation into Christ means incorporation into his body, the body which since Pentecost possesses the gift of the indwelling Spirit. *It would seem to be impossible to be incorporated into the body of Christ without sharing in the gift of the indwelling Spirit.*" (my italics).

The metaphor of the mystical body seems at this point to fail us, as all metaphors necessarily must at some point, for there is every reason for saying, providing one avoids a dichotomy between body and spirit, that the human spirit indwells the human body, but no reason for imagining that the human spirit indwells fingers or ears or other members of the human body. The metaphor of the body of Christ will only take us as far as the doctrine that the Holy Spirit indwells the Church as a whole.

To be embraced by the arms of Christ's mercy, to be received by him, and to be given the blessing of eternal life, or to be made partaker of his kingdom, i.e. to be brought under his rule, do not necessarily imply that the individual is given a personal gift of the Spirit, but rather that one is brought within the circle of his life and influence and power.

If the metaphor of the Family is used, as the word *regeneration* demands, (or, if that be thought of in the gardener's sense, the phrase *born again* demands) we can make analogies with the governing conditions of a child in a human family, where he certainly has rights and privileges, shares the life, the food, the shelter, the conversation (but only in a limited way, for adults speak of many things he does not understand, and he is not allowed to stay up for supper) and yet must await the day when he earns his own living, and contributes fully as well as shares the family's resources. This is not a mere stage of growth, for, although he may often anticipate his majority, there is a change from childhood to manhood.

So, had the age of discretion (traditionally seven) been adhered to, although individuals may have anticipated it, it could have been argued that the Spirit could not be given as an indwelling gift until full self-conscious personality was reached. But this would be to go back on the first 1200 years of tradition, as indeed the Church did, and to condemn the Eastern Orthodox practice wholly. It would seem better to assume that self-conscious personality is present in infancy, and that however pastorally useful it may be to defer Confirmation, any human being is potentially capable of being confirmed.

I cannot agree that being incorporated into the body of Christ automatically bestows the gift of the Spirit, for that seems to confuse the Second and Third Persons, but I can see that being so incorporated implies capacity to receive the gift of the Spirit, and I cannot see any valid reason for withholding confirmation from baptism candidates of any age. Although if we revert to confirming babies at baptism we can clearly only initiate the children of communicant parents, and need to revive a catechumenate for the others.

Mr. Taylor's difficulty would not have arisen had we not deferred confirmation, but it is nevertheless confusing to identify the Word with the Spirit.

Yours faithfully,
HENRY COOPER.

REVIEWS

AUGUSTINE

THE YOUNG AUGUSTINE. By JOHN O'MEARA. Longmans. 21s.

WHEN a man's reputation and influence has survived close upon 1600 years, it shows a great bluntness of mind not to be interested in his life and development. Such a man was Augustine of Hippo, who—St Paul only excepted—has done more to shape Christian thought and doctrine than any other protagonist of our faith. For centuries the pulpits of Christendom have quoted his words as though they were oracles; and in Spain there is an old saying, " Sermon sin Agostino, olla sin tocino ". A sermon without Augustine, is as a stew without meat. Here then is a man not to be neglected, and here is a book making its timely appearance (the sixteen-hundredth anniversary of Augustine's birth) which will reawaken our interest in the great Saint.

The author shows a complete mastery of his subject, his prose is terse and lucid, and he has not followed the modern fashion of distracting the reader with pages of trivial and quite unnecessary notes.

In an early chapter a brief sketch is given of the North African background, a more fertile and populous region than at the present day; yet the habitat of lions and panthers, then sent in great numbers to Rome for the arena games.

For such a book as this, the author inevitably relies upon " The Confessions "—yet how different from another celebrated " Confessions " Rousseau, although once or twice managing to mention the remote and impersonal " Etre éternal ", writes of nothing but self, self, self. But Augustine from his opening words " Magnus es Domine " relates every thought and experience to God; and his book might appropriately bear the sub-title " God's dealings with Augustine ".

Many roads lead into the City of God, and Augustine's was a long and dark one. His degree of youthful culpability has been much debated; but Professor O'Meara makes no attempt to minimise his loose adolescence, his sexual indulgence and excesses, his ambition to share at least in the praise of his companions' shameful deeds, even when he himself had not participated in them.

There is one incident in this youthful period which must have puzzled many. Augustine reproves himself at great length for joining with others in stripping a pear tree near his father's vineyard, and he paints this in blacker colours than his acts of gross sensuality. Our author attempts to explain this apparent paradox, but for one reader the explanation is not convincing.

In early manhood, for a time Augustine became attached to

Astrology, but this lost its hold upon him as his knowledge of Astronomy increased.

For 9 years he lived in the false dreamlight of Manicheism, which slowly faded before the dawnlight of Neo-Platonism; and then—greatly helped by the enlightening sermons of Saint Ambrose—he eventually emerged into the full day of Christianity. Manicheism and Neo-Platonism are big subjects, impossible to be touched upon in a short review; but Professor O'Meara treats them at some length, and although those pages require close reading they will be found amply rewarding. Coming now to the final episode of Augustine's conversion: some second-rate minds by a strange illogical mental process associate scepticism with intellectual superiority; and in recent times a few writers of this class have thrown doubts upon the momentous "Tolle lege, tolle lege" incident. Professor O'Meara states and examines these objections very fairly, but decides strongly in favour of the authenticity of Augustine's dramatic account of his final step.

To sum up: this is a well made book, the result of wide reading and much thought presented in clear and concise English—the author shows it to be quite possible to discuss abstruse subjects without an involved and ponderous style. It is a book not to be borrowed but bought; and on account of its index will serve as a useful work of reference for Augustine's early years.

John Searle.

INTERPRETING PAUL'S GOSPEL

Interpreting Paul's Gospel. By A. M. Hunter, D.D. S.C.M. Press. 10s. 6d.

St. Paul's theology which is inseparable from his gospel is not only the most persuasive interpretation of Jesus Christ, but also in its main features the official interpretation of the Church, and embodied in its doctrine. Its blending of mysticism and realism, its complete Christo-centricity, and its psychological penetration into the human situation, have shaped not only the organism of the Church's life but also its attitude, as a divine-human society, to the world.

Yet even after so many centuries of predominant influence it is in constant need of reinterpretation, not only for missionary purposes but also to a reluctant but unvocal minority of Christians themselves who incline in their hearts to say "I am of St. John" and "I of St. Thomas" and "I of St. Francis" and even "I of Jesus". The fact that St. Paul's gospel is a living power involves the need for fresh interpretation: and such interpretation has been almost revolutionary in the very lively theological climate of to-day. A welcome is therefore assured for Dr. Hunter's timely and vigorous study, as that of a scholar well known for his powers of clear exposition and effective teaching.

Unlike the same author's *Interpreting the New Testament*, this book is not a survey of Pauline studies in the twentieth century: in some ways one wishes it had been, for something on such lines is greatly needed. In this case, the "interpreting" is not a survey of recent interpretations, but Dr. Hunt's own demonstration of the relevance of Pauline Christianity to our times. The interpretation, however, is made essentially for the convinced believer and preacher, and it does not attempt to talk to critical unbelief in its own language. It is for Christians who are tempted to lay aside the Pauline emphasis as outworn, or over-pessimistic. It is a powerful *apologia* for Paulinism; it does not ask critically whether the essentially Pauline ideas are true, but rather "are they not persuasive?" The appeal is rather to experience than to reason: it is a confirmation of faith in St. Paul for those who know and love him rather than a proof that his interpretation of Christ is final.

For indeed modern man finds some of St. Paul's gospel difficult to accept, and sympathizes with the naïve remark of the author of II Peter that there are in his epistles many things "hard to be understood" which apparently caused as much controversy in his day as in ours. Of these one might mention particularly (1) the doctrine of natural man, living "in the Flesh", as "all wrong", "at enmity with God." As Bultmann says, our existence is not "natural-human" but in itself sinful, a life of desire. (2) The consequent causal connexion of sin with natural death. (3) Pride as the cardinal human sin. (4) The law of Moses as, not an instrument of righteousness, but positively harmful.

Of these four, for which Bultmann appears to produce abundant justification, Dr. Hunter accepts (1) and (3) rejects (2) like most people, and differs on (4). The purpose of the law is not for him as for St. Paul according to Bultmann, "to lead man into sin by arousing his desires, and leading him to strive for a righteousness of his own", or more briefly "the ultimate purpose of the law is to lead man to death": rather than that the Law, for St. Paul according to Hunter, was given to show up sin as sin, to give knowledge of sin, though in fact it provokes to sin by arousing desire and disobedience. This certainly seems more plausible.

Another Pauline conception of sin as a demonic power of an almost personal kind meets with Dr. Hunter's assent. He points impressively to a demonic element in the depravities of our age, but passes lightly over the consequent inconsistency of explaining the origin of sin by the Fall, by man's misuse of free will. Either St. Paul here is inconsistent or his hints of a demonic source of evil are to be explained by his constant habit of personification. Is to be sinful to be "in Adam" or "in the Devil"? The doctrine of "the wrath"—another "scandal"—is explained on the usual lines as not inconsistent with the divine love ("The opposite of love is hate, not wrath"). To conclude all men as "under wrath" and as exciting God's "righteous indignation"—even those who tried earnestly to obey the law without becoming self-righteous—is surely too sweeping. One would have wished some deprecation of this severity rather than Dr. Hunter's "Loyalty to the Bible will not allow us to jettison the doctrine". The fact is that all Pauline theology is affected by his tragic personal situation. Desperately he wrestled with the problem of how God could have allowed his own people to go so tragically astray. As

Dibelius has said, his theology is essentially Theodicy—justification of God. The justification is that all are under sin, and a new beginning applicable to all must be made. "All the stars that used to Light the way are regarded as having set".

Justification and Redemption too, as Dr. Hunter sees, are difficult metaphors for the modern preacher to bring home. He suggests that a better approach is through a third term of St. Paul, "reconciliation" which answers a universal need. The parable of the Prodigal Son is sure to awaken response, he feels; yet its "moving human terms" will not be effective for belief in the Redeemer to those who are not convinced of the Fatherhood of God, and the unique sonship of Christ. One questions, too, whether the author has faced the real difficulty of the "preaching of the Cross" to-day when he writes: "Deep down in them the 'depersonalized' men of our time, their own lives torn and crucified by tragedy and catastrophe, feel not only a kinship with 'the strange Man on the Cross' but a sense that here at Calvary they are dealing . . . with reality". This could not be true of the "depersonalized"; and our problem in the main is a more or less contented and superficial materialism.

Sometimes, in fact, Dr. Hunter forgets the interpretation in the zeal of the preacher, and uses an emotional approach which would have to be very warm indeed to melt the ice of a scientific age. When he passes to the Pauline doctrine of the New Life, there is admirable insight for the Christian whom the book will assuredly make a better interpreter: and perhaps that is the result which the author most desires. For in his preface he quotes as his conviction a sentence from Karl Barth: "Paul as a child of his time addressed his contemporaries. As prophet and apostle of the Kingdom of God he veritably speaks to all men of every age. If we rightly understand ourselves, our problems are the problems of Paul" (but are they?) "and if we be enlightened by the brightness of his answers those answers must be our answers too" (but must they?).

C. B. ARMSTRONG.

A MASTER OF PRAYER

THE SPIRITUAL LETTERS OF DOM JOHN CHAPMAN, O.S.B., FOURTH ABBOT OF DOWNSIDE. Edited with an Introductory Memoir by DOM ROGER HUDLESTONE, O.S.B., of the same Abbey. Sheed and Ward, 12s. 6d.

THIS IS A REPRINT, AFTER NINETEEN YEARS, of the second and slightly enlarged edition—a reprint long overdue. For these letters are the work of a master of contemplative prayer. Dom Chapman, it is true, was, even painfully, aware how unscientific, tentative and uncertain mystical theology was when he wrote, as indeed it still is. "All the theologians and mystical theologians contradict each other, whereas the mystics themselves are often very vague . . . One wants an enormous mass of data". And his modesty is such that he often disclaims knowledge. Nevertheless, combining wide and careful reading with personal experience and access to the experience of many witnesses, he is able to describe with confidence the nature of contemplative prayer, abandonment of the will to the will of God, as we know it at this present moment, its union with Him and desire for closer union, a state, however, of conceptually meaningless adherence and desire to and for a God, beyond all possible earthly knowledge, without regard to the feelings, imaginations and wishes of the lower soul. "At every moment we are in touch with God and His hand is on us; we have only to be carried in His arms. Our one care must be not to jump out of them and try to walk alone. There is nothing so simple as the spiritual life. It has no difficulties, no troubles—these are all in the lower, the unspiritual part of us. You belong to God. Let that union be your real life and look down on all the rest. We have to make sure that the highest part of our soul is united to God and nothing else matters at all in this world. The essential interior act of religion is the giving ourselves to God, turning to Him and remaining turned, uniting ourselves to His Will and renewing the union as often as we think of it or simply remaining united. While this essential act is going on in the point of the soul, all the rest of the soul can be in a disturbance, unrest, rebellion, misery—it does not matter; on the contrary the point of the soul accepts it, embraces it, wills it". When meditation is no longer possible and prayer becomes contemplative, "the time of prayer is passed in the act of wanting God", an "irrational unmeaning craving for God", in some cases with nothing but "a blind certainty that God knows our want", in others with "a vague undefinable knowledge that God is there."

This, surely, is the substance of contemplative, but it should rather be termed unitive, prayer as taught by the Cloud of Unknowing, Baker and St. John of the Cross, to whose teaching Abbot Chapman subscribes. I cannot, however, agree that "Every involuntary thought and feeling within us is God's own touch." Many are attacked during prayer by obtrusive images or thoughts obscene or blasphemous. Though there is no sin and God permit them, they cannot surely be His touch.

In my opinion this view of prayer, if its implications are followed up, enables us to answer the question which, the writer says truly, must be decided, but "no one seems able to decide". Is the mystic way the only road to perfection?" If the essence of mystical prayer is union of the will with the will of God, which is in fact union of the soul with God, its progressive development must be the only road to perfection. For it is the progressive attainment of perfection which is perfect union with God. That is to say, the way of mystic union is the way of perfection. But the consciousness, the intuition, of this union is accidental, largely dependent on temperament and environment. Accordingly, though progress in holiness is the progressive union with God of which the mystics are aware, the subject need not be aware of it or even if he is aware of union may be unaware of the intimacy, the height of the union he has actually reached. To the Abbot's further question, "Is there a veiled mystic way by which certain holy people reach the transforming union without ever knowing that they are mystics?" I therefore would reply: There is such a way, and many without mystical experience, infused contemplation, are as far advanced on the way of union as others who are mystics, or even further advanced. But I should doubt whether a soul, however opaque, can reach the highest, the most intimate state of union, the transforming union, without being aware of some measure of union with God, though this experienced union may well be far weaker and lower than the actual union it possesses without knowing it.

Another question which Dom Chapman raises but leaves unanswered is the nature of this subject of mystical union, variously denominated the apex, fine point, centre or fundus of the soul. He is disposed to deny that it is the substance of the soul, the personality itself and to regard it as merely an intellectual faculty. The human spirit, I hold, is essentially a spiritual energy, a radical volition. This radical central volition is the central self, the essential personality, the substance of the soul.

The view of mystical awareness which Dom Chapman expounds at length in a paper added to this collection of letters that it is a knowledge by means of pure conceptual species, satisfies me as an account of passive infused contemplation. But the active infused contemplation which is an awareness of the soul's volitional union with God seems to be without any such species being a purely existential knowledge of an Object with which the central will is united without any direct knowledge of Its nature.

The Abbot seems to regard the aspirations of the will, on whose account Baker calls the lower stages of mystical prayer the prayer of aspirations, as no more than a psychological device, a mental equivalent of saying the Rosary, to occupy the imagination and emotions while the will is engaged in a conceptually meaningless adherence to God's will: the accidents, therefore, not the substance of the prayer. Baker certainly did not regard them in this light. For he regards the aspirations as inspired by God who would hardly inspire unimportant concomitants of prayer. On the contrary for him, as for the author of the *Cloud*, the aspirations are of the essence of the prayer—exercises, in fact, of the soul's desire for God and his will in which it consists. In one passage Abbot Chapman seems to pronounce impossible a form of prayer which is an affective and concentrated attention to a particular idea: let us say an attribute of God or an event in the Gospel, yet is not meditation but a species of contemplation. What he declares impossible is surely the contemplation described by St. Francis de Sales in his *Love of God* (Book VI, Ch. 6) and distinguished by him from meditation.

It would, indeed, appear that the essence of unitive prayer, adherence of the central will to God and desire for closer union which when perceived however obscurely is mystical contemplation, can and does co-exist with more varieties of actual prayer than Dom Chapman admits. In short, his understanding of the essential nature of unitive prayer is true and of the utmost importance, but is capable of more applications than he seems to allow. For the many contemplative souls—but not, I am sure, all—whose prayer passes directly from meditation into emotional aridity and impotence of imagination and thought, the advice given in these letters and in the paper of instructions printed as an appendix, is wholly admirable. But there are others, I believe, who reach this stage of unitive prayer with different psychological accompaniments and by the practice of other forms of prayer. Sancta Sophia, we might notice, describes more forms of active prayer than find mention in Baker's *Secretum*.

I cannot agree with Dom Chapman that "The whole order of creation is a manifestation of God's love." The mass of innocent suffering shows that there is another factor at work, though a negative one, namely the comparative nonentity of creatures making evil inevitable. All that is positive in creation, however, is and must be the work of Love.

Why add (*sic*) to the statement that England is not an island? It isn't.

E. I. WATKIN.

THE LOLLARD BIBLE

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LOLLARD BIBLE. By MARGARET DEANESLY. University of London (Athlone Press). 2s.

IT IS NOW MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS since Professor Deanesly's pioneer work on the Lollard Bible appeared. Very little substantial work on this subject has been printed since. All medieval scholars, therefore, will welcome Professor Deanesly's conversion, even if only a temporary one, from the field of Merovingian history.

In her lecture on *The Significance of the Lollard Bible*, delivered as the Ethel M. Wood Lecture before the University of London, the author has returned to her first love. She goes over again some of the ground of her book, but this time with surer tread, and with the wisdom and mature experience of a wise teacher and scholar. She sees the Lollard Bible in a wider context, and draws especially upon her deep knowledge of the devotional literature of the Middle Ages. She moves with charm, simplicity and skill among a wide variety of writers: Caedmon, singing of how the Lord Almighty shaped first the heaven and the earth; the writers of homilies and manuals for parish priests; the Chancellor of York who sent down to his parish in Kent "to re-create his parishioners with sermons"; Archbishop Caesarius of Arles having the doors of his church locked to prevent the casual worshipper leaving before the *Ite Missa Est.* Professor Deanesly's outstanding quality and merit in this lecture is to look at the production of the Lollard Bible from a pastoral and devotional point of view. Wyclif and his followers and imitators are being more harshly judged to-day than formerly, but the production of the Lollard Bible was not only a formidable task: it was of supreme importance in the devotional make-up of Englishmen and women.

Anyone who has tried to read the latest study of the Lollard Bible by a Swedish scholar (S. L. Fristedt, *The Wycliffe Bible*, Stockholm, 1953) will see how wise Professor Deanesly was to avoid any discussion of the problems of the authorship of the parts of the Lollard Bible, or any study of its linguistic peculiarities. Instead, and more appropriately in a lecture of this type, she has concentrated upon the purpose and method of the translators. She emphasizes the uniqueness of translating the Bible whole and entire into English, and makes her readers realize what a tremendous task this "notable academic feat" was. There were a great many partial translations before, in French as well as English, and Professor Deanesly has examined some of these in her earlier book. It had occurred to no one before Wyclif's day to translate the whole Bible into English for pastoral purposes. There was no reason why it should. The large number of manuscript copies of the Lollard Bible which have survived suggest that it reached a much wider audience than the schoolmen to whom Wyclif seems to have addressed most of his Latin works (and there is no evidence that he wrote any in English).

The Lollard Bible has survived in two versions: the first is a literal construe, the second meaning for meaning. Professor Deanesly suggests that the difference between these two translations corresponds to Wyclif's work inside the University of Oxford and some of his followers' work outside the university. Wyclif wanted a new authority, that of "Goddis Law", to set against that of the Canon Law; hence the first translation, which he seems to have inspired but not to have made himself. His followers wanted a popular, memorizable version for which the first translation was unsuited, and so a second translation was made after his death. This argument would be more convincing if the pattern of these two translations (and there were probably subsidiary translations) did not follow that of almost all medieval translations. The first was generally a construe, and then more polished versions followed. It seems doubtful whether we shall really understand the problem of the production of the Lollard Bible until we know more, much more, about the nature and state of biblical studies in Oxford in the late fourteenth century, on the lines of Miss Beryl Smalley's study of the thirteenth. Wyclif's treatise *De Veritate Sacre Scripture* seems to me to be the important point of departure, the disputations on vernacular translations in the last decade of the fourteenth and the first decade of the fifteenth the sequel.

J. CROMPTON.

MODERN LOGIC

BEING AND BECOMING. By D. J. B. HAWKINS. 176 pp. Sheed and Ward. 1954. 10s. 6d.

THIS claims to be an "attempt at a critical rethinking of the metaphysics of the Aristotelean and Thomistic tradition" (p. vii) and it contains, among others, chapters on "The Problems of Being", "The Analysis of Being", "Distinction and Relatedness", "Change, Potency and Act", "Substance", and "Value".

The author warns: "Philosophers outside that tradition may well think that a great deal is taken for granted that seems to them highly problematic" (p. vii). An instance would be: "Consider a being which has neither complete nor partial cause of its becoming or of its being. Such a being, I would venture to say, is self-evidently timeless.

and changeless " (p. 168). This is not a bit self-evident to me putting it to the test of instances, for there is nothing *self-contradictory* or otherwise *unintelligible* about Hoyle's perhaps in fact *mistaken* suggestion (so incorrectly labelled by him " continuous *creation* ") that hydrogen atoms are all the time simply popping into existence without cause.

The blurb is supercilious about " fashions in thought " and " that cultivation of mere cleverness which might be called the occupational disease of the contemporary philosophy industry "; and attributes to the author " a sympathetic awareness of contemporary developments " and " professional competence ". So it is disappointing to find that the latest references are to papers published by Braithwaite, Ewing, Price, and Collingwood in the late twenties and the thirties (Ch. X and XI); and that the second Wittgensteinian revolution has simply passed Hawkins by. It is even shocking to notice laid to the here guiltless door of " recent logic " Russell's pre-World War I " notion of formal implication " which " holds when for all x, x is a, materially implies that x is b " (p. 150). Hawkins points out that neither " material implication " nor " formal implication " (in this sense) can be equated with " implication " in the everyday sense; as if Moore, Stebbing, and most lately Strawson (see *An Introduction to Logical Theory*) had not been at pains long since to make this clear; and as if anyway the creators of logical and geometrical calculi were justly to be despised because these used new notions, not familiar in everyday discourse, or sometimes could not find application in this physcial world.

This could not in Hawkins' equipment interdicts the mounting of effective offensives. Thus " unable to accept this conception of logic and mathematics as tautological " Hawkins urges " that although symbols are in principle a matter of choice, how we can legitimately manipulate them depends not on us but on what we make them mean. The fact that two and two would not make four if " four " meant *five* does not entail that they can make anything but four so long as "four" means *four* . . ." (p. 29). True: but none of this even begins to upset the thesis that mathematics is tautological; any more than noting that the truth of "All husbands are married" follows necessarily from the meanings we have given to the terms involved even begins to upset the contention that it is a tautology. Furthermore, Hawkins' own positive thesis that such pieces of mathematics " tell us something about the real world which contains numerable groups of similar things " (p. 29) rests on an often exposed confusion: between bits of mathematical calculus, e.g. $2+2=4$; and the physical statements producible from these by inserting the (same) word for some countable object after all the numbers, and replacing the + and = by words for operations such as physically putting together and physically finding what the result is. Whereas the former *are not* the latter *are* open to empirical verification and falsification. The necessity of the former is not inherited by the latter; which may well be in fact false; as this one would be if the countable objects were suitably sized portions of U235.

(Though of course you *could* complicate, without fundamentally altering, the logical situation by insisting that it should be part of the meaning of "countable" that such physical applications must yield true physical statements).

The only single subject with which Hawkins gives himself enough elbow room to come to grips is causality. Here he is concerned by knocking down Hume to make room for the synthetic *a priori* knowledge, whose possibility is a precondition of metaphysics as Hawkins understands it (p. 148). Of course there is a great deal wrong with Hume here: both most notably his general defect, which Hawkins shares but scarcely discerns, of confusing questions of logical analysis with questions of psychology and questions about the relations of things in the world around us; and his equation, again not seen as such by Hawkins, of the sum of all possible evidence for a causal assertion with the meaning of such a causal verdict. But really it is far too late in the day now to insist on finding some justification of induction showing it to be *fundamentally* deduction (pp. 148, etc.).

At least if with Hawkins you do so without even mentioning much less attempting to meet any of the recent attempts, accepted by the majority of British philosophers, to prove: that this is a logically vicious demand, there being no way of demonstrating that "the future will resemble the past" (p. 148); and that inductive procedures can be justified only but sufficiently as elaborations of one basic simple and uniquely rational principle, to go ahead on the assumption that if all A's so far have been x others will be x too, until and unless experience forces us—as it always may—to readjust our ideas about A's. This is not a vast factual postulate on which science is based and whose falsification must result in the collapse of the structure erected on it: but a condition of methodical inquiry, perhaps part of the very meaning of "method". (See, e.g. G. H. von Wright *The Logical Problem of Induction* and Strawson *loc cit* Ch. IX).

" Yet it would be a pity if an essay such as this failed completely as communication to thinkers of other schools " (p. vii). It will be a pity: especially if they are misled to think that attention to St. Thomas also would be unrewarding. But in view of the author's total lack of sympathy for or, apparently, knowledge of the enormous and very relevant developments in the last fifteen years; it should not be a surprise.

ANTONY FLEW.

THE HOLY SPIRIT

THE SPIRIT, THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS. By J. G. DAVIES. The Faith Press. 1954. 12s. 6d.

" THE objectification of Spirit is the final blasphemy." With the worthy purpose of insisting that the Holy Spirit is a Person, Mr Davies has written this book, which is learned and honest. It would give me real pleasure to say that this was one of those very rare books about the Holy Spirit which is satisfying to read. But in spite of its virtues, which are real, it does not satisfy.

It will make a good study book for men of scholarly tastes. It will serve a tutorial class very well indeed. Mr. Davies has collected an immense mass of references: and when he quotes, with a few exceptions the passages mean the same in their own context as they do in his book; this is a great virtue in a scholar.

The chief weakness is in the Introduction, chapter one, which sets out his presuppositions: "(1) that the Holy Spirit is a Person; (2) that the Holy Spirit cannot be separated from His gifts; (3) that one cannot receive more or less quantitatively of the Spirit." (1) and (2) are compatible: in another sense (1) and (3) are compatible: but (1), (2) and (3) together make no sort of sense. If the Holy Spirit cannot be separated from His gifts, then there must be a receiving of more or less. But Mr Davies goes further than this. The Holy Spirit must, it seems, be received *in toto* or not at all: there are no degrees or stages of progress in the receiving (or being possessed by) the Holy Spirit. And in setting forward this thesis, and clinging loyally to his presuppositions he gets himself into all kinds of difficulties. For instance: John 14: 17 suggests that the disciples "know" the "other Paraclete, the Spirit of truth" already, because He "dwells" (*menei*) among them and will be in them. But this means degrees of progress. Therefore Mr. Davies points out that "dwells" and "will dwell" are both *menei* in Greek, regardless of the havoc which the future tense makes of the meaning of the passage: the disciples know the Spirit because Jesus is possessed by Him; and Mr Davies' own list of patristic quotations show that this was the view of the early Church. He calls in the ninth Cyrilline anathema against Nestorius to his rescue, but not convincingly. He goes on (as I understand him) to say that Jesus did not receive the Holy Spirit in His Baptism (wherein the evangelists, who said He did, were much deceived) (pages 21-26).

On p. 31 Mr. Davies is compelled to demythologize Pentecost as a doublet of the account in John of our Lord's gift of the Spirit to his disciples on Easter evening. One may be conservative, but such treatment of the New Testament reduces its foundation of truth to a few doctrinal points, which themselves are deprived by such treatment of any supporting evidence at all. Bultmann's approach is at least based on a particular philosophy, that of Mr Davies on an untenable presupposition. On p. 87, Aquinas' "conception of grace is seen to be connected with the *mana* of primitive religion"; this shows a complete ignorance of what *mana* means, and a misunderstanding of Aquinas: *mana*, which is the extra force beyond normal existence which possesses certain natural objects, is never *infused* into man, but is obtained by knowledge and magical guile. There is no parallel at all.

There is some reason behind Mr Davies' dislike of degrees of possession by the Spirit, which appears best on p. 93. But it is nonsense to say that because the Holy Spirit is a Person, He must therefore be received once and for all, whether at Baptism or any other time. The very essence of the meeting of persons is that one person never fully receives another: the contact of persons is in the Spirit, which "bloweth where it listeth". More trouble with this awkward presupposition (3) will be found on pages 88, 100, 108 (the Eucharist), 137, 174 (the Holy Spirit is "Christ's vice-gerent"), 175 (the Holy Spirit is not received in ordination).

This is the chief fault to be found with the book. A few further remarks: it is rather "sticky" reading in many places, and ideas do not always seem to follow on; there is some repetition and an unnecessary number of abstract nouns. There are some good ideas from the fathers usefully emphasised. Chapter VII is the best in the book, and brings the two great sacraments into line: the Communion is the continuation of what Baptism has begun.

If the book is used intelligently—to be argued about—it will provide a mine of authorities for reference and discussion.

H. A. Blair.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Science and the Human Imagination. Aspects of the History and Logic and Physical Science. By Mary B. Hesse. 172 pp. S.C.M. 1954. 12s. 6d.

There has been no lack in recent years of books on the relations between natural science and the Christian religion; nevertheless it is difficult to feel that many of them have got to the heart of the matter. Partly, I think, this has been due to a tendency on the part of the authors to bring in their theological and philosophical presuppositions at an early stage of their arguments without making it plain that these presuppositions are not derived from within the scientific field. Partly it has been due to a tendency to slur over the necessary but difficult prolegomenon of a close investigation of the nature and the rôle of scientific explanations and theories. Partly, no doubt, it has been due to the notorious way in which many of the most readable popular exponents of modern scientific theory have jumbled together indiscriminately theology, philosophy and science of very varied degrees of excellence. Neither the Gifford Lectures of Dr C. E. Raven nor the two volumes of Dr Karl Heim, for all their promise, seem in fact to do very much more than provide a description of the present condition of natural science as seen through the spectacles of their authors; in the first case through the spectacles of early twentieth-century liberal Christology, in the second through a peculiar bifocal combination of Lutheran irrationalism and Kantian idealism. In short, the first requisite for a satisfactory book on science and Christianity is that it shall contain a thorough discussion of scientific theory itself; and it is for this that the book now before us is to be so warmly commended.

When Dr Hesse says on page 155 of a book which ends on page 164 ' We have arrived at last at the point at which most books about science and religion begin ' she may seem to be making a damaging admission, but she is in fact indicating the real importance of her discussion; for most books on the subject begin very much too far on. Although her explicit references to Christianity are few and scattered, her book is in fact admirable Christian apologetic; furthermore, if potential readers are not deterred by the imprint of a religious publisher, it should become a standard introductory text-book on the history and philosophy of physical science.

The first three chapters are historical, and trace the development of science from medieval cosmology to the nineteenth-century ' billiard-ball ' universe. There is nothing very original here, nor should we expect it, but the exposition is luminous and gripping and the author is thoroughly abreast of the most recent work and of the way in which it has demolished the nineteenth-century myth of the passage from the medieval to the modern world as an exodus from darkness and error into reason and light. Much more important is her discussion of the work that has been done in the present century on the epistemological nature of scientific theory and explanation; for it seems still to be largely unrecognised outside specialist circles that the philosophers of science of today have completely abandoned the post-Newtonian assumption that the scientist's story of the universe, told in terms of atoms, ether-waves and so on, is a literal description of what the world of our experience is ' really ' like. As Dr Hesse herself says, ' today almost all the positive logical reasons based on science for the rejection of the Christian faith have been shown to be without foundation—the concept of rigid mechanical law for instance—but suspicion of religion has penetrated so deeply into men's minds that the mere removal of logical difficulties is no longer enough '. The really important part of her book consists of the last six chapters in which she gives a historical and critical discussion of various views that have been held about the nature of scientific explanation from Boole, Mach and Frege down to the present day. She shows how the ' constructionism ' of Russell and Whitehead (i.e. the view that scientific concepts are simply logical constructs out of sense-data) was shown to be inadequate by F. P. Ramsey, and was abandoned in different ways by its authors, so that the projected fourth volume of *Principia Mathematica* never appeared. Then she passes on to the somewhat less drastic ' operationalism ' of Bridgman (i.e. the view that a scientific concept is simply synonymous with the operations by which its measurement is defined); she describes modern quantum-theory as a half-hearted attempt to carry out this programme. She then deals with the view, associated with Dirac and Toulmin, that the function of a scientific theory is merely to be a good ' model ' or ' analogue ' of the physical observations; she points out that a good model must both be independent of the physical observations for its intelligibility and also be extensible to phenomena other than those for which it was originally devised. It is unfortunate that Mr. R. B. Braithwaite's *Scientific Explanation* was apparently published too late for Dr Hesse to comment upon it; her views about it would have been most interesting. It is in fact a form of this doctrine that she herself adopts, but she gives it a much less positivist form than it commonly wears. Taking up a suggestion of Whitehead, but detaching it from Whitehead's questionable metaphysics, she insists that, while the Aristotelian theory of substance is to be abandoned, ' in so far as scientific language is understood in its own proper context, the structures about which it speaks do exist in external nature, and exist just as surely as chairs and tables and scientists and philosophers exist '. With a realism which scientists will welcome but which will be disconcerting to some present-day philosophers, she asserts that there is ' a kind of continuity between our perception of ordinary objects and our inference to such scientific concepts as the fundamental particles. We do not doubt,' she says, ' the object-like-ness of viruses and large organic molecules which just come into view in highly magnifying microscopes, and it is natural to extrapolate to a hierarchy of particles of decreasing size and increasing unlikeness to ordinary objects: atoms, nuclei, protons, electrons '. ' We cannot find grounds for saying the particles greater than, say, two Angstroms in diameter are objects in the external world, and those less than two Angstroms are only mathematical constructions '.

Again, she rejects the positivist views of the nature of scientific induction and of historical statement. Finally she refuses to admit that apparent conflicts between religion and science can all be dismissed as verbal confusions arising from misunderstandings about two similar but actually distinct types of language; each conflict, she says, must be dealt with on its own merits. All this is admirable, and the only point at which I should wish to make any additions or alterations is in her exposition of the *analogical* character of scientific theory. I am not sure that I fully understand Dr Hesse at this point, and I should very much like to see her views developed at greater length. Without disagreeing with her main contention I should wish to suggest that, by adopting and extending the Thomist doctrine that perception is more than sensation and that the sense-datum is an *objectum quo*, through which the intellect grasps the intelligible non-sensible or trans-sensible real being, which is the *objectum quod* and which is not necessarily isomorphic relationally with the sense-datum, one can be thoroughly realistic about the world of scientific objects without imposing upon it the geometrical and sensible characteristics of the sensory continuum. This is, however, too large an issue to discuss at the end of a review and I hope to deal with it at greater length elsewhere. I will only conclude by repeating that Dr Hesse has written a book which, in spite of its comparative brevity, is of the first importance for Christian apologetics and which moreover provides a brilliant and much-needed survey of recent and contemporary views on the nature of scientific descriptions and explanation.

E. L. MASCALL.

MELBOURNE

Lord M., or The Later Life of Lord Melbourne. By David Cecil. Constable. 21s.

It was already clear from *The Young Melbourne* that Lord Melbourne was a subject after Lord David Cecil's own heart; and this second and last instalment of his biography is worthy of its predecessor. Lord David clearly revels in the congenial task of depicting and explaining the contrasts and contradictions of one of the most complex and attractive characters in history—the sceptic who "doubted whether he doubted", the man of the world with a passion for theology, the cynic whose eyes could fill with tears of genuine sentiment, the softhearted anti-humanitarian, the Prime Minister who genuinely hated politics, the head of a reforming government who did not believe in reform, the man of free and easy views who could yet act as moral mentor to a young Queen. It is true that, as far as concerns the main episode of Melbourne's later life, the strange but touching idyll of his relations with Queen Victoria which gives the book its title, he has had only to fill in the outlines of Lytton Strachey's brilliant sketch; but there was plenty to fill in, and he has made skilful use of his material, much of it new, to produce a picture which is both entertaining and charming, like Melbourne himself.

On the political side the book is perhaps not quite so satisfactory. Though it is not primarily concerned with politics, since Melbourne, as Lord David points out, "was not primarily a public character", politics could not be kept out of it, for Melbourne was in the thick of them for almost the whole period which it covers, and indeed was Prime Minister, with two brief interruptions, from 1834 to 1841. Lord David gives a clear and on the whole a fair account of the political events of the time; but he seems inclined to claim rather more political credit for his hero than most modern historians are willing to allow him. He does not call him a great Prime Minister—no one could do that; but he does imply that he was something very near to a great politician. Yet Melbourne's political achievements were almost entirely negative, and though he succeeded, by skilful and tactful management of men, in keeping his party together and his government in office for years on end when they had no firm majority, in the belief that he was thereby staving off chaos and revolution, it does not seem likely, in the light of our present knowledge, that anything very dreadful would have happened if he had failed.

Lord David is also concerned to defend Melbourne from the usual accusation of weakness. "It was not that he was weak," he declares. "On the contrary, no one could act more vigorously once he was convinced he was right. The trouble was that he was seldom so convinced." Yet if there was one thing of which he was fully convinced, it was the evil of religious intolerance; but he never actively fought against it unless driven into a corner and forced to act, as in the case of Dr. Hampden.

He has been called a Voltairean, but one cannot imagine him rushing to the defence of a Calas. In foreign affairs, too, he was always timorously critical of Palmerston's policy, even when he thought it right in principle; and though here again, when driven into a corner over the Syrian question, he summoned up courage enough to support Palmerston at the critical moment, it is to be feared that if he had lived at the time of Munich he would have been found among the "appeasers".

Moreover, the chief positive action of Melbourne's political career, his harsh, not to say brutal, suppression of rioting and rural discontent when Home Secretary in Lord Grey's government, which culminated in the affair of the "Tolpuddle Martyrs", is one which his biographer cannot contemplate without some regret and misgiving. Lord David makes a good defence of it on political grounds, and adds that Melbourne's apparent callousness "was also, paradoxically, the defect of his very softheartedness. Just because he hated the painful so much, he tended to shut his eyes to it. He shrank from imagining the labourers' feelings for the same reason that he was later to shrink from reading *Oliver Twist*". This is doubtless true as far as it goes; but the man who could say, and apparently mean it, that if he had been in power at the time he would never have abolished the slave trade, cannot be acquitted of something worse than mere self-protective indifference.

Still, Melbourne's political conduct, even when least to our liking, cannot seriously affect our enjoyment of his personality. In his own day many people disapproved of him, but few could help liking him when they met him; and he has had the same effect on posterity. For he had charm —perhaps to a greater degree than any of his predecessors or successors, not excepting Disraeli—and his charm was never so well displayed as when he talked his characteristic mixture of irony, whimsical humour and robust common sense to the young Queen whom he loved as a daughter.

Luckily we have the Queen's full record of those talks. It is so full, indeed, that it is a positive *embarras de richesses* to a biographer, as Lord David confesses; but he has extracted from it a sufficiency of entertaining passages to enable us fully to appreciate its quality. We read, for example: "I observed to Lord Melbourne that there were not many good preachers. He replied in the affirmative and added: 'But then there are not many good anything', which is *very true*!" She notes curious items of information from him: "that the Indians burnt their widows, for instance—'not a good custom', he said; and he explained that the natives in New Zealand though a fine race, had one unfortunate fault. 'They eat men; and they say it is impossible to break them of it: they say it is the best thing!' " She fears that he dislikes the Germans, but he denies it, explaining: "I have a great opinion of their talents but not of their beauty." He finds Scotch history depressing: "There are too many James-es and all murdered. The Scottish are a dreadful people." He defends Henry VIII: "Those women bothered him so!" He likes faces with large features: "People with small features and *squeeny* noses never do anything".

As Lord David says, "one is tempted to go on quoting for ever"; but enough has now been written to show that the book is very good reading as well as a good presentation of its subject. In one or two places the grammar is strangely lax for that of so eminent a writer, and the proof reading might have been more careful; but few readers are likely to notice such things as they are carried along in the stream of the easy-flowing narrative, sometimes witty, sometimes pathetic, but always absorbing.

LAURENCE COLLIER.

CHRISTIANITY AND HISTORY

EARLY CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY. By R. L. P. MILBURN. A. &. C. Black. 18s.

THIS book comprises the Bampton Lectures for 1952 together with an appendix on the Historical Background of the Doctrine of the Assumption. The subject is one of immense importance, and never more so than in the present trend in theological discussions. Mr. Milburn brings to his study of the problems concerned a wide knowledge of his chosen period. He writes with a graceful pen. His pages are filled with many apt and telling quotations which cover an amazingly wide field of general reading. But, when all is said and done, the impression remains that the main subject with which the book is concerned has not been probed deeply enough to answer all the disturbing questions that are raised. Perhaps the author's method of treatment precluded more than a mere glance at questions that clamour for a solution. One lays down the book, therefore, with a feeling of disappointment.

The problem of history, as Mr. Milburn clearly acknowledges more than once, is concerned among other things with the relation of interpretation to fact. Christianity, like Judaism, is an historical religion. The Faith is derived from facts of history. It stands or falls by their "truth". Doctrinal interpretation must be controlled by a faithful adherence to what God has done. Heretics are condemned for their false speculations or for their failure to do justice to the historic facts of revelation. But, as Mr. Milburn says truly (in a quotation from the Dean of St. Paul's), "there are no events which have any existence for us in which interpretation of some kind is not inextricably mingled". And he comments: "Historical truth, indeed, appears to be uneasily balanced between the poles of fact and interpretation, and tension between the two extremes can never be wholly resolved unless either the blank surface of annalistic reporting is to be taken as the whole duty of the historian or, on the other hand, imagination is to be allowed to rove unchecked by any scruple."

Applied to the historical claims of Christian belief this means that it is impossible to get back to the "bare facts" of the Gospel to find therein their real and original meaning. Our knowledge of the events that comprise the Christian revelation is already coloured by the minds of the original eye-witnesses from whom it is derived. But there are other "facts" of the Gospel equally binding upon us which are not strictly speaking historical. They are derived rather from those acts of God in history which gave rise to the Christian faith. Thus, belief in the resurrection of the body is one of those truths of revelation which is an inference drawn from belief in the historic resurrection of Christ. The whole of St. Paul's argument in I Cor. xv is built upon the belief that as Christ rose from the dead *as man,* so we believe that we shall rise. "Since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead."

But the problem of the relations of history and revelation goes deeper than that. There is an element of "Ought-ness" no less than of "Is-ness" in the truth of revelation, although, as Mr. Milburn rightly observes, "It is . . . a perilous thing to dictate to God what he ought to do." Our Lord nevertheless himself appealed to the "Ought-ness" of his own death and resurrection (Luke xxiv, 26*ff.*, *cf.*, 44*ff.*). He took his disciples to task for their slowness of heart to believe the prophets who foretold the Passion and its sequel, not in so many words but as consonant with his rôle as Messiah. The Messiah *ought* to suffer and to enter into his glory. And the disciples should have been prepared to believe in the resurrection even if they had never seen the Risen Lord. The truth would seem to be that the revelation is not so much determined by the history as that the history of the Divine Disclosure is governed by the revelation. Failure to understand the meaning of the Biblical revelation renders us incapable of interpreting the history aright. If we do not already believe in Moses and the prophets neither will we be persuaded if one rose from the dead. For that reason the Risen Lord appeared only to his friends and disciples, not to instil belief in him but to revive it.

Mr. Milburn adds a learned discussion on the Historical Background of the Doctrine of the Assumption. Also in his VIIth lecture on "Apocryphal Stories" he devotes several paragraphs to an examination of the apocryphal tales and legends that have grown up around the birth and death of the Blessed Virgin Mary. No doubt these pages serve a useful purpose. But it may be questioned whether such criticism meets the real situation. Belief in the Immaculate Conception and the corporeal Assumption cannot be dismissed as due entirely to *apriorism*. Mr. Milburn says that "the grave difficulty concerning the doctrine of the Assumption that remains when all has been said about it is that, according to the recent papal definition, something has been solemnly stated as assured historical fact that has no other strictly historical basis even pretended than a Coptic romance".

It is recognized even in Roman Catholic circles that the Assumption is not based upon history in the strict sense of the word. No doubt the legends gave a widespread impetus to the popular belief. But it can be argued that legends grew up in circles that already believed in the Assumption on other grounds, but where stories that claimed to give it the support of history were eagerly welcomed. Be that as it may, to say that "the tradition of the Virgin's Assumption . . . came from a group of documents, extant in several languages, which are to be classed as typically apocryphal legends"; or that a Latin version of the Assumption by Gregory of Tours is "the sole begetter" of the doctrine, surely fails to understand why the belief grew up spontaneously in East and West. It is possible to deplore the recent papal definition without at the same time rejecting the doctrine on the grounds that it is historically worthless. Both the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption are beliefs that have possessed the mind of the worshipping Church as inevitable consequences of faith in the Divine-human transaction that took place in the historic Incarnation. They must be judged not on the plane of history but of faith.

E. C. RICH.

A NOTABLE CHURCH HISTORY

THE CHURCH IN ENGLAND 597-1688. By S. C. CARPENTER, sometime Dean of Exeter and Master of the Temple. viii + 516 pp. John Murray. 1954. 40s.

A LARGE number of people beside those engaged in preparing to pass examinations in English Church history will be glad of this lively and lucid exposition by Dr Carpenter. It is always delightful to read a book with plenty of epigrams, and here are plenty of epigrams. Here is, moreover, for many of the centuries dealt with, a good understanding of the historical background, and here are also a scholarly appreciation of sources and a judicious estimation of controversial issues. Here is, above all, a real appreciation of piety, courage and devotion, even when found in centuries or among persons with no natural attraction for Dr Carpenter. He loves the devout: he loves martyrs: even if he cannot discern the flame that kindled their devotion or admire the cause for which they died. Commenting on the lines from the Primer beginning:

> God be in my head
> And in my understanding

he writes, characteristically enough: '. . . the tale of churchmanship from the earliest times to 1485 reveals much occasional infirmity: it is redeemed by continual piety. God is perhaps seen in its heart and in its thinking, and perhaps even more in its hands and in its doing, rather than in its head and in its understanding, but God is seen also in its knees and in its praying'.

Dr. Carpenter's history embraces the formative part of the history of the English church, from the arrival of Augustine's mission in 597, through the development of medieval Christianity in England, closely linked as it was with that of the continent, through the struggle and separation of the Reformation, the eclipse of the national church in the Commonwealth, its restoration and re-establishment under Charles II, and the vindication of its national character in the Revolution of 1688. Through this limitation of his field of study, for Christianity in this land began well before 597 and had some notable developments after 1688, Dr Carpenter has found space to quote verbally many original sources, and it is this that gives atmosphere and character to his book. His on the whole unsympathetic treatment of the middle ages is redeemed by the original sources quoted in chapter IX (Medieval religion). There is much quotation also in his account of the Reformation, particularly when he describes the genius of Cranmer in some of the loose translations of the Book of Common Prayer. [Of the Second and Third Collects for Morning and Evening Prayer, he says notably: ' Age has not wearied them nor custom staled their infinite propriety ': but will theologians have a mild shock in hearing that ' they have worn as well ' as the Magnificat itself? Does the agelessness of the Magnificat depend on its literary beauty?] In the latter part of the book too, the description of the work of Richard Baxter, who preached ' as a dying man to dying men ', and of Hooker and the Caroline divines, is sympathetic and illuminating.

The pre-Conquest and medieval period is probably the field with which Dr Carpenter is least familiar, and a few dubious assertions may be noted. It is astonishing to read (p. 9) that a West Minster was begun in the time of Mellitus (*c*.604): Dr Carpenter has no comprehension of the extreme precariousness of the position of the Christian missionaries at the turn of the seventh century, and of how completely they depended on the good will of the Bretwalda Æthelberht and his power to protect them in the provinces of his underkings, as that of the East Saxons. Bede knows nothing of such a West Minster, nor does any other early source. Again, Dr Carpenter writes approvingly of Gregory's permission to Augustine to take whatever he found fitting in the use of Roman or Gallican churches, and accustom the minds of the English thereto: but severely and unintelligibly about Augustine's actual liturgical choice: the opportunity was wasted, he says, when ' we might have had throughout the middle ages a mass, said indeed in Latin, but of a vernacular spiritual quality ', whatever the last may mean! Dr Carpenter should read F. Dvornik's *National Churches and the Church Universal* for the early use of vernacular liturgies in east and west. It is unlikely, in any case, that Augustine had a large number of liturgical manuscripts to select from, or any not written in Latin; we do however know that he had at Canterbury what Professor Wormald believes to have been an altar-book, an illuminated gospel book with a picture of St. Peter consecrating the blessed sacrament, with the apostles next him also lifting their hands in blessing: it is in fact a picture of the very old act of concelebration. This sixth century manuscript is now at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge.

Among other assertions showing Dr Carpenter's unfamiliarity with the pre-Conquest period are his rather supercilious references to Æthelbert's insertion in the customary law of a tariff of wergelds and bots to safeguard the clergy and their churches: but such an insertion was necessary, in a society ruled hitherto by unwritten law, if a completely new social class were to continue to exist in Kent. Coifi's assertion (p.9) that the old gods had done nothing for him was not merely ' vulgar ' but courageous: pagan society accepted the power of these old war and thunder gods, and Coifi's ritual profanation of his own altar would then appear a very risky action. Paulinus' bringing of Æthelburga home instead of sacrificing her and remaining to preach in Yorkshire (p. 10) was sheer common sense, when all mission work depended on royal protection. The Benedictine rule does not prescribe one meal a day, as asserted on p. 28, but dinner and supper for all the year except Lent. About rural parishes Dr Carpenter is also misleading: at the time of the synod of Hertford, 673, it is more than doubtful if there were any ' parishes ' other than those of the bishop himself (his see is normally spoken of as his *parochia*), and of the minsters, the clergy of which served the countryside. To say of the time of the council of Clofeshoh, 746 (p.33), that 'there is by this time a fairly complete parochial system ', as of single priests residing under a thegn's authority in a village, is also an anachronism: the canons of this synod speak of the bishop as having a parish, which he must travel through and visit: but the word parish is not used of the sphere of those priests who ' through the places and regions of laymen have been appointed by the bishops of the province and commanded to exercise the apostolic office of preaching the gospel and baptizing and teaching and visiting '. This would apply as much to travelling preachers as to priests maintained permanently by a thegn in his village. Minsters, on the other hand, are spoken by these canons as having a parish.

M. Deanesly.

THE MINISTRY OF JESUS

The Life and Ministry of Jesus. By Vincent Taylor. Macmillan. 12s. 6d.

Dr. Vincent Taylor has given us a splendid book which deserves the widest circulation. It is at once critical and constructive, fully abreast of Synoptic studies—to which he has himself made so many outstanding contributions—and deeply true to the conviction that from the Gospels there emerges a trustworthy outline of the life and ministry of our Lord. It is an admirable example of a short book based upon profound study. Although the general reader will not be discouraged by too many learned footnotes, adequate references to recent literature occur at all the main points. Even when many would wish that the author could go a little further, as in his treatment of the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection, there can be no question of the deep reverence which leads him to lay down his pen as an historian at the point at which he does. Above all, it becomes increasingly clear that there is no statement which he could not at need support by a wealth of learned argument. All this is what we have learnt to expect of any work of Dr. Vincent Taylor.

The book opens with a discussion of the sources. The brief accounts and criticisms of the work of Abbot Butler, Dr. Farrer and Archbishop Carrington are especially welcome. But the bulk of the work is devoted to a critically based consecutive narrative which gives within its compass the best account of the subject which has recently appeared. At the same time there are naturally many points of detail on which there is room for a second opinion. The author's general approach to the Virgin Birth is well known from an earlier work. His treatment of the historical problems connected with the Lucan census in a footnote is sensible, though some might be inclined to accept with less hesitation Tertullian's replacement of Quirinius by Saturninus. Despite the complete absence of any textual support it has considerable attraction as a correction. By the time of Tertullian it was no light matter to correct an Evangelist, and that in a work against Marcion, the acutest critic in the early Church. As a former lawyer Tertullian would know what sources to consult in such a matter, and the fact that Saturninus was closely connected with the civic rebirth of Carthage would again lend probability to the suggestion. The date which emerges would harmonize well with the astronomical phenomenon underlying the Matthaean narrative of the Star in the East. It is, again, difficult to believe that contrasts in Lucan vocabulary between the cycles of Infancy Stories connected with John the Baptist and our Lord really carry the subject a great deal further. If it may lend probability to the view that St. Luke had a written source for the former, it has nothing direct to tell us of the historical value of the latter.

Dr. Vincent Taylor marshals the evidence for a corporate significance of the title Son of Man, but the case will still fail to carry conviction to many minds. Granted that the term Kingdom implies rule rather than realm, it does not follow that the title Son of Man is just the plug needed to stop the hole. The corporate correlative may well be left at the level of images like the flock and its shepherd on Old Testament lines, or of action as in the institution of the Twelve. Why should not it remain an implicate of the rule occasionally rising to the surface in certain Matthaean parables and possibly even the use of the term *ecclesia* ? Some, again, will wonder whether the treatment of the Twelve as episodic, " one of the things which pass because its original purpose was fulfilled ", exhausts the significance of the call of the pillar disciples. The extension of the term " Apostles " to others outside the Twelve in the Apostolic Age is certainly part of the evidence, but does not of necessity carry with it the inference which the author draws from it.

One of the most significant parts of the book opens with the Mission of the Twelve. The point that they are in this connexion not preachers but delegates, not teachers but heralds, is well developed, and the problem of Matthew x, 23 handled in an unusually conservative way. But the admittedly tentative exegesis of the Logion " I beheld Satan falling from heaven " seems less convincing, especially if it is compared with the parable of the strong man bound. The so-called Northern Journey is wisely handled with a brief notice of the textual difficulty. The suggestion that it may represent a withdrawal from would-be friends no less than from potential enemies is convincingly argued. But the idea that our Lord was thinking of his disciples, and even perhaps of himself, in the words addressed to the blind and the deaf needs a good deal of caution.

There is an admirable discussion of Messianic Suffering for which the detailed work had already been done in his excellent work on "Jesus and His Sacrifice". Not everyone will feel satisfied with the reconstruction of the Jerusalem ministry, though the use made of the Johannine datum of a withdrawal to a city called Ephraim is as interesting as it is provocative. The novel exegesis of the stones which cry out (Luke xix, 40) is worthy of serious attention. The exposition of the Passion narrative is wholly admirable, but many will regret that the author has not felt able to deal with the Resurrection narrative with greater fullness. At the same time, the motives that led him to halt where he does are worthy of every respect, and it would be grievously wrong to suggest even by implication that any attempt is made to cast doubt upon or ignore the "crowning mercy" of the Gospel record. All that is at stake is the precise point at which the historian proper must lay down his pen.

Notwithstanding disagreements and hesitations of this kind, this is a book from which every reader of the Gospels can derive the greatest profit. It abounds in brief and important critical comments and is inspired by a living faith. Perhaps no higher praise can be given than to say that at the close of the book we feel closer to Jesus in the historical setting of his earthly ministry than we did at the beginning.

H. E. W. TURNER.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

THE AUGUSTAN WORLD. By A. R. HUMPHREYS. 283 pp. Methuen. 16s.

IT is stated on the dust-wrapper of *The Augustan World* that "the discerning reader will readily find a place on his shelf for this book between *Johnson's England* and *The Eighteenth Century Background*." That may be true, but this book neither ranges so widely as the former, nor deals so fully with a single group of topics as the latter. Its object is "to explore outwards from literature to society and then return from society to literature again. Its intention . . . as much critical as social-historical." (p. vii). In six chapters Professor Humphreys examines the social, economic, political, religious, philosophical and scientific, and artistic activities of the age, whose limits he places, roughly, at 1660 and 1789. This is surely too long a period on which to generalise successfully, and indeed his most valuable judgments are those which apply most easily and fully to the years 1700 to 1750, the Augustan era as it is generally accepted. In the last section of each chapter he suggests some possible effects which each of these activities wrought upon literature.

His treatment of each topic, necessarily brief, is based on a collection and arrangement of material, which should prove useful to those just coming to the period. Writers, both major and minor, in prose and in verse, are enlisted in copious documentation of the historical account.

His criticism, almost always sound, is sometimes most penetrating, as, for instance, in the compact statement (p. 187) of four important consequences of Locke's " white paper " analogy of the mind. One appreciates also the reminders that Locke's definition of " property " included " not only material wealth but also life and safety " (p. 101) and that " Utilitarianism " was " a nobler aim than the name suggests, being a state God intended for all men, and a goal towards which the Augustans started on a long pilgrimage." (p. 189).

Some of the activities which Mr. Humphreys studies influenced literature less, and less significantly, than others. Economic expansion, for instance, which produced changes in the composition of the audience and the status of authors, was perhaps hardly so important as, say, the sense of community in social affairs, of moderation in politics, and of stable values in religion, for all these assisted in creating that note of assurance which pervades Augustan literature. The process and progress of these influences are not always so clearly traced as they might be. A single example (and that from a time when Augustanism was past its peak, but within Mr. Humphreys' limits of the period) must suffice. In the chapter on philosophy there is a most suggestive remark—" If the literary moods of the late Augustans are in general warmer and more indulgent than those of the early, the credit must go in a marked degree to the philosophers whose thought had given prestige to feeling and the encouragement of psychological theory to the promptings of emotion." (p. 204). But its implications are never developed. When alongside it are placed the statements that philosophy operated, generally, " within the framework of Christian belief " (p. 216) and that " in much Augustan writing . . . we miss the sense of the numinous " (p. 176), one surely sees possibilities of indicating an important relationship between philosophy, religion and literature.

Mr. Humphreys assesses the quality of eighteenth century religion satisfactorily because he judges it in its own, and not, as sometimes happens, in the critic's own, contemporary setting. He describes the religious activity of the period and then examines the accusations often made against it, of dull preaching in dull churches, worldliness, and spiritual anaemia. He concedes the validity of the charges where he must, but insists that " the Augustans' religious emotions were different from ours but not necessarily inferior " (p. 150), that " the Augustans were often enough worldly, but they often also encouraged devotion, sometimes prosaic but reliable as with Parsons Cole and Woodforde, sometimes complacent yet genuine, as with Addison, sometimes troubled as with Butler, Johnson and Cowper, and sometimes passionate and joyful as with Berkeley and Law " (p. 141), and that their "characteristic belief in the mercy of God and the duty of beneficence in man " contributed to that " supramundane scale of values " which gave to the thought of the period its sense of great significance. The qualities which Professor Humphreys finds in, and illustrates from, the period—

its social cohesion, its spirit of industry, its political toleration, its sense of order and clarity, its confident philosophical tone, its high culture—all may be said to be related to, developed or modified by, its fundamental Christianity.

Professor Humphreys set himself a big task, and, although his book may fail to satisfy the specialists, as an attempt at fairly comprehensive survey within a comparatively small compass it is to be commended. From it there emerges a coherent view of the Augustan world.

ARTHUR POLLARD.

CHURCH AND STATE

CHURCH AND STATE FROM CONSTANTINE TO THEODOSIUS. By S. L. GREENSLADE. S.C.M. Press. 7s. 6d.

THIS SLIM VOLUME CONTAINS the substance of the Frederick Denison Maurice lectures delivered at King's College, London, in 1953.

The author, who is the Van Mildert Professor of Divinity in the University of Durham, does not attempt a complete history of the relations between Church and State in the fourth century. He assumes a general knowledge of the period or a willingness to read the recognized histories. For that purpose these three lectures will provide an excellent introduction to the subject. Dr. Greenslade devotes his first lecture to a consideration of the meaning and significance of the Christian Emperor as he appeared to Christian historians such as Eusebius. Eusebius is "ready with a theory, indeed a theology, of the Christian Emperor." Constantine "is the first true emperor" whom God has raised up. He is the universal authority, the ultimate court of appeal in all matters—including ecclesiastical. Thus stated, the relations of Church and State are full of danger. There would have to be modifications and adjustments if the alliance was to work smoothly. "They were to be discovered in the course of a century of experience and experiment, and more than one answer was given." What was normal, however, was the intervention of the Emperor in all ecclesiastical disputes. And this was recognized as much by the Catholics as by the Donatists. All parties in the State appealed to him. The Emperor, for his part, "could not happily accept a dualistic theory of Church and State or a policy of neutrality in religion."

The second lecture discusses the freedom of the Church and the dualistic theory of Church and State. Already in the fourth century there was a marked difference in the attitude in West and East towards the State. The tendencies were already at work which ultimately hardened into Papalism on the one hand and Caesaro-papalism on the other. Professor Greenslade's study is invaluable as he traces the clarification of the issues in his references to the teaching of such leaders in the Church as St. Athanasius, St. Martin, and above all St. Ambrose. The Church's freedom in the West was safeguarded by the growing authority of the Roman Primacy. "The point is that in the West it was in fact the Papacy, rather than a series of autonomous regional Churches . . . which came to be, at its best, the bulwark of the liberty of the Church." It was in the fourth century that the Church induced the State to recognize that there are realms of life over which it has no absolute rights. It gave "the lie to the omnicompetent, totalitarian State."

In the final lecture on the Ascendancy of the Church, without discussing the general theory of Church and State relations, Professor Greenslade outlines "the three broad types of thought" which emerge from his historical survey. Theory arose from concrete situations. He concludes with offering some practical suggestions for the present time. In practice, he declares "we are . . . driven back upon some form of Dualism". The great peril to be avoided in approaching the problem of Church-State relations is to be too empirical. The principles involved are here clearly enunciated, and this study is a valuable contribution to their elucidation.

E. C. Rich.

CATHOLIC AND CHRISTIAN

God and the Supernatural. A Catholic Statement of the Christian Faith. Edited by Fr. Cuthbert, O.F.M., Cap. Revised Edition. Sheed and Ward. 12s. 6d.

This volume of Essays first appeared in 1920. It now appears without the Introductory Essay by Mgr. R. A. Knox on the contemporary situation. So also has Fr. Knox's other contribution on the Person of Christ been withdrawn. Readers are now referred to his more recent book, *In Christ*, for a fuller expression of his mind. The brilliant team of writers whom Fr. Cuthbert gathered together for the production of this book were united in one aim. Facing "the fact that Christianity as a substantive and intelligent Faith has been lost and is practically unknown to the people at large . . . they . . . made an attempt to set forth the fundamental doctrines of that Church which claims, and has ever claimed, to be the depository of the Faith of Christ." They wrote in no controversial spirit, but "merely endeavoured to set forth the doctrine of the Faith they held, in language intelligible to the ordinary educated reader."

Such being the intention of the writers of this volume, non-Roman readers will want to look for those things which they hold in common with themselves. Those who recall the intellectual climate immediately following the first World War will detect here and there expressions which reflect that religious situation. But the positive statements on the Divine Revelation deal with timeless truths which are unaffected by the changes in human opinion. Perhaps the most encouraging impression that such readers will receive on a re-reading of these essays will be how much theological thinking in non-Roman circles has moved back to the more traditional statement of the Faith which this book upholds. Mr. Christopher Dawson's contribution on "The Nature and Destiny of Man" and Mr. E. I. Watkin's Essay on "The Church as the Mystical Body of Christ" would to-day undoubtedly receive far more sympathetic appreciation than when they first appeared. During the past 30 years there has been a widespread re-grouping of Christian thinkers in all the denominations. Nor is this movement of thought at an end.

Not everything that this book contains will be acceptable to Anglicans. But on the whole it may be said that when the book first appeared there was an over-emphasis on the Divine Immanence, whereas to-day the Divine Transcendance is held in truer balance. This should mean that when we speak of the reality of the supernatural as do the contributors to this volume, we shall speak the same language and draw many of the same conclusions for faith.

E. C. RICH.

MYTH OR LEGEND

THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE RING. By J. R. R. TOLKIEN. Allen and Unwin. 21s.

ELVES and dwarfs, orcs and trolls, Numenor and the true West, Sauron and the Dark Riders, Saruman and wizards,—all these break quickly through into the channels of unconscious mind. The archetypal channels may lie dusty and disused as stream-beds in the Sahara; but as soon as the rain falls, be it never so rare, the waters take the old familiar courses: as soon as poet's fancy or story-teller's art fall lightly upon the mind, be it never so arid and materialistic, ideas easily take their old familiar courses.

How brave the minnesinger who dares to import into his heroic songs a strange creature who answers to no archetype! What is a Hobbit? A shoeless *halfling* with furry feet, a yard high, full of mature but innocent wisdom, full of fears, of unexpected courage, of strange farsightedness. Were Mr Tolkien's eyes upon small solemn faces, bright eyes and bedroom slippers when he first invented (or discovered) the Hobbit? However that may be, the Hobbit has now taken charge, as such creatures commonly do, and demands an existence in its own right.

The Hobbit was a fairy tale; but here hobbits step out on a more ambitious stage. *The Fellowship of the Ring* is the first of a trilogy: professing to deal with the high and far off days, it has much to say to an age which has made knowledge and power its twin gods. Mr Tolkien uses the past as Olaf Stapledon used the future, as both warning and encouragement. He has a sense of *sumpatheia ton holon* which might seem Stoic to one who had forgotten Romans 8. Tom Bombadil, Old Man Willow, the elves, the barrow-wights, the Balrog of the mountain—these might suggest pantheism or animism to the sort of critic who says "Kenneth Grahame is a pantheist", or "Africans are animists (full stop)". To such minds many of the early fathers were animists—not to mention the evangelists in their interpretation of the nature miracles.

The truth that Mr Tolkien tells is poetic truth, which does not mean that it is not really true at all: its truth is self-authenticating. In details, in his Celtic sureness of touch in the poetry of names, he has something in common with Dr C. S. Lewis (*Out of the Silent Planet* and *Perelandra*): but there the resemblance ceases. One reads Dr Lewis and one says, "This is appallingly true," or "This is so nearly the answer to my fugitive nostalgias". Mr Tolkien sings a song of the mists, a song of the border, which is neither myth nor legend nor pure fantasy but something of them all.

By the sense of reality which such a book creates or fails to create it must stand or fall. The dust cover claims that "in an extraordinary feat of imagination Mr Tolkien has created and maintains in every detail a new mythology". The details may be new, but to succeed the atmosphere must be as old as neolithic quarries.

Halfway through the book I still thought it a pity that hobbits were hobbits. By the end of the book Mr Tolkien had convinced me (or very nearly) that Frodo, Bilbo, Sam, Merry and Pippin were real people; my last shadows of doubt were about Frodo.

Why a review in a scholarly and religious periodical? This is a religious book, pre-Christian, its theology that of the Zendavesta at its best: it is the original dualism of Zarathustra, in which the only true reality is in goodness and light. But there are Christian echoes and emphases: baptism (p. 155), self-commitment (p. 178), exodus (p. 227), paradise (pp. 243, 303), absolution (p. 372); evil is not to be used for good ends, it must be dealt with here and now; false gnosis cannot save (p. 272ff), indeed it caused the fall (p. 255). The Ring is the desire to escape into fantasy and nothingness; in its power the Nothings are seen—the things which are not, because they are not in the Mind of God except as rejected possibilities.

It is a book for theologians to read—and lend to their children when they are ready for it.

H. A. Blair.

CONTINENTAL AND NEAR EASTERN REVIEWS

IRÉNIKON. PRIEURE. BENEDICTIN D' AMAY, CHEVETOGNE, BELGIQUE, 1954.

PROCHE-ORIENT CHRÉTIEN. SEMINAIRE DE SAINTE-ANNE. JERUSALEM. Tome IV.

UNITAS. UNITAS ASSOCIATION. ENGLISH LANGUAGE EDITION. Vol. 6.

THE main subjects of these reviews this year, apart from those which are strictly theological, are understandably concerned with what is now called Ecumenism, with the unhappy ninth-centenary of the schism between East and West of 1054, and also with consideration of and information about the crises that have arisen again both in Alexandria and Constantinople over the limits of power of a Patriarch in relation to his Synod. It would be unsuitable for those outside Orthodoxy to discuss this last problem, which is after all a domestic one, were it not that it involves questions of Church order that still have relevance historically both in the East and the West. A careful selection of comments on these subjects is all that can be attempted in this notice.

Irénikon, in the recent autumn number, has the first part of an article by Dr. Florovsky, the Dean of the Orthodox Seminary in New York, a scholar well known in this country, on " Ecumenism in the Nineteenth Century ". The author is of the opinion that the background of the French Revolution, of the Napoleonic wars, and above all of the defeat and fall of Napoleon himself, led to a violent spiritual reaction in Europe. This showed itself in a strangely apocalyptic way in the Holy Alliance of 1815, signed by Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Orthodox monarchs, purporting to usher in a new age in which Christ himself should be recognized as the true sovereign of a single Christian people, of which all States should be branches. The Alliance was a fiasco, but important as a renewed attempt, after a very long period of indifference, to realize a Christian unity. This was conceived in an inchoate manner, indifferent to confessional frontiers which a new age of faith and hope should render transparent. It was also of the character of a confederation. In Russia it led to intense religious activity, to the translation of the Holy Scriptures into Russian and to close relations with the British and Foreign Bible Society in this country. But the mood was generally a religious mysticism that laid little stress on doctrine, and less on Church order, both of which were to be taken into account later by the great Russian ecclesiastic Philaret, Metropolitan of Moscow, and by the lay theologian Alexis Homiakov respectively.

The rest of the article deals directly and fully with our own Anglican ecumenical contacts of a hundred years ago, in which the names of William Palmer, of Worcester College, Oxford, of J. M. Neale, and the founding of the Eastern Churches Association in 1864, are prominent. Dr. Florovsky maintains, however, that the real origin of a revival of interest in the Orthodox Church is to be found in the initiative taken somewhat later by certain members of the Episcopal Church in America, the account of which awaits us in the next number of the periodical.

Of a quite different character is an article in the same number by the Orthodox priest, Fr. A. Schmemann, entitled " Fast and Liturgy ". In these days in the West when the subject of fasting appears to be becoming almost purely a matter of the minimum observance of a ceremonial rule, this study calls the reader back to spiritual principles and deals first with the fast before Communion. He shows how the approach to sacramental Communion, and the preparation for it, is a fulfilment of the expectation of the Messianic Lord. John the Precursor represents New Testament asceticism and also the whole process of preparation and expectation of the Old Testament. Christ the Lord in contrast comes " eating and drinking ", and this coming is the signal of the advent of the Kingdom and of salvation. Every celebration of the divine Liturgy is thus both a setting forth of the ultimate and glorious coming of Christ and of a mystery known now to the Church which will be manifested to all in the end. The fast, then, before Communion (intimately connected with the Vigil) is the perpetual reminder of this awaiting, and has its full meaning in its end and fulfilment in Communion, " in the Mystery which transforms Remembrance into Presence ".

But fasting has also a complementary meaning as " the fight against Satan ", especially as manifested in the *ascesis* of the monk. Our Lord appeared in the world as the great and final victor of Satan, the enemy of mankind. It was Satan who in the beginning caused man to fall by tasting of the forbidden food of this world. Fasting is not, in the practice and teaching of the ascetics, a moderating exercise of hygiene, but a clear and studied defiance of the laws of nature by mortification and prodigies of abstinence from food, while the true nourishment is that which comes from feeding on every word that proceeds out of the mouth of God. However strange to modern ears, no history of fasting in the Church is complete without the setting forth of this aspect of it.

Proche-Orient Chrétien, in the first and second quarterly publication of 1954, deals at considerable length with the question of the relation of a Patriarch to his Synod in the Byzantine Church. In the chronicle of ecclesiastical events, both in Turkey and Egypt, i.e., of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and of the ancient patriarchal see of Alexandria quotations are made from local journals of both, which set out the present crises, which are neither new nor strictly our business: bu the general problem involved is an important one. It is hardly fair indeed, to call it exclusively one of the Byzantine Church, i.e., on the model of the Great Church of Constantinople. The difference between the Latin West and the East in their developed theory and practice in Church government and order is perhaps more evident in this issue than in any other. In the West we have almost forgotten what the function of a Patriarch is, since the Patriarchate of Rome has absorbed and transformed the conceptions of ecclesiastical rule into that of a sole and monarchical head. But in the East the rule, first of the bishop and by development of the historic patriarchates, has preserved a democratic character of church rule that may well claim to be earlier. Strictly speaking, the rule of a patriarchate would appear to be realized through its Holy Synod, of which the Patriarch is a member and which gives him his place as *primus inter pares.*

Purists in Orthodox theory today maintain, therefore, that a Patriarch has not the power to dismiss members of his Holy Synod, and cannot treat it as a purely consultative body: patriarch and synod of metropolitans together make up the complement of the organ of government. It is just on these lines that difference of opinion has arisen. It is fair, however, to say that the strict application of the rule of Patriarch through Synod is continually being made difficult, if not impossible, by the traditional activities of parties for and against the Patriarch. The tendency, not merely in the upsets of the last century but earlier, has been for a Patriarch to cut the Gordian knot and dismiss dissident members of a Holy Synod, or indeed at least in one case to try to make it a merely consultative body.

AUSTIN OAKLEY.

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The Pattern of Christian Truth. A Study of the Relations between Orthodoxy and Heresy in the early Church. By H. E. W. Turner. 508 p. Mowbrays. 42s.

In the Bampton Lectures for 1954 Professor Turner has endeavoured to discover the basic principles which underlie the task of theology while furnishing an illuminating appreciation of the early Church in the age of the Fathers and the development of Christian doctrine in the controversies of that age.

Born Catholics. Assembled by F. J. Sheed. Sheed and Ward. 12s. 6d.

An anthology of personal records by some prominent Roman Catholics who were brought up as Catholics. There is much of value in these records, some of which are ably written.

Sense Without Matter: or Direct Perception. By A. A. Luce, Berkeley Professor at Trinity College, Dublin. 164 p. Nelson. 12s. 6d.

" Materialism has political aspects and implications, but ultimately it is a philosophy, and it must be met and conquered in the sphere of the mind ". The sphere of the mind — how little that sphere is honoured in contemporary religion! Canon Luce, an authority on Berkeley shares the determination of the great Irish thinker to refute materialism as being the gravest threat to religion today. In this very readable book he puts the arguments of Berkeley into a contemporary idiom. Dr. Luce is not one of those scholars who are content to impart their ideas in the crudest language. He has a style, and this will enable the general reader to become familiar with the main philosophical defence of a theistic view of life.

The New Oxford School Bible. A.V. Oxford Press, 9s. 6d.

This bible, which includes the Apocrypha, is printed in a new typeface called *Sheldon.* The publishers claim for it legibility in spite of its size. It is designed by Mr. J. Van Krimpen.

The Decline of Wisdom. By Gabriel Marcel. 56p. Harvill Press. 5s.

Recommended.

The Demon of Progress in the Arts. By Wyndham Lewis. Methuen. 12s. 6d.

An able writer discusses the effect of innovation — of newness for newness' sake—in the arts. An important topic handled with vigour.

Defeating Mau Mau. By L. S. B. Leakey. Methuen. 8s. 6d.

An important book, to which we draw attention on another page. It forms a sequel to the author's *Mau Mau and the Kikuyu*, which we mentioned in an earlier issue of this journal.

Living Christianity. A Personal Essay by Michael de la Bedoyere. Burns Oates. 15s.

The able writer of this book deals with a need felt in every Communion. Today so much religious instruction dwells on the superstructure, embellishments and externals of full Christianity that any basic connection between the Catholic and the average man of the world is wholly missing. And even those whose faith is well assured by heredity or upbringing may often fail to comprehend " the beautiful meaning and inner spirit of this great structure ".

The author, Editor of the Catholic Herald, has written a very good book, most of which is very appropriate to current Anglicanism, for in the Church of England also the accidents of religion occupy far more attention than the essence—" the inner spirit of the great structure ". He, the biographer of Von Hügel, writes with a comprehensive knowledge of Christian thought and an experimental insight into the life of a devout believer.

Life, Faith and Prayer. By A. Graham Ikin. 127p. George Allen and Unwin. 8s. 6d.

Miss Ikin writes with exceptional experience of pastoral and medical co-operation. We can, accordingly, recommend her work.

Silage Fermentation. By A. J. G. Barnett. 208p. London: Butterworth. 27s. 6d.

An able review of a subject of great practical and theoretical importance to those interested in agriculture.

Science and the Common Understanding. By J. R. Oppenheimer. Oxford Press.

In the Reith Lecture for 1953 the distinguished scientist deals with recent Atomic theory and some of its implications.

> The discoveries of science, the new rooms in this great house, have changed the way men think of things outside its walls. We have some glimmering now of the depth of time and the vastness in space of the physical world we live in. An awareness of how long our history and how immense our cosmos touches us even in simple earthly deliberations . . . We have begun to understand that it is not only in his rational life that man's psyche is intelligible, that even in what may appear to be his least rational actions and sentiments we may discover a new order.

These lectures deserve wide attention.

Fénelon: Meditations and Devotions. Fleur de Lys Series. Mowbrays. 3s. 6d.

For a thorough knowledge of this great writer it is necessary to read French. His works have not yet been translated in full. This has made them inaccessible to an immense number of readers who little know that they have been deprived of one of the greatest writers. We are now much indebted to Messrs. Morehouse-Graham of New York and Messrs. Mowbray for a small book of selections which have been well translated by Elizabeth Fenn. But the need of a comprehensive edition is urgent.

Francois Fénelon flourished and wrote during the great times of Louis XIV. His life and character have been a subject of study and stimulus to the well informed for two and a half centuries. His knowledge of the human heart was supreme, and many would place him first among devotional writers.

The editor has made a good selection. Fénelon never deviated from the basic truths of religion and life. Living at court among the people of all sorts who frequent such places, he never for a moment forgot those standards to which every priest is wholly committed. He abhorred self-interest and those other common sins which by their frequency among public men, ecclesiastical leaders and even scholars seem usually to be condoned by society.

> Since we love greatness so much, let us seek it where it really is and where it will endure. The ambition to live eternally with the Son of God and to sit at his right hand is truly admirable. But what a childish ambition to be eager for worldly recognition—to strive for a reputation more ephemeral than smoke, the plaything of the wind! Should we take such pains to win people who only *say* they are our friends, and to keep up appearances?
>
> Let us seek true greatness. It is only to be found by humbling ourselves. God confounds the proud who foster envy, criticism and slander. The humble, who are hidden and content to be forgotten and who shun being sought after by the world, are respected even in this life and an eternal glory will be their recompense for their indifference to temporal glory.

One can only wonder why the publishers do not publish Fénelon's complete works—something that will live to the end of time.

Christian Perfection. By Francois Fénelon. Translated by M. W. Stillman. Edited by C. F. Whiston. Harper: New York and London.

An admirable translation of a famous devotional work.

A Discourse on the Life to Come. By Stephen Hobhouse. Independent Press. 6s.

Mr. Hobhouse has written a good book. It contains the fruit of a life-long study of the spiritual classics, *Psychotherapy and the Christian Message.* By Albert C. Outler. 286 p. New York: Harper. $3.50.

An able and learned attempt to bring about constructive mutual understanding between psychotherapy and Christian teaching.

Religious Education in Schools. An inquiry by the Minister of Christian Education into the working of the 1944 Act. S.P.C.K. 8s. 6d.

More Letters of Herbert Hensley Henson. Chosen and Edited by E. F. Brayley. S.P.C.K. 15s.

Many have missed that penetrating mind, that strong, courageous heart, that well-chosen word and legible calligraphy. The Church of England will long be grateful to Canon Brayley for his trouble and judgement. These letters show the man in his most active and masterly period. They will be the subject of later review.

The Doctrine of Justification by Faith. By five Contributors. Mowbrays. 7s. 6d.

Papers read at a Conference, the object of which was " to clarify the views of different schools of thought in the Church of England ".

Education, Religion, Learning and Research. By J. Burnaby. Cambridge Press. 2s. 6d.

This inaugural lecture by the Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge deals ably with the four important issues described in the title. It will be the subject of further notice in this journal.

Revolution in Missions. By Willis Church Lancott. 228 p. Macmillan Company, New York. 24s. 6d.

A well-informed study of missionary policy as it is conceived today. The author is Professor of Christian Missions at the San Francisco Theological Seminary.

FROM THE REVIEWS

The Universities Quarterly, November, 1954, has an interesting series of articles on *Health and the Student.* Prof. Mansell Jones in articles on *The Swiss Federal School of Technology* shows how provision is made to counteract the dangerous consequences of over-specialisation.

Science Progress, October, 1954, includes two articles of great interest to the general reader. They are *Science in France and Britain: A Retrospect* by Douglas McKie—an historical account of a long-standing *entente* between the scientists of the two countries beginning with Descartes — and *The Recognition of Species,* by C. F. A. Pantin, which advances an interesting theory of what the author terms " aesthetic " Recognition (as opposed to the analytic method of systematic deduction).

The Journal of Theological Studies, October, 1954. Two articles of outstanding interest are written by the late Prof. Clement Webb and by Prof. J. Burnaby. Of outstanding importance is Professor Webb's valuable appreciative study of *W. R. Inge.* None of our readers should miss this article to which we hope to allude in a later number. Professor Burnaby deals profoundly with Tillich's important work as a Christian apologist. Another remarkable piece of writing is furnished by Clement Webb in his review of *Dr. Raven's Gifford Lectures, Second Series (1952).*

Philosophy, October, 1954. Among many good things are articles entitled *Basic Intrinsic Ethical Values,* by the Very Rev. the Rt. Hon. Prof. R. Corkey, and *The Justification of Punishment,* by Antony Flew.

The Political Quarterly: Special Number—The Civil Service, Oct.-Decr. 1954. This special number of the quarterly is recommended. It includes excellent articles by Mr. Attlee, Sir Edward Bridges, W. A. Robson and Sir John Woods. The problems of civil service policy concern us all.

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Fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te.

IN MEMORIAM

PAUL SHUFFREY

THIS number of *The Church Quarterly Review* is the last to appear under Paul Shuffrey's editorship. He had just got it ready for the printer when early in February he was taken ill with a malady which proved fatal. He died on March 22.

As I remember him at school and at Oxford I can see signs that gave promise of the ability he was to manifest in later years. He had a genius for making friends, and to his friends his company was an unfailing source of interest and delight. Whatever persons, events and ideas came up in conversation, he would see them from some unusual angle which was all his own, and with shrewdly penetrating remarks almost persuade one of the rightness of his vision. This originality of his mind prevented him in his youth from attaining high academic distinction. There was not time enough to combine the pursuit of his own ideas with the attainment of the kind of learning required by examiners. But with maturity he came into his own.

After some years in the Colonial Service in West Africa Shuffrey came back to England in 1923 for family reasons. It was as a consequence of working for the National Council of Social Service that he came into editorship and found the sphere which gave full scope for his powers. With his capacity for friendship, his wide knowledge of affairs, his many interests and his shrewd judgement he made first *The Guardian* and then *The Church Quarterly Review* journals in which discriminating readers knew they would find contributions of real value to the thought of our time.

When he had taken charge of these papers they became his whole life. He spared neither time, trouble, energy nor expense in their service. He had a robust faith in the Christian religion as taught and practised in the Church of England. He believed that it had nothing to fear from critical scholarship and honest inquiry, and sought to have it presented in his pages by writers who could combine learning with lucidity of expression. Alert to the fluctuations of public interest in topics of the day, he had a flair for discovering contributors and reviewers of books whose comments were both informed and intelligent.

Shuffrey's enthusiasm for the cause he espoused was infectious. It kindled in those who worked with him a devotion to the journals and an affection for their chief. Moreover, many who mourn his loss will have memories of what they owe to his generosity of spirit and ready help in need, and see in his death the passing on from this world of a great Christian gentleman.

LEONARD HODGSON.

EDITORIAL

HUNGER FOR GOD

AMID the apprehensions and alarms which distort and darken our times, indeed to some extent as the result of them, there are encouraging signs of a return to God. From the universities, certainly from Oxford and Cambridge, comes good news that a large proportion of the undergraduates, men and women, and belonging to many Christian denominations and schools of thought, are convinced and practising believers. And, although this religious revival is not as yet evident in the country at large, Billy Graham's evangelistic campaign last year enjoyed a considerable measure of success, the secular Press is beginning to discover a news value in religion, even in theology, and one is constantly meeting Christian sons or daughters of agnostic parents.

The secularist idol, the humanism which was convinced that mankind emancipated at last from its fetters of religious superstition can by its own unaided powers and with a progress rendered inevitable by the growth of scientific knowledge and its practical techniques erect an earthly Paradise, has displayed all too plainly its feet of clay. Moral progress, the inevitable growth of a humanitarianism owing nothing to religious belief, but founded securely on man's natural dignity and kindliness—the dream has been dissolved by the spectacle of slaughter, devastation, wholesale persecution of the innocent, millions of Jews, men, women and children, gassed like vermin for the crime of their birth, Communist labour camps packed with hopeless slaves. And the world is darkened by the shadow of an atomic warfare capable of wiping out whole countries and obliterating the vaunted civilization of modern man.

It is not surprising that, where faith in the idol of man self-deified has been lost, men should turn away from the void left by its fall and stretch out their hands towards some Divine Power able to save and satisfy.

For the majority, however, it is still but a search, a groping in the dark. True, as Cromwell remarked, "the Seekers are the nearest sect to finders." True, also, as Pascal knew, that to seek, however uncertainly, for God, is already in some measure to have found him. Christians, however, cannot be satisfied with this. If their faith is more than formal profession, they must desire to impart it to these hosts of muddled seekers, to give them the assurance of revealed truth they possess themselves. But the obstacles are enormous, often apparently insuperable. The gulf dividing the neo-pagan and the Christian, progressively widened as the decades have passed, is now so vast that intelligible communication across it has become at best extremely difficult, often impossible. When the Christian speaks of the Trinity or the Incarnation, of sin, redemption, grace, sanctity, the sacramental principle, the communion of saints, reward and punishment after death, he is speaking in an unknown tongue. What can be done about it?

Controversy is in many, we think even in most cases, fruitless. There is no communication. But we can pray. What is impossible to man, we are told, is possible to God.

By prayer we plunge the religious need of the world into Omnipotent Love. It cannot be in vain. Our prayer, however, must be the prayer of utter faith, unhesitating confidence. As our Lord insists, it must be persevering, importunate, not taking an apparent No for an answer but, as Mary at Cana, confident that he will turn the water of a blundering and feeble desire for good into the wine of Christian charity. Such prayer indeed begins, so to speak, to answer itself. For it is nothing less than the Spirit praying in our spirits and therefore answering himself. Its immediate and infallible effect must be to unite us ever more closely to God, to make us purer and therefore fuller receptacles of his divine power. It must transform a merely notional or formal assent to religious truth into a real assent, a vital experience. This, however, cannot pass unperceived by those to whom we desire access. Though they can make nothing as yet of the theological notions we profess, they will, when there is no longer the positive barrier of a self-assured secularist humanism, be aware that we have experienced a Reality, and a Reality somehow of mighty power and satisfying goodness. What we *say* about God and his revelation in Christ may be unconvincing, even unintelligible; what we *experience* of these things in the prayer of faith will be perceptible. These seekers will be aware of it and therefore, if genuine seekers, will want to understand it, to know more about it.

The attitude of respectful inquiry thus induced will gain a hearing for an exposition of religious doctrines as the intellectual explanation of this evident experience. Those concepts hitherto meaningless, the Trinity, the Incarnation, sin, redemption, grace, sanctity, the sacramental principle, the communion of saints, reward and punishment after death, seen as the prolongation of union with God or separation from him on earth, can now be displayed as theologically scientific terminology, expressing, clarifying and co-ordinating the religious experience of Christianity, of the Divine Human Revealer and of those who have humbly received his revelation, as the terminology of the sciences expresses, clarifies and co-ordinates their experimental data.

The movement, that is to say, from the Christian to the non-Christian seekers so numerous to-day, will and must be from within outwards, from experience to its conceptual interpretation, and from above downwards, from God present and manifesting himself in Christ, the total Christ, Head and members, to every department and level of human life, work and need. And this double movement is precisely prayer, true prayer, the prayer which is the surrender of a loving will seeking and receiving God in confident faith. In such prayer God supremely above the soul yet most intimately within it makes the soul the seat of his Presence, the instrument of his work. And it will be recognized as such.

The many external and interior forms such prayer may or should assume is beyond the scope of these remarks to discuss. We are concerned here with the essential prayer which is common to all these, and the substance of them all, without which they are empty and impotent. It is the prayer of a will which adheres to God, accepts his will, aspires to union with him, even though the affections may be dried up, the prayer of a faith which holds fast to him as he exceeds all we can imagine or conceive, yet has revealed himself in Christ, even though our thoughts may be distracted or certainties known by the spirit at its summit may be overclouded at a lower level and seem incredible, unreal. Such prayer possesses God, or more truly is possessed by him, can therefore—nay, inevitably must—give him to a world now increasingly aware of an unsatisfied hunger, which is in fact hunger for God. And in the first place it gives God by the evidence of its own possession of him, that the soul thus praying is in contact with the central, supreme, ultimate, Reality, has found a joy deeper than any sorrow, a peace which no superficial storms, not even those that rage on the emotional level of the soul itself, can disturb.

Such a soul must necessarily attract other souls to the God with whom it is in touch, as surely as the charm of a man or woman draws others to him or to her.

And, as we have said, now, though not before, is the opportunity and time for intellectual explanations. The world's present need, increasingly sensible, is thus a summons to the prayer which alone is fruitfully apostolic, can alone produce an effective Christian apostleship. We may add by way of corollary that this prayer is also the only approach to Christian reunion which offers a prospect of success. Where polemics widen the breach, prayer unites. In itself it unites, here and now in a central union with God and in him, Christians who must remain externally separated. In other words it realizes the interior union already existing. The realization of this central union must produce charity between these divided Christians, the sympathetic mutual understanding and appreciation which is its fruit. And beyond this it opens the way for God in his own time and way to accomplish in this sphere what is impossible to merely human endeavour, and reunite all believers in Christ.

The call to prayer is urgent, its power and promise immense, incalculable. For it is Christ himself praying in us. Let us pray.

Psychology and Religion*

By ROBERT H. THOULESS

We may regard the impact of psychology on religion as having started in 1902 when William James chose as the subject of his Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh "The Varieties of Religious Experience".[1] I think the importance of these lectures lay in the novelty of the manner of approach. There had been much discussion of religion before, but mainly by those who wished to defend or propagate religious ideas and by those who wanted to attack them. James was not concerned to do either; he regarded it as his primary aim to describe the phenomena of the religious life and not to appraise them. Scientific psychology was the platform from which he described it; expressed more exactly, we may say that scientific psychology provided him with a language in which he could talk about religious phenomena without necessarily making judgements about them.

This attitude of describing without judging is much more familiar to us now than it was half a century ago. It is the attitude of the anthropologist towards the cultures he studies. It is the attitude adopted by Mass Observation towards the social problems of our own times. It was introduced into religious study by William James and it was named by Flournoy "the principle of the Exclusion of Transcendence". On the whole (without complete rigidity) it has been adopted as the standard method in the psychological study of religion.

I say "without complete rigidity" because some psychological writers have regarded the primary purpose of the psychological study of religion to act as a solvent of religious belief (such as Leuba[2] and Freud[3]), some have regarded it as a weapon in the defence of religion (Grensted[4] and Rümke[5]), and others have regarded it as a method for the purification of religion by making an appraisal of the relative value of its different parts (Pfister[6]).

I am by no means sure that the principle has been adopted with complete rigidity by anyone. It becomes somewhat hampering if one feels oneself bound to talk about religion as a mere fact of human psychology without raising any question as to its value as a way of life or the reality of what its beliefs are about. This is inclined to be a treatment of religion which ignores its most important and difficult problems. Non-appraising description may be valuable as a preliminary to making judgements on such questions and it is a preliminary that is often left out in the study of religions; but it is not altogether satisfactory to stop there. William James was by no means inclined to ignore difficult and important problems and he did a good deal of appraising in his *Varieties*. So also have most of those who followed James in writing on this subject. In mentioning contributions of later psychologists, I shall also mention the judgements as to religious values either explicitly made or implied by them. These are often, indeed, among the most interesting things they have said.

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* This paper was read at the Thinkers' Holiday Organization Summer School on "Religion in the Atomic Age," which was held in Romsey last August. It is hoped to publish it in a volume containing the full proceedings of the School.

James himself was not an apologist for religion. His own background was sceptical although not actively hostile. But he was always critical of the orthodoxies by which he was surrounded and he was inclined even to question the this-world centred view of his academic contemporaries. He was willing to consider the possibility that there was a world of spiritual realities which was known to the saints and mystics but to which he was himself blind. He was inclined to think that there might be such a world and that one had a right to believe in it although there could be no coercive reason for believing in it (at least not coercive for one who did not share the mystical experience). His Gifford lectures may be regarded as arguing that the door to religious faith should be considered as open by the psychologists.

There were, however, other psychologists who wished to see it closed. One of the earliest of these was Leuba, Professor of Psychology at Bryn Maur, an American psychologist born in Switzerland. He was a somewhat younger man than James with much less than James's width of interests. He wrote several books on the psychology of religion which are somewhat similar to one another.[2, 7] He also made some interesting observations on the frequency of belief in immortality and in God amongst various academic groups.[8] His general conclusion was that the physical scientists were most prone to be religious believers and the psychologists least.

Although Leuba was often attacked by the defenders of religious orthodoxy, it would be a mistake to regard him as hostile to religious values. He valued strongly the moral aspect of Christianity and regretted that this aspect should be linked to a system of transcendental beliefs which he considered to be indefensible. I think it would be true to say that he regarded as the aim of psychological analysis the foundation of a new religion firmly based on science and rejecting such transcendental accretions as belief in God or in a future life but uniting men in mutual love and the practice of the Christian virtues.

A typical quotation which, I think, makes clear Leuba's position is the following: "In religious lives accessible to psychological investigation, nothing requiring the admission of super-human influences has been found. There is nothing, for example, in the life of the great Spanish mystic [St. Teresa] whose celebrity is being renewed by contemporary psychologists, not a desire, not a feeling, not a thought, not a vision, not an illumination, that can seriously make us look to transcendent causes."[2]

This is an eloquent profession of faith but as an argument it is weak since its force depends on an over-optimistic view of the extent to which psychology can so completely understand states of mind that we can be justified in saying that we know what are their causes. Certainly a psychologist can explain St. Teresa's religious experiences in the trivial sense that after their occurrence he can suggest a purely psychological cause for them. But he has no such complete understanding of the relationship between mental effects and their internal or external causes that he can say that his explanation is the right one rather than such an explanation as might be given by St. Teresa herself that God had spoken to her. The psychologist may say that he rules out that sort of explanation and adopts the principle that any element of experience which is not caused by an event in the external world is to be attributed to an internal (i.e. a psychological) cause. But this is a methodological principle freely adopted by the psychologist and not one forced on him by the character of religious experience. Our psychological understanding of the conditions of mental experience would have to be very much more complete than it is before we could properly claim, as Leuba does, that it enables us to decide whether or not religious experience has transcendental causes.

The most powerful attack on religion came from the founder of psycho-analysis, Professor Freud, whose book *The Future of an*

Illusion should be read by all who wish to understand the psychological case against religious faith.[3] The force of his attack came from the claim of psycho-analysis to demonstrate how a strongly held system of belief apparently upheld by rational considerations might really be based on irrational unconscious mental processes. Religion seemed to him to be typically such a system of belief. He is sometimes represented as having supposed that all belief was so determined but this was not the case. He was basically a rationalist; his aim was to demonstrate the irrational basis of false beliefs in order that they might be replaced by true beliefs with a more sure foundation. Religion seemed to him to be a false system of belief irrationally based on human wishes which must in future be replaced by a rational system of beliefs about the world based on the realities of science. He considered religion to be a socially accepted neurosis which is a transitional stage to a rationally based morality. His positive faith is perhaps summed up in the last two sentences of this book: "Science is no illusion. But it would be an illusion to suppose that we can get anywhere else what it cannot give us."[3]

Freud's psychological explanation of the genesis of religious belief was, in brief, as follows. It arises in the early situation in which man finds himself as helpless as a child before Nature, when he creates Gods whose function is to control Nature and to protect him just as his father protected him in his actual childhood. Later in his development, man finds himself in conflict with the demands of a civilization made by groups of men to protect themselves against Nature. His Gods then have the function of safeguarding the restrictions imposed by civilization just as the father was the guardian of restrictions within the family, and the further function of consoling the individual man for those renunciations of his instinctive tendencies which civilization demands of him.

The attitude implied by this direction of thought is obviously one not favourable to religious faith. It implies that religious beliefs are accepted because they are serviceable and not because there is rational ground for supposing them to be true. It does not, however, necessarily imply that such beliefs are false. What is serviceable may also be true.

Freud did indeed consider that religious beliefs were false but not on the ground that they were based on human wishes. He considered that this only made them suspect. He urged further that "they do not admit of proof, and no one can be compelled to consider them as true or to believe in them . . . Of the reality value of most of them we cannot judge; just as they cannot be proved, neither can they be refuted . . . scientific work is our only way to the knowledge of external reality." Nor would he accept the idea which appealed to James that the mystics might have some source of knowledge that the rest of us are without. "It is merely illusion to expect anything from intuition or trance; they can give us nothing but particulars, which are difficult to interpret, about our own mental life, never information about the questions that are so lightly answered by the doctrines of religion." To an imagined objector who takes up the point that religious beliefs cannot be refuted and that it would seem to follow that they can rationally be held, Freud retorts that in using such arguments the defender of religious faith is not following the path of correct reasoning. "Ignorance is ignorance; no right to believe anything is derived from it."

It is clear that Freud's rejection of religious belief is not itself based on any psycho-analytic or other psychological argument. On other grounds, he held religious beliefs to be erroneous and used psycho-analytic considerations to explain why, in spite of their erroneous character, they were so widely believed in. Certainly he also considered that the putting forward of such an explanation gave additional support to the opinion that they were erroneous but it was not the foundation for that opinion.

At the same time there were certain ways in which psycho-analytic thought tended to create an atmosphere unfavourable to religious belief. If in considering beliefs we concentrate attention on their supposed unconscious causes, we tend to regard them as entirely determined by such causes and to accept it as axiomatic that they are not grounded in reality. The force of this way of thinking is psychological and not logical but it may nevertheless have much influence on the formation of opinion. We may say that psycho-analysis created a fashion of not holding positive religious beliefs.

The psycho-analytical reference of beliefs to unconscious forces is not, however, the sole factor coming from psychology which tends to create a fashion in thought unfavourable to religious belief. There is also the general adoption by psychologists of the mechanistic principle of explanation. As a regulative principle of explanation it has no direct bearing on religious questions; the psychologist is free to accept what principles of explanation he finds serviceable without committing himself to any opinion as to whether or not there are other legitimate principles of explanation applicable in other fields or within his own field. Acceptance of mechanism as a principle of explanation, however, may easily lead to the attitude of scientific naturalism which asserts that this is the only admissible principle of explanation—that nothing significant can be said beyond naturalistic description and mechanical explanation.

Mechanistic psychology is a system of thought which provides no room for religious ideas. In a sense, this is true for any departmentalized system of thought: there is no room for religious ideas (or for political ideas) in the system of academic economics, atomic physics, or pure mathematics. Students of these subjects may, nevertheless, have religious faith or political opinions. If they want to express these, they use an extended linguistic system which goes beyond that used in their own special field of knowledge.

A real barrier to the acceptance of a religious point of view arises, however, when the basic explanatory principles adopted in a science are regarded as something more than a system of regulations as to the way in which one shall talk within the field of that science and are exalted into the position of a creed in which the scientist is ready to affirm his faith. He may have the opinion that no real fact will ever be found that requires an extension of language beyond the limits adopted within any science or system of sciences, but the attitude of faith is one not appropriate to this opinion. The development of a system of mechanistic psychology, for example, may prejudice one against any system of thought which uses other than the mechanistic language system; it does not provide a sound basis for a faith that no such system of thought can be dealing with reality. Yet this faith I think underlies the whole of Freud's argument. His passionate affirmation that science is no illusion and that religion is, seems to be a faith rather than an opinion. If it is recognized as an opinion, it may, of course, be right but it may also be wrong. There can really be no coercive grounds for one opinion or the other. Psychological study can no more close the door to religious faith that it can provide a proof of any religious faith.

The impact of psycho-analytic theory on religion has not been wholly negative. In contrast with Freud, we have the works of Jung and of Pfister. Jung was a brilliant follower of Freud who broke away from him early in the psycho-analytic movement and followed his own line of thought which left room for religious ideas although in a form that the orthodox religious believer would have found difficult to recognize. His earliest pronouncement on religion that "God is a psychological reality"[9] does not indeed seem to take us very far from Freud's view that God is the subject of a fairy tale, but it is difficult to know exactly what Jung meant. "Psychological reality" certainly meant to him more than merely imaginary; to him such psychological facts as archetypes are very real. His later writings are much more in the language of religious belief. In a letter to Father Victor White in 1948 he wrote: "Christ is in us, and we are in him! Why should the activity of God and the presence of the Son of Man within us not be real and observable? Every day am I thankful to God that I have been allowed to experience the reality of the Divine Image within me."[10] Yet again we must be careful in interpretation. We may be certain that these words do not mean to Jung what they would mean to the orthodox Christian believer. Jung's thought is difficult because his use of language is his own, and what he says can be understood only if it is read as a part of his whole system of thought. Yet it is clear that Jung's own brand of theory derived from psycho-analysis has led him along a path very different from that followed by Freud, and one of which Freud would have strongly disapproved.

Jung was also much concerned with the function of religious faith and with the extent to which loss of religious faith might result in mental disorientation. Here too his view was sharply different from that of Freud. Freud also thought that religion served a purpose in mental economy, that of providing the believer with reassurance in a hostile universe, but he considered that the reassurance was illusory and that dependence on it was a sign of mental immaturity, an acceptance for oneself of a social neurosis. The clear-sighted adult man should outgrow the need for such dependence and be willing to face the world as science revealed it. Then only had he truly attained mental health.

Jung's view on the contrary was that every one of his patients was led to him by a failure of his religious faith and that the road to cure was the restoration of faith. Not, as I understand Jung, a restoration of the original form of faith but rather its reconstruction in a form that was capable of withstanding the stresses of life which the original form of faith had failed to do.

Jung's line of thought has been carried further in a recently published book by a Swiss psychotherapist, Alphonse Maeder[11]. Maeder reports that he started his medical work as a positivist rejecting all forms of religion. The difficulties of his patients made him face the problems of religion and he became converted to Christianity. He found that this gave him a new power of helping his patients because he could enable them to make the spiritual readjustments that were necessary to the restoration of their mental health.

The combination of psychotherapy and pastoral work was approached from the opposite side by the Swiss pastor Oscar Pfister.[6] He was strongly influenced by psychoanalytic theory and had given up teaching theology because he felt that it "had no satisfactory answer to questions expressing our most profound longing and our most tormenting needs."[6] He later found these answers in psycho-analysis although he strongly disagreed with the materialism and agnosticism of Freud. Briefly the problem that worried Pfister was that it seemed to him that Christianity had started as a means of liberating men from fear and releasing their love, but that in the course of its history it had lost these aims and produced fear and hatred. Psycho-analysis too was on the side of love and Pfister applied the insights it gave him to his pastoral work and found to his joy that he could "discover facts and render help in a way which since then has not failed."

On the side of religious doctrine he felt that he could discriminate between those teachings that liberated men from fear and those that created fear compulsions, and could purify religion by retaining the former and discarding the latter. There is a difficulty here. Every religion regards its doctrinal system as a statement of how things are. The criterion of serviceability to human needs is not obviously a safe one for deciding questions of fact. If we accept what seems to liberate from fear and reject all that we are afraid of, we are making our doctrinal system a set of wish-fulfilments which may not be a description of other-world realities. Freud, of course, would say that they are this anyway but presumably Pfister would not think so. It is only if they can be believed, that religious doctrine can serve any function whether that of liberating from fear, or releasing love, or any other end.

There were a number of other writers on the psychology of religion whose approach was from the pastoral side besides Pfister. These writers were generally interested primarily in psychotherapy (and particularly in psycho-analysis) and in the bearing of these studies on their practical work in the cure of souls. Some religious ministers have undergone psycho-analytic training and practised psycho-analysis on those under their care. Generally this has been regarded as a mistaken aim. Not because a religious minister will not be as good a psycho-analyst as a doctor; that depends on his own personality and the efficiency of his training. The objection has rather been felt to be that this is to combine two functions that are better exercised by different individuals. The religious minister in his pastoral work deals with sin, disharmony, and unhappiness on the conscious level. It may be a help in his work that he should understand the deeper unconscious roots of these things and should understand the necessity for the more unbalanced members of his flock having these roots dealt with before pastoral aid can be effective. Yet it does not follow that he should deal with them himself, particularly since this will be made difficult if psycho-therapeutic treatment requires a different system of evaluation from that adopted by the religious pastor. The object of most of the religious books on the subject was to give this background knowledge and to guide the pastor as to when he should encourage members of his flock to seek the aid of a psycho-therapist rather than to encourage the pastor to take over the task of the psycho-therapist himself.

On the theoretical side, these writers were generally concerned to point out the weakness of Leuba's arguments against religious faith. They also dealt with Freud's criticisms of religious belief although many of them were inclined to attribute to Freud a simpler line of argument that the one he actually used. They supposed that he had argued that because religious ideas ministered to unconscious wishes, they must therefore be void of factual content. That would certainly be an unsound argument but it is not the one actually used by Freud. Sometimes they employed psychological arguments for the truth of religious ideas. I think that these were necessarily unsound for the same reason as psychological arguments for the falsity of religious ideas are unsound: because one cannot make an inference as to fact from mere consideration of a conceptual system.

One book, however, which has been recently published stands in a class by itself: Rümke's *The Psychology of Unbelief.*[5] Freud took unbelief as the standard rational attitude and asked what unconscious forces led people to believe; Rümke, on the contrary, takes belief as the standard rational attitude and asks what forces drive men to unbelief. It is a short somewhat obscure book, whose value lies in the fact that it redresses the balance by asking a question complementary to that asked by Freud. Obviously it predisposes to religious belief as Freud's question predisposes to unbelief. Like Freud's work it does not and cannot provide a rational ground for decision one way or the other.

The works that I have mentioned have been those that were of major importance in the sense that they initiated new ways of approach. They do not include all of the writings on the psychology of religion since James started interest in the topic. Particularly during the decade after the first world war, there were a number of books on the Psychology of Religion. I wrote one myself[12] and there were others by psychologists (Coe[13], Pratt[14], and Flower[15]) and by religious philosophers and theologians (Barry[16], Grensted[4], and Berguer[17]).

Looking back, as impartially as I can, on this period, it seems to me that we accomplished less than might have been hoped. It was, I think, to the good that such books habituated people to the non-partisan study of religious questions. I do not think that they introduced any important new insights into these questions. They can be regarded as a discussion of religious questions in a new language, as a kind of translation from the language of religious devotion into that of scientific psychology. Such translation has its uses; it enables one to see old things in a new way (as happens when people read, for example, the New Testament in modern speech). But translation does not in itself enable one to say anything new, and one often has the illusion that one is saying something new when one is saying an old thing in a new language.

There is, of course, a limit beyond which one cannot continue to make new contributions to knowledge by general discussion of the problems of the psychology of religion. Before the spate of books on the subject in the twenties subsided, they were already becoming to some extent repetitive of each other. From that time, those psychologists who have been interested in religion have been inclined rather to make an intensive study of some particular problem of religion instead of discussing the field in general. Good examples of such particularized studies are to be found in Dimont's *Psychology of the Methodist Revival*[18] and Gregory's *Psychotherapy: Scientific and Religious*[19]. Occasional more general works have appeared to the present day of which one may notice particularly F. C. Bartlett's Riddell Memorial Lectures on *Religion as Experience, Belief, Action*[20] and G. W. Allport's short book on *The Individual and his Religion*[21]. Both works are of value and in both the authors (as might be expected from their distinction as psychologists) find something new to say. Nevertheless the general impression remains that this is a field which is likely to continue to yield diminishing returns.

What might have been hoped for as the fruit of the interest in the Psychology of Religion in the first quarter of this century was not a continuation of general psychological discussions about religion but rather the development of a series of experimental psychological studies of particular religious problems. There certainly have been such studies but they have been relatively few in number. I have already mentioned the investigation by Leuba of belief in God and in immortality[8]. Even earlier than this, Starbuck had made an empirical study of conversion experiences[22] which excited the interest of William James. At the Ninth International Congress of Psychology, Dr. Hightower reported an investigation in which he had studied the association between the responses of a group of children to a test of honesty and their study of Scripture in school[23]. He found that the group who had studied Scripture at school did not give a different mean response in the honesty test from that given by the group who had not studied Scripture. I myself made an experimental study of degrees of certainty in religious belief and found that both believers and unbelievers showed a high degree of certainty in their responses to religious propositions to roughly the same extent[24]. I also found that in the group I studied the amount of adherence to religious groups was significantly less than that of their parents[25]. This is related to the later finding of Allport, Gillespie and Young that 50 per cent. of the students investigated reported their religious beliefs less firm than those of their mothers while only 7 per cent thought their beliefs were firmer than those of their mothers[26]. Since, however, the subjects of this inquiry were all students, this difference may not indicate a time trend but a weakening of religious beliefs during the period of studentship. Welford studied the effect of using archaic language in religious services and found that it was more favourably regarded by religious worshippers than might be expected[27]. Jahoda has made an empirical study of the causes of religious unbelief.[28]

These are the principal empirical studies of religious problems by psychological methods which have come to my notice. There are no doubt many others, but nevertheless the total harvest is obviously small as compared with the psychological studies made in other fields (such as those of industry and of mental health). It may be that few religious problems of real importance can be solved by experimental psychological methods. Yet there is a field to be explored and the range of methods used so far has not been wide. For example, the social psychological methods developed by Lewin and Shereef have not, so far as I know, been applied at all to religious problems. It is only by the successful employment of experimental methods to its problems that the interest of psychologists in the study of religion can be maintained.

From a practical point of view, the most important outcome of the psychological study of religion is its outcome in religious practice. One is inclined to ask whether, from a psychological point of view, it is a reasonable thing that men and women should go to church, receive the sacraments, and engage in worship and prayer. Probably psychological study has less bearing on this question than is commonly supposed. Whether or not these are reasonable forms of behaviour depends on what kind of a universe we live in, and that cannot be discovered by studying psychology. Psychology may indeed help us to understand why some people behave in a religious way and other do not, and may help us to decide which way of behaving is the more serviceable with respect to this-world problems of living. The promotion of tolerance is perhaps the greatest gain to be expected from the psychological study of religion. That is a very great gain indeed. We are now inclined to be more tolerant than men were in times past, not only in respect to variant forms of Christianity but also with respect to non-Christian forms of religion. If psychologists have not contributed much directly to this changed attitude, they have at least helped to create favourable atmosphere for its development. But to ask of psychology that it should tell us whether the religious or the irreligious way of life is the right one, is to ask from it something that it cannot give.

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Mental Health and Christian Responsibility

By R. K. HARRISON

WITHIN recent years we have been privileged to witness a remarkable change in many areas of the world of thought. Long cherished principles of interpretation in the sciences and humanities have been seriously questioned, and in some cases so modified as to present an entirely new method of approach to traditional problems. In physical science, for example, we have become acutely aware of the deficiencies implicit in earlier interpretations of life which were framed in deterministic and mechanistic categories. Thus it comes as no surprise to those who are abreast of the times when Canon Raven, in a recent series of Gifford Lectures, pleads for the revision of the history of science in terms of holistic and organic concepts.

In the world of medical science, too, has come a change of outlook, and if it is not quite so spectacular in its appearance as might be the case for other branches of learning, it is none the less significant for the day in which we live. In part it reflects attitudes which are increasingly in evidence in the other sciences, but it is of particular importance because it is so intimately bound up with individual health and wellbeing.

Stated briefly, there has been a decided shift in emphasis from the nineteenth-century German attitude that disease-producing agents were wholly material things which could be observed in clinical demonstration, and in the main enticed within the range of the microscope. Nowadays there is in evidence a different view of the situation, which recognizes the material nature of many factors in disease, but which is also prepared to admit that specific diseases may be caused directly by non-material influences which operate within the personality.

This new attitude has been made possible by the tremendous development within recent years of scientific investigation into the previously uncharted areas of the mind. Though there are quarters where psychological and psychiatric scientific method is not above suspicion, there can be no doubt that many of their conclusions have reinforced a great deal of what was previously known of human behaviour over the centuries. Those findings which represent an advance upon earlier assessments of the situation have in turn opened up new approaches for the understanding of the human personality. As a result of the investigations of Freud into the nature of the unconscious mind we have learned a great deal, among other things, about the way in which it is possible to repress or bury certain types of experience deep in the unconscious. We have also become aware that painful physical and mental effects may be the end-result of such a procedure, and that the mind may be responsible for afflictions whose causative factors were previously described in material terms.

The change of attitude which is increasingly apparent in the medical world may best be summarized by saying that disease is now being regarded as a disturbance of the entire person, and that while certain aspects of it may admit of normal clinical demonstration, the causative agencies may have emerged from the realm of the *personality*. It is no longer a sound therapeutic approach to think of a diseased organ in isolation from the remainder of the body. The patient is being treated as a *person*, and not as an aggregation of physical parts, so that the resultant emphasis falls upon the unity of the individual. We have long been accustomed to the idea that mind —using that term in its most comprehensive sense to include spiritual factors—can and does exercise a great influence over matter. This has been confirmed by modern scientific investigation beyond all previous knowledge.

This new approach to the nature of disease has been given the name of "psychosomatic medicine," a term which attempts to stress the recognition of mind (psyche) and body (soma) as an essential unity. It takes into account the fact that there may well be mental conditions underlying particular diseases of the body, and vice versa, since the human personality is deemed to be inseparable from its manifestation in the physical structure of the individual.

Now all of this is of singular importance to any who profess even the slightest acquaintance with the Christian faith, for it involves a fundamental change of outlook on the theology of sickness and disease. We have for centuries been subjected to the pre-Reformation development of the philosophy of Descartes, which thought of man as a dualism of "body" and "soul", making these categories two independent principles of human existence. The ecclesiastics of those days claimed the soul as their special prerogative, while the body was regarded as the sole and proper sphere of influence of the physician. From this it was an easy step to seeing the disease-situation in the light of a "sick body and a healthy soul", with the result that all too frequently the priest was only called in when the sufferer was *in extremis.* In view of the modern emphasis upon mind and body as an integrated manifestation, and not two quite separate entities, this theory of Cartesian origin has to be abandoned. With it goes the barrier that has for too long come between the clergyman and the doctor, so that a new era of understanding and cooperation has opened for religion and medicine.

The validity of the claim made for the close inter-relation of mental and physical aspects of the personality is not hard to appreciate. If the body is functioning improperly, or if there is some imbalance in glandular secretions, it is not long before the personality is affected. A sluggish body makes for a tired brain and a dull appearance, as for example in thyroid deficiency, where mental and physical lassitude are characteristic symptoms. We have all heard of some persons being described as "liverish" or as having a "jaundiced outlook" on life, and, without discussing at this point the mechanism of such a condition, we ought to remember that the savants of an earlier age than ours were quite well aware of the effects on the personality of hepatic malfunction. Other physical diseases, especially if they are chronic in nature, may lead to profound depression and even suicide. Probably the most dramatic personality changes are to be seen in instances of sex-hormone derangement, where a male is changing into a female.

The effect of the mind on the body is often quite obvious, as may be seen in cases of simple shock, where a person faints or collapses from fright. But modern psychological and psychiatric study has shown that in general the occurrence of disease in the body as a result of mental processes is often a very complicated affair, and one which may at times baffle the best psychosomatic endeavours at diagnosis. Such diseases are spoken of as "psychogenic," that is to say, illnesses which have their origin in the mind or psyche, and which we associate with the unconscious rather than the conscious mind.

It has been estimated that the conscious mind accounts for only two fifths of all mental activity, so that if these figures are correct, there is a vast reservoir of mental function available for the unconscious mind. This is where the instincts proper are thought to belong, and it is the area where many of our impressions are stored. If certain undesirable experiences have been deliberately buried in the unconscious mind, there may be a degree of conflict at this level. It is here, too, that we find most of the roots of psychogenic illness, while to complement the picture, these remote depths of the mind contain those integrating factors of the personality which we describe as faith, love, hope, the will-to-live, and the like.

Where there is sustained conflict in the unconscious mind, psychogenic illness is often the result, and it is so frequently in the nature of the case that the sufferer is completely oblivious to the real causes of his affliction. When deep conflict is present it involves the emotional life to a greater or lesser degree, so that hate, guilt, anger fear, resentment, worry, and so on may be the underlying causative factors of whatever pathology is present. Emotional involvement affects a part of the nervous system which is not under the direct control of the brain, but which nevertheless produces characteristic responses in various organs of the body. Thus we may blush in embarrassing circumstances, and no amount of will-power can prevent us from blushing, as we have probably discovered to our cost on occasions! Other parts of our body are affected simultaneously and we may perspire, become nervous or short of breath, experience changes in blood pressure, skin temperature, and other familiar effects. Emotional stimulation of any sort is a greater strain than is commonly realized, and people of apparently sound constitution have been known to drop dead in a fit of anger, or under stress of fear.

Repression in the emotional life is often the beginning of psychogenic illness, while at other times prolonged indulgence in some emotion is sufficient to produce a diseased condition. The person who worries habitually may well develop a duodenal ulcer simply because he has been generating tension of pathological proportions in his personality. A man may be short-sighted, not because there is anything organically wrong with his eyes, but simply because he flatly refuses to alter his mental perspective. An invalid may "enjoy" ill health as an escape from the responsibilities of life in a rough and tumble world. Fear in chronic proportions becomes anxiety, and hate when prolonged is crystallized into an attitude of resentment. These elements in the emotional life leave their mark upon the body and mind alike, so that a discerning practitioner can often tell the general state of the mind by observing the body, and vice versa.

Occasionally one hears some well-meaning dispenser of advice telling a sick person that his affliction is "all in his mind," thereby casting doubt on the reality of the physical symptoms. Quite obviously, whatever principles of psychosomatic medicine may have been imbibed have certainly been ill-digested, for while there is a degree of correctness in the statement (i.e., that certain types of illness are emotogenic), the implication that the physical symptoms are thereby illusory robs the expression of any positive value which it may have. Let me stress that the physical nature of psychogenic (or emotogenic, as we have described it above) ailments is distinctly real, and that it exhibits every symptom of classical organic pathology. So characteristic is the appearance of psychogenic disease that the unsuspecting practitioner often spends his time treating the symptoms, while the underlying disease is left untouched, to break out later on in a different form. I have seen people dying from heart-disease who were literally burning with resentment at particular circumstances in their environment, and when the things which provoked the resentment were removed, an immediate, "miraculous" cure was effected. It was fortunate for those individuals that psychotherapy was applied in time, otherwise they would have met a premature end.

Much has been written in recent years about the hygiene of a contented mind. We may claim to possess new insights into the mechanisms of the personality, and as a result of increased knowledge we may now be able to give rational scientific explanations for happenings which would have been considered strictly miraculous some centuries ago. But we have also to admit that contemporary prescriptions for mental health seldom contain anything that was not already evident in a general way to the discerning observer of the human personality in earlier ages. The very theory of psychotherapy itself is not new, for it was first used by the ancient Mesopotamian priest-physicians, nearly three thousand years before Christ was born.

Indeed, the teachings of Jesus himself are being increasingly cited as illustrations of his concern and provision for the stability of the personality, and his methodical insistence upon the removal of guilt as a prerequisite to mental and spiritual reorientation is a model for would-be psychotherapists. Some authorities claim that the distilled wisdom of modern psychiatry constitutes but one small aspect of the Sermon on the Mount. Certainly the Apostolic interpretation of the life and teaching of Christ leaves no room for doubt that mental hygiene is an important part of all spiritual development. The "fruits of the Spirit" are the ingredients of a mature personality oriented in eternity and accommodated to time. Fear, anger, hatred and kindred emotions are spoken of as being dispossessed by the power of Divine love, which in its own way integrates the personality and brings body and soul into harmony with the Divine purposes of redemption and salvation.

In view of all this, it is unfortunate, to say the least, that the Christian Church is so little alive at the present time to its responsibilities in the matter of mental and spiritual health. We hear a great deal about restating our message in the thought-forms of our generation so as to make what we have to say more meaningful to our hearers. I do not wish to imply that, by being in sympathy with this sentiment, I am recommending that henceforth all our sermons or addresses ought to be couched in modern psychological or psychiatric terminology. What I would like to see, however, is an intelligent and imaginative treatment of Divine wisdom as revealed to us by Jesus Christ applied specifically to this matter of personality-hygiene. More and more people are feeling the stress of life each year, and the Christian Church, which in its doctrines has the answer to the problems of health for the mind and the body, seems to be almost completely indifferent to the situation.

It is time that we faced up to the blunt fact that, by and large, our spiritual ministrations are not meeting the deepest needs of those to whom we minister. Our thought-forms are often those of a bygone age, and our religious vocabulary is teeming with obsolete and meaningless expressions of spiritual sentiment. Many clergy are so concerned with the expression of their own personalities in ritual and histrionics that they completely ignore the crying need of the emotionally-starved and frustrated people committed by God to heir care. So often while the clergy are preaching about life, their hearers are literally dying from some form or other of emotional pathology, and the great riches of Divine grace which are available for the healing and salvation of body and soul are squandered through gnorance of the manner in which they should be applied to the human situation.

Clearly it is not sufficient for the Christian minister to wander aimlessly around his parish in the pursuit of pleasant social calls. nor to assert the superiority of the priestly office when he is under stress. The average person is entirely ignorant of mental mechanisms such as we have been thinking of them, and if on rare occasions he is familiar with the factors involved he would seldom be willing to divulge his repressed experiences or emotions, were he the victim of them. Anyone who has engaged in psychotherapy knows the tremendous strain upon the mind and body of the counsellor as session succeeds session with no apparent advance in treatment Because the clergyman is so much more responsible for the welfare of those for whom Christ died, an effective programme of psychotherapy for the almost limitless casualties in the struggle for individual adaptation to environment calls for considerable physical stamina and more than ordinary mental and spiritual resources. It will be evident that this is not the sphere for the maladjusted priest or the well-intentioned but bungling cleric. Unless the pastor has first settled his own emotional problems he will merely communicate his personal disturbances of mind to those whom he is endeavouring to counsel, an experience which is apt to be devitalizing for all concerned.

To meet his immense task, the minister will need careful training in the field of pastoral psychology, with the emphasis on the characteristically spiritual nature of his work. It will be important for him to be familiar with the mechanisms of the human personality, and to be aware of the more common forms of psychosomatic disease. He will never act as though he were in competition with the professional psychologist or psychiatrist, and he ought to have sufficient insight into the matter of the human personality to know when a particular situation is beyond his technical competence. It seems to me that this kind of pastorate is what Christ had in mind when he thought of himself as the shepherd of human souls whose task was to preach the Gospel to the poor, to heal the brokenhearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, to set at liberty those who are bruised, and thereby to make the Kingdom of God a reality among men.

In his own healings, Christ laid great emphasis upon the spiritual conversion of the individual, and this will always be one of the foremost procedures in Christian psychotherapy. The assurance which comes from knowing that when one is "in Christ" one belongs to the great Divine family as a son and not as a servant affords an important feeling of security, which may be augmented by fellowship within the Christian group. An intelligent evangelism must be supplemented by a thriving group-life if the maladjusted person is to regain proper mental and spiritual equilibrium, and the Christian Church has long recognized this fact.

The Christian ministry is the most exacting of all vocations because of the immense responsibility entailed in bringing people closer to God. The onus, however, does not rest upon the clergy alone, for it is the privilege of every sincere believer in Christ to exercise this same ministry. Therefore, mental health is not the concern of a few obscurantists, but in its widest sense is the commission of the whole Christian Church. Spiritual integration is synonymous with a sound mind, and it would seem to the writer that the requirements for mental health are consonant with those which are implicit in the Christian Gospel in its demand for spiritual wholeness. Our responsibilities are those of the evangelist and the pastor, and if on this basis we apply ourselves intelligently to the tasks ahead, we shall see in our own ministry the saving and healing power of God as never before. By this means we may also be able to persuade the average human being that the message of Christianity is, after all, strictly relevant to the needs of this age.

Philosophy and Language

By THOMAS McPHERSON

WHAT follows is a series of reflections on the contemporary linguistic movement in philosophy. If these reflections should strike any reader as over-elementary he may conclude that it is not for him that they are intended.

Linguistic philosophy is chiefly associated with the name of the late Professor Ludwig Wittgenstein (though there is a clearly-continuing and rather different tradition which derives directly from Professor G. E. Moore, O.M.). The philosopher, for Wittgenstein, is not a man whose job it is to put forward theories or opinions (or "the truth") about morals or the nature of the universe. He is a man whose job it is to engage in a certain sort of activity, the activity of philosophizing, which is an activity of "clarification".

In a way, Wittgenstein was not in this saying anything new. Kant, to mention only one of his predecessors, said that he aimed to teach not philosophy but *to philosophize.* In fact, ever since Socrates philosophers have been concerned with the activity of clarifying: of getting clear what they and others were talking about; of making sure they knew what they meant by a question before they rushed into the answer; of comparing the different sorts of "meaning" that different sorts of utterance have. Wittgenstein was not the first who thought of philosophy as an activity of clarification. But what is new in Wittgenstein is the fact that he seems to want to say that this is *all* that philosophy is. Clarification is not a preliminary to philosophizing: it is the beginning and the end of philosophy. Wittgenstein wrote in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*: "Philosophy is not a theory but an activity . . . The result of philosophy is not a number of 'philosophical propositions', but to make propositions clear."

The philosopher, in Wittgenstein's sense of the word, is not someone who makes assertions or suggests hypotheses, but someone who waits for somebody else to make an assertion or suggest an hypothesis. The Wittgensteinian philosopher always speaks second in intellectual debate. The person who speaks first may be anybody: another philosopher (that is, a philosopher who is not a follower of

Wittgenstein, and so does not resist the temptation to speak out of turn), a scientist, an historian, a "plain man". When someone has said something the philosopher (the Wittgensteinian philosopher, that is), will examine what he has said and "clarify" it.

It may be perfectly "clear" in a sense already: that is, grammatically respectable, not over-abstract, using familiar words in a familiar way. The kind of clarification that results from the linguistic philosopher's going to work on it will probably not be (though it might partly be) the kind of clarification that shows itself in a grammatical correction, or the getting round an *obvious* logical fallacy, or the replacing of woolliness and comfortable vagueness by sharpness and precision. What the linguistic philosopher does when he clarifies may include these things but it is usually rather more than this. "Clarify" is a word which is convenient in this context but not altogether the best. However, it is the word commonly used in accounts of what linguistic philosophy is, and it will serve our purpose here well enough. What the philosopher clarifies are propositions (sentences), expressions (words or phrases), and concepts ("ideas"). The philosopher's great interest in words has led to the criticism that philosophy to-day is "all about words" and that the contemporary philosopher is "obsessed by language". But this criticism misses the point, as I shall argue later.

Clarification is a process of coming to understand what is being said: of finding out the different sorts of "meaning" possessed by different sorts of proposition or expression which grammatically are similar but which are in other ways different; of finding out differences between concepts that seem to be of the same sort and that have mistakenly been thought to be of the same sort. One or two examples will serve to show how this is done. I have compressed these examples into a few sentences. I give them to indicate in a rough way the sort of thing the linguistic philosopher does: readers will not expect examples as briefly expressed as those which now follow to do the method justice.

The first example. "I shall survive my bodily death" is something said by "plain men" and, perhaps, by theologians. The linguistic philosopher, in his attempt to understand exactly what is meant by this, compares it with other propositions of the same grammatical form. We need not go through the process of collecting differences: it is enough to point out one important difference (literally a vitally important difference) between this proposition and one other, *viz.*:

"I shall survive the coming battle." This second statement is one that might well be made by a soldier before an engagement. What is meant by someone who says this? Surely he means: "I shall not die. My heart will not be found to have ceased to beat and my other bodily processes will not be found to have ceased to function when the smoke has cleared away and they poke about for me among the bodies". "I shall survive the battle" means (very roughly), "My body will not die in battle". (This will not really do, for we do not say "My body will not die" but "I will not die", and this is different but we can ignore this here.)

Now, clearly, "I shall survive my bodily death" does not mean "My body will survive my bodily death"; for this would be absurd It is obvious that we must be meaning something different by "I" in "I shall survive the battle" from what we mean by "I" in "I shall survive my bodily death". In other words (to generalize): the notion one has of what constitutes "the real person", "the self", "the 'me' ". is different in statements about personal survival of death from what it is in some other common sorts of statement. What follows? It is not particularly the concern of the linguistic philosopher to build up any positive views about the nature of survival of death from this, but it has been suggested that we should conclude that whatever survival of death may mean it cannot be the person I commonly think I am that survives.

Another example. The question "What is Truth?" has been asked by many philosophers in the past and has received various answers, but there has been no agreement among all philosophers that any of these answers is the right answer. Now, this question looks like others of the same grammatical form—it is like the question "What is a canary?" or like the question "What is gorgonzola cheese?" These questions are easily or fairly easily answered, yet the question "What is Truth?" is not. Perhaps there are differences underlying the similarities. This is indeed the case.

"Truth" is an abstract word, and to point this out is to say that "truth" is not the name of the same sort of thing as "canary" or "gorgonzola cheese" are the names of. Abstractions do not lend themselves to being defined in a simple way, because they are not simple things but are shorthand for something very complicated; in this case, probably, all the many situations where people say of *statements* that they are "true."

To think of "truth" as a concrete thing is to be misled by the likenesses between "What is Truth?" and "What is a canary?" When we see the differences we no longer are surprised by the failure of philosophers to answer the question "What is Truth?" to their own satisfaction. We see it not to be the sort of question that can be answered by a simple straightforward definition, because "truth" is not the name of a single concrete thing; and in its place we may, if we wish, set up the different question "How do we use the word 'true'?", which at least looks as if it does admit of being given an agreed answer, though it will be a long answer.

A final example. The body-mind problem is one of the oldest in philosophy. "I have a body and a mind," a man may say. This looks like "I have a post-war car and savings of £10,000". But it is not really like this.

The argument of Professor Gilbert Ryle's celebrated *The Concept of Mind* can be reduced to: To say "I have a body and a mind" is to mix up in the same sentence two things of very different types—just as people do when they make a joke of the kind called by Fowler "the well-worn 'flood-of-tears-and-sedan-chair' pleasantry". One of Fowler's examples—from *The Times*—is: "Sir Charles, of course, rescues her from the clutches of the Italian, and they return together in triumph and a motor-car". We do not laugh at "I have a body and a mind" as we do at Fowler's sentence from *The Times*, for we do not see that mistake; and in any case it is not a particularly funny mistake; it is serious rather than funny—serious because failure to see it has led to centuries of "pointless" philosophical speculation about the relation between body and mind. (What is the relation between triumph and a motor-car?) It is worth saying, while we are on the subject, that it may be doubted whether people often do say things of the "flood-of-tears-and-sedan-chair" kind, except intentionally as jokes and in such a way that everyone recognizes them as jokes. Indeed, perhaps it is only philosophers who perpetrate type fallacies with any regularity and then often only as horrible examples. (One non-joking instance that I do remember coming across outside philosophical writings was a sentence in a broadcast by Wynford Vaughan Thomas, the B.B.C. commentator: "There stands St. George's Chapel with its tombs, its banners, and its history". But no-one is likely to get into philosophical difficulties over this.)

Here, then, are three examples of the way the linguistic philosopher goes to work. I should perhaps say that in giving these examples I do not myself intend to maintain any position on these three questions.

It will perhaps begin to emerge from these examples what the procedure of the linguistic philosopher is. In order to understand what an expression or a proposition "means", consider how it is used; that is, compare it with others which are on the surface the same, and look for significant differences. One may hope at first to find what it does not mean, and in doing this one may come to see what it does mean. This procedure has affinities with the *via negativa* of the theologians: there are indeed interesting parallels between some religious views and Wittgensteinian philosophy. There is also an interesting likeness between this negative way of proceeding and the similar procedure of the scientist; the scientist looks for likenesses *and differences.* It is possibly significant that Wittgenstein began as a kind of scientist; he was trained as an engineer and came to philosophy through mathematical logic.

It is not possible to say very much in explanation of what "clarification" means. Designedly I have tried to explain through concrete examples, and have made only one generalization: that the method consists somehow in looking for likenesses and differences among propositions or expressions. What precise form the clarification will take will depend on the particular proposition or expression being considered, so generalizations about the method may be dangerous. Indeed, at one time this fact seemed so impressive that philosophers in Cambridge were in the habit of saying that every particular proposition has "its own logic", from which it followed that one could not possibly make even the mildest generalizations about the treatment of philosophical problems of the same class—for indeed there are no problems of the same class. Each problem must be tackled separately. This view showed itself in an extreme unwillingness on the part of some Cambridge philosophers to commit themselves to saying anything whatever, even when speaking second. ("The Cambridge silence".)

What is the motive behind linguistic philosophy? It is the same as that behind all philosophy: the desire to solve philosophical problems. But Wittgenstein's way of solving them is not like other philosophers'. He tries to solve them by dis-solving them. Linguistic philosophy is designed to make philosophical problems vanish away. In 1918, the year at which the Preface to his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is dated, Wittgenstein was more dogmatic than he seems later to have become. Then he seems to have thought that he had succeeded in solving all outstanding philosophical problems. (" . . . the *truth* of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable and definitive. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the problems have in essentials been finally solved.")

But after that he seems to have taught (if one may judge from the work of his chief disciple Professor Wisdom) that no sooner is one problem settled than another is generated—or even the same one comes back disguised. But still the end to be aimed at is the same: the end of "curing" metaphysical worries. Indeed, linguistic philosophy has been called "therapeutic positivism", with the emphasis on the "therapeutic". The asking of metaphysical questions, like "What is Truth?" or "Is there a God?" is held to be symptomatic of—almost—a neurotic condition. The proper way to answer such questions is to bring the "patient" to the stage where he no longer looks for an answer; for he no longer feels any desire to ask the question. Readers of Wisdom's writings in recent years will be familiar with how he publicly cures himself of metaphysical worries: only the driving out of metaphysical devils is a process that seems never to end with him; for no sooner is one spirit exorcized than it returns with seven others more wicked than itself, and the last state of Wisdom is worse than the first.

"Therapeutic positivism" is a useful name for linguistic philosophy but not when the accent is on the "positivism", for this suggests that it is something like "logical positivism", which term is used somewhat wildly nowadays as an expression of abuse. The term "logical positivism" once had a perfectly clear descriptive meaning, but this has either been forgotten by many or else they never knew it. Most of the philosophers commonly called "logical positivists" are not, and never have been, logical positivists. Wittgenstein was never a logical positivist, though his earlier views (those set out in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) had some influence on the true logical positivists (that is, the so-called "Vienna Circle").

But Wittgensteinian philosophy and logical positivism have this much connexion, that they are both "philosophies of language". And what is characteristic of philosophy in this century—from the English analytical philosophy of Moore and Russell at the beginning of the century through Austrian logical positivism to the so-called "philosophy of ordinary language" now flourishing at Oxford—is interest in language. This interest is, indeed, not new, but never has it been so keen or so widely felt.

I have tried to explain linguistic philosophy. I come now to consider some criticisms that have been levelled against it. I think most of them can be answered. This is not to say that there is nothing in them. Far from it. They do, in fact, point out faults into which the linguistic philosopher tends to fall. But in saying that the criticisms can be answered I mean that the faults they point out are faults that the linguistic philosopher need not fall into and ought not to fall into. The criticisms point out dangers in linguistic philosophy, but they do not destroy its value.

First, we should consider the criticism that I mentioned above: the criticism that philosophy today is "all about words", and that the contemporary philosopher is "obsessed by language."

Is it a fault in a workman to be interested in the state of his tools? The linguistic philosopher has been compared to someone who concentrates all his attention on the spots on, and the faults in, a window-pane instead of looking through it at the view. This is a figure which retorts upon its inventor. Concentration upon the window-pane is just what is appropriate in a philosopher, for the view of reality that one gets is vitally affected by the faults in the glass, the colour of the glass, the spots upon it. To ignore the limitations of the medium through which one looks is to have a false picture of "reality"—to think that it really is what it looks to you to be, and that someone else's description of it (seen through a different window possessing different faults and spots) is false.

Our experiences of the world are either describable or not describable. If they are not describable we need not waste time trying to describe them. If they are describable they are describable in language, and they will sound different according to the sort of language we use. Contemporary philosophy is saying in terms of language what Kant said in other terms. It is philosophy's job—among others—to get clear about the differences between different sorts of language (the scientist's, the theologian's, the historian's, the "plain man's").

Is this the sole task of philosophy? The "pure" Wittgensteinian view would seem to be that it is. But this would be like sharpening and resharpening one's tools and becoming more and more certain that a spade is not used for the same purpose as a needle without ever again applying our wonderfully sharp tools to any job. It would be foolish to think that the philosopher is like this (though some philosophers do suggest as much).

But there is still plenty of sharpening to be done before the philosopher may feel inclined to dig or sew again. Or, to go back to the earlier figure, there are still sufficiently many people looking through different windows in the same direction, and excitedly contradicting each other about what they see, for him to be fully occupied in searching out such differences between their windows as explain the differences in their accounts of the view; there is no need for him to be interested yet either in setting up as a universal window-cleaner or in going back to his profession's earlier practice of stationing itself by yet another dirty window and trying to shout louder than anybody else. There is no need for this; but admittedly some linguistic philosophers (indeed, most of those who write) do sometimes offer positive views. Those who are interested in knocking down, and not interested in building up, in the nature of the case do not generally write. The pure Wittgensteinian does not often appear in print.

A second criticism of the linguistic movement is directed at the "appeal to ordinary language" that is often an important part of the method of the linguistic philosopher.

It is true that an appeal to ordinary language has been one of the weapons employed in pieces of linguistic analysis. "But we do not say this", has sometimes been offered as if it were a complete refutation of some traditional view. Unintelligently made, the appeal to ordinary language can be the opposite of helpful. But the appeal to ordinary language is not an end in itself; and if anyone has treated it as if it were he is at fault.

The appeal to ordinary language, sensibly used, may be of great help in philosophical analysis. "What the bus-conductor says" need not often be treated by the philosopher as of more importance than what Plato or Spinoza say; but some attention to it may on occasion prove valuable.

Philosophers have set themselves very often to improve and refine language. They have wanted to draw distinctions that are not drawn by bus-conductors and that accordingly are not reflected in the language of bus-conductors. The philosopher has had to invent new terms in order to state the distinction he thinks he has found, or he has had to use some common everyday words in sharper and more limited ways than those in which ordinary men use them (or sometimes he has had to use words in wider senses than those in which ordinary men use them—e.g., "perception"). This is all part of the philosopher's job of clarification. Some of the philosopher's technical terms have passed in time into common speech (e.g., "idea"), and some of the philosopher's special uses of "ordinary" words have tended to be accepted among the ordinary uses of those words (e.g., "sensation").

But there is clearly a danger in a complete divorce between the philosopher's way of looking at things and describing things and the bus-conductor's way of looking at things and describing things. We all inhabit the same world and we all have roughly the same sorts of experiences. The philosopher is concerned (in his own way) to describe that world and to explain those experiences. If he uses a special terminology in which to do these things he may find himself—or, more likely, his successors, who take over from him his terminology without thinking about it, may find themselves—in a position where the experiences he has—or they have—are determined by his—or their—terminology. It is then that the dangers of "scholasticism" are realized. And it is then that illumination may come from considering the relatively unsophisticated way of looking at things that is reflected in ordinary language.

The philosopher is not tied to what the ordinary man says. But if he never takes any notice of it he may fall into the unfortunate state of multiplying distinctions where there are no differences or of failing to draw distinctions where there are differences. Ordinary language will not do altogether for philosophy. But without an appeal to ordinary language when it is appropriate, the language of the philosophers may not do for philosophy either.

The appeal to ordinary language, as I mentioned above, is not an end in itself. It is only one of the tools of the philosopher. The contemporary linguistic philosopher is concerned to point out that its use ought not to be neglected. But its use is not peculiar to him. Bishop Berkeley, for one, knew its worth and used it.

In any case it is doubtful whether the appeal to ordinary language plays such an all-important part in linguistic philosophy as its critics think. Ryle, for instance, does not use it consistently throughout *The Concept of Mind.* He is not there always greatly concerned with words. His refrain is not "But we do not say this"; it is rather "But this is not the sort of thing that . . . ". Mention of this, by the way, helps to show the difficulty of finding an accurate characterization of linguistic philosophy. In some hands linguistic philosophy is not particularly about language at all. The expression "linguistic philosophy" is useful as a label, but it ought not to be taken (or not seriously taken) as an adequate descriptive expression.

A third criticism of linguistic philosophy is, to make use of a word I have just used to characterize the sort of philosophy that linguistic philosophers think they have superseded, that it suffers from the faults of "scholasticism". Some have not hesitated to say that it is the new scholasticism. And closely linked with this is the criticism: "What sort of inspiration does this philosophy give to the ordinary man? Does it teach him anything about the nature of the universe? Does it give him clearer understanding of moral principles?"

I suspect that it is sometimes temperamental reasons that lead to such things as these being said. To some people, who do not care for what they would themselves call "logic-chopping", the sort of ultra-careful examination into the uses of expressions that the linguistic philosopher sometimes engages in, is distasteful and a waste of time. To people of another kind it is of absorbing interest; and it is "inspiring", too. I, at least, never cease to be amazed at the extraordinary complexity of language; at the wonderful power we have of being able to communicate ideas, with the most remarkably fine shades of meaning, and of being able to express by means of words our emotions and attitudes. What is there uninspiring and a waste of time about the study of anything that bears upon man's rational powers and his emotional life?

Some great philosophy is "inspiring" in obvious ways; some on the surface seems not so at all. But what is arid and depressing to one reader may be exciting or uplifting to another. (Consider how differently students of philosophy react to Spinoza.)

It is sometimes said that in any case it is not the job of philosophy to be inspiring. The philosopher's job is to help men to *understand*; not to provide a substitute for religion. But this, I think, is mistaken. I do not mean that I think it is *not* the philosopher's job to help men to understand, or that I think it *is* his job to provide a substitute for religion. What I mean is that there really is something inspiring about the activity of trying to understand and about the achievement of understanding if understanding is achieved. No one should be called a philosopher who is not sure that what he is doing is not mere academic exercise but has some real bearing upon the lives of men.

A philosopher does not need to preach for it to be clear enough whether he regards his work in this way or not.

What has just been said leads naturally on to the fourth and last criticism of linguistic philosophy that I propose to consider. From the charge of "scholasticism" we move by an easy transition to the charge of "unreality". This is not perhaps the best word, but it is the best I can think of.

Sometimes the result of linguistic analysis looks like a mixture of the obvious and the irrelevant. Consider, again, one or two of the examples that I used earlier when I was trying to explain what the linguistic philosopher's activity of clarification is.

Take the example about "the I", "the real me". "I shall survive my bodily death" looks like, but is actually importantly different from, "I shall survive the coming battle"; and this shows us that what we mean by "the person", "the real me", "the self", is different when we are talking about survival of death from what it is when we are talking about this-worldly events.

But so what? we may well ask. We knew this anyway. We are not in the habit of confusing the soul and the body, so we do not need to be reminded not to confuse them.

Or take the example about truth. We do not really think that truth is a thing like a canary or gorgonzola cheese, so we do not need to be warned not to treat truth as if it were.

This is what I mean by saying that there looks to be something unreal about the linguistic philosopher's activity. I have suggested that the linguistic philosopher in this second case may choose to sidestep the question "What is Truth?" and set himself to answer instead the more manageable question "How do we use the word 'true'?" And certainly the uses of the word "true" are many. But they are not all in any obvious way relevant to the traditional philosopher's question, "What is Truth?" He is interested in one use of the word "true", or in one kind of use of it, and what he wants to know is: What does it mean when it is used in that way? He is not going to be satisfied with an answer to his question that runs: "Oh, yes, we do indeed use it in that way; and we also use it in the following ways . . . " This is no answer. Does his question, perhaps, not have an answer? It may very well not have an agreed answer, or its answer may not be obvious; but on what grounds is one justified in saying that it has no answer?

This is what we may tend to feel. But I think to speak thus is to be unfair to linguistic philosophy. What the linguistic philosopher says when he sets out to give his kind of answer to the question "What is Truth?" may in a way look obvious but it is not irrelevant. He can suggest what truth is not. And there is a point in saying that truth is not like gorgonzola cheese. Truth is not the sort of thing that you can point to and describe as you can point to and describe cheese; if you held a Platonic theory of universals (which is to say, a theory in which universals are treated as if they were a kind of particular) you might think that truth was a *thing*; you might—it is conceivable. What is more likely, perhaps, is that (not being a Platonist) you might think of truth as a *quality* inherent in situations. The linguistic philosopher is concerned with the negative task of pointing out that truth is not really like that. In a sense he does end up by saying the obvious, but the obvious is often what most needs to be said; and perhaps anything whatever becomes obvious once it has been (clearly and persuasively) said. He may go off down side-tracks which seem to lead away from the road of relevance (but do not really); but that springs from his desire to achieve exhaustiveness—to make sure, and to let his reader see that he is trying to make sure, that nothing is overlooked.

When I did mathematical problems at school I was told to "show my working". Some of my rough working on the left-hand page may have had little bearing on the neatly written out answer on the right-hand page. But its presence there was properly insisted on. Whether the answer was right or wrong was of less importance to my mathematics master than a clear indication of the way my mind worked; he was interested to know all the absurd and not-so-absurd false starts I had made.

The linguistic philosopher—typically—shows his working. (I should qualify this by saying that the early Wittgenstein himself notoriously did not, but wrote in a cryptic aphoristic style.) The linguistic philosopher wants to show the false starts as well as the promising ones; he wants to consider the possibilities of the situation as well as the actualities. Someone later may profit from his labours. But whatever else he does he ought not to claim (as the early Wittgenstein did) to have found the final solutions to all philosophical problems.

The Second Decade

By O. JESSIE LACE

As we move away from August, 1954, into the second decade of the working of our Education Act, we may well ask what has been achieved in the past ten years, what lessons have been learned and what are the outstanding problems for the immediate future. While education has to be carried out within the very general framework of the Act, the planning of details is a local responsibility and all Christians should be concerned to know what is happening in their area.

Conspicuous among the problems are those of the provision of secondary education and the supply of teachers of certain subjects in grammar schools. Where different kinds of secondary education are given in different schools, how are the pupils' abilities and aptitudes to be tested? How can we remedy the shortage of teachers adequately equipped for the teaching of science and of religious knowledge? To these must be added the many problems peculiar to the field of religious instruction. What developments have taken place in these last ten years and what is the present position? Such questions can only be answered on the basis of some facts, and it is, therefore, singularly appropriate that there should now be published a document which is described by Professor Lester Smith in his foreword to it as "the results of four years' diligent fact-finding". (*Religious Education in Schools*: *The Report of an Inquiry made by the Research Committee of the Institute of Christian Education into the working of the* 1944 *Education Act.* Published for the Institute of Christian Education by NS/SPCK. 8s. 6d.)

The material on which the Report is based was gathered from two basic surveys, one made in Birmingham and one in Norwich and Norfolk, and from some specialized investigations of particular aspects of the subject. There are nine main sections, including three concerned with matter of particular importance to the Churches: on "Content of Teaching: Agreed Syllabuses", on "Staffing: Specialists and Non-Specialists", and on "Corporate Worship in Schools". There follow a conclusion and two appendices, one of which is a list of the agreed syllabuses in use in the various counties and county boroughs of England and Wales.

The section on the content of teaching is the longest in the report: it deals with the practical working of the much discussed agreed syllabuses:

> Though the principle was familiar enough, in the form given to it in Sect. 26 of the Education Act it was pivotal to the whole settlement of the "religious difficulty" embodied in the Act and achieved by numberless conversations, consultations, and conferences before the final draft of the Bill was completed. Denominational controversies were obviated, direction without governmental definition or prescription was given, the Churches and the teachers through their officially appointed representatives were brought into a sound co-operative relationship, and the syllabus to be followed in any Authority's area was determined by those in the area who were most concerned with the actual use of it. (P. 23).

Different Authorities have worked differently in the Conferences which were called; there has been a steady flow of syllabuses and revisions of syllabuses; this in itself has proved to be a most useful result of the Act. The syllabuses themselves are an interesting study: they have clearly been designed and further revised in the light of experience in the school and in the class-room.

It is now beginning to emerge, and the Report has a very interesting section on this, that syllabuses fall into different categories with four main types of structure. At first sight the number of different ones and the variety of ways in which the material has been organized are bewildering. It might have been expected that the suggestions made for the teaching of church history would vary in different parts of the country because of the use of local material but there must be some other explanation of the different organization of the biblical material. The explanation is two-fold. In the first place there is the normal range of variation which is to be expected in the teaching of any subject. Even when the strictly logical character of the matter in hand imposes itself so as to restrict this variation, as in mathematics, there still remain alternative methods of approach. Secondly, in the case of religious instruction, there is an historical explanation. In the past this work has so often been regarded as "different", or as not presenting problems comparable with those of other subjects, that there is not the same body of shared experience on which to draw. This, though true of the picture as a whole, is not true of all schools, or of all types of school. A change is coming. The fact that the Act puts religious instruction on a new footing has already been the opportunity for more interchange of experience among teachers and more general discussion of problems. Many syllabuses have handbook material and essays bound up with them. These, too, reflect this stage of interchange of experience and show what particular subjects have called for particular treatment.

It is abundantly clear from this section of the Report that some very fruitful work has been done in the making of these syllabuses and there is much to learn from a careful study of them. It is also clear that many teachers find the syllabuses difficult to handle because they have neither the training nor the experience which they need. Many Authorities have organized courses for teachers in relation to their syllabuses and much expansion and progress in this field will certainly be a feature of the next ten years.

On the subject of staffing, too, the Report has much to say which is important and which should be of general concern among Christians:

> In the first place, agreed syllabuses have made it clear that religious knowledge is not an optional extra. Nor is it marginal. Educationally, the subject as a subject has been put on a level at least no lower than that of others in the curriculum. Its range, variety, interest, and practical significance from the point of view of teaching have been revealed increasingly ever since the Cambridgeshire syllabus of 1924 was published. (P. 48).

But it is difficult to establish the teaching of scripture at a generally high standard because of the shortage of skilled men and women who are as well equipped in this as they are in other teaching subjects. Conscientious teachers are reluctant to undertake work which they know they cannot carry out with the same degree of confidence that they command in other subjects.

There is also a more fundamental difficulty to be faced which does not arise with other subjects in the school curriculum. Within certain limits there is an understanding in the scholastic world about the place of the various disciplines and the relations between them. This is not true of religious instruction: not because it is not taken very seriously, or because teachers are unwilling to give it due attention, but because of the fundamental issues which are involved. We may now be thankful that there is a new situation and that religious instruction has a recognized status, but we have to realize that in the past controversies set such obstacles in the way that, except in a minority of individual schools, thinking was inhibited nd growth was hindered. Teachers who would be willing to take ull advantage of the new situation need not only courses on the ctual material of the syllabuses but opportunity for discussion and ebate on the place of religious instruction in the curriculum, its lace in the educational process and on the objective of the task. o good teacher can be expected to embark on teaching in a field here there is little clear guidance on these issues.

The section on corporate worship in schools shows clearly two hings. It is clear that in the very great majority of cases much hought and care is devoted to planning and conducting it. It is lso clear that only too frequently the difficulties which arise from vercrowding and the general inadequacy of buildings make it very ifficult to hold a full assembly of the school. Physical conditions are ot the only necessities and many physical difficulties are being agnificently overcome, but when it is impossible for reasons of ygiene to gather the school together for more than a very brief eriod the limitation of opportunity is indeed severe.

II

These three topics, Content, Staffing and Corporate Worship, are ubjects of study and concern in the world of school. Each of them s of immediate interest to those whose task and problem is the uilding up of the life of the congregation in the world of Church. n all of them there is need for greater mutual understanding beween those who are responsible for teaching in school and those who each in the name of the Church. In the membership of Churches, and n the organizations connected with them, are to be found not only embers of Local Education Authorities and Religious Advisory ouncils but also teachers, parents and children of varying ages. large number of teachers are practising church members and still very large number of children are in Sunday schools even if many f their parents are not in church. With regard to older children he evidence is that a relatively high proportion of boys and girls in rammar schools have some connection with a Church.

1. *Content.* It is of first importance that children and young eople should recognize, whatever may be the limitations of home in his field, that the teaching of church is closely related to the teaching f school and at the same time that the teaching of church has a haracter of its own. Most important of all, perhaps, the standards

expected at church must be at least as high as those of school. This raises many thorny problems for clergy and ministers and others who teach in the name of the Church. Many different schools, with many different standards and different schemes of work, may be found in one area and children from them in one Sunday school or class; nevertheless it is important to have some idea of what they are learning at school and to plan the teaching given at church in some relation to it.

Those who are working along these lines already will welcome the help which is available in the I.C.E. Report, both about facts and the interpretation of some of those facts: those who have not so far attempted to see their teaching in relation to that given in school may be encouraged to do so by the general picture which the Report gives. It may be that differences of approach will be conspicuous in some cases and honesty will demand the presentation of a contrasting point of view: every possible care must be taken to avoid confusion in the children's minds and it may be that in such cases the choice of subject matter should be made so as to be as remote as possible from what is being learnt at school. More frequently it will happen that careful planning will give opportunity for making connecting links with school: children never cease to be surprised and impressed when different departments of their lives are seen to be connected with one another!

But this is not enough. The Report speaks of the "sound co-operative relationship" brought about between the Churches and the teachers during the years immediately preceding 1944. After ten years' experience of the working of the Act in schools and nearly ten years' post-war thinking about the mission of the Church in this country it should be possible to find common ground for debate between clergy and teachers in the places where the work is done. It would be idle to pretend that this is generally easy: too often each tends to expect and resent a dogmatic attitude in the other. But this can be broken down by repentance leading to a realization that all are operating a Christian teaching ministry, though working in different callings.

In all fields of education the subject matter itself imposes its own methods of approach. Christians are now only too well aware that to-day the subject matter both of their teaching and their preaching is subject to searching criticism. Small wonder, therefore, if there is hesitation and uncertainty about the method of presentation in school. Teachers look to the churches and their scholars for a lead n the field of tackling the fundamental issues of belief and practice nd perhaps the churches may find some useful pointers in the exper-ence of teachers in school. At all events there is a great challenge o new thinking about method in religious education at a level uch deeper than that of teaching techniques. Sometimes to teach ld subject matter with new techniques leads to disaster, for it ercilessly exposes the irrelevance of the material.

2. *Staffing.* The second major issue in the Report which is of hurch concern is the staffing problem. There are three separate oints here. There is urgent need for young men and young women f first-class calibre to enter the teaching profession and to enter it nowing what they are doing. Much can be done in church to see hat this is regularly put before young people and their parents as an pportunity for Christian service in society. With regard to the eaching of scripture the most urgent need is probably that more eachers with a few years' general experience should be enabled and ncouraged to take a supplementary period of full-time study. For on-graduate teachers this is comparatively simple, for recognized ourses are available and fees payable for students who are accepted or them: nevertheless clergy and ministers do well to encourage romising young teachers to take courses and to persuade their arents, possibly, that it is worth while. For graduates it is more ifficult, and therefore they need all the more encouragement. lergy should know of someone in the area who is able to give ound professional advice about courses and financial assistance. t is not easy for a responsible young graduate teacher, especially graduate in science, to leave a post which will be difficult to fill. ut a proportion of such young people, many of whom are in hurch congregations, must be encouraged to take a longer view if he religious instruction in grammar schools is to be of grammar chool standard. It is pointed out in the I.C.E. Report and elsewhere hat unless the Teachers' Training Colleges can count on a good oundation of sixth-form work they cannot hope adequately to quip their students to teach scripture. This foundation requires aching at specialist standard in the sixth form. These three short-ges, of first-class entrants to the profession, of qualified teachers ith scripture as a main subject and of graduate teachers with an dditional qualification, are urgent and should continually be on our inds and on our consciences.

3. *Worship.* All teaching in church and Sunday school is related to worship, formal or informal, and is concerned to build children and young people into the life of a community one of whose characteristic activities is corporate worship. Those who are concerned with this training on behalf of Church must be concerned to know what the practice is and what training is being given in the more limited context of school on five days (probably) in each week The school context is in one sense a limitation but it also has its own particular value. Children in school are members of a community whose life and objectives they understand and whose worship therefore, has immediate meaning for them and increasing significance as they move up the school. As with religious instruction, so with school worship, children should at the same time find it familiar and yet different at church. Even when children come to church without their parents, it is possible to give them a sense of worshipping in a group with a bigger proportion of grown-ups if the adults in the congregation will play their part. The main difference for the child between school worship and Sunday worship should be this consciousness of belonging to a real group of adults, otherwise he is likely to associate all worship with children and to put it away with other childish things. Indeed, we are all only too conscious that this does happen and the very reality and significance of school worship as reported in the I.C.E. inquiry can increase this danger. It is, therefore, imperative that when they are at church growing children should be encouraged to mix with adults and be treated as though they were adults. This is, of course, particularly true of the time of adolescence and we should be acutely aware of this need and respond to it in the life of the Church.

III

We have then a potentially new situation in the relationship between clergy and teachers just as we have a potentially new situation in the field of church relations. But this does not mean that the frustrations, the misunderstandings and the wasted time of the past can now be discounted. There is a great deal of lost time to be made up and we have to be laying foundations when the demand is for visible super structure. If we are looking for indications of what our plans for co-operation might be we may well find them in the I.C.E. Report. On all hands we are told that the Christian gospel must be re-presented and that the language in which it is preached must be re-cast, but there is so far little indication about how this should be done. It may well be that light on these problems will only begin to appear when those who are concerned with them in such different ways, clergy, parents and teachers, can begin to study them together; so there comes to all at the beginning of this second decade the opportunity to contribute towards the establishment of a new phase which shall be marked by a new fellowship in prayer, in study and in honest discussion of the contemporary challenge in the field of education.

Week by week, on the first day of the week, in ministry of Word and Sacrament, the congregation is gathered together for worship, thanksgiving and intercession. The Church prays amongst other things for places of education "that they who serve thee therein, as teachers or learners, may set thy holy will ever before them, and be led to the knowledge of thy truth; that so both Church and Commonwealth may be bettered by their studies, and they themselves be made meet to be partakers of eternal life." Then for five or six days of the week individual members of these Christian congregations are engaged as teachers and as learners in doing this work. When, after a week's work, they come again to meet with the rest of the congregation for worship they offer their work, along with the work of other kinds which other people have been doing, to God; and they ask that, in spite of all its grave inadequacy, he will make it fruitful for his purposes. Members of Christian congregations should be aware of the work which other members of the congregation do, so that they may make a really corporate offering of it in worship. Everybody is involved in some way with the work of education and many of those who are professionally engaged in it would be much encouraged to feel that other Church members were seriously interested in their work and recognized it as the individual's part in a corporate ministry and were associated with it in prayer and thanksgiving. Gradually to educate a congregation to an understanding of its responsibility for the whole work of education, not only for the small part of it which is actually done in church, would be of lasting value to the congregation and of enormous encouragement to individuals whose work is in this field.

The Existence of God *

By J. J. C. SMART

THIS lecture is not to discuss whether God exists. It is to discuss reasons which philosophers have given for saying that God exists. That is, to discuss certain arguments.

First of all it may be as well to say what we may hope to get out of this. Of course, if we found that any of the traditional arguments for the existence of God were sound, we should get out of our one hour this Sunday afternoon something of inestimable value, such as we never got out of any hour's work in our lives before. For we should have got out of one hour's work the answer to that question to which, above all, we want to know the answer. (This is assuming for the moment that the question "Does God exist?" is a proper question. The fact that a question is all right as far as the rules of ordinary grammar are concerned does not ensure that it has a sense. For example "Does virtue run faster than length?" is certainly all right as far as ordinary grammar is concerned, but it is obviously not a meaningful question. Again "How fast does time flow?" is all right as far as ordinary grammar is concerned, but it has no clear meaning. Now some philosophers would ask whether the question "Does God exist?" is a proper question. The greatest danger to theism at the present moment does not come from people who deny the validity of the arguments for the existence of God, for many Christian theologians do not believe that the existence of God can be proved, and certainly nowhere in the Old or New Testaments do we find any evidence of people's religion having a metaphysical basis. The main danger to theism today comes from people who want to say that "God exists" and "God does not exist" are equally absurd. The concept of God, they would say, is a nonsensical one. Now I myself shall later give grounds for thinking that the question "Does God Exist?" is not, in the full sense, a proper question, but I shall also give grounds for believing that to admit this is not necessarily to endanger theology.)

However, let us assume for the moment that the question "Does

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God exist?" is a proper question. We now ask: Can a study of the traditional proofs of the existence of God enable us to give an affirmative answer to this question? I contend that it cannot. I shall point out what seem to me to be fallacies in the main traditional arguments for the existence of God. Does proving that the arguments are invalid prove that God does not exist? Not at all. For to say that an argument is invalid is by no means the same thing as to say that its conclusion is false. Still, if we do find that the arguments we consider are all fallacious, what do we *gain* out of our investigation? Well, one thing we gain is a juster (if more austere) view of what philosophical argument can do for us. But, more important, we get a deeper insight into the logical nature of certain concepts, in particular, of course, the concepts of deity and existence. Furthermore, we shall get some hints as to whether philosophy can be of any service to theologians, and if it can be of service, some hint as to how it can be of service. I think that it can be, but I must warn you that many, indeed perhaps the majority of philosophers today, would not entirely agree with me here.

One very noteworthy feature which must strike anyone who first looks at the usual arguments for the existence of God is the extreme brevity of these arguments. They range from a few lines to a few pages. St. Thomas Aquinas presents five arguments in three pages! Would it not be rather extraordinary if such a great conclusion should be got so easily? Before going on to discuss any of the traditional arguments in detail I want to give general grounds for suspecting anyone who claims to settle a controversial question by means of a short snappy argument.

My reason for doubting whether a short snappy argument can ever settle any controversial question is as follows: *any argument can be reversed.* Let me explain this. A question of elementary logic is involved. Let us consider an argument from two premisses, p, q, to a conclusion r.

$$\begin{array}{c} p \\ q \\ \hline r \end{array}$$

If the argument is valid, that is if r really does follow from p and q, the argument will lead to agreement about r provided that there already is agreement about p and q. For example,if we have the premisses p All A, B and C grade cricketers are entitled to a free pass to the Adelaide Oval for Test matches, Sheffield Shield matches, etc. (quite uncontroversial, it can be got from the rules of the South Australian Cricket Association).

q John Wilkin is an A, B or C grade cricketer. (Quite uncontroversial, everyone knows it.)

We may conclude

r John Wilkin is entitled to a free pass to the Adelaide oval for Test matches, Sheffield Shield matches, etc.

But we now consider this argument:

p Nothing can come into existence except through the activity of some previously existing thing or being.

q The world had a beginning in time.

therefore

r The world came into existence through the activity of some previously existing thing or being.

If this argument is valid (as it certainly is) then it is equally the case that

(not—r) The world did not come into existence through the activity of some previously existing thing or being.

implies that either

(not—p) Something *can* come into existence otherwise than through the activity of a previously existing thing or being

or

(not q) The world had no beginning in time.[1]

That is, if $\dfrac{\begin{matrix}\text{p}\\ \text{q}\end{matrix}}{\text{r}}$ is valid $\dfrac{\begin{matrix}\text{not—r}\\ \text{q}\end{matrix}}{\text{not—p}}$ and $\dfrac{\begin{matrix}\text{not r}\\ \text{p}\end{matrix}}{\text{not—q}}$ must be equally valid.

Now it is possible that a person might think that we have *fewer* reasons for believing (r) than we have for believing (not—p) or (not—q).

In which case the argument $\dfrac{\begin{matrix}\text{p}\\ \text{q}\end{matrix}}{\text{r}}$ though perfectly valid will not convince him. For he will be inclined to argue in the opposite direction, that is from the falsity of r to the falsity of either p or q.

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[1] I owe this illustration, and the whole application to the idea of "reversing the argument", to Prof. D. A. T. Gasking of Melbourne.

This last example is perhaps itself a—not very good—argument for the existence of God, but I have given it purely as an example to show *one* of the things to look out for when criticizing more serious arguments. The other thing to look out for, of course, is whether the argument is *valid.* It is my belief that in the case of any metaphysical argument it will be found that if the premisses are uncontroversial the argument is unfortunately not valid, and that if the argument is valid the premisses will unfortunately be just as doubtful as the conclusion they are meant to support.

With these warnings in mind let us proceed to the discussion of the three most famous arguments for the existence of God. These are

(1) The Ontological Argument.
(2) The Cosmological Argument.
(3) The Teleological Argument.

The first argument—the Ontological Argument—really has no premisses at all. It tries to show that there would be a contradiction in denying that God exists. It was first formulated by St. Anselm and was later used by Descartes. It is not a convincing argument to modern ears, and St. Thomas Aquinas gave essentially the right reasons for rejecting it. However, it is important to discuss it, as an understanding of what is wrong with it is necessary for evaluating the second argument, that is, the cosmological argument. This argument does have a premiss, but not at all a controversial one. It is that something exists. We should all, I think, agree to that. The teleological argument is less austere in manner than the other two. It tries to argue to the existence of God not purely *a priori* and not from the mere fact of *something* existing, but from the actual features we observe in nature; namely, those which seem to be evidence of design or purpose.

We shall discuss these three arguments in order. I do not say that they are the only arguments which have been propounded for the existence of God, but they are, I think, the most important ones. For example, of St. Thomas Aquinas' celebrated "Five Ways" the first three are variants of the cosmological argument, and the fifth is a form of the teleological argument.

The Ontological Argument. This, as I remarked, contains no factual premiss. It is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the supposition that God does not exist. Now *reductio ad absurdum* proofs are to be suspected whenever there is doubt as to whether the statement to be proved is *significant*. For example, it is quite easy, as anyone who is familiar with the so-called Logical Paradoxes will know, to produce a not *obviously* nonsensical statement, such that both it *and* its denial imply a contradiction. So unless we are sure of the significance of a statement we cannot regard a *reductio ad absurdum* of its contradictory as proving its truth. This point of view is well known to those versed in the philosophy of mathematics; there is a well known school of mathematicians, led by Brouwer, who in certain circumstances refuse to employ *reductio ad absurdum* proofs. However, I shall not press this criticism of the Ontological argument, for this criticism is somewhat abstruse (though it has been foreshadowed by Catholic philosophers, who object to the ontological argument by saying that it does not first show that the concept of an infinitely perfect being is a *possible* one). We are at present assuming that "Does God exist?" is a proper question, and if it is a proper question there is no objection so far to answering it by means of a *reductio ad absurdum* proof. We shall content ourselves with the more usual criticisms of the Ontological argument.

The Ontological Argument was made famous by Descartes. It is to be found at the beginning of his Fifth Meditation. As I remarked earlier, it was originally put forward by Anselm, though I am sorry to say that to read Descartes you would never suspect that fact! Descartes points out that in mathematics we can deduce various things purely *a priori*, "as for example", he says, "when I imagine a triangle, although there is not and perhaps never was in any place . . . one such figure, it remains true nevertheless that this figure possesses a certain determinate nature, form, or essence, which is . . . not framed by me, nor in any degree dependent on my thought; as appears from the circumstance, that diverse properties of the triangle may be demonstrated, for example that its three angles are equal to two right, that its greatest side is subtended by its greatest angle, and the like". Descartes now goes on to suggest that just as having the sum of its angles equal to two right angles is involved in the idea of a triangle, so *existence* is involved in the very idea of an infinitely perfect being, and that it would therefore be as much of a contradiction to assert that an infinitely perfect being does not exist as it is to assert that the three angles of a triangle do not add up to two right angles or that two of its sides are not together greater than the third side. We may then, says Descartes, assert that an infinitely perfect being *necessarily* exists, just as we may say that two sides of a triangle are together *necessarily* greater than the third side.

This argument is highly fallacious. To say that a so-and-so exists is not in the least like saying that a so-and-so has such-and-such a property. It is not to amplify a concept but to say that a concept applies to something, and whether or not a concept applies to something cannot be seen from an examination of the concept itself. Existence is not a property. Growling is a property of tigers, and to say that "tame tigers growl" is to say something about tame tigers, but to say "tame tigers exist" is not to say something about tame tigers but to say that there are tame tigers. Prof. G. E. Moore once brought out the difference between existence and a property such as that of being tame, or being a tiger, or being a growler, by reminding us that though the sentence "some tame tigers do not *growl*" makes perfect sense, the sentence "some tame tigers do not *exist*" has no clear meaning. The fundamental mistake in the ontological argument, then, is that it treats "exists" in "an infinitely perfect being exists" as if it ascribed a property existence to an infinitely perfect being, just as "is loving" in "an infinitely perfect being is loving" ascribes a property or as "growl" in "tame tigers growl" ascribes a property: the verb "to exist" in "an infinitely perfect being exists" does not ascribe a property to something already conceived of as existing but says that the concept of an infinitely perfect being applies to something. The verb "to exist" here takes us right out of the purely conceptual world. This being so, there can never be any *logical contradiction* in denying that God exists. It is worth mentioning that we are less likely to make the sort of mistake that the ontological argument makes if we use the expression "there is a so-and-so" instead of the more misleading form of words "a so-and-so exists".

I should like to mention another interesting, though less crucial, objection to Descartes' argument. He talks as though you can deduce further properties of, say, a triangle, by considering its definition. It is worth pointing out that from the definition of a triangle as a figure bounded by three straight lines you can only deduce trivialities, such as that it is bounded by more than one straight line, for example. It is not at all a contradiction to say that the two sides of a triangle are together less than the third side, or that its angles do not add up to two right angles. To get a contradiction you have to bring in the specific axioms of Euclidean geometry. (Remember school geometry, how you used to prove that the angles of a triangle add up to two right angles. Through the vertex C of a triangle A, B, C, you drew a line parallel to B, A, and so you assumed the axiom of parallels for a start.) Definitions, by themselves, are not deductively potent. Descartes, though a very great mathematician himself, was profoundly mistaken as to the nature of mathematics. However, we can interpret him as saying that from the definition of a triangle, *together with the axioms of Euclidean geometry*, you can deduce various things, such as that the angles of a triangle add up to two right angles. But this just shows how pure mathematics is a sort of game with symbols; you start with a set of axioms, and operate on them in accordance with certain rules of inference. All the mathematician requires is that the axiom set should be *consistent*. Whether or not it has application to reality lies outside pure mathematics. Geometry is no fit model for a proof of real existence.

We now turn to the *Cosmological Argument*.

This argument does at least seem more promising than the Ontological argument. It does start with a factual premiss, namely, that something exists. The premiss that something exists is indeed a very abstract one, but nevertheless it is factual, it does give us a foothold in the real world of things, it does go beyond the consideration of mere concepts. The argument has been put forward in various forms, but for the present purposes it may be put as follows:

Everything in the world around us is *contingent*. That is, with regard to any particular thing, it is quite conceivable that it might not have existed. For example, if you were asked why you existed, you could say that it was because of your parents, and if asked why they existed you could go still further back, but however far you go back you have not, so it is argued, made the fact of your existence really intelligible. For however far back you go in such a series you only get back to something which itself might not have existed. For a really satisfying explanation of why anything contingent (such as you or me or this table) exists you must eventually begin with something which is not itself contingent; that is, with something of which we cannot say that it might not have existed; that is, we must begin with a necessary being. So the first part of the argument oils down to this. *If anything exists an absolutely necessary being must exist. Something exists. Therefore an absolutely necessary being must exist.*

The second part of the argument is to prove that a necessarily existing being must be an infinitely perfect being; that is, God. Kant[2] contended that this second stage of the argument is just the ontological argument over again, and of course if this were so the cosmological argument would plainly be a fraud; it begins happily enough with an existential premiss ("something exists") but this would only be a cover for the subsequent employment of the Ontological argument. This criticism of Kant's has been generally accepted, but I think that certain Thomist philosophers have been right in attributing to Kant's own criticism a mistake in elementary logic. Let us look at Kant's criticism. Kant says, correctly enough, that the conclusion of the second stage of the cosmological argument is "All necessarily existing beings are infinitely perfect beings". This, he says, implies that "Some infinitely perfect beings are necessarily existing beings". Since, however, there could be only one infinitely perfect, unlimited, being, we may replace the proposition "some infinitely perfect beings are necessarily existing beings" by the proposition "All infinitely perfect beings are necessarily existing beings". (To make this last point clearer let me take an analogous example. If it is true that some men who are Prime Minister of Australia are Liberals and if it is also true that there is only one Prime Minister of Australia, then we can equally well say that all men who are Prime Minister of Australia are Liberals. For "some" means "at least one" and if there is only one Prime Minister, then "at least one" is equivalent to "one", which in this case is "all".) So the conclusion of the second stage of the cosmological argument is that "all infinitely perfect beings are necessarily existing beings". This, however, is the principle of the ontological argument, which we have already criticized, and which, for that matter, proponents of the cosmological argument like Thomas Aquinas themselves reject.

Kant has, however, made a very simple mistake. He has forgotten that the existence of a necessary being has already been proved (or is thought to have been proved) in the first part of the argument. He changes "All necessary beings are infinitely perfect beings" round to "some infinitely perfect beings are necessary beings". If this change round is to be valid the existence of a necessary being is already presupposed. Kant has been misled by an ambiguity in "all". "All X's are Y's" may take it for granted that there are some X's or it may not. For example, if I say "All the people in this room are interested in Philosophy" it is already agreed that there are some people in this room. So we can infer that "Some of the people interested in Philosophy are people in this room". So "All the people in this room are interested in Philosophy" says more than "if anyone were in this room he would be interested in Philosophy", for this would be true if there were in fact no people in this room. (As I wrote this lecture I was quite sure that *if* anyone came he would be interested in Philosophy, and I could have been quite sure of this even if I had doubted whether anyone would come.) Now sometimes "All X's are Y's" does mean only "if anything is an X it is a Y". Take the sentence "All Trespassers will be Prosecuted". This does not imply that some prosecuted people will be trespassers, for it does not imply that there are or will be any trespassers. Indeed the object of putting it on a notice is to make it more likely that there won't be any trespassers. All that "All trespassers will be prosecuted" says is "if anyone is a trespasser then he will be prosecuted." So Kant's criticism won't do. He has taken himself and other people in by using "all" sometimes in the one way and sometimes in the other.

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[2] *Critique of Pure Reason* A 603.

While agreeing thus far with Thomist critics of Kant[3], I still want to assert that the cosmological argument is radically unsound. The trouble comes much earlier than where Kant locates it. The trouble comes in the *first* stage of the argument. For the first stage of the argument purports to argue to the existence of a necessary being. And by "a necessary being" the cosmological argument means "a *logically* necessary being", i.e. "a being whose non-existence is inconceivable in the sort of way that a triangle having 4 sides is inconceivable". The trouble is, however, that the concept of a logically necessary being is a self-contradictory concept, like the concept of a round square. For in the first place "necessary" is a predicate of *propositions*, not of things. That is, we can contrast *necessary* propositions such as "3+2=5", "a thing cannot be red and green all over", "either it is raining or it is not raining", with *contingent* propositions, such as "Mr. Menzies is Prime Minister of Australia", "the earth is slightly flattened at the poles", and "sugar is soluble in water". The propositions in the first class are guaranteed solely by the rules for the use of the symbols they contain, in the case of the propositions of the second class a genuine possibility of agreeing or not agreeing with reality is left open; whether they are true or false depends not on the conventions of our language but on reality. (Compare the contrast between "the equator is 90° from the pole" which tells us nothing about geography but only about our map-making conventions and "Adelaide is 55° from the pole" which does tell us a geographical fact.) So no informative proposition can be logically necessary. Now since "necessary" is a word which applies primarily to propositions, we shall have to interpret "God is a necessary being" as "The proposition 'God exists' is logically necessary". But this *is* the principle of the ontological argument, and there is no way of getting round it this time in the way that we got out of Kant's criticism. No existential proposition can be logically necessary, for we saw that the truth of a logically necessary proposition depends only on our symbolism or, to put the same thing in another way, on the relationship of concepts. We saw, however, in discussing the ontological argument, that an existential proposition does not say that one concept is involved in another, but that a concept applies to something. An existential proposition must be very different from any logically necessary one, such as a mathematical one, for example, for the conventions of our symbolism clearly leave it open for us either to affirm or deny an existential proposition; it is not our symbolism but reality which decides whether or not we must affirm it or deny it.

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[3] See for example Fr. T. A. Johnston, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume XXI, pp. 14-15 or D. J. B. Hawkins: *Essentials of Theism*, pp. 67-70, and review of Fr. Hawkins's book by A. Donagan, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume XXVIII, especially p.129.

The demand that the existence of God should be *logically* necessary is thus a self-contradictory one. When we see this and go back to look at the first stage of the cosmological argument it no longer seems compelling, indeed it now seems to contain an absurdity. If we cast our minds back, we recall that the argument was as follows: that if we explain why something exists and is what it is, we must explain it by reference to something else, and we must explain that thing's being what it is by reference to yet another thing, and so on, back and back. It is then suggested that unless we can go back to a logically necessary first cause we shall remain intellectually unsatisfied. We should otherwise only get back to something which might have been otherwise, and with reference to which the same questions can again be asked. This is the argument, but we now see that in asking for a logically necessary first cause we are doing something worse than asking for the moon. It is only *physically* impossible for us to get the moon; if I were a few million times bigger I could reach out for it and give it to you. That is, I know what it would be *like* to give you the moon, though I cannot *in fact* do it. A logically necessary first cause, however, is not impossible in the way that giving you the moon is impossible; no, it is *logically* impossible. "Logically necessary being" is a self-contradictory expression like "round square". It is not any good saying that we would only be intellectually satisfied with a logically necessary cause, that nothing else would do. We can easily have an absurd wish. We should all like to be able to eat our cake and have it, but that does not alter the fact that our wish is an absurd and self-contradictory one. We reject the cosmological argument, then, because it rests on a thorough absurdity.

Having reached this conclusion I should like to make one or two remarks about the necessity of God. First of all, I think that it is undeniable that if worship is to be what religion takes it to be, then God must be a necessary being in some sense or other of "necessary". He must not be just one of the things in the world, however big. To concede that he was just one of the things in the world, even a big one, would reduce religion to something near idolatry. All I wish to point out is that God can not be a *logically* necessary being, for the very supposition that he is is self-contradictory. (Hence, of course, to say that God is not logically necessary is not to place any limitations on him. It is not a limitation on your walking ability that you cannot go out of the room and not go out. To say that someone cannot do something self-contradictory is not to say that he is in any way impotent; it is to say that the sentence "he did such and such and did not do it" is not a possible description of anything.) Theological necessity cannot be logical necessity. In the second place, I think I can see roughly what sort of necessity theological necessity might be. Let me give an analogy from physics. It is not a *logical* necessity that the velocity of light in a vacuum should be constant. It would, however, upset physical theory considerably if we denied it. Similarly it is not a logical necessity that God exists. But it would clearly upset the structure of our religious attitudes in the most violent way if we denied it or even entertained the possibility of its falsehood. So if we say that it is a *physical* necessity that the velocity of light *in vacuo* should be constant—(deny it and prevailing physical theory would have to be scrapped or at any rate drastically modified)—similarly we can say that it is a *religious* necessity that

God exists. That is, we believe in the necessity of God's existence because we are Christians; we are not Christians because we believe n the necessity of God's existence. There are no short cuts to God. I draw your attention to the language of religion itself, where we talk of *conversion*, not of *proof*. In my opinion religion can stand on its own feet, but to found it on a metaphysical argument *a priori* s to found it on absurdity born of ignorance of the logic of our anguage. I am reminded of what was said about the Boyle lectures n the 18th century: that no one doubted that God existed until the Boyle lecturers started to prove it.

Perhaps now is the time to say why I suggested at the beginning of the lecture that "Does God exist?" is not a proper question. Once again I make use of an analogy from science. "Do electrons exist?" (asked just like that) is not a proper question. In order to acquire the concept of an electron we must find out about experiments with cathode-ray tubes, the Wilson cloud chamber, about spectra, and so on. We then find the concept of the electron a useful one, one which plays a part in a mass of physical theory. When we reach this stage the question "Do electrons exist?" no longer arises. Before we reached this stage the question "Do electrons exist?" has no clear meaning. Similarly, I suggest, the question "Does God exist?" has no clear meaning for the unconverted. But for the converted the question no longer arises. The word "God" gets its meaning from the part it plays in religious speech and literature, and in religious speech and literature the question of existence does not arise. A theological professor at Glasgow once said to me: "Religion is 'O God if you exist, save my soul if it exists!' " This of course was a joke. It clearly is just *not* what religion is. So within religion the question "Does God exist?" does not arise, any more than the question "Do electrons exist?" arises within physics. Outside religion the question "Does God exist?" has as little meaning as the question "Do electrons exist?" as asked by the scientifically ignorant. Thus I suggest that it is possible to hold that the question "Does God exist?" is not a proper question without necessarily also holding that religion and theology are nonsensical.

The cosmological argument, we saw, failed because it made use of the absurd conception of a *logically* necessary being. We now pass to the third argument I propose to consider. This is the *Teleological Argument*. It is also called "The Argument from Design". It would be better called the argument *to* design as Kemp

Smith does, for clearly to say that the universe has been designed by a great architect is to assume a great part of the conclusion to be proved. Or we could call it "the argument from apparent design". The argument is very fully discussed in Hume's "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion", to which I should like to draw your attention. In these dialogues the argument is presented as follows. "Look around the world: Contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines . . . The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance . . . Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man; though possessed of much larger faculties proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed."

This argument may at once be criticized in two ways: (1) we may question whether the analogy between the universe and artificial things like houses, ships, furniture, machines (which admittedly are designed) is very close. Now in any ordinary sense of language, it is true to say that plants and animals have *not* been designed. If we press the analogy of the universe to a plant, instead of to a machine, we get to a very different conclusion. And why should the one analogy be regarded as any better or worse than the other? (2) Even if the analogy were close, it would only go to suggest that the universe was designed by a *very great* (not infinite) architect, and note, an *architect*, not a *creator*. For if we take the analogy seriously we must notice that we do not create the materials from which we make houses, machines, and so on, but only *arrange* the materials.

This, in bare outline, is the general objection to the argument from design, and will apply to any form of it. In the form in which the argument was put forward by such theologians as Paley, the argument is of course still more open to objection. For Paley laid special stress on such things as the eye of an animal, which he thought must have been contrived by a wise creator for the special benefit of the animal. It seemed too inconceivable how otherwise such a complex organ, so well suited to the needs of the animal, should have arisen. Or listen to Henry More: "For why have we three joints in our legs and arms, as also in our fingers, but that it was much better than having two or four? And why are our fore-teeth sharp like chisels to cut, but our inward teeth broad to grind (instead of) the fore-teeth broad and the other sharp? But we might have made a hard shift to have lived through in that worser condition. Again, why are the teeth so luckily placed, or rather, why are there not teeth in other bones as well as in the jaw-bones? for they might have been as capable as these. But the reason is, nothing is done foolishly or in vain; that is, there is a divine Providence that orders all things." This type of argument has lost its persuasiveness, for the theory of Evolution explains why our teeth are so luckily placed in our jaw-bones, why we have the most convenient number of joints in our fingers, and so on. Species which did not possess advantageous features would not survive in competition with those which did.

The sort of argument Paley and Henry More used is thus quite unconvincing. Let us return to the broader conception, that of the universe as a whole, which seems to show the mark of a benevolent and intelligent Designer. Bacon expressed this belief forcibly: "I had rather believe all the Fables in the Legend and the Talmud and the Alcoran than that this Universal Frame is without a Minde." So, in some moods, does the universe strike us. But sometimes, when we are in other moods, we see it very differently. To quote Hume's dialogue's again: "Look around this Universe. What an mmense profusion of beings, animated and organized, sensible and active! You admire this prodigious variety and fecundity. But nspect a little more narrowly these living existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive to each other! How nsufficient all of them for their own happiness! . . . the whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children!" There is indeed a great deal of suffering, some part of which is no doubt attributable to the moral choices of men, and to save us from which would conflict with what many people would regard as the greater good of moral freedom, but there is still an immense esidue of apparently needless suffering, that is, needless, in the ense that it could be prevented by an omnipotent being. The difficulty is that of reconciling the presence of evil and suffering with the assertion that God is both omnipotent and benevolent. f we *already* believe in an omnipotent and benevolent God, then ome attempt may be made to solve the problem of evil by arguing that the values in the world form a sort of organic unity, and that making any *part* of the world better would perhaps nevertheless reduce the value of the whole. Paradoxical though this thesis may appear at first sight, it is perhaps not theoretically absurd. If, however, evil presents a *difficulty* to the believing mind, it presents an *insuperable* difficulty to one who wishes to argue rationally from the world as we find it to the existence of an omnipotent and benevolent God. As Hume puts it: "Is the world considered in general, and as it appears to us in this life, different from what a man . . . would *beforehand* expect from a very powerful, wise and benevolent Diety? It must be strange prejudice to assert the contrary. And from thence I conclude, that, however consistent the world may be, allowing certain suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a Diety, it can never afford us an inference concerning his existence."

The teleological argument is thus extremely shaky, and in any case, even if it were sound, it would only go to prove the existence of a very great architect, not of an omnipotent and benevolent Creator.

Nevertheless, the argument has a fascination for us that reason can not easily dispel. Hume, in his 12th Dialogue, and after pulling the argument from design to pieces in the previous 11 dialogues, nevertheless speaks as follows: "A purpose, an intention, a design strikes everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems as at all times to reject it . . . all the sciences almost lead us insensibly to acknowledge a first Author." Similarly Kant, before going on to exhibit the fallaciousness of the argument, nevertheless says of it: "This proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and the most accordant with the common reason of mankind. It enlivens the study of nature, just as it itself derives its existence and gains ever new vigour from that source. It suggests ends and purposes, where our observation would not have detected them by itself, and extends our knowledge of nature by means of the guiding-concept of a special unity, the principle of which is outside nature. This knowledge . . . so strengthens the belief in a supreme Author of nature that the belief acquires the force of an irresistible conviction." It is somewhat of a paradox that an invalid argument should command so much respect even from those who have demonstrated its invalidity. The solution of the paradox is perhaps somewhat as follows[4]: The argument from design is no good as an argument. But in those who have the seeds of a genuinely religious attitude already within them the facts to which the argument from design draws attention, facts showing the grandeur and majesty of the universe, facts that are evident to anyone who looks upwards on a starry night, and which are enormously multiplied for us by the advance of theoretical science, these facts have a powerful effect. But they only have this effect on the already religious mind, on the mind which has the capability of feeling the religious type of awe. That is, the argument from design is in reality no argument, or if it is regarded as an argument it is feeble, but it is a potent instrument in heightening religious emotions.

Something similar might even be said of the cosmological argument. As an argument it cannot pass muster at all, indeed it is completely absurd, as employing the notion of a logically necessary being. Nevertheless it does appeal to something deep seated in our natures. It takes its stand on the fact that the existence of you or me or this table is not logically necessary. Logic tells us that this fact is not a fact at all, but is a truism, like the "fact" that a circle is not a square. Again, the cosmological argument tries to base the existence of you or me or this table on the existence of a logically necessary being, and hence commits a rank absurdity, the notion of a logically necessary being being self-contradictory. So the only rational thing to say if someone asks "Why does this table exist?" is some such thing as that such and such a carpenter made it. We can go back and back in such a series, but we must not entertain the absurd idea of getting back to something logically necessary. However. now let us ask: "Why should anything exist at all?" Logic seems to tell us that the only answer which is not absurd is to say "Why shouldn't it?" Nevertheless, though I know how any answer on the lines of the cosmological argument can be pulled to pieces by a correct logic, I still feel I want to go on asking the question. Indeed, though logic has taught me to look at such a question with the gravest suspicion, my mind often seems to reel under the immense significance it seems to have for me. That anything should exist at all does seem to me a matter for the deepest awe. But whether other people feel this sort of awe, and whether they or I ought to is another question. I think we ought to. If so, the question arises: If "why should anything exist at all?" cannot be interpreted after the manner of the cosmological argument, that is, as an absurd request for the nonsensical postulation of a logically necessary being, what sort of question is it? What sort of question is this question "Why should anything exist at all?" All I can say is, that I do not yet know.

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[4] See also N. Kemp Smith's Henrietta Hertz lecture "Is Divine Existence Credible?" (Proceedings of the British Academy, 1931.)

In the footnote on page 24 of our January-March issue reference is made to *The Philosophy of Science*. Its author is incorrectly given as S. E. Tomlinson. This should have been S. E. Toulmin.

On page 28, line 33, the sentence should have read—With the analogy of proper proportion it's different.

CORRESPONDENCE

GALATIANS iv, 6

Sir,—I have been reading the letter by Fr. Pawson referring to Galatians iv, 6, and its suggestion that ὅτι in this verse should be rendered "in proof that". May I suggest that we have a stronger case of something the same thing in Luke vii, 47, ὅτι ἠνάπησεν πολύ If we translate ὅτι here "because", we make nonsense of the words following, and indeed of the whole passage. The point of the little parable of the two debtors is that love is the result of forgiveness, and not *vice versa*. I know that the translation "as for the fact that" is clumsy in English, but it surely gives the sense, and read in this sense, in Greek the clumsiness disappears.

R. J. Morrice.

Sir,—Fr. Pawson's letter on this subject in your last issue was of great interest to me, because in a forthcoming article on Dr. L. S. Thornton's book, *Confirmation : Its Place in the Baptismal Mystery*, I make the same criticism as Mr. Taylor's: that is to say, I assert that Dr. Thornton has failed to translate this text correctly, and that Professor Moule's interpretation, "(proof) that you are sons is (the fact that) God sent forth the Spirit . . . into your hearts", is right.

Perhaps Mr. Taylor and I have been too sweeping in our assumption that Professor Moule's interpretation is right, and that Dr. Thornton's (following the English versions) is absolutely wrong. We ought no doubt to have been content to point out that Dr. Thornton prefers an interpretation which not only Professor Moule, but also the great majority of New Testament scholars, ancient and modern, have *believed* to be wrong.

Professor Moule's predecessors in this opinion include Jerome, Chrysostom, Theodore and Theodoret among the ancients. All these explain the text as meaning, not that we receive the Spirit because we have already become sons, but that our possession of the Spirit is the proof that we are sons. The exegesis of Cornelius à Lapide is worth quoting:

> Est argumentum a signo vel effectu ad causam, vel potius ad causae ostensionem, ut cum dico: Quia ibi fumus est, ignis est: licet enim ignis sit prior et causa fumi; fumus tamen prius ostendit se nobis, ut ex eo colligamus ibi esse ignem: ita hic prius est Deum in nos mittere Spiritum suum, quam nos esse filios Dei, quia per Spiritum filii sumus: ex eo tamen quod simus filii, quasi a posteriori recte colligmus Deum iam ante missise in nos Spiritum suum. Vox ergo *Quoniam*,vel *Quia*, non causam in se, sed . . . necessariam consequentiam et connexionem significat.

Of the modern commentators, those who, like Lightfoot, Emmet and W. L. Knox (in Gore's *New Commentary*), print the English rendering "because", usually point out that, as Knox expresses it: "We now have the freedom of sons *as is proved by the fact that* he has sent into our hearts the Holy Spirit", and, like Lightfoot, they adduce Rom. viii, 14-16 in support. Lagrange discusses the text at some length in his commentary, published in 1942. He holds that in the above-mentioned passage from Romans we have an expansion of the terse language of Galatians, and that the text means: "That you are sons of God is proved by the fact that God has sent the Spirit". He remarks that the harsh ellipse which this rendering presupposes (which troubles Fr. Pawson) has led some modern interpreters to render the ὅτι causatively; "mais on ne cite guère d' exemples où ὅτι, *tout à fait* au tête d' une phrase, signifie 'parce que' ".

Fr. Pawson thinks that the argument from "what the context requires" is of doubtful validity in interpreting St. Paul, and he objects that Professor Moule has cited no examples of a parallel to the ellipse which his interpretation entails. He should perhaps be referred to Moulton and Milligan, *The Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament*, p. 463 where ὅτι δὲ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἔστιν γράμματα αὐτῆς δι̕ ὧν ὁμολογεῖ εἰληφέναι (from a papyrus letter) will probably suffice.

The text in question has been the subject of an exhaustive study recently published: S. Zedda, *L'adozione a figli di Dio e lo Spirito Santo* (Pontificio Istituto Biblico, Rome, 1952). The conclusion reached in this work is that the interpretation favoured by Dr. Thornton is theologically untenable. The latter view, however, can claim the support of Burton in the *International Critical Commentary* and those other modern interpreters whose opinion is rejected by Lagrange. It is, therefore, too sweeping a judgement to condemn Dr. Thornton's rendering outright as undoubtedly wrong; it is merely contrary to the great weight of critical scholarship.

As some excuse for making the stronger judgement one may plead one's not unjustifiable irritation at Dr. Thornton's calm assumption that his rendering is right against the bulk of ancient and modern exegesis. He does not even inform his readers that any other interpretation than his own has ever been advanced. This is especially misleading since this text of Galatians, as he interprets it, is the main scriptural pillar on which he builds up his theory of Confirmation. It is, indeed, the only Pauline text which, if his interpretation were accepted, would fit directly into his doctrinal pattern without requiring typological adjustment.

G. W. H. LAMPE.

"A VOICE WAS HEARD"

SIR,—For the purpose of a projected book I am particularly interested in instances recorded in the Bible and elsewhere of a Voice being heard by an individual or a group of people at a time of great moment to themselves or to mankind.

Actually there are instances recorded, albeit legendary, which pre-date the Hebrew civilization. The numerous references in the Bible will be familiar to all; there are also instances recorded over the span of history, while the writer can recall a biography giving an account on good authority of such an occurrence in quite recent years.

I seek to show that while, to many, such events may be expected in the lives of saints and mystics, they also occur when circumstances require it in the lives of ordinary people. I would be grateful if anyone who has had such an experience would please communicate details to me, intimating that such may be quoted as opportune.

All letters will be gratefully acknowledged.

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REVIEWS

ORTHODOXY AND HERESY IN THE EARLY CHURCH

THE PATTERN OF CHRISTIAN TRUTH. A STUDY IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ORTHODOXY AND HERESY IN THE EARLY CHURCH. The Bampton Lectures for 1954. By H. E. W. TURNER. Mowbray. 42s.

PROFESSOR Turner has used, more than to the full, the opportunity afforded by the Bampton Lecturership of producing a full-scale work of learning. The eight lecture-sermons delivered in the University Church at Oxford, amounting, *crede experto*, to a maximum possible length of about forty thousand words, have here become a massive work of over five hundred pages, with little remaining of the sermon form except the maintenance of a very easy and sometimes strikingly epigrammatic style and the retention, rather curiously, of some of the ascriptions which, to the reader of a work of pure and impressive scholarship, spring very suddenly and unexpectedly out of their context.

The book is of the first importance. If any problem of significance in the doctrinal history of the Early Church, or in the related history of happenings and documents, has been omitted, I certainly have not noticed the omission. Such matters as the detailed evidence for the early establishment of the Roman Symbol, for Origen's particular brand of Platonism, for the evaluation of the episcopal succession-lists given by Hegesippus and others, for Bauer's theory of a Marcionite origin of the Church at Edessa, are taken in Professor Turner's stride. Each of them is submitted to a comprehensive and masterly analysis, with reference to everything, ancient and modern, which has been written about them. The appreciation of the book from the point of view of this high-level and detailed scholarship is not a matter for a review but for a series of articles in various learned journals during the next decade. In any case it must immediately become a standard work of reference not only for the general student of the subject but even more for the specialist.

The general student will, in fact, find that much is expected of him before he begins to read. The book is not a history of doctrine, but a study of the pattern of that history, a pattern into which an enormous number of interlocking facts and personalities have to be fitted. It is at the same time a study of the development of the modern critical approach to the whole subject, the ecclesiastical historiography which is itself a changing and developing science. One of my complaints about the book, a thankless one where so much has been given, is that the reader is given practically no help, in footnotes or bibliography or in any way, in dating the modern authorities quoted. From Harnack and even Ritschl through Burkitt to Messrs. Knox, Knox and Knox all are timeless. and only a well-read scholar indeed is in a position to read the story aright. This is a pity, for the story of modern scholarship, for which all the facts are here, is, when rightly read, illuminating, and of an importance barely second to that of the early centuries and of the great achievement of those first pioneers in scholarship to whose efforts we apply to-day our relative and changing canons of interpretation.

But though the reader is paid the compliment of being regarded as Professor Turner's equal in at least a general knowledge of the facts, sources and authorities, he is given a great deal of help by the way. The main theme of the lectures is clearly laid out in a careful analysis of what Professor Turner calls the classical theory of the relationship of heresy to orthodoxy, a theory substantially shaped in ancient times and accepted more or less without dispute until modern critics from Harnack to Werner, Bauer and Bultmann got to work upon it. Though the views of these critics are rejected, with a varying degree of sympathy, the whole purpose of these lectures is to re-examine the classical theory itself, a process in which its hard and uncompromising outlines become shaded off into a historical picture at once changing, dynamic and emergent, and, as it seems to me, one far more likely than the conventional history which most of us take for granted to be at least in part adequate to the representation of the working of the Holy Spirit in the Church.

The theme of the lectures is worked out, with clearly defined headings and sign-posts by the way, first in an analysis of the ways in which the types of thought ultimately condemned as heresy actually came to the fore, and, second, in a similar analysis of the process of formulation in which orthodoxy became aware of itself against the background of Scripture, Tradition, and Reason. This background was, as is obvious so soon as Professor Turner states it, the same throughout all the development of orthodoxy and heresy. The *praevaricatio* entered as a plea by Tertullian was, as Tertullian knew very well when he was not working on his brief against Marcion, only special pleading.

The end of the matter, despite the obscurity of many of the byways into which the argument has had to be followed, is brought out clearly enough in the concluding lecture, entitled Conclusions. Here the best guide, as indeed throughout the whole volume, may be found in a few paragraphs from Professor Turner's Preface, to quote which in full might well have saved me the trouble of writing this review. In effect he there states his intention of resting his exposition upon the classical Anglican appeal to authority. He acknowledges the unfortunate necessity of working through the contributions resulting from the monumental erudition of German savants and the brilliant clarity of French and Belgian scholars. He admits "the acceptance in some form of the doctrine of development", while wholly rejecting Newman's form of that doctrine, and notes that his last lecture introduces "some of caveats which a loyally Anglican approach to the subject seemed to require."

His main conclusion, in a sentence, is that, so far from being greatly indebted to the heresies with which it was confronted, orthodoxy developed to maturity under its own autonomy within the main stream of the life, work, and domestic interests of the Church.

Perhaps most important of all is the paragraph in which he hopes that his conclusions may be of some service in the task of reuniting a divided Christendom, with its final sentence: "I have also been led to the conclusion that the conception of a rich Unity in Diversity is neither as unprimitive nor as uncatholic as it has been sometimes fashionable to suppose." I could not agree more.

L. W. GRENSTED.

ROME AND THE EUCHARIST

THE SACRIFICE OF THE MYSTICAL BODY. By EUGÈNE MASURE. Translated by ANTHONY THOROLD. Burnes Oates. 12s. 6d.

IN 1944 there appeared, under the title of *The Christian Sacrifice*, Dom Illtyd Trethowan's translation of Canon Masure's remarkable treatise, *Le Sacrifice du Chef*. This has now been followed by a translation of *Le Sacrifice du Corps Mystique*, which, while it is described as a sequel to the former work, could equally well be taken as an independent exposition of the theology of the Holy Eucharist. It was, in fact, directly inspired by the papal encyclical of 1947, *Mediator Dei*, and appeared in the original French in 1950. These two books together should establish their author in the very forefront of contemporary theology, and, in spite of its unpretentious claims and its, at first sight, limited field, the book now under review may without exaggeration be described as one of the most important theological works of this century.

It is well known that ever since 1915, when Père Maurice de la Taille fluttered all the more conservative theological dove-cotes with his monumental and encyclopaedic work *Mysterium Fidei*, there has been a growing reaction against the type of Eucharistic theology which was characteristic of the Counter-Reformation, whose leading figures were Franzelin, de Lugo and Lessius, and which held that the essence of the Mass as a sacrifice lay in some modification which it was alleged to bring about in the condition of Christ's glorified body. This view, which was typical of the Scotist and Suarezian schools, though not, as we are now told, of the pure Thomist tradition, has been flatly repudiated by a succession of writers who differ in many respects from one another but who agree, in Canon Masure's words, that "the Mass considered as a rite celebrated by the Church cannot exert any power, or rather, has no efficacy over Christ but only over the bread in order to change it into the body of the Christ victim. It has, however, an efficacy which falls immediately on us and on our behalf because the sacrifice of Christ becomes our sacrifice and the victim of Calvary the victim of our altar". The forerunner, if not the founder, of this movement of reaction was the celebrated Jesuit theologian Cardinal Billot; its later representatives include not only de la Taille, but also Vonier, Casel, de Montcheuil and many others; and the peculiar importance of Masure is that he has been able to draw the various strands of the reaction into a coherent and unified pattern. In the whole movement two insights stand out as supremely important: Vonier's doctrine of sacramental representation as an irreducible metaphysical principle, and Masure's comprehensive doctrine of sacrifice as consisting not primarily in the death, and not at all in the destruction of the victim, but in its offering to God to be transformed by the divine acceptance and its subsequent return to man as the food which supernaturalizes his whole being.

Masure's magnificently coherent and lucid exposition is of importance for two main reasons. In the first place it rescues Eucharistic theology from the constricted and negative state in which it had got by the end of the Middle Ages and still more in the Counter-Reformation. No longer is the Mass seen as a hole-and-corner repetition of Calvary, deriving its efficacy from a quasi-destruction of Christ by the individual priest, but as the perpetual re-creation and regeneration of the Mystical Body of Christ by the sacramental representation in its midst of the redemptive act of its Head. Secondly—and this is a point to which Masure repeatedly returns—the traditional objections of Protestant theologians to Catholic Eucharistic theology lose most, if not all, of their force when the Catholic doctrine of the Mass is stated as Masure states it. On the theological plane one of the greatest services that could be rendered to Christian reunion would be a thorough examination of Masure's theses, not merely by those whose sympathies already lie with Catholic ways of worship and thought, but by the great contemporary champions of Reformation theology—our Barths, Brunners, Auléns, Nygrens and Tillichs—in order to discover whether Masure's exposition is in accordance with Scriptural truth and, if not, in what respects and why.

One further reflection, provoked by Masure's book and by the whole movement of thought of which it is the culmination, is that Roman Catholic theology is far more fluid, over longish periods, than either its opponents or its professors are usually ready to admit. In two matters at least this century has seen a quite revolutionary reversal of attitude. One is this present question of Eucharistic theology. The other is the recovery of the great tradition of contemplative prayer, about which Dom John Chapman wrote so profoundly in his article "Mysticism, Christian, Roman Catholic" in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, and the abandonment of the universal insistence upon discursive meditation as the normal lifelong method of prayer. In both these matters a tendency which was growing throughout the later Middle Ages became overwhelmingly dominant in the post-Reformation period and acquired a quasi-official status from which it could not be dislodged for four centuries. And in both these matters the fundamental distortion lay so deep down below the conscious level that it became the common assumption of Catholics and Protestants alike. Both Catholics and Protestants identified sacrifice with the immolation and destruction of the victim. Both Catholics and Protestants were profoundly suspicious of anything that savoured of contemplation or mysticism; for Catholics discursive prayer and the training of the human will, for Protestants the act of justifying faith, took the place of contemplative prayer. However, among Catholics at least the tide has turned in both these matters, and we can only surmise what further reactions may still take place. It is at any rate surprising, in view of the authority that attaches in the Roman Communion to the Council of Trent, to notice that there is far greater readiness among Roman Catholics than among Protestant theologians today to call in question the formulations of the sixteenth century with a view to healing the divisions of Western Christendom; and very impressive in this respect is Père Bouyer's recent book *Du Protestantisme à l'Eglise*. This fact makes it all the more desirable that Canon Masure's book should receive careful and sympathetic attention from those who are most anti-Roman by temperament or by profession.

One final moral may be drawn. If the flexibility of contemporary Roman Catholic theology is anything more than a passing phase, there is little comfort for either the apologists or the antagonists of Rome in the alleged unchangeableness of Roman Catholic teaching. The prospective convert cannot truthfully be assured that throughout the centuries Rome speaks with a clear and unwavering voice, when the most distinguished Roman theologians of the twentieth century teach a doctrine of the Eucharist which their predecessors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries would have denounced as erroneous, if not indeed as heretical. But neither can the non-Roman legitimately despair of ultimate reunion with Rome on the ground that Rome has made for herself a procrustean bed and is determined for ever to lie on it; this is perhaps a salutary reflection for Anglicans, in these days when they are so often urged to achieve reunion with the Protestant bodies at any price, since reunion with Rome is asserted to be hopeless.

We have, however, digressed from the main theme of Canon Masure's book, and it only remains to repeat our commendation. The style is readable and clear, and the translation is excellent. And in these days of expensive books the publishers are to be congratulated both on the high standard of production and on the moderation of the price.

E. L. Mascall.

HOPE IN HUMAN LIIFE

Eternal Hope. By Emil Brunner. Translated by Harold Knight. Lutterworth. 18s.

Some books break new ground, start fresh lines of thought: others sum up positions already reached. This belongs to the latter class. It deals with an all-important theme—the place of hope in human life. The naïve belief in inevitable human progress has collapsed. Its place will be taken either by nihilistic despair, or Christian hope. This hope is eschatological, based on the relation between the eternal and temporal realms, and the conquest by the eternal.

As Brunner deals with this theme his characteristic qualities come clearly into view—his religious earnestness, his power of lucid expression, the thought-provoking paradoxes, and the insight into the present situation. These make every page worth reading. He deals trenchantly, yet sympathetically, with the campaign of demythologizing. This seemed to me one of the best parts of the book. Characteristic of the author, too, is something that may be described as a neo-fundamentalism. Here the virtue is the determination to do justice both to the critical study of Holy Writ and to the conviction that the biblical record of revelation is our only court of appeal. This is an attempt that had to be made, and in the main Brunner makes it very well. Yet sometimes it seems doomed to failure in the final issues. Here is one example. It is not possible to ignore the questions involved in the theories of hell, of conditional immortality, and universalism. But the evidence of the New Testament seems equivocal, and many of us are compelled to feel that human reason must be called in to enable us to have a solid belief. Here, however, is what Brunner says:

> What, then, is our conclusion to be—the word concerning judgement and separation, heaven and hell, or the message of universal redemption? Both aspects remain juxtaposed in their harsh incompatibility . . . Which of them is the ultimately valid point of view?
>
> Our answer is: both voices are the Word of God. But God's Word is a Word of challenge, not of doctrine . . . We must listen to the voice which speaks of world judgement as to the voice of God Himself, in order that we may fear Him; we must listen to the voice which speaks of universal redemption as to the voice of God Himself, in order that we may love Him. (pp. 183-4).

Can any fear or love be powerful which is infected with a doubt? Surely they must be grounded in that which is convincedly accepted as fact. And if God's Word does not give doctrine, where shall doctrine be found? Had we not better give up dogmatics once and for all? It looks as if pragmatism were coming back in a new guise. The aim of God is to produce results in us, not to proclaim and reveal truth.

It is no doubt intelligible that the critical situation on the Continent should lead to a theology of crisis. But we must recognize that this emphasis on crisis and decision is not the whole truth. Man's relations with God are not exhausted by the elements of encounter. God does not come to every man in every time and place as the "Wholly Other" (see Romans x, 6-8). The denial of a progress based entirely on natural and human forces need not exclude a progress based on the ubiquitous immanence of the divine Spirit. We have our Lord's own authority for the fact that the Kingdom grows like a seed.

Again, Brunner has little interest in the prophetic eschatology, e.g. of Isaiah ix and xi, which has something very definite and articulate to say about the establishment of divine sovereignty on this earth. This "political" eschatology has an element of abiding truth. This earth's history is not to close leaving our planet the scene of Christ's defeat, rather than of his unqualified triumph. The concept of a new heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness is more definite than Brunner admits. Sometimes one fears that thought to-day is treading the old line of apocalypticism, which ever and anon fell into phantasy; and in its despair removed God too far from earth and man. Somehow in Brunner we miss the sign of Immanuel—God with us.

One final question. Any doctrine of the final consummation leads to a consideration of the ultimate relation between the Absolute, God, and

Creation. It may be that God and Creation co-exist within the Absolute: yet this would introduce something well-nigh indistinguishable from finiteness into our thought of God. Its strength is the insistence on the permanence of the distinction between Creator and Created. The goal of the religious life is communion, not union.

The weakness of this position is a failure to realize with adequate vividness the unity that is sometimes felt to be an integral part of our thought of the eternal life beyond history and time, when God is all and in all. Nor may the testimony of the mystics to the final unity be lightly dismissed. Therefore we ask, can justice be done in human thought alike to the mystic's quest for union with God, and to the truth embodied in the position that God and man stand eternally in an I-Thou relation? The debate will long continue.

C. J. BARKER.

THE PARABLES

THE PARABLES OF JESUS. By JOACHIM JEREMIAS. Trans. by S. H. HOOKE. S.C.M. Press. 16s.

DIE GLEICHNISSE JESU of Jeremias went into its third edition in 1954, and it was a happy idea to have the translation of this edition into English done by Professor Hooke. This is a most important book on the Parables, taking up the threads of other works, especially of Jülicher and C. H. Dodd, but also of others like A. T. Cadoux and B. T. D. Smith. The author acknowledges his debt to Dodd, *The Parables of the Kingdom*, which "opened a new era in the study of the parables; although differences of opinion with regard to many details may exist, yet it is unthinkable that there should ever be any retreat from the essential lines laid down by Dodd . . ."

Jeremias begins with a statement of the problem how to go behind the interpretation put by the Church on to the parables of Jesus to their historical setting. "What did Jesus intend to say at this or that particular moment?" In an age when form-criticism has dried up the stream of the Lives of Jesus, it is as refreshing to see pp. 20-88 headed "The Return to Jesus from the Primitive Church" as it is to read about the Temptation of Jesus (p. 99). "Since these temptations have their *Sitz im Leben* in the period before Good Friday, and political temptation did not exist for the primitive Church, it is not legitimate to attribute the substance of the temptation-stories to the poetic imagination of the primitive community". However, Jeremias has it both ways (p. 74). "We are indebted to the results of form-criticism for the recognition of the fact that the frame-work of the gospel narrative is largely secondary, and this is of great importance for the right understanding of the parables of Jesus", and he has not hesitated to find traces of "embellishment" in the parables as they stand; or to assert that a parable now addressed to disciples was originally spoken to opponents like the Pharisees; or to discover the influence of the community which turned the parables into exhortations or made them fit the Church's situation, or altered them from being parables with one or two main points into "allegories" with many underlying "spiritual" meanings, or in the process of collecting the parables has doubled them or fused them together.

The English reader will be as impressed by the wealth of learning in these pages as depressed by the typically German assertion about these "laws of transformation" from the parables' original meaning, and he will add, are these "laws" real laws or only summaries of observed facts some of which may be wrong? For again and again he will say that Jeremias may be right, if the original context of the parables has been lost, but why should we accept a German's *ipse dixit*? Surely not because he is a German, endowed with enormous erudition and painstaking thoroughness. Why, for instance, could Jesus not have used an allegorical form occasionally? Are we bound to accept what was originally Jülicher's thesis, right though he was in the main, that Jesus did not speak in allegories? Is not the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen an allegory, which the Church has not revised, formed, recreated or spoilt, for it has not added any hint of the Resurrection, which surely it would have done if the parable had been subject to one quarter of the suspected influences? Could not Jesus for once, with Isaiah's allegory of the vineyard in mind, have uttered an allegory? Contrast pp. 56-60.

With the second half of the book (pp. 89-159) the reader will probably be more in agreement, granted Jeremias' "laws". Here, too, there is something to learn on almost every page, for Jeremias seems to have absorbed all the relevant literature and his footnotes are often illuminating as well as informative. His conclusion is that the parables of Jesus "compel his hearers to come to a decision about his Person and mission". For they are full of "the secret of the Kingdom of God . . .", the recognition of "an eschatology that is in process of realization". Dr. Dodd has apparently agreed in principle with this phrase in place of his own famous "realized eschatology".

C. S. C. WILLIAMS.

THE MISSION OF JESUS

THE MISSION AND ACHIEVEMENT OF JESUS. By REGINALD H. FULLER. Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 12. S.C.M. Press. 8s.

PROFESSOR FULLER has made a notable contribution to Gospel scholarship. Further, he has tackled the challenge of Bultmann from a different standpoint. Instead of a generalized discussion about myth and history, he has taken the critical standpoint of Bultmann and may be said to have fairly beaten him at his own game.

The book is tightly compressed and closely reasoned, and is therefore not for armchair reading. It abounds in useful discussions of particular passages, though it would be unreasonable to expect that all its exegesis will appear equally convincing. As the work proceeds a common pattern begins to emerge which makes it much more than an extended critical comment on the work of Bultmann. In many respects it resembles that of Otto, without the latter's perhaps undue preoccupation with I. Enoch.

The opening chapter, on the Kingdom of God, is in fact more critical of Dodd than of Bultmann. The Kingdom is imminent rather than realized, and the decisive act is neither in the present nor the past but in the immediate future. In fact, the Kingdom is realized in the Cross. Through an interesting defence of the Marcan order, especially as concerns the Transfiguration, the author turns to a defence of the predictions of the Passion. Here, of course, both Vincent Taylor and William Manson had preceded him. It is to be regretted that, albeit with scholarly caution, he does not feel able to defend the prophecies of the Resurrection with which these predictions are conjoined. His discussion of the Last Supper aligns him with Preiss rather than with Jeremias, though I wonder whether he is right in his rejection of the longer Lucan text. The whole section leads up to the conclusion of the cruciality of the Cross.

He next turns to the raw materials of Christology which the tradition supplies, still with Bultmann's analysis in view. He is, of course, right that we overhear rather than hear the Christology of Jesus in the sense that Jesus did not come merely to transmit a true theology of his own person. There are, however, elements in the discussion which seem disappointing and provisional. This is especially true of his discussion of the title "Son of God", in which the meaning of some of his key sentences is not always clear. What, for example, does he mean by the phrase that the title is "pre-Messianic"? And does he seek to draw a distinction in one passage between Son-hood and Sonship? He obviously believes that the concept of the Suffering Servant is basic to the thought of Jesus, who may even have been the first to give an unambiguously individual connotation to the term. Discussion is, however, extended over a great part of the book, and the special section devoted to the title is largely taken up by a long discussion of the Johannine thunderbolt. A displacement of his material here, and a somewhat more extended note on the Servant, even at the risk of some repetition, would have helped the reader. He successfully criticizes the view that the title Son of Man is derived from Ezekiel, and dismisses the view that Jesus either had knowledge of or was indebted to Enoch. Here he may be right, but at least some bibliographical reference would have helped. Its source is Daniel vii, but the picture of the sufferings of the Son of Man is filled out by details drawn from the Suffering Servant. The title has an individual rather than a corporate significance. Like Otto, Professor Fuller relates closely his discussions of the Kingdom of God and the Son of Man. In the Gospels Jesus is not yet Son of Man who is essentially a triumphant figure. But he acts as one who is destined to be the Son of Man even during the conditions of his ministry. This view certainly makes good sense, but is not altogether supported by one group of the passages.

The author finally reaches the conclusion that the life of Jesus is not so much "unmessianic", as Bultmann regards it, but "pre-messianic". What Professor Fuller means is clear enough, but, as with his discussion of the Son of Man, certain reservations are left in the mind. There are certainly two phases of the Messiahship as of the Son of Manhood of Jesus, but is he not in each case "all the Son of Man" or "all the Messiah there is"? It is a question of how the Gospels phrase the humiliation-exultation schema of Philippians ii, 5-11. The author has given us a most interesting and stimulating discussion. Would he now turn to the task of expansion and clarification?

H. E. W. Turner.

A POETICAL MINIATURIST

Collected Poems. By Frances Cornford. Cresset Press. 10s. 6d.

Lovers of poetry must welcome this selection by Mrs. Cornford of her best work. There is nothing here of the obscurity which demands from the reader a laborious work of interpretation which interferes with poetic communication. These poems are simple, most of them extremely short, not one of any great length. They are the work of a poetical miniaturist. A particular scene, a particular event, is seen and shown as significant somehow of a spiritual reality beyond. The moment is viewed *sub specie æternitatis*, fixed and immortalized. These scenes and events are for the most part scenes, events, of everyday life, not far away and long ago except in the sense that the world they portray has not yet been invaded by the results of modern technical progress. The farms belong to the peaceful, slow-moving, unmechanized agriculture of the past.

There is a singular purity in these poems as of a limpid spring, refreshing and soothing. Certain themes recur. There is the moonlight in its cold brightness. Early dawn is a favoured time with the magic its light imparts to the commonplace objects of a bedroom. Sleep, dreaming and the drowsiness sinking off to sleep : we experience these things with the poet. Thus,

WAKING IN THE ATTIC BEDROOM

More innocently born and calmer seems
In its soft summer haze
This Sunday morning than all other days.
A peace is everywhere
As if the whole created world believed in prayer,
Over the solitary fields of wheat,
And down the village street
And on my folded clothes across the chair.

Always the joy of simple things, of the first spring flowers;

Violets blue, violets white
We found one of each;
She touched with her fingers
The buds on the peach;
A cold-stalked snowdrop I put into her hand,
And we were both more glad than we could say or understand.

"Goldheaded rose", "Vetch", "varnished buttercup", "hemlock", "blue speedwell lovely as the dew", "old brownheaded plantains."

O child to be, though my life ends
And change or chance your spirit rends
With the same faces, these will be your friends.

No lesson is more needed in this age of fevered rush in search of new sensations than to see the beauty of common things, to find in them food and peace for the spirit and an inexhaustible significance. And this precisely is the burden of these poems.

Unlike her "fat white woman" who walked through the fields missing so much and so much, Mrs. Cornford misses nothing of nature's daily and nightly loveliness: sees therefore common things with the freshness of a vision which sees them as if seen now for the first time. One poem brings before us a Lincolnshire farm in those better days when agriculture was still unmechanized and in harmony with its natural environment. And the *genius loci* receives his due; Cambridge and its surrounding countryside where the poet was born, has lived her life, and where she would end it. Just a few detailed touches and the scene is before us with its predominantly grey and green, characteristic colouring, rich with the memories of a long history and the music of so many poets.

The background of eternity, of infinite Spirit, suggested by the peculiar intensity with which the passing scene or event is realized, appears more explicitly in another theme: the child's delight playing with the sand or pebbles yet conscious the while of the vast sea beyond. As a child, she says: "I laboured with a wooden spade, against this background of Eternity." The beauty of the pebble is mainly due to the colour bestowed by the seawater and must fade when it dries, "Bright with a beauty not its own". This, it is true, is meant immediately of the fading physical beauty of youth. But in view of other poems I cannot but give it a deeper meaning. There is a more austere theme in which eternity suddenly asserts against time and its superficial often trivial contents, its sovereign reality, is death breaking in upon the commonplace and comfortable routine of a sheltered bourgeois life as the irruption of another dimension of reality, the invasion of an infinite unknown. So "the day my great aunt Smith died",

She was more quiet than the bare, ploughed fields that lay outside:
The knowledge in her listening face as certain was, and wide.

or again:

Out of this seemliness, this solid order
At half-past four today . . .
At half-past four on Friday you went out;

Dateless, whole
Light of Eternity
You went away.

The simplicity, the inevitability even, of the poems must not deceive us. It is achieved by a scrupulous artistry alert for the *mot juste*. A few examples may be permitted. There is the finale to the poem which relates the story of the Princess fain to run away with the gypsies but unable to pay the price of physical hardship:

As I went up the palace steps
I heard the gypsies laugh;
The birds of spring so sweet did sing
It broke my heart in half.

or these:

> The voice of a child who suddenly misses those only hands
> That understood to make him safe, usual, and warm,
>
> The revolving, hard, enamelled world
>
> He moves as though before
> Man sliced the vast of time in fretful hours:
> And the wide sky on the old farm looks down.
>
> They knew the rent sky sweeping over the moors
>
> I belong to night,
> *The brown surrounding caverns made of dream.*

Since the poems are arranged in the order of the collections in which they first were published, a chronological order is roughly preserved. But it is very far from exact. Two poems, both written in 1915, are separated by a wide gap because they were published separately. This matters less, however, than in the case of other poets. For one detects little change of theme or treatment during the half century between the earliest poem printed and the latest. From the outset the poet found her gift and her instrument and wisely has not looked elsewhere.

Rupert Brooke's memory—he was a personal friend—has been magnificently though anonymously enshrined in a poem written when the news of his death arrived, "Contemporaries":

> Can it be possible when we grow old
> And time destroys us, that your image too,
> The timeless beauty that your youth bestowed
> (As though you'd lain a moment since by the river
> Thinking and dreaming under the grey sky
> When May was in the hedges) will dissolve?

No, it is an immortal youth arrested timelessly, not only in his own poems but in this worthy tribute which Mrs. Cornford's characteristic economy of language displays as known to those privileged by his friendship.

Nor can I pass over unnoticed in many poems touches of an ironic humour too humane to be cynical.

Frankly I regret the inclusion of the youthful *Villanelle*, London Streets exclaiming against the "blundering and cruel ways of Providence". In the quotation from Darwin which heads the poem they are the ways of "nature". Nature, however, is not Providence but the product of two factors: a positive cause, namely God, and a negative cause, the intrinsic limitation of finite being which makes it impossible even for God to create a world free from suffering and sin. He permits what he knows is worth while permitting. This is Providence.

E. I. WATKIN.

TRADITIO-HISTORICAL CRITICISM

Oral Tradition. By Eduard Nielsen. S.C.M. Press. 7s.

Traditio-Historical criticism is not as obscure as it sounds. It may be defined as the study of the nature, origin and history of tradition. The use made of it in Scandinavian Old Testament studies recently under the leadership of Professor Ivan Engnell of Uppsala is somewhat narrower than this and, implying a number of dogmas about the role of oral tradition, tends to obscurity. The difficulty of knowing with precision what it means, together with the accident that the most systematic account of it is in Swedish, makes interpretation necessary. Here now is a book which presents this form of inquiry in action.* It is of modest length, though packed with good things and happily inexpensive in the *Studies in Biblical Theology* series. In a foreword, Professor Rowley describes it as "a better introduction to traditio-historical criticism than can be found elsewhere in any of the international languages of scholarship". With this favourable judgement the reviewer is disposed to agree. And since the questions discussed are acutely important for the way in which biblical texts are handled and some commitment on the issues imperative, the book ought to have an extensive circulation and lead to some salutary clarifications.

The first chapter presents a rough outline of the modern debate, and attempts to put the real problem of oral tradition into focus. That problem is raised by the unimaginative and anachronistic habit of the typical western literary critic of reading the assumptions of his own literary culture into a quite different oriental (biblical) culture. Against this entrenched habit, some (mainly) Scandinavian scholars, led by Engnell, have entered a vigorous and loud protest. They claim that it is no longer possible to make a simple distinction between a literary and a pre-literary (oral) stage of tradition.

The second chapter seeks to illustrate the value and use of oral tradition in the ancient near East generally, and to contrast this with the value that a modern literary culture sets upon it. The special spheres of oral and written tradition are distinguished, and the status and function of early scribes described. The use of writing in prophetic and poetical texts is linked (following Nyberg) with a general crisis of confidence in Israel following the events of 586, and even thereafter there is an interplay between oral and written transmission which keeps alive the oriental reliance upon the memory and the creative power of oral tradition.

In the third chapter the subordinate role of writing in pre-exilic Israel is demonstrated, and conversely the positive role of oral tradition is traced in the Law and Wisdom literature. The signs of this positive role in respect of the historical and prophetic traditions are confined to a fascinating last chapter, in which the traditio-historical method is tested in the detailed exposition of three texts, viz, Jer. ch. 36, Mic. cc. 4—5, and Gen. cc. 6—9. This transition from the general to the particular, a

*It is by a Danish scholar, and comes to England in an excellent translation.

ave and able effort to illustrate principles within the unyielding limits precise texts, is in some ways the most important part of the book and rtainly illuminates the whole issue.

In general the Scandinavians may well claim to have administered a rrective to much modern critical study of the Bible. They have created more favourable attitude to the power and reliability of oral tradition. hey are teaching us to take more account of the ancient oriental culture ithin which Israel grew up, and to take corresponding care to see that e do not impose the assumptions of our own literary culture upon our terpretations of the biblical traditions. This is great gain, and Mr. ielsen has now played a notable part in making clear just what has ppened in recent scholarship, notable for an advocacy which is both eighty and refreshingly free from bombast and scathing denunciation. is must not suggest that he is content to echo the opinions of others. n the contrary, this book contains his own independent investigations d original applications of the method he advocates.

But it is doubtful whether, beyond this, the illumination reveals to the ader quite what the author intends him to see. For this book, while arifying the main issues, also clarifies the excesses and ambiguities of e Scandinavian contribution. Its principle excess is largely a result of lemical exaggeration. The enlightened Swede has been set over against e obscurantist Wellhausenian, the traditio-historian over against the erary critic. This vivid and exciting antithesis has been made possible ly by setting the older generation of literary critics in opposition to the w enlightenment. It is Wellhausen, Duhm, Marti, Gunkel and the like o are the main foils, together with those contemporaries who still ree with some part of their method. The literary critics are lumped gether as "the literary critics", a phrase which now takes on a somewhat inous and depreciatory tone. This conceals the very real and healthy fferences within their ranks, and, indeed, their varying evaluations of oral adition. Many have acknowledged truth in Scandinavia, but are made look like submitting to an enemy in doing so. The prophetic tendency see things in blacks and whites is a liability in the field of careful olarship. It is impossible to see in literary critics a homogeneous body o can be set in dramatic opposition to the traditio-historians. After the eat classical names, Gunkel and Gressmann represent one decisive vance, T. H. Robinson and Eissfeldt another, while the work of owinckel, Bentzen and others makes clear-cut distinctions nonsensical. is also conceals the extent to which the modern Scandinavian traditio- torian still owes more to Wellhausen and the old literary critics than he es to any before them and, viewed from the perspective of pre-critical ys, belongs with them over against all other types of biblical scholarship this or any other age. He is an ungrateful child and ought to have been e to correct his parent without being so arrogant and aggressive. In t, he sees further than his parent only because he has been able to stand his shoulders and has been granted a wider (but not deeper) education.

The principal ambiguity of the Scandinavian contribution is a result of excitement of the chase. It is undoubtedly true that a favourable attitude to oral tradition opens the eyes to fresh possibilities of interpretation. The student reads the texts with a new alertness. The older shar distinction between the authentic oracles of a prophet and the unauthen or secondary elements is often impossible. What was formerly taken to b editorial addition may be convincingly argued to be a form taken by th tradition of the master's oracles. "Nucleus and deposit" is often a bet language to use than "authentic and secondary". And so on. Aga there is great gain.

But much of the argument does not necessarily follow from the traditio-historical method. It is simply alternative theory. This is show very clearly in this book in the treatment of Gen. cc. 6—9. The conclus that P was never a separate tradition source or stratum (a view held a by Engnell) is an interesting alternative theory: it in no wise owes i appearance to traditio-historical method but rather, in the main, to a argument worked out by Cassuto on the basis of chronology. It is t that eyes freshened by a new approach fastened on the possibility, but i not strictly correct to give this as an example of traditio-historical meth In the same way Engnell gives us much which is less the fruit of th method than the illumination of ancient oriental culture.

The impression that Mr. Nielsen, in his enthusiasm, does not se clearly enough to strike the right balance is confirmed by the quotatio of some texts from the Accadian Irra myth to illustrate the importanc anciently attached to learning by heart. This is contrasted with "th modern contempt for learning by heart". But these brief references out o the blue are not in themselves impressive. As well might one generalize t the contrary about modern education from a recent letter in the *Manchest* *Guardian* by the Sub-Warden of St. Deiniol's Library that a like respect fo the memory is still among us: "Learning by heart . . . is still a necessar accomplishment for men reading Honour Mods. at Oxford. Dr. R. R Marrett, Rector of Exeter in my day, used to commend this method to a whose memory had not reached saturation point. At Balliol under Jowet he would say, it was considered nothing to learn fifty lines standing wit one's back to the fire after breakfast. He thus made himself able, whi still in his teens, to repeat in Latin two books of the *Aeneid*, with sever of the *Bucolics*, the first book of Lucretius and the *Peleus* and *Thetis* Catullus; and in Greek the *Agamemnon* and the *Oedipus Coloneu* choruses and all". Mr. Nielsen may be right in his general conclusion, b his argumentation at this point is thin. Undoubtedly these Scandinavian are engaged in a real and important chase. Our impression is that a mo balanced judgement and attitude will be possible when they cool dow from the heat of pursuit. They are both chasing the truth and runni away from it at the same time.

Meanwhile it is probable that more secure results are obtained by tho who scrutinize scientifically variant texts for the concrete signs of oral ar written tradition, as, for example, Ringgren, who employed scientif criteria in the study of parallel psalms and oracles. Mr. Nielsen does n meet Professor Albright's criticism that, while the emphasis on or tradition is right in principle, the Scandinavians go too far in lowering th ate of the reduction of oral tradition to writing *in general* to a date as ow as the exile. Albright appeals to recent researches in Hebrew orthoraphy as direct evidence for the reduction of some poems to writing as arly as the tenth century B.C. This is evidence of a more objective kind, nd provides a challenge to one of the cherished positions of the Scaninavian school. Engnell, it is true, states that "especially collections of aw and cultic-poetical texts, above all the Psalms, have been taken down writing already in early pre-exilic times." He is right to emphasize hat the manner of transmission varies highly within different species of ld Testament literature. But then the very conviction with which the rophets are associated with the cult ought to create a probability that heir work would be reduced to writing reasonably quickly. Circles which reserved written laws, cultic poems and psalms, in which therefore writing as a highly practised art, would tend naturally, once the oracles of a rophet had achieved a more or less sacrosanct authority, certainly within generation, to reduce them to the same familiar form, that is the written rm. This is of course an assumption to be tested in minute scrutiny of e texts, but it is a better assumption than the entirely hypothetical one of crisis of confidence as the motive for writing down the prophetic oracles.

These are serious criticisms, and mean that the truth has been distorted the violence of a highly-spirited debate. We have not to unlearn so uch as we are told. On the other hand, this book should show to nglish readers that something of lasting importance is being said which hould make a positive and welcome difference to our new commentaries hen they come to be written.

DOUGLAS R. JONES.

MORE ABOUT DEMYTHOLOGY

EMYTHOLOGIZING AND HISTORY. By FRIEDRICH GOGARTEN. Translated by NEVILLE HORTON SMITH. S.C.M. Press. 7s. 6d.

is time that these Demythologizers and anti-demythologizers had a ood dose of logical analysis. Here is another book, from Professor riedrich Gogarten of Gottenburg, purporting to make it all clear. How ear, the reader must judge: it needs a lot of existentialization to underand sin as "the responsibility for the world in so far as the right to it as been forfeited but the obligation of it still remains" (p.29), and that history "an event unconceals itself and is to be perceived only by means a corresponding self-unconcealment on the part of him for whom or whom it happens" (p. 80). But such quotation is unfair to Professor ogarten, for his explanation of the demythologization controversy is erhaps the best yet given and, if one has the patience to follow its intricies, it is definitely comprehensible. Like Angus Maclan's pibroch in *ab Ballads* it "distinctly resembles a tune" in its general effect.

To elucidate what it is all about one should first deal with the existentiist suppositions on which Bultmann's and Gogarten's views are based;

then with their application to the context of the Christian faith as recorded in the New Testament, and conclude with some critical observations.

As to the presuppositions, it is assumed that modern historical method has rendered the old metaphysical interpretation of the world obsolete History and science between them now give us a world in which man is the central reality. Metaphysics is a thing of the past, and, as the orthodox theology is metaphysical in its structure, it can no longer give a true picture of reality. But the resultant humanism is defective in two ways: it falls back (in Troeltsch and others) on a kind of inner impulse or creativeness in history, possibly the identity of finite minds with an infinite mind, which is a reversion to the metaphysical: and secondly it persists in a subject-object mode of thinking, when science with its space-time stream of neutral events (in Russell and Whitehead presumably) should have taught us that we must think in terms of "being in" and a part of the process, that is in existential terms of the possibility of existence "for me". A further presupposition, as yet unproven, though ably developed in Bultmann's critical work on the New Testament as well as by Goguel and others, is that modern historical criticism has taken away the factuality (which the translator always calls factualness) of the miraculous element in the New Testament. Its authority as an historical record is undermined it is in great part mythological. Further, it is assumed that the Lutheran emphasis on the theology of the Word of God and of justification *sola fide* provide the key insights into the meaning of true Christianity, which has been obscured by the metaphysical dogmata of our creeds and by the sacramentalism of an institutional Church.

Granted these presuppositions, the Demythologizers ask, what form of the Christian faith is now tenable, or rather, for they are existentialists, what is my possibility of existence, my salvation, in face of the reality of God It depends on faith in his promise. God has turned himself in mercy towards mankind. He has proclaimed his love and forgivingness through Jesus The salvation event is my response to his proclamation, his *kerygma* Existentially the salvation occurs when the saving *kerygma* presents itself to my existence, and I accept the promise in faith. God made, historically his proclamation of mercy in Jesus: the redemptive event is proclaimed by his followers always; it is the Word of God, the Word, in which Jesus is as present as he was to his apostles, "encounters" each person to whom it is proclaimed. Before his encountering the *kerygma* man is "in sin" and under perdition: by faith in the Word he enters into the freedom of a son of God.

The phrase "in sin" needs explanation. By worshipping the creature rather than the Creator man had reversed the true order of nature, and shut himself away from reality in a world of his own imagining, a world of unreality, a world "in perdition". My existence is ruled by sin, and sin calls me to account: I can answer only with my existence: I am in perdition Towards this state of mine God turns in mercy. The *kerygma* "encounters" me, with all the power of the Word of God in Christ. My response to it by faith takes me out of my own responsibility for history, as envisaged modern critical historians, and sets me into a real and free relationship th God.

Existentialism represents the revolt of the living individual against his bmergence either in a metaphysical system in which he is of little or no count, or in a scientific world of space-time events in which he is utralized. In the attempt to assert his own reality he either finds himself s Sartre thinks) alone and free in a godless and incomprehensible orld in which his situation is one of anguish and despair, or alternatively frustration and absurdity; or else, on the lines initiated by Kierkegaard, is forced to realize himself by the realization of his sin, and, being thus perdition, his only hope lies in the mercy of God which he can attain the self-abandonment of faith.

The theological consequence of this latter Christian form of existenlism is the theology of the Word of God. God promises himself in ve, proclaims his mercy to the individual soul; and the individual accepts in faith and obedience, so that his true existence is realized as being "in rist". The response is that of a life, in its "life situation", met by a hallenge": sin threatens its very existence; acceptance of the *kerygma* eans salvation. This is more than thinking, or believing in dogmata. ogarten explains that it means the abandonment of subject-object inking, in which salvation is part of a metaphysical "schema", in favour existential thinking in which salvation is a challenge here and now from od. It is either . . . or . . .

On this view, which Gogarten complicatedly explains is not a view or *ltanschauung* but an existential situation, the old theology based on etaphysical subject-object thinking is superseded. The salvation event historical in Jesus through whom God's Word comes to man: but it not intra-mundane history. The intra-mundane history of Jesus when itically examined shows that it has been mythologized in most of e New Testament apart from certain insights, notably of St. Paul and John, and more completely in the orthodox theology of our Creeds. We ust not contemplate Jesus and the historical events recorded about him objects of our thoughts. If we do we make ourselves the centre of ference of Being as such. We must think in terms of being: sin dominates existence and my total world, and I am responsible for it, and God has oken through Jesus to me. Jesus is God's Word, and he is as truly esent in the *kerygma* as he was during the incarnation. The *kerygma* in fact, not a report, but a message from God to man of which the arer is Jesus, the Word. The content of the message is salvation which kes place within the *kerygma*. The *kerygma* is historical because it kes place within history, but it does not consist in historical salvation ents, in redemptive facts. "Only in the concealment of the unity of the ther and the Son does salvation take place by faith", and not in its jective explication as Christology. "To speak of objective factuality ould be to be guilty of a miserable rationalization of New Testament history". The *kerygma* is "eschatological history" because the mercy and e obedience are eternal. We can no longer seek in the historical fact of the crucifixion the basis of faith in our redemption. It is only the origi in time, of the Cross in which we trust. Neither, says Bultmann, is Jesu to be questioned in regard to his historical origin. The meaning (*Bedeutung*) of his history arises from what God wishes to say to me through i (*Bedeutung* here, Gogarten explains, has not its ordinary sense of "meaning" but implies that God "notifies something" to me in an "existential" an not a "subject-object" sense).

In sum, then, it does not matter whether the factual aspects of th Creeds are historically factual or not. They are, it would seem, a mythologization of a salvation event, the essence of which is that God speaks Jesus, offering salvation to all to whom the message is given. The tas of the preacher is to proclaim this word. "To *you* is the word of this salvation sent" is his message. The Word, as Luther reveals, is *sui generi* and our attitude to miracles, including the Resurrection, is not to dictated by scientific concepts of reality, nor by "the reality criteria of th natural man". "To objectify the Word of God is to deny him".

Well—there it is! A challenging theology, fully, if not always lucidl described. But it is not easy to be lucid about existentialism, because it an attempt to induce a new way of thinking.

And it is here that criticism must begin. For thinking *is* a subjec object activity. It is difficult to resist Meinong's conclusion that we kno ourselves as referential consciousnesses: all our inwardness is the inwardnes of outward-directed beings. Existentialists would have us think, instead in terms of being: so would Thomists, in a different sense: but Thomists at any rate allow man to think in the ordinary sense—up to a point; while existentialists would have us "think" in a way which seems little else than feel our desperate situation, if what Luther and Karl Barth say is the whole truth about man. We are not asked to *think* in terms of Being, but to abandon normal thought in favour of an intuitive "self-understanding." In justice to Gogarten's position this may well be because thinking in ou usual subject-object way about God, who transcends thought, is an impossibility. That may well be so. In fact, according to orthodox theology, that is the very reason why God has revealed himself in the comprehensible terms of the Incarnation. Bultmann and his expositor read like men who, frightened at the inroads which their criticism has mad on the Gospel story, are making desperate efforts to retain faith by wha Kierkegaard calls a "passionate inwardness". An obsession with sin an faith has turned the fair landscape of God's world into a "desert drear" which, for a reason still obscure, man has been permitted to make b (to use Gogarten's words) "reversing the true nature of the world" and so becoming "responsible for history". This combination of megaloman with "elachisto-mania" (if one may out-rival existentialists in word-coining) seems odd.

Theology is thinking about God: we have been given minds, and they think in subject-object terms: and we have been encouraged to think about him: if we think about him our thinking must be metaphysical, in spite of logical positivists and existentialists. And such profound and m metaphysical thinking preserves sanity in dealing with moral values d practical conduct of affairs. Metaphysical thinking is necesssary cause God is the supreme reality. One may reasonably ask what is an stentialist to do after the achievement of self-understanding by faith. re all apostles? are all prophets?" All, that is, who are not critics.

The Christian understanding of history must involve a metaphysical ology. And this includes a critical discernment of how God's control human destinies operates and has operated, especially through our Lord. But this is very far from the nightmare thinking of existentialism, and m the destruction and discarding of event values by demythologization.

C. B. Armstrong.

CHRIST AND THE GENTILES

us and the Non-Jews. By T. W. Manson. University of London. Athlone Press. 2s. 6d.

en an isolated lecture by Professor Manson is an event for those who already heavily in his debt for his studies in the Gospels. Here, h characteristic lucidity, insight and common sense he is dealing with somewhat intractable problem. His fundamental solution is one to ich others may have come by different routes and is aptly summarized the Pauline principle "To the Jew first, and also to the Greek". What lluminating is his method of getting there and the light on particular ints which he sheds *en route*. A policy or a code must be promulgated widely as possible without any self-imposed "restrictive practices"; ninistry conforms to a different pattern. As Professor Manson shrewdly serves, "It was the incorporation of Gentiles into the Christian Body, t the inculcation of Christian ideas into Gentile minds, that was the interest in the middle of the first century". With this as starting int Professor Manson argues convincingly that this scale of priorities the apostolic age was an essential part of the intention of Jesus. The thousand are not uninstructed minds but leaderless men, a dangerous tential, capable not only of being mobilized into a nationalist movement t even of attempting to sweep Jesus himself into the same network. is leads on to a short but valuable survey of the attitude of contempor- Judaism and of our Lord himself to the Roman power. Particularly iking are the interpretations offered of the Cleansing of the Temple d of the woman taken in adultery. This leads him finally to discuss the incidents in which our Lord has dealings with Gentiles: the centurion Capurnaum and the Syro-Phoenician woman. Both having glimmerings real faith, sufficient to secure a response from Jesus according to their ed but not enough to warrant an appeal for close and real discipleship. e really constructive work of the ministry had to lie elsewhere.

While I am sure that the fundamental thesis is sound, I am left a little certain of some of the details. If Dr. Vincent Taylor's account of the irlwind tour of the Twelve in Mark vi is accepted, as it probably should be, a further element in what Jesus meant by mission would have to com into the picture. And I am left less happy than perhaps I ought to be tha the last two incidents are satisfactorily explained.

H. E. W. Turner.

CLASSICAL STUDIES

Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship. Edited by Maurice Platnau
Blackwell. 13s. 6d.

This volume, commemorating the Classical Association's Jubilee meetin last year, consists of a collection of articles by various scholars, each o which is designed to summarize the achievements of the past fifty years i a particular field of classical studies. On the subject of Homer Profess E. R. Dodds's most interesting point is the proof that the poems are i origin oral compositions, which bears closely on the question of thei unity: the Unitarian position was to some extent popularly accepted afte the Great War, in reaction to the rather wearisome controversies of th nineteenth century, but has been strongly challenged in recent yea Professor L. R. Palmer and Miss Dorothea Gray show how philologis and archaeologists have undermined it. In other branches of Gree literature the most universally important new factor has been the papy found at Oxyrhynchus towards the turn of the last century: the fact tha the date of the discovery of most of the fragments lies outside the prescribe fifty-year period is, of course, unimportant compared with the subsequen work done in deciphering the texts and assessing their significance. M J. G. Griffith, on Early Greek Lyric Poetry, points out that in this instanc they have stimulated inquiry in a field formerly obscure. In his own word "The significant originality of these poets is now becoming clear as hardly was fifty years ago. We not only owe to them the first experimen in the metres and forms that later were to grow into Attic Tragedy, b have in them the earliest witnesses to the new direction Greek thought wa taking."

Some advance thereby has been achieved with Hellenistic poetry als here Mr. E. A. Barber notices a broadening in approach which has l to the substitution of the term "Hellenistic" for "Alexandrian". To t papyri is to some extent due the recognition of the originality (previous suspected) of the Roman love elegy, which Professor T. E. Wright no in his chapter on Augustan Poetry. The discovery of new drama fragments has had more positive and more impressive effects, as appears the articles on Greek Tragedy and Greek Comedy, by Professor T. B. Webster and Mr. K. J. Dover respectively: there is now some dire knowledge of plays formerly known by their titles alone, and New Come can now be studied, not merely in the disconnected quotations of la writers and the adaptations of Plautus and Terence, but also in the fo tolerably complete plays of Menander and a good number of substant fragments. Ill-founded theories on the nature of Greek drama have th been upset, and a salutary lesson has been given on the danger of generalizing about a subject for which the documentary evidence is still comparatively incomplete. More striking still, perhaps, is Mr. Dover's singling out, as a characteristic of twentieth-century work, "the realization, as yet imperfect and erratic, of the full implications of the simple truism that Comedy is *drama*"; this comment is equally relevant to Professor Webster's study and to Professor W. A. Laidlaw's on Roman drama, where Beare's realistic approach in recreating the conditions of staging comes in for deserved mention. Sir David Ross's chapter on Greek Philosophy makes difficult reading, as, contrary to the practice of the other contributors, he inserts the bulk of his references into his text instead of relegating them to the end of chapter; even so, he hardly provides adequate comment on the contents of the books he mentions. It is surprising to find several bibliographical errors and inconsistencies: most are trivial enough but it is inaccurate to say that "the whole of Aristotle has appeared in the Loeb series". In dealing with the Greek Orators and Rhetoric, Professor H. Ll. Hudson-Williams is mainly concerned with work done in improving the text and with the publication of popular editions in the Loeb and the Bude series: papyri discoveries have not been extensive here, or in the field of the Greek historians (treated by Mr. G. T. Griffith), where the main advance has been in interrelating the different ancient authorities.

In Roman studies no general factor has appeared comparable to the findings at Oxyrhynchus. In the chapter on Late Republican Poetry Dr. C. Bailey is prevented by modesty from assessing the value of his own great edition of Lucretius; on Catullus Mr. R. G. C. Levens deals entertainingly with modern attempts to reconstruct the poet's life on the basis of exceedingly sparse evidence, but his frank admission that, though Catullus has recovered popularity with the generation of Dylan Thomas, little scholastic advance has been made—there is not even an up-to-date text available—makes it surprising that Catullus should have been allowed such a substantial place in this book. In recent study of the Roman historians Dr. A. H. McDonald distinguishes three trends: "First, historical analysis has developed the methods of Mommsen in treating their subject-matter; secondly, literary criticism has applied the conventions of Roman rhetoric and Hellenistic historiography to examination of their style; and thirdly, increasing interest in Roman ideas has led to discussion of their standards of historical judgement." Mr. S. F. Bonner provides a long chapter on Roman Oratory, with much detail of primarily linguistic interest. On Silver Latin Poetry Mr. H. H. Huxley welcomes the revival of interest in Statius and suggests that a revaluation of Silius' *Punica*—at present often decried but rarely read—is overdue.

It may be emphatically said that this book, which is not designed for the general reader, should prove of great use to the student: the bibliographies which accompany each article are of particular value. Its composition, however, suggests two major criticisms. In the first place, the contents of its fourteen chapters are confined, as the title implies, to almost exclusively literary themes. Mythology and religion. science and mathematics have no place in it; epigraphy, palaeography and papyrology are likewise absent. In the excellent chapters on the Greek and Roman historians the restrictive form of the title precludes any discussion of numismatic evidence. Archaeological evidence is continually cited throughout the book, as it must be; but a science (if so it may be termed) in which this century has seen such spectacular advances and of which the impact on all branches of classical studies has been so great might surely have been accorded a chapter to itself. Secondly, it is disappointing to find no editorial introduction to summarize and coordinate the contents of the individual chapters: as a result of this omission the reader gets no general impression of the whole. The name of Wilamowitz occurs again and again in the lists of references, but the immense scope of his activity is nowhere separately described. An introduction would have been the place, also, for a consideration of the altered trend which classical scholarship has taken. Professor Wright justly refers to Housman's critical edition of Manilius as "striking evidence that the spirit of Scaliger and Bentley has survived into our present age", but it cannot in general be denied that the high degree of specialization necessitated by the complexity of modern scholarship gives less opportunity for the appearance of giants comparable to the polymaths of past centuries. Major achievements by individuals are bound to be rarer (though Ventris' decipherment of Minoan linear script B shows that they are at least possible) and the emphasis is now rather on the results of teamwork (on a greater or lesser scale) and the perfection of the tools of scholarship. The *Cambridge Ancient History*, the *Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum*, Müller's Handbooks, Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll's *Real-Encyclopädie* and works of a similar kind are the characteristic and lasting product of the scholarship of the past half-century.

E. W. WHITTLE.

DIPLOMAT AND TRAVELLER

THE PHANTOM CARAVAN. By SIR OWEN O'MALLEY. John Murray. 21s.

THIS curious, uneven but interesting production is partly a personal autobiography, partly the account of a diplomatic career and partly a series of impressions of travel; and this last part is the best. As an autobiography the book suffers from the evident conflict between the author's Irish temperament and the standards of his English upbringing. He is, for the most part, very frank about his personal life—sometimes embarrassingly so, as when he quotes a love-letter of his undergraduate days; but at times, often critical times for the reader, reticence overcomes him and the picture is suddenly blurred. He makes it plain, for example, that his relations with his parents were not easy; but when we hope to learn the causes of this, we are told merely that "they were a highly coloured pair, but piety restrains me from description of the singularities of our family life." The piety is commendable in itself; but it is not an ingredient of the best autobiographies. Had Edmund Gosse felt it, we should never have had *Father and Son.*

As a picture of diplomatic life the book would have been more instructive had the author been a typical diplomat. That, however, he was very far from being or trying to be. In a service where almost the first requisite for success is to be what is called a good "mixer", he was, as he admits almost with relish, not merely a bad mixer but practically no mixer at all, as far as his British colleagues were concerned. He quotes one of these as explaining what he considers his comparative lack of success in his career (though in fact he does not seem to have done too badly) by his having been "arrogant, intolerant and obstinate"; and it is clear from this book that he has a truly Hibernian propensity for "trailing his coat". Being a convinced reactionary, in the strict sense of the term—that is, one who reacts against the tendencies of the present day—he dislikes "progress" and democracy, denounces any weakness towards communism, approves of Right-Wing dictators like Franco and Salazar, and can even write of "the deplorable Nuremburg trials"; and if, as there is good reason to believe, he expressed the same sentiments with the same vigour when in the Service, it is hardly surprising that he was not popular with the governments which he served, particularly the Labour Government after 1945. At the same time, however, he made himself unpopular with the out-and-out "appeasers" by opposing the policy of giving Mussolini a free hand in Abyssinia because, as he says simply, he thought it morally wrong; and when it is added that he was involved in the once celebrated "Francs Case", where his clearly unfair treatment by the authorities was due, partly at least, to his own defiant attitude towards them, it will be plain that his experiences, like his temperament, were peculiar to himself and that his account of them does not give a balanced picture of what life n the Foreign Office was like in the years when he worked there. The nost valuable parts of it are the accounts of personalities like Sir Eyre Crowe, whom he knew well and of whom, as he says, "it is high time that somebody wrote a biography": the rest, when not polemical, is really ancillary to the main theme of the book, his travels and impressions of ravel.

Diplomats, of course, have opportunities for travel denied to most men; but the author's travels have been exceptional, even for a diplomat's. He usually managed to proceed to, or return from, a post abroad by the ongest, most interesting and most uncomfortable route, and on one occasion he got permission to make a special journey of "political exploraion" through Russia into Persia. He is not a learned traveller. He conesses that he had never heard of Hue, the capital of Annam, before he vent there: he calls the Tatra Mountains of Slovakia "High Tartary", vhich really denotes a very different part of the world; and he supposes hat the wall of Derbent in the Caucasus was built by the Crusaders, who ever got within many hundred miles of it. He possesses, however, vhat many more learned travellers have lacked, an intense susceptibility to impressions, both of landscape and of people, and he writes well enough to be able to give the reader a good idea of what he saw, and some idea of what he felt, in countries as diverse as Russia, China, Cambodia, Mexico, Hungary, Spain and Portugal.

What he saw was often strange enough, but what he felt was stranger still, for it might almost be called a part of his religion. His family were Irish Protestants and he was brought up in an atmosphere of strict evangelical piety, of which he gives a vivid picture when describing his grandparents' household. He has retained much of this, though apparently not in the dogmatic sense — he says that his teachers "who made claims to universality for the words and practices of their religion had only opened the door ajar to apprehension of the life of the spirit"; but he has added to it a sort of nature-mysticism of more than Wordsworthian intensity. He declares that at certain times and in certain places—once in Cambodia. looking at the Mekong river, once in Spain and once, as a child, in England —he has experienced what he calls "a moment of translumination . . . distinguished from all the rest of life in the perception of something appears momentarily to be of overwhelming significance, though what it signifies is unknown and—as it feels—unknowable". That this is perhaps more subjective than he realizes is suggested by his admission that he never felt it in Mexico where, he surmises, the visitor is still subconsciously repelled by the smell of blood from the human sacrifices of the past, but did feel it in Spain, ignoring the smell of burnt flesh from countless *autos-da-fé*. A cynic would note that he liked the Spanish but hated the Mexican régime. Subjective or not, however, his feelings were clearly real and intense; and even on more normal occasions he seems often to have been affected by landscape as others are affected by music. When to this susceptibility there is added a wide-ranging curiosity about, and usually sympathetic interest in, the life of foreign peoples, the result is well worth reading; and it is for that, rather than for the author's opinions on politics or diplomacy, that the book is memorable.

LAURENCE COLLIER.

ENGLISH MEDIEVAL ARCHITECTS

ENGLISH MEDIEVAL ARCHITECTS. A Biographical Dictionary down to 1550. By JOHN HARVEY. With contributions by ARTHUR OSWALD. Batsford. 75s.

THIS is a very substantial contribution to the sources for the history of English architecture. It should be used and treasured not only by those who are specially interested in this subject, and by reference librarians throughout the country, but also by all members of diocesan advisory committees. For, as is the case with so many forms of medieval art, the Church and its affairs perforce occupy the larger part of the volume.

John Harvey has already made a name for himself as a historian of medieval building and kindred subjects, and his previous books lead us to expect once again that all too rare combination of deep knowledge with practical understanding. And he understands not only how an architect works and builds, but also what the readers of his book will want to know. Here arises that special problem posed in works of this character which have to be lexicographical in form, and have to deal at the same time with ground untrodden by perhaps more than one in a hundred readers. The average man will open this volume, admire briefly, and then find that the body of the book, after fourteen all too brief pages of Introduction, consists of 307 quarto pages of alphabetical biographical notices covering more than 1,300 artists and craftsmen.

Now the most optimistic publisher or author can hardly expect that this average reader will want to plough straight through this array of material. The names are nearly all unknown to him: he has probably heard of Yevele and of Vertue and of perhaps one or two others. So he will be well advised to skip these 307 pages at once, and begin at the end by looking at the scheme of indices—seven in all. One or other of these will certainly wake up in him some recollection of a subject about which further information will be gratefully received. It may be a more or less out-of-the-way subject, such as Roodlofts; or a definite period; or a particular building; or some neighbourhood in which he is interested. For all such, as well as for matters economic, separate tables are provided. Thus, if we wish to know about some building which is perhaps familiar from photographs, descriptions, or an actual visit, we may turn up (e.g.) Walberswick in Suffolk, where we are directed to particulars of no fewer than seven individual East Anglian artists and craftsmen who shared responsibility for its vanished glories: and thence (if we want to acquire knowledge in this desultory fashion—surely the most pleasant and not the least useful way) through Richard Buk we find ourselves in the little-known College of Mettingham. And we also find from the same index that in the case of Walberswick's more famous neighbour Southwold, though the glory has been preserved or restored, no trace of its makers has so far been unearthed.

A Batsford book needs no recommendation as to style.

DOM ANSELM HUGHES.

GREECE FROM SHAKESPEARE TO BYRON

FAIR GREECE SAD RELIC. Literary Philhellenism from Shakespeare to Byron. TERENCE SPENCER. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 25s.

A FASCINATING book and amazingly erudite. That a Lecturer on English literature should be acquainted with his subject and in addition with the Classical and continental literature without which English literature would be unintelligible, is not surprising. That Mr. Spencer knows and uses a host of writers long since forgotten and covering over three centuries is matter for wonder and admiration. Nor does he wear his erudition heavily. He is never dull but always full of those anecdotes and personal touches which make the past come to life; not one, however, is irrelevant but illustrating and enforcing his theme—the relations between the British and the modern Greeks, the British attitude towards the latter, at first prejudiced, ignorant and contemptuous, but gradually under the influence of an enthusiasm for classical Greece becoming in many quarters a passionate Philhellenism awaiting the revolt against Turkish rule which it was supposed would free the Greeks from the inevitable vices of a subject population and revive among them the intellectual and moral virtues too indiscriminately ascribed to the ancient Greeks. And of this attitude Byron, in his poetry at any rate, was the most outstanding exponent.

As we go forward we make all sorts of unexpected discoveries. Here are a few samples of many. Henry VIII employed Argives from the Peloponese, a body of Greek mercenaries, in his war against Scotland. William Lily, the first High Master of St. Paul's, learned his Greek under the Knights of St. John at Rhodes, and Elizabeth dispatched a certain Thomas Dallam to convey to the Sultan, with whom she had established diplomatic relations, the present of an organ. In December 1599 Dallam and his party were on Mount Parnassus. They were followed by four Turks determined on cutting their throats. They compelled their dragoman to fall in with their plans. He dared not refuse, but contrived on the fatal night to drug the assassins' wine and got the party safely down to the coast. He then told them of the plot and disclosed the reason which had made him save their lives. He was "an English man, born in Chorlay in Lancashire: his name Finche. He was also in religion a perfect Turk, but he was our trusty friend."

The Lancashire cotton industry did not begin with cotton imported from the American plantations. In the seventeenth century "the Manchester men buy cotton wool in London that comes from Cyprus and Smyrna, at home work the same . . . and then return it to London where the same is vended and sold and not seldom sent into foreign parts." Among British exports to the Levant were "the cloths of Suffolk, Gloucester, Worcester and Coventry dyed and dressed, Kersies of Hampshire and York." And the Greeks wondered why the English needed such a quantity of currants. Nevertheless the risks of travel were such that travellers insured against them on the basis of three to five to one against return. When Henry Moryson set out for Jerusalem and Constantinople he "put out some four hundred, to be repaid twelve hundred pounds upon his return . . . and to lose it if he died in his journey."

Athens was almost unknown, a group of fishermen's huts at the Piraeus being mistaken for the city. But the Troad was much visited partly because the Trojans were regarded as ancestors of the Romans and as such were the heroes of the *Aeneid*, partly because it could be visited while vessels were waiting for a favourable wind to take them to Constantinople. The ruins of Alexandria Troas, however, were mistaken for the city of Priam. Among inscriptions cut by these early visitors was the following on a marble slab supposed to cover Hector's tomb:

I do suppose that here stood Troy,
My name it is William a jolly boy,
My other name it is Hudson and so
God bless the sailors wherever they do go.
I was here in the year of Our Lord 1631 and was bound to Old England, God bless her.

In the seventeenth century there was a widespread traffic in ancient marbles, encouraged for example by the British Ambassador collecting for Lord Arundel and Buckingham. Collectors did not scruple to break up statues too large to remove and much was lost in transit —a sad chapter in the history of vandalism.

Of a far later date is the story of John Tweddell, a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, who arrived in Athens in 1799 determined to see, describe and illustrate every surviving antiquity. "Not only every temple but every stone and every inscription shall be copied with the most scrupulous fidelity." Alas, he died four months later, to be buried at his own request in the Theseum.

A chapter is devoted to the relations between the Greek Church and the Anglican. Greek bishops visited England. For a few years under Charles II there was a Greek church in Soho encouraged by Bishop Compton. And an abortive attempt was made to convert Gloucester Hall, Oxford, later to be Worcester College, into a seminary for the education of select Greek ecclesiastics. The Greeks, however, even Greek bishops, seem to have stated their Eucharistic beliefs in accordance with the wishes of their questioners, and after the reign of Anne there were no further relations between the two Churches.

It is gratifying but surprising that so early as 1699 and 1718 the British Ambassador to the Porte was able to negotiate terms of peace between the Habsburg Empire and the Turks. Goldsmith was a prophet indeed when in 1758 he wrote in his *Citizen of the World*: "I cannot avoid beholding the Russian Empire as the natural enemy of the more western parts of Europe."

These are but examples of the store of interesting information in this book, which will delight those who retain our ancestors' love of Greek literature and can sympathize with the thrill they experienced in reading Homer on the site of Troy, or in his native Smyrna, Plato or Demosthenes in the shadow of the Acropolis. But we can no longer accept the modern Greeks as without qualification descendants of the Ancient.

Leo IX did not, as we are told here, excommunicate Cerularius. The excommunication was pronounced by his legates without his instructions and after his death. I am perplexed by Milton's statement, quoted from his *Defensio Secunda*, that it was the news of the outbreak of civil war in England which made him abandon his projected visit to Greece. For he set out on his return in the winter of 1638 at a time when no one could have foreseen the outbreak of the Civil War in 1642.

E. I. WATKIN.

NEW TESTAMENT PATTERN

New Testament Pattern. By Jean-Louis Leuba. Trans. by Harold Knight. Lutterworth Press. 17s. 6d.

This book appeared originally as *L'institution et l'événement*, with the sub-title, "the two modes of God's work according to the New Testament, their difference, their unity", in the series Bibliothèque Théologique, to which other notable contributions have been made by Cullman and Lecerf. Barth's distinction between Anstalt and Ereignis is well known, and Leuba here works out two main lines of thought about the New Testament in the light of the ideas behind these words. The former stresses God's enduring work historically along, as it were, the horizontal line; the latter stresses the "spiritual" and "charismatic", the more "vertical" outpouring of God in events. The two conceptions are complementary one to the other.

This method of approach may be disquieting to any who say that "Institution" and "Event" are not Biblical words at all, and that they are not appeased by learning that "event" is not used here in its ordinary sense but rather in the sense of "event of God's intervention". Yet if an essay in systematic theology such as this is, however little justice it can do to the richness, fullness and complexity of Biblical theology, serves to throw light on the New Testament data and at the same time to help to heal our "unhappy divisions" between Protestant and Catholic, then even those most disturbed by the use of these two categories should read this book with the care that it deserves.

The author thinks that the cleavage in the Christian world runs back to the dichotomy in the Person of Christ, to the distinction between the "institutional Apostolate of the Twelve" and the spiritual apostolate of St. Paul, as well as to the separation between the institutional Church of Jewish-Christianity and the "spiritual Church" of Gentile Christianity. But he stresses at each stage the underlying unity of Christ, of his apostles, and of the Church. In working out this dialectic, Leuba shows an astonishing power of selection of data and an "impressive virtuosity", as Masson has put it. Yet even the sympathetic reader will ask constantly, "Are not the New Testament facts being forced to fit into this particular mould?" Why, for instance, should the titles of Jesus, namely Christ, Son of David, King of Israel, Son of God, be conceived as static, dynastic titles, while others like Son of Man, Lord and Servant, be conceived as dynamic and spiritual? Can we force the realities for which these titles stand into an *entweder-oder* pattern, either horizontal or vertical, even if in doing so Leuba has many startling and significant points to make? Is not the vertical and horizontal pattern, one might say the sign of the Cross, stamped on each and every title?

Again, whatever value Leuba's treatment of the two apostolates may have, one is left wondering whether St. Paul would have recognized the duality or denied that either was spiritual and charismatic. Once again, the horizontal plus vertical pattern could be traced equally well in the facts so far as they can be seen in the records. Similarly in the third part of the book, on the Church, Leuba thinks that the early Church was the direct continuation of the community of the old covenant, and also the new community called into being by God's dynamic act; yet, once again, the Church is not one of priests or prophets but rather of both from the beginning. St. Paul could speak with tongues more than all at Corinth, but he preferred the moral qualities which make for the edifying of the community to the psychological grace-gifts, also from the Spirit; and St. Ignatius could be both a bishop and a prophet.

Valuable as much of this book is, it has the weakness of some modern works of Biblical theology in setting out from the data, such as modern conceptions of what is Catholic or Protestant. For the sake of the "unity" behind the differences one may be tempted to assume the validity of the claim of each. Does this explain why Matthew xvi, 16*ff.* are crucial verses not discussed in this book? But then, why is John i, 14 not mentioned?

C. S. C. WILLIAMS.

JURIDICAL MYSTICISM

LIFE IN CHRIST. By THÉO PREISS. Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 15. S.C.M. Press. 7s.

THIS work consists in a series of studies by a French Reformed scholar cut off by a premature death. His main thesis, to which all but two of his essays are closely related, is the theme of juridical mysticism which might, had he lived, formed the unitive motif of a theology of the New Testament. His first essay, on "Justification in Johannine Thought", attempts a reconciliation between the theologies of St. Paul and of the Fourth Gospel. If Pauline themes such as justification and even faith and grace occur either not at all or but rarely, their place is taken by terms like witness, judge, judgement, accuser, convince and Paraclete, while even truth and light can be seen against this particular setting. While this essay is a useful warning against those who would set the two theologies at loggerheads. it hardly appears as if he has established his case. A similar application of his main theme to a burning problem in Gospel criticism is to be found in his study of the mystery of the Son of Man. Here his starting point is inevitably the Matthaean parable of the Great Assize. While agreeing with Mersch in finding in the passage a content similar to that of the Pauline image of the body of Christ, he finds deeper parallels in the theology of justification and the mysticism of the formula "in Christ". There is much shrewd and interesting comment in this essay, but it is possible that the author distils rather more than is legitimate from his principal passage. A further study works out the theological implications of the ethics of the epistle to Philemon.

By far the best of the studies technically concerned with New Testament problems is devoted to the relation between the Last Supper and the Passover. Here he has the courage to differ from the reigning theory of Jeremias, that the Last Supper was technically a Passover, and prefers to speak of it as an anticipation of Paschal themes. This conclusion is brilliantly argued and appears to me conclusive. The study on the Vision of History in the New Testament, originally presented at Bossey, is a brilliant piece of work which indicates something of the esssential quality of what the world of scholarship has lost. A special word of praise must go to the translator, Harold Knight, who makes us forget that English was not the language in which these essays were originally given to the world.

H. E. W. TURNER.

CREATIVE EVANGELIST

EDWARD SYDNEY WOODS: 94TH BISHOP OF LICHFIELD. Some appreciations. Collected by JANET STONE. Victor Gollancz. 7s. 6d.

THE late Bishop of Lichfield was described as a fine old cameo. The aptness of the metaphor appears in this short and composite but convincing memoir. The qualities were all there: delicacy, colour and genuineness enhanced by austerity and vigour. Charity mellowed the whole. The effects were happy and joyous living, in which a rare human affection was informed by an extraordinary love of God. Such was the secret of Edward Woods's simplicity which shot through his countless friendships with unusual radiance.

There is a unity about the book because, as one contributor points out, "his long life unfolded itself with a singular consistency." Free from doubts in more than one sceptical generation, the Master of the Temple sees in him "a classic example of the 'once born' Christian." Of Quaker stock, he held a simple evangelical faith which in becoming more expansive lost nothing of its character. He found *Pilgrim's Progress* a trusted guide to life and a *viaticum* in death. "He did not", asserts the Bishop of Middleton, "discuss his dying: Bunyan said all that needed to be said." Another son emphasizes the sustained greatness of his preaching, which is reinforced by the Primate's tribute to the prophetic character of his speaking.

Unity of purpose underlay all his interests—sketching, reading, walking, writing and shooting were of a piece with prayer and devotion. His unique quality was a genius for friendship, as with the late Colonel Wedgwood, M.P., described by his niece as "our gallant anarchist, the opponent of all authority whether of Church or State."

Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, though not deeming Edward dialectically skilled, maintains that he had a better mind than humility would allow him to recognize. Forthrightness in denouncing indiscriminate bombing was an answer to critics who thought him prone to side-step the unpleasant.

Mr. F. A. R. Chapman, a former domestic chaplain, bears out the acuteness of the bishop's mind. That he was a master interpreter of obscure Pauline passages, and used to have "a stiff book on the go", argue modesty in the Bishop of Middleton's contention that he did not attempt to master the larger works of scholarship. He himself felt that Holy Trinity, Cambridge, was given to him to interpret the scholars to the man in the street, a fact not overlooked by the Bishop of Salisbury. The Master of Pembroke College recalls that nowhere took the place of Cambridge in his affections. As bishop he became increasingly trusted by all shades of churchmanship.

Members of the Woods family write intimately yet objectively, even of the late bishop's shortcomings. There is a humorous touch in an inability to boil an egg or make tea. His dislike of modern art and poetry is understandable, but to be out of tune with the Welfare State is more surprising for an avid reader of Dickens. The Archdeacon of Singapore tells of the ease with which the bishop and Mrs. Woods travelled widely. It is not hard to imagine the former's disapproval of doing obeisance to an ikon. A devoted home life, latterly under stress, gratitude for recovery from T.B. in Switzerland, the cause of reunion, and thanksgiving at Pozzuoli for St. Paul's benefactions, echo the Bishop of Stafford's claim that "he was younger in spirit than most of his clergy". Gabrielle Pike's delightful letter shares her father's buoyancy.

The book has its omissions. There is no mention of the bishop's brilliant chairmanship of a diocesan conference. An index would be invaluable for looking up cross-references in a composite work. The editor rightly does not wish to compete with a full-scale Life. But many will, with the Queen Mother who testifies to the bishop's friendship, be glad that the record of his simple goodness is "in such loving and skilful hands."

GILBERT SLATER.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH

THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH IN ANGLICAN THEOLOGY 1547-1603. By H. F. WOODHOUSE. S.P.C.K. 25s.

FEW considering churchmen would deny that the doctrine of the Church has been a major concern in the theological work of the last two decades. This book, by the newly-appointed principal of the Anglican theological college in Vancouver, is offered as "a contribution to the study of a great and often neglected subject, the doctrine of the Church." This contribution is in the limited field of Anglican writing between 1547 and 1603, a period which was, in the words of the author, "a fruitful one for the study of doctrine, since it was a time when men thought deeply and when the subject was very much to the fore." It is not difficult to show, as these pages do, that the Reformation inaugurated a serious and sustained discussion of the doctrine of the Church. So considerable a theologian as St. Thomas gave very little attention to this doctrine, and it was not until the time of Wyclif and Hus that the first systematic treatises on the doctrine of the Church were composed.

The book offers a comprehensive survey of early Anglican teaching on the subject, arranged under such headings as "The Marks of the Church", "The Ministry", "Succession and Ordination", "Church and State", "The Anglican and the non-Roman Churches". As a book of reference it will doubtless prove to be of great value to any students who may attempt a systematic study of the doctrine of the Church in its historical setting. But it must be admitted that the book bears too many signs of its origin as a thesis for a doctorate. The writing is ponderous and unimaginative, in some passages amounting to little more than a catalogue of the opinions of certain writers under review. The conclusion is a valiant attempt to draw out the significance of the laborious discussion of the previous chapters—not without some success, but the relevance of this material to contemporary issues requires a more incisive demonstration than these pages offer.

F. J. TAYLOR.

The Psalmist's Emphasis on God's Kindness

By CECIL S. EMDEN

MANY people whose worship of God is largely based on the Psalms —and, of course, rightly so—may encounter unnecessary difficulties in raising the language of the Psalmist to a Christian plane. These difficulties are chiefly due to unsatisfactory translations; unsatisfactory, that is to say, for the worshipper of today. A revision of many antiquated renderings would enable the text in our Prayer Book to give a much truer picture of the Psalmist's God than it does now. These corrections would only be small in extent, and would in no way impair the literary beauty of the traditional English version.

The feature of God's character which is most inadequately portrayed is His active kindness. It is true that there are some few references to God's " loving-kindness " in our English versions; but there are many more instances where the Hebrew word *chesed* (best translated as " kindness ") is translated " mercy ". " Mercy " is far from being the right word. It is chiefly suggestive of a judge refraining from the imposition of a punishment, whereas " kindness " implies positive help, as well as sympathy; and, in God's exercise of it, it also implies such activities as guidance, care, and protection. There is an outstanding example of this likelihood of misunderstanding in the verse which runs: " But when I said, my foot hath slipt: thy mercy, O Lord, held me up " (94. 18). The substitution of "kindness" for "mercy" is not only better translation but better sense.

In several passages in our Prayer Book version, as well as in other books of the Old Testament, " truth " is mentioned as an attribute of God in connection with " mercy ", i.e. kindness. For instance, " He hath remembered his mercy [kindness] and truth . . ." 98. 4). Instead of " truth " the Hebrew word should at the present day be translated " faithfulness ". The frequent conjunction of the ideas of kindness and faithfulness suggests that much importance is to be attached to the representation of God's kindness as unfailing and constant. This is not a case of mistranslation. Three or four hundred years ago " truth " could mean loyalty, constancy, and fidelity. But not so today. This is one of a number of occasions where archaic phrases in the English versions of the Psalms, though picturesque, are misleading. They should now have their modern equivalents substituted for them.

Another instance of the same kind is the very frequent use of the word " fear ", where the proper rendering in modern language is " reverence ", used either as a substantive or a verb. The meaning of the word may sometimes be intensified into the notion of standing in awe. There are naturally numerous Christians who are puzzled by such passages as " The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom " (111. 10). To those unversed in the history of our language these words seem inconsistent with, say, the picture of the loving-kindness of God comprised in the well-known twenty-third Psalm. Here again, it is not a matter of mistranslation. About three or four hundred years ago " fear " could mean " reverence "; and the word was quite correctly employed by the translators of that period.

Much is said in the Psalms about God's " goodness ". Sometimes " goodness " is used to translate the Hebrew word *chesed* above-mentioned. In these instances, it would be better to be uniform and to use the word " kindness ". In other instances, where a different Hebrew word is used, " goodness ", though a proper translation, implies helpfulness.

This positive goodness of God frequently underlies the expression " the Name of the Lord ", " thy Name ", and so on. This fact is largely overlooked by commentators on the Psalms, who as a rule explain this typical piece of oriental indirectness as either a periphrasis for " God ", or as meaning " God in his character as revealed to men ". In fact, if the contexts are studied, it will be found that, in most of the instances in which " Name " comprehends character, the reference is not a general one but is concerned with His kindness. For example: " But deal thou with me, O Lord God, according to thy Name: for sweet is thy mercy " [i.e. for thy kindness is good] (109. 20).

Passages in the Psalms can often be advantageously compared so as to help interpretation. In this way the indeterminate expression " Name " can in doubtful contexts be shewn to refer to God's kindness. God's help is often called on " for thy mercy's kindness] sake; and it is also invoked in almost similar terms " for thy Name's sake ".

This interpretation of " Name " as " God in his kindness " or " God's kindness " can be supported from elsewhere in the Old Testament. " And he [God] said, I will make all my goodness pass before thee, and will proclaim the name of the Lord before thee; . . ." (Exod. 33. 19). It is, in fact, mistaken to suggest that " Name ", when used as a token expression for God's character, usually refers, as some experts seem to imply, chiefly to His power, eternity and holiness. God's kindness is far more often emphasized by the Psalmist.

There are other features in the Psalmist's portrayal of God's kindness which are more patent. These reinforce the material for the picture which has been briefly indicated in preceding paragraphs. God's care and protection are constantly acknowledged in convincing terms. One particular feature is worth special attention, His nearness to those who know their need of Him. Not only is God " nigh unto them that are of a contrite heart " (34. 18), but He is " nigh unto all them that call upon him " (145. 18). All the passages in which mention is made of God's nearness to those who trust in Him can be advantageously studied together. These and many other passages can demonstrate to us that it is no aloof, remote God of whom the Psalmist sang.

The information about God's kindness which is available in the Psalms is worth careful investigation as coming from those who knew God intimately, and who were habitually in close converse with Him. Their profound experience of communion with God provides an admirable basis for our interpretation of Psalms in the terms of Christian fulfilment.

Existentialism and the New Testament

By E. L. ALLEN

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THE recognition of Biblical Theology as a discipline distinct from Systematic Theology was the work of eighteenth century rationalism, when it broke with the naive identification of the teaching of one's own communion with the content of Scripture Historical considerations made inevitable the division into Old Testament and New Testament theologies, and the latter in turn was broken down into a number of sections, the most important being those devoted to the Synoptic Gospels, the teaching of Paul and the Johannine literature. In the nineteenth century a series of text-books appeared and three of them won international reputation, that of H. J. Holtzmann, the liberal, and those of Bernhard Weiss and Paul Feine, with their differing degrees of conservatism. And now the latest of such studies has been completed, in Rudolf Bultmann's *Theologie des Neuen Testaments,* though only the first half is yet available in English. So it is possible to see how the principles of interpretation, with which his name has been associated since he called for the demythologizing of the New Testament, are applied.

In the concluding section of the work he tells us how he envisaged his task. There are, he says, two standpoints from which the New Testament may be approached, that of history and that of faith. The concern of the former will be the recovery of the past, the reconstruction of primitive Christianity in its various types on the basis of its documentary remains. The concern of the latter will be with the significance of those documents for the spiritual life of to-day. Of course, neither approach will be able to dispense with the other, but it is important which of them has priority. He acknowledges that for him historical study is subservient to the interpretation of the New Testament as a book with a message for to-day. In other words, his approach to it is existential rather than academic. And here we are reminded at once of his contention that the task of the interpreter is to show how the myths of the

New Testament are in their intention existential, concerned with our relation to God in the present.

Bultmann's study of New Testament theology follows the pattern usually accepted in German works on the subject. He interpolates between the teaching of Jesus and that of Paul a study of the *kerygma* of the Primitive Church and another, nearly four times its length, of the Hellenistic Church. The Pauline and Johannine theologies are followed by an investigation of the remaining literature, in conjunction with the Apostolic Fathers, as showing how the transition was made to the organized Church of later history. One is aware as one reads of three factors that co-operate to produce the final result. They are historical scepticism, the Lutheran principle of justification by faith, and an existential philosophy derived from Heidegger. Historical scepticism about the Gospels reinforces the Lutheran appeal to the Christ of the Pauline Epistles and the Fourth Gospel, and existential philosophy provides a language in which the Pauline and Johannine messages can be restated.

In what follows, I propose to trace briefly the influence of these three factors and to consider how far they serve to reproduce the New Testament message and how far they tend to distort it. I begin with *the Lutheran principle of justification by faith.* The whole weight of Bultmann's exposition is borne by the Word or *kerygma* on the one hand and faith on the other. The Jesus who is significant for the Christian faith is not the Jesus who taught in Galilee and died on the Cross, but the Jesus who is preached and offered to faith. For Paul explicitly and for the Primitive Church in Jerusalem already implicitly, the death and resurrection of Jesus were "the eschatological event", the decisive irruption of God into the world for us men and our salvation. As such, they are not to be apprehended by any process of historical investigation, whether that has for its object the personality of Jesus or the evidence for the empty tomb, but solely by the submission of faith to what it recognizes humbly and joyfully to be from God. The saving action of God is actually present in the Word proclaimed by the Church and received in faith.

This means, of course, that Paul and, to a slightly less extent, John are taken as the standard by which everything in the New Testament is judged. This comes out particularly in the third part of the book, where the later books of the New Testament and the writings of the Apostolic Fathers are graded according as they do or do not reproduce the Pauline-Johannine understanding of the gospel. The Synoptic Gospels, too, are demoted from the position they have long occupied in the veneration of the Church. Bultmann seems to have no appreciation of the possibility that the early days of Christianity were so vital and so inspired that the common faith found expression in a variety of forms, so that most of the major divisions within the Church since can appeal with some measure of justification to the New Testament.

I have indicated already that the Synoptic Gospels do not fare particularly well at the hands of our author. In his *Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition* (1921) he had reduced the historical element in the Gospels to the barest minimum and, five years later, in his *Jesus* (Eng. tr., *Jesus and the Word*) he had outlined a portrait of Jesus that enters unchanged into the present work. It is markedly different from the one that has been handed down across the centuries in the worship and faith of the Church. The Jesus he describes is the prophet of the imminent Kingdom of God, summoning men to immediate and life-transforming decision. As such, He is Himself the supreme "sign of the time". He is also the rabbi who expounds God's law as a total and unconditional demand that puts an end to Jewish legalism. So He confronts the individual with an inescapable God, for His message is to the individual and not, as with the prophets, to the nation as a whole.

But He did not think of Himself as Messiah. The Temptation story is legend. So, to a less extent, is that of the entry into Jerusalem. "The passion-narrative is also to a considerable degree overspread with legend". The suffering Son of man is the creation of the Church's faith. Few scholars have been found to follow Bultmann in his elimination of so much from the Gospel record. But what I have called his *historical scepticism* fits in admirably both with his Lutheranism and with his existentialism. With his Lutheranism, because it takes away from the preached Word, or *kerygma,* every possible support, so that its authority resides purely in itself, and the faith that accepts it is no kind of human achievement, whether intellectual or moral, but self-abandonment to God. And with his existentialism, because Jesus becomes for him, as it were, an incarnate crisis, a stark summons to decision.

I come therefore to the part played by *existentialist philosophy* in his interpretation of the New Testament. Perhaps one great value of this is that it enables him to do justice to an element in the New Testament that has often presented great difficulty, its eschatology. For, whereas other philosophies have stressed the past and the present, the time-dimension to which existentialism attaches importance is the future. Man is freedom moving forward into an unknown to which he is called to give shape, he is able to transmute and redeem the past by the use to which he puts it in the future. And, as Bultmann has pointed out in his *Das Urchristentum,* the Biblical message of the living God and His coming Kingdom can be stated in similar terms, inasmuch as it makes man's destiny an affair of a future over which God rules. God is related to man as the future to the present, challenging it. judging it, requiring instant decision from it.

Even those who are critical of Bultmann's cursory treatment of the Gospels (of his 591 pages only 33 are given to the ministry and teaching of Jesus!) will allow that his exposition of Paul is often powerful and convincing. His point of view throughout is anthropological. Paul "deals with God not as He is in Himself but only with God as He is significant for man, for man's responsibility and man's salvation. . . . Every assertion about God is simultaneously an assertion about man and *vice versa*". Hence he describes the Pauline theology under the two heads: "Man prior to the revelation of faith" and "Man under faith". The account of what Paul means by such terms as "body", "flesh", "world", etc., can be most illuminating, and readers of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* will not fail to note the influence of that book. Faith for Paul is a surrender of the self to God by which the self is transformed in all its relations. Yet it is not lifted out of its struggles. Rather does the believer live between "no longer" and "not yet". All things have become new for him, so that he is no longer what he was. Yet he is not yet what he is meant by God's grace to be.

Critics of Bultmann have usually been New Testament scholars not sufficiently at home in existentialist philosophy to do justice to this element in his thinking. On the other hand, it is precisely at this point that the criticism of his work by Karl Jaspers in the June 1953 number of *Schweizerische Theologische Umschau* is so valuable. He has in mind, of course, the earlier essay on demythologizing and not the just completed *Theologie des Neuen Testaments.* He seems to have made the mistake some others have made, of supposing that Bultmann proposes to dispense with the rich imagery and symbolism of the New Testament in favour of a philosophical translation, and rightly protests against this. But Bultmann wishes to retain the New Testament symbolism as the indispensable stimulus to faith and source of insight, while translating it into language intelligible to the mind of to-day. One would have thought that this is precisely what Jaspers himself has advocated more than once.

But he is surely right when he points out that something of the utmost value is missing from Bultmann's exposition. Whereas the existentialism of Heidegger, in spite of his constant disavowal of any ethical or didactic purpose, does again and again vibrate with a human experience of dread, guilt, and all the tragedy of life in this world, there is something strangely suppressed and insensitive about Bultmann. His exposition of what Paul means by "flesh" may be admirable, but he fails entirely to convey to us the devotion of Paul for his Lord. We get the ideas of the great Apostle, but not his missionary passion. Now Bultmann must expect to be judged by his avowed aim. He has set out to be existential, to speak from the standpoint of faith. He has not done so, he has given us history instead.

What has gone wrong? Here again Jaspers's criticism is sound. There are two types of existentialism, and the attempt has been made to distinguish between them in spelling. The one is concerned to describe scientifically and objectively the human situation, in terms first of inauthentic existence and then of authentic, while repudiating any attempt to persuade the reader to pass from one to the other. The second type is, as Jaspers calls it, an "appeal from freedom to freedom", it casts light on what the self is in order to evoke in it unrealized potentialities, to bring it into living relation with God and other selves. What Bultmann has done is to interpret the New Testament by an existentialist system instead of with an existentialist attitude. The one gives us God and man, the other God and—myself.

The theologian must enter so deeply into the world of the New Testament that it comes home to him in challenge and promise, so that he knows for himself what sin and redemption, the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit mean, and can then interpret it from within and in the language of his own day. He will not be bound to any philosophy; but he will be thinking existentially even when he prefers some terminology that is not existentialist. He will not preach, since his work will be done under academic restraints. Yet there is a limit to academic restraints, and that limit comes when they would prevent a scholar from doing justice to his subject. At this point, as some of his most ardent disciples grant, Bultmann has failed. He has allowed the believer in him to be kept too much in check by the scholar.

The Richness of the Divine Liturgy of the Eucharist

By AUSTIN OAKLEY

IT is clear from many converging lines of thought and practice that the Holy Mysteries of the Eucharist are always richer in content than any one title or even all the titles that have been given to them in both the East and the West throughout the life of the Church from the beginning. A conspectus makes it plain that the particular emphasis of an age or of a formulated body of doctrine, although tending to be exclusive or even satisfying at the time is only a partial aspect of a whole that is infinitely rich, since it is concerned with, involves, a divine act. This richness warrants us in believing that much evolution in definition, as well as what may be called accommodation still awaits us.

It is an interesting and instructive fact that the East has had little or no Eucharistic controversy. Behind what we now call Orthodox belief and practice lies an unquestioned immemorial tradition that has remained unchanged in its central insistence on the truth that the *quando* and *quomodo* is unknowable. It is permissible to say that both with reference to the Presence of the Lord in the Eucharist (παρουσία) and the overshadowing and descent of the Holy Spirit (ἐπίκλησις), the first conception has never been tied down to any specific act or words, while the Epiklesis of the Spirit has only been definitely attached to a formula when the Orthodox were challenged by the Latins to designate a form of words that called down the Spirit upon the worshippers and the Prepared Gifts. It has as yet been impossible to separate out the doctrinal emphasis that led St Ambrose (and to a certain extent St Augustine) to bring into general currency in the West the teaching that the repetition of the Dominical words of Institution effected or were vitally necessary to the consecration of the Holy Gifts. This doctrine has had and still has a very definite place in Western eucharistic dogma, but it should be noted that the mediaeval and Tridentine definitions on this matter have moved far from the original climate of St Ambrose and the sense of the Presence of Christ, of the Lord Who is at Hand, of the anticipation of the Second Advent, which was implicit in fourth century thought and belief. This idiosyncrasy was we know zealously disseminated in the West from the fourth century onwards. It can hardly have been distinctive of the rest of Italy, unless our ideas of what the Ambrosian and Mozarabic rites signify in this connection are to be modified considerably. We do know that the ousting of local rites in the West largely through the influence of the Carolingian empire led to the triumph of the Roman rite over the large family to which the Ambrosian, Gallican, Mozarabic and Celtic Rites belong.

It is important, however, to stress at this point a general theological consideration. If we are justified in trusting to the consistent tradition of Christendom, perpetuated and expressed quite clearly even as late as the 17th Century by the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem Nectarios in the eucharistic and sacramental activities that led to the Synods of Jassy and Jerusalem, in the seventies of that century, the whole conception of Epiklesis is not, as generally thought, restricted to the eucharist, but to every sacrament of the Church. In Nectarios's Homologia, he makes the answer to "What is a Mystery?" in the following terms: "A Sacrament is a rite which under a specific visible sign is the cause of, and brings to the soul of the believing person, the invisible grace of God . . . And to the question, " How many things (πόσα) are necessary (πράγματα) for a Mystery?" the answer is, "Three: suitable matter, such as water in baptism, bread and wine in the eucharist, oil and those others congrous to the particular sacrament. Secondly, a priest lawfully ordained, or a bishop. Thirdly, the invocation (ἐπίκλησις) of the Holy Spirit and the formula of the words by which the priest consecrates the Mystery in the power of the Holy Spirit, with avowed intention to consecrate it."

Here is a very clear and exactly worded dogmatic statement which puts the Invocation of the Holy Spirit in its rightful place as essential to every sacrament. It might be useful to us in these modern times when the sacraments of baptism and confirmation are being so urgently discussed in Anglican circles, to give it consideration.

With special regard to the Eucharist, the evidence from primitive and patristic writers makes it most difficult to accept the theory that the Invocation of the Holy Spirit was of comparatively late growth. That it evolved in a particular form is certainly true, that there was always a formal invocation to God to send His Spirit upon the Gifts is also almost certainly untrue and unhistoric. One would not for instance expect such a clear dogmatic statement in a liturgy of the Church before the theological development with reference to the divinity of the Third Person of the Divine Trinity was clarified. There was undoubtedly a period during which the Logos and Spirit was almost interchangeable—and under this heading we must bring Justin Martyr and even Serapion, although this latter was clearly using material of considerable antiquity in reference to his own day and belief. The best manuscript of the anaphora of Hippolytus is a clear witness for the Invocation. Even St Ambrose himself knows of an "Ascending Epiklesis", still present in the Roman Canon. The witness during the great Fourth Century is abundant.

In the East again it may be said, with a due regard for its eucharistic history, that it is only after the enforced contact of Greeks and Latins in the Latin Empire of Constantinople (in which we may include what happened also in the island of Cyprus under Latin rule) that the Orthodox found it necessary, or were unconsciously led to formulate a clear-cut definition of what is technically known as the Epiklesis of the Holy Spirit, the calling down of the Holy Spirit to consecrate the Prepared Gifts. We may justifiably suppose that under the pressure of (for example) the Barlaam and Palamite controversy of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Orthodox when pressed to define *moment* of consecration of a similar kind to the Dominical Words, indicated the prayer of Epiklesis and the use in it of the word μεταβαλών. But as has been already suggested the whole tenour of Orthodox eucharistic tradition was strongly opposed to the limiting of the divine Act of the Eucharist to a verbal "*quando*". Indeed the Western mediaeval doctrine of a Real Presence of Our Lord becoming effectually adorable at the time of and subsequent to a consecration effected by the Dominical Words, has always been foreign to Orthodox modes of thought, and it is wiser to banish these categories and implications of the "Real Presence" if we are to enter into the spirit of Orthodox (and indeed patristic) eucharistic theology and practice.

Although this is by no means the whole story, it may be useful at this point to refer to a certain amount of indirect and somewhat startling light thrown upon this problem in the sixth and early seventh centuries, a period full of unsolved questions for the student of Liturgy, and actually the period when the typical Orthodox rite of St. John Chrysostom was taking the form familiar to us today. In the latter half of the sixth century and the beginning of the seventh was compiled and written by John Moschus, a collection of something over 200 anecdotes of the lives of hermits and ascetics, mainly but not exclusively in the lavras frequented by them between Jerusalem and Bethlehem and Jericho.[1] This collection was made from personal accounts by John Moschus himself, with the help of his life-long friend Sophronius the Learned, afterwards Patriarch of Jerusalem. The interest for liturgy in these anecdotes is that the references to belief and practice are spontaneous and unstudied, and with no thought of controversy.

How far liturgical practice (in Rome itself for instance) is described in such terms as a Palestinian hermit would uncritically use, is a debateable question: while to what period some of the anecdotes told belong is sometimes not clear. Finally, the exact equivalent of the Greek words employed to describe liturgical acts is not always quite consistent. With these provisos the evidence is fairly straightforward.

I. Our first instance[2] is a Syrian one, in which a number of herd-boys decide to "play at Church", but in a very thorough manner. They therefore proceed to "do the synaxis and offer the prosphora", that is to reproduce as closely as they can the whole action of the Liturgy as in Church. One acts as a priest and two others as deacons. As they are familiar with the words of the anaphora, the leader repeats them and performs the appropriate gestures, and completes the sacrifice. The Holy Spirit comes down in fire and consumes the bread and wine, the vessels and the very rock upon which they lay, sparing however the children. The bishop is informed, attests the results of the miracle, and in the forthright way of the times has a monastery built on the spot and orders the boys involved to become its first inhabitants.

II. The second[3] is from Cilicia, where a holy monk is the subject of a complaint by the congregation of lay people he serves for completing the Holy Liturgy at different and often late hours. His explanation to the bishop is "I sit down near the place of sacrifice, and until I perceive the Holy Spirit throwing His shadow. (*ἐπισκιάζειν*) the place of sacrifice (*θυσιαστήριον*), I do not begin the synaxis. Whenever I perceive the regular visit (*ἐπιφοίτησις*) of the Holy Spirit. I complete the Liturgy." The holy monk was permitted to continue his pious irregularity.

III. A third striking instance[4] is recounted in Rome itself, which gives rise to a host of liturgical queries, with which, for the most part we are not here directly concerned. A holy bishop of a small town near Rome called Romilla was reported to the Pope Agapetos "for eating out of a consecrated paten (*δίσκος*)" and imprisoned in Rome. Just before the dawn of Sunday, the Pope was warned in a dream that neither he nor anyone appointed by him was to offer the Sacrifice on the coming Lord's Day, but only the bishop of Romilla, then lying in prison. The bishop was fetched from prison and questioned, with the result that he celebrated the Sacrifice, the Pope standing by with the deacons. Four times the celebrant began the anaphora, and four times he failed to complete it. On being questioned by the Pope on the matter, he stated that it was because he had not seen, as he was wont to do, the coming of the Holy Spirit. But if a certain deacon (whom he designated) could be ordered to withdraw, he would be able to complete the Sacrifice. This was done, whereupon both he and the Pope perceived the coming of the Holy Spirit, and they and the whole assembly of the clergy were covered over for three hours by the great veil which hung over the altar.

These three instances, whatever degree of historical accuracy they may possess, reveal a very definite way of regarding the Eucharist, and one that is consistent throughout the "Spiritual Meadow". The characteristics are these: The central point of worship, the necessary condition for the completion (*ἐπιτέλησις*) of the Divine Liturgy is the acceptance of the Offerings by the descent of the Spirit. It is, however, noticeable in II and III that there is a preliminary "overshadowing" (*ἐπισκιάζειν*) that is awaited (whether physically or spiritually discerned is not made entirely clear), which is in turn the signal for proceeding with the anaphora, and the promise of the completing and acceptance of the Sacrifice by the descent of the Spirit. This latter is clearly regarded as visible as light or fire. Every Eucharist is then a "descent of the Dove", while in I that descent is of a catastrophic character clearly linked up with the accepted sacrifices of the Old Testament.[5]

Is there a possible meeting-point for Latin and Orthodox on this matter? It is clear that eight hundred years after the days of John Moschus, Nicholas Cabasilas seems to have thought so. This brilliant lay theologian of Thessalonika, the nephew of Archbishop Nicholas Cabasilas of Thessalonika wrote an explanation of the Divine Liturgy that rightly became classical and was much drawn on at the Council of Florence-Ferrara in the 15th century. He clearly implies that the application (*ἐφαρμόζειν*) of the divine words of our Lord when He consecrated the Eucharist (*ἐυχαριστίαν ἡγίασε*) is necessary to the right understanding of the prayer of Epiklesis so that the celebrant "applies those divine words of His only-begotten Son our Saviour to the prepared Gifts, that they may be changed by the reception of the all-holy and all-powerful Spirit".[6]

This accommodation was undoubtedly accepted by the Council of Florence, and possibly lies today at the root of those pronouncements of the Holy See that permit and indeed order the use in the Roman Communion of the Eastern Rites. It is justifiably eirenic.

To return again then to a preliminary observation, the Eucharist in two thousand years has passed through many aspects of emphasis and interpretation, none of which can exhaust the overflowing richness of the Divine Act, none of which is fully explanatory or exhaustive of a Mystery that is in its mode unknowable, because it is God Himself who energises that Mystery. As far as one can see, the only blunder that might be committed is for the Church as a whole to embark upon an infallible *definition* of the Eucharist, until such time as the richness of the whole Church is gathered in Unity.

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[1] Migne, P. G., Vol. 87, 2851-3116; also in translation (French) R. P. Rouet de Journel S.J. "Le Pré Spirituel" Sources chrétiennes. Edition du Cerf. Paris.

[2] Migne, P. G., Vol. 87, No. 196.

[3] Op. cit. No. 110.

[4] Migne, P. G., Vol. 87, 150.

[5] cf. Judges vi, 21, 22; xiii, 19, f20, but especially I Kings xviii, 38.

[6] For actual wording see Migne, P. G., 150, 426 b.c.d.

Robert Herrick: 1591-1674

By BASIL WILLEY

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[AS a memorial to James Rumsey (1743-1792), American pioneer in steam navigation, who died in London from an apoplectic seizure while attending a committee of the Society of Arts at the Adelphi, and was buried in the churchyard of St. Margaret's, Westminster, on Christmas Eve, 1792, citizens of West Virginia, on the initiative of Miss Rachel Snyder of Shepherdstown, W. Va., have with great generosity restored one of the lost treasures of St. Margaret's, an epitaph by Robert Herrick for his niece, Elizabeth Herrick (1619-1630), daughter of his brother William. This epitaph, formerly on a mural tablet in the north aisle of the church, disappeared during the eighteenth century. It is, however, recorded in the 1633 edition of Stow's *Survey of London* (p. 812). and was first brought to the attention of the present Rector of St. Margaret's by Dr. R. G. Howarth, Reader in English Literature at the University of Sydney. It is of particular interest because it differs slightly from, and is distinctly superior to, the version printed in 1648 in Herrick's *Hesperides* ("*Upon his kinswoman Mistris* Elizabeth Herrick": *Poetical Works*, ed. F. W. Moorman. 1915, p. 145). The inscription on the James Rumsey Memorial Tablet is as follows:

In memory of the late deceased Virgin
Mistris Elizabeth Hereicke

Sweet Virgin
that I doe not set
Thy Grave-verse up
in mournful Jet
Or dapl'd Marble
let thy shade
Not wrathful seeme,
or fright the maid,
Who hither at her
weeping howres,
Shall come to strew
thy earth with flowres:
No, know blest soule,
when there's not one
Remainder left
of brasse or stone,
Thy living Epitaph
shall be
Though lost in them
yet found in me:
Deare, in thy bed
of Roses then,
Till this world shall
dissolve (as men)
Sleepe, while we hide thee
from the light,
Drawing thy Curtains round
—Good night.

This Epitaph by Robert Herrick, formerly on a mural tablet in the middle of the north aisle of this church, was restored in memory of

JAMES RUMSEY

whom the State of West Virginia honours as the inventor of the Steamboat, which he demonstrated privately to George Washington in 1784 and publicly on the Potomac River at Shepherdstown, W. Va., 3rd December, 1787. Born of English parents in Cecil County, Maryland, in 1743, he died while lecturing on the principles of steam navigation to English scientists in London, and was buried in St. Margaret's Churchyard, 24th December, 1792.

The tablet is in the middle of the south aisle of St. Margaret's church, and was unveiled on Wednesday, May 18th, 1955, by the Second Sea Lord (Admiral The Hon. Sir Guy H. E. Russell, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O.) in the presence of His Excellency the American Ambassador (The Hon. Winthrop W. Aldrich), when Professor Basil Willey delivered the following address.]

"Heterogeneous ideas yoked by violence together"—so Dr. Johnson described the conceits of some of Herrick's poetic contemporaries, and as such we might at first sight regard to-day's linking of Herrick with James Rumsey: the sweet lyrist of rosebuds and daffodils with the inventor of the steam-boat. Herrick's life was divided almost equally between London and Devonshire, and he was one of the least maritime of English poets. The only time he ever went to sea was when he accompanied the Duke of Buckingham, as his Chaplain, on the ill-starred expedition to the Isle of Rhé in 1627. His references to the sea suggest that he felt towards it the proper respect of the land-lubber, as when in the poem *His Sailing from Julia,* he begs her to pray that when he has gone "into that watery desolation" his "wing'd ship may meet no remora". His own prayer, probably on the same occasion, is to Neptune, the "great blue ruler of the seas", and it is a prayer for a safe voyage and a speedy return, accompanied by the promise of a tunny-fish as a thank-offering. James Rumsey's steam-boat would undoubtedly have appealed to him as much (though for different reasons) as it did to George Washington. Did he not write, in words paraphrased indeed from Horace, but almost applicable to Rumsey—

> "A heart thrice wall'd with Oke, and Brasse, that man
> Had, first durst plow the Ocean"?

And yet this incongruity is hardly greater than that of Herrick's own life, whereby this jeweller's apprentice, this associate of Ben Jonson in the London taverns—The Sun, The Dog, The Triple Tun—was transformed into a parson and sent off to a Devonshire parish almost as remote from town (as things were then) as America itself. To Herrick, the English Catullus or Anacreon, the worshipper of sack and of Julia, Anthea, Corinna and a score of other mistresses, the incumbency of Dean Prior seemed at times a banishment as harsh as that of Ovid at Tomi. Of his *Discontets in Devon* he wrote feelingly, and many times:

> "More discontents I never had
>   Since I was born, then here;
> Where I have been, and still am sad,
>   In this dull *Devon-shire*:"

or:

> "Search worlds of Ice; and rather there
> Dwell, then in lothed *Devonshire*"
>   (*To his Household gods*).

He hated Dean Bourn, "a rude River in Devon by which sometimes he lived": hated it for its "warty incivility" and "rockie bottome"; and his parishioners, too, seemed to him a "rockie generation"—

> "A people currish; churlish as the seas;
> And rude (almost) as rudest Salvages."

There is a tradition that he once threw a sermon at his congregation in rage at their inattention.

It happened that only a short while ago I found myself—quite by chance, but with my thoughts busy with Herrick and to-day's ceremony—passing on a weekday through Dean Prior itself, on the road between Buckfastleigh and Ivybridge. The "golden pomp" of May was spread over the Devon landscape; apple trees were in blossom, and though the daffodils had hasted away there were still primroses in the hedges. I broke my journey and mused awhile in the Church and Churchyard. No memorial marks the place of his interment in the Churchyard, and almost the only visible signs of his former presence are his epitaph on the tomb of Sir Edward Giles, Squire of Dean Court and Herrick's good friend and a small wooden tablet beneath the tower-arch, bearing his lines *Upon Prew his Maid*:

"In this little Urne is laid
Prewdence Baldwin (once my maid)
From whose happy spark here let
Spring the purple violet."

I thought of William Marshall's grotesque engraving of Herrick's bust upon a pedestal (the frontispiece to his poems); the Pegasus upreared upon a rock, and the winged Cupids dancing in a ring, while two others scatter wreaths and flowers from the air upon the poet's very un-clerical head—with its tousled hair, Roman nose and bull-neck. I was finding it hard to picture him in this setting, except as some genial faun or satyr, when, with a start, I noticed what might have been his ghost. There, sitting in the stalls, all alone, was the Vicar, apparently saying Evensong to himself in default of a congregation. His solitary presence was truly affecting, and (though he looked properly clerical) he seemed an apt symbol of Herrick's own rustic isolation.

But surely, you will say, Herrick must have loved the beautiful Devonshire countryside? Could any poet—least of all one who sings

". . . of *Brooks*, of *Blossomes*, *Birds*, and *Bowers*:
Of *April*, *May*, of *June*, and *July*-Flowers.
. . . of *May-poles*, *Hock-carts*, *Wassails*, *Wakes*,
. . . How *Roses* first came *Red*, and *Lillies White*,—"

could *he* merely have moped and pined all those years in the "lothed West"? Assuredly not. Many of the disgruntled poems were written at the time of his ejection by the Puritans (1647), and reflect the mood of that unhappy crisis and his rapture at the prospect of returning to his "beloved Westminster". During the sixteen years (1629-1647) of his first stay at Dean Prior, and the later twelve (1662-1674) from his restoration to his death, he adjusted himself happily enough to rural ways, picturing his Vicarage as a Sabine Farm, adopting Horatian sentiments about frugality and contentment, and steeping himself so thoroughly in the congenial paganism of the peasants that his poems are a perfect treasury of folk-lore and folk-ritual from Mayday to Twelfth Night and Candlemas. Against his discontented verses we must set, not only all this, but poems like *His Content in the Country*:

We blesse our Fortunes, when we see
Our own beloved privacie:
And like our living, where w'are known
To very few, or else to none.

His Grange, or private wealth:

Where care
None is, slight things do lightly please.

and *Thanksgiving to God for his House*:

Where Thou my chamber for to ward
Hast set a Guard
Of harmlesse thoughts, to watch and keep
Me, while I sleep.

. . . .

Like as my Parlour, so my Hall
And Kitchin's small:
A little Butterie, and therein
A little Byn,
Which keeps my little loafe of Bread
Upchip't, unflead:
Some brittle sticks of Thorne or Briar
Make me a fire
Close by whose living coale I sit,
And glow like it.
Lord, I confesse too, when I dine
The Pulse is Thine,
And all those other Bits, that bee
There plac'd by Thee;
The Worts, the Purslain, and the Messe
Of Water-cresse,
Which of Thy kindness Thou has sent;
And my content
Makes those, and my beloved Beet,
To be more sweet.

But though no poet has mentioned flowers more often than Herrick, we must not think of him as a Nature-poet in any accepted modern sense. His daffodils, roses, lilies, violets and primroses have more to do with the conventions of love poetry or with the emblem-books of the time, than with any joy in natura things for their own sake or any imaginative reading of their essence. We can see this by comparing his exquisite poem *T Daffodils,*

"Faire Daffadills, we weep to see
You haste away so soon:"

with Wordsworth's equally well-known daffodil poem. Herrick does not show us the daffodils themselves; to him they are simply emblems—as any other thing of ephemeral beauty might be—o the transitoriness of human life.

We have short time to stay, as you,
We have as short a Spring;
As quick a growth to meet Decay,
As you, or any thing.
We die,
As your hours doe, and drie
Away,
Like to the Summers raine;
Or as the pearles of Morning dew
Ne'er to be found againe.

Wordsworth places us firmly at a particular spot, "beside the lake, beneath the trees", and shows us his host of golden daffodils "fluttering and dancing in the breeze". The sight of them is a challenge and a revelation; he accepts it as a message from outside the circle of his own thoughts, and his only moral reflection is that the joy of it remains to cheer him when a vacant or a pensive mood returns. This is not to disparage Herrick, but merely to mark a difference. The gem-like precision and the crystalline purity of Herrick's poem are as far beyond Wordsworth's scope as Wordsworth's visionary profundity is beyond Herrick's. Herrick's favourite themes are love and wine, pagan joy and pagan sadness; he has no complexities and no "metaphysical" subtleties. Perhaps that is the reason why, during the recent revival of interest in Donne and his school, Herrick has attracted no critical attention. His best lyrics, however, are like diamonds, exquisitely cut and set, and have the same enduring quality.

The seventeenth century was an age of poetical parsons, and Herrick, in virtue of his *Noble Numbers,* must be counted one of them. But unlike Donne, Herbert, Vaughan, Crashaw, Traherne or Bishop King, he is not to be remembered as a writer of religious poetry. Indeed he was probably not what we should call a religious man; not, though a priest, what we mean by a Christian. When he took Holy Orders he bade farewell to the Muse of his "wild, unhallowed times", but he went on writing secular verses just the same. There is reason to believe that he was a good, kindly man, innocent and childlike at heart; and we may take his own word that

". . . the threshold of my doore
Is worn by'th poore,
Who thither come, and freely get
Good words, or meat."

His religious verses often breathe contentment, thankfulness, trus and stoical resignation; but of contrition, the fear of God, or an of the intenser phases of spiritual experience, they show hardly a trace. He was no saint, but neither does he seem particularl aware of being a sinner. It was as an artist that his conscienc was most exacting, and here no man was ever more scrupulous— as the perfection of his craftsmanship, and the proofs we have o his careful refining and polishing, amply show. In the poem *His request to Julia* he adjures her thus:

> "*Julia*, if I chance to die
> Ere I print my Poetry:
> I most humbly thee desire
> To commit it to the fire:
> Better 'twere my Book were dead
> Then to live not perfected."

A good example of his care in revision is to be found in one o his best poems. *To* Anthea, *who may command him any thing*:

> "Bid me to live, and I will live
>   Thy Protestant to be:"

—this originally read "Thy votary to be". Many poets would have been content with "votary", which is a good enough word for a devout, dedicated servant, whether of saint or mistress. But Herrick probably felt it to be too conventional, and hit upon "Protestant" instead, a word which brings the whole thing to life— keeping the religious implication but adding a spice of topical vivacity and the note of valiant championship of a good cause.

Herrick was just the sort of parson who *would* be ejected by the Puritans, and perhaps that may nowadays seem a point in his favour. As we have seen from the extract I quoted from his *Thanksgiving to God for his House*, the quality of his religious sentiment was not exalted, but it was none the less genuine. He was one of those who take God so much for granted that they can be homely and familiar with Him without irreverence. And what a relief this sometimes is from the nagging conscience and the doubting mind! Herrick was the true forerunner of George Eliot's Mr. Irwine in *Adam Bede*, who, as you will remember, "was like a good meal o' victual, you were the better for him without thinking on it", whereas his more evangelical successor "was like a dose o' physic, he gripped you and worreted you, and after all he left you much the same".

Herrick loved Westminster, and lived here for a time during his enforced but not unwelcome absence from Dean Prior. Unlike his greater contemporary John Milton (and how unlike Milton he was in every way!), he was never a parishioner of St. Margaret's—as Milton was from 1651-1660, the very time of Herrick's residence here. To American generosity this great Church owes the Milton window at the western end of the north aisle, and to American generosity again, coupled with the zeal and piety of the present Rector, it owes the restoration of this epitaph which has just been unveiled. Herrick's own "living epitaph" is his book, but his gentle shade, which might grieve that at Dean Prior

"there's not one
Remainder left of brasse or stone"

to mark his grave, will surely be appeased by the reappearance, in the Westminster he loved better than Devon, of these charming lines, lost from this Church for two hundred years.

Daniel Scargill. "A Penitent 'Hobbist'."

By C. L. S. LINNELL

AT a very inopportune moment, in the early years of the Restoration when anything that hinted at the political ideas of the Commonwealth was anathema, Mr Daniel Scargill, Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, elected to be a disciple of "Mr Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury". He was suspended from his degree and expelled from the University on 12th March, 1668/9. At first he affirmed that he "gloried to be an Hobbist and an Atheist" but later he thought better of it, and, after making a solemn recantation from the pulpit of Great St. Mary's, he was restored to the University, though it does not appear from the College Books that he was readmitted to his fellowship.

This event, which caused no little stir in the Cambridge of the time, has been noticed by students of Hobbes,[1] and the career of Daniel Scargill himself may perhaps be considered an interesting by-way in the history of the period.

Daniel Scargill, whose family originated from Yorkshire, was born at Knapwell, Cambridgeshire, on 31st August, 1647.[2] He entered Corpus Christi College as a sizar on 25th January, 1661, was admitted to a Manners scholarship on 6th April, 1666, and proceeded B.A. in that year, together with seven other members of his college. On 30th August, 1667, he was elected to the fellowship left vacant by the promotion of Dr John Spencer to the Mastership of the College, and on 4th September, 1668, he appears in the Chapter Book as "lecturer in Greek Grammar". He was not present at a college meeting on 7th November following when Mr Briggs[3] was elected to the fellowship vacated by Thomas Tenison, presumably upon the latter's marriage and appointment to the rectory of Holywell and Needingworth in Huntingdonshire.[4] That "Sr. Scargill", as he is designated in the Chapter Book, was not present on this occasion indicates that by this time he was perhaps already under a cloud, and a month later on 7th December, he was suspended from his degree for having asserted "several impious and aetheistical tenets; to the great dishonour of God, the scandal of the Christian Religion and of the University".

This happened upon a Monday, and Daniel Scargill was permitted by the Vice-Chancellor, Dr Boldero, with eight of the Heads who were present in the consistory, to make a public recantation in the Bachelor's Schools on the following Friday, 11th December, and to bring a true copy thereof to the Vice-Chancellor, his suspension to continue until after the Commencement next. At first he refused to comply and was accordingly expelled. He was, however, given another chance, and "upon his showing a disposition to retract his errors he was summoned to draw up a Recantation, which after being perused by the Vice-Chancellor and Heads, and some alterations made therein, was spoke as follows, and afterwards printed at the University Press."

The text of this Recantation, which was delivered in Great St. Mary's and caused a good deal of excitement,[5] is set out in Masters' *History of Corpus Christi College,*[6] but since that book is not easily accessible, I venture to reproduce it here.

> The Recantation of *Daniel Scargill,* publicly made before the University of Cambridge, in Great St. Maries July 25, 1669.
>
> Whereas I *Daniel Scargill* late Bachelour of Arts and Fellow of *Corpus Christi* College in the University of *Cambridge,* being through the instigation of the Devil, possessed with a foolish proud conceit of my own wit, and not having the fear of God before my eyes; Have lately vented and publicly asserted in the said Universitie divers wicked, blasphemous, and atheistical positions, (particularly, That all right of Dominion is founded onely in Power; That of the Devil were omnipotent he ought to be obeyed; That all moral Righteousness is founded onely in the positive Law of the Civil Magistrate; That the Scriptures of God are not Law further than they are enjoyned by the Civil Magistrate; That the Civil Magistrate is to be obeyed though he should forbid the worship of God, or command Theft, Murder, and Adultery) professing that I gloried to be an *Hobbist* and an *Atheist*: and vaunting that *Hobbs* should be maintained by *Daniel,* that is, by me: Agreeably unto which principles and positions, I have ived in great licentiousness; swearing rashly; drinking intemperately; boasting myself insolently; corrupting others by my pernicious principles and example: To the high dishonour of God; the Reproach of the Universitie: the Scandal of Christianitie; and the just offence of mankinde. And whereas, the Vicechancellor and Heads of the said Universitie, upon notice of these my foul enormities, upon a full examination and clear conviction of these premised offences, after suspension from my degree, did expel me out of the said Universitie: Now I the said *Daniel Scargill,* after frequent consideration, strict examination and serious review of the said Positions, do finde by the grace of that God, whom I had deny'd, that they are not onely of

dangerous and mischievous consequence, Inconsistent with the Being of God, and destructive to humane society; but that they are utterly false, the suggestions of a lying spirit, wholly against my own judgement resolved upon better consideration, as well as against the common sense of mankinde. And I do freely acknowledge the proceedings and sentence of my Governors, the Vicechancellor and Heads of the Universitie to be just and equal, agreeable to the duty of their place, and the Trust reposed in them, That they could not have done less to vindicate the Divine honour, and suppress that mischief growing up in this age, which no former hath known.

And now I Adore and Bless the highest Majesty of God in His infinite mercy to me, that he hath not suffered me to go on unreclaimed in my enormous principles and practices; but hath made my face to be ashamed, that I may seek his name. *Righteousness belongeth unto Thee O Lord, but unto me,* and to those who have seduced me, and to those who have been seduced by me, *shame and confusion to face.* Oh what height of wickedness had I not arrived unto! For I must confess myself guilty of impleading the Divine Majesty at the Tribunal of human wit, making man judge whether God should be God or no. Nay, whereas the Devil, my tempter, to whom I had hearkened, doth beleeve and tremble, I vile wretch have been void of the Faith and fear of God in the manifold manifestations of him. Wherefore I humbly ask pardon of God above all whom I have blasphemed; of my Governors in the Universitie whom I have disturbed; of all Christians and all men for the great offence I have given unto all: more especially of so many as have been misled into any errour or vice by me. And I do also humbly and earnestly beseech all men, especially so many of the younger Scholars as have been seduced by me (who now abhor what I formerly boasted to assert) that by my example of the most subtle insinuations of the Devil in the vain obstentations of their own wit. *That they lean not to their own understanding,* but consult the holy scriptures, the lively oracles of God, That from thence they may learn φρονεῖν τό σωφρονεῖν *to be wise unto sobriety,* as the holy Apostle with great wisdom requires. And now I humbly hope and trust in the infinite mercy of God, against whom I had audaciously opened my unhallowed mouth that He who hath promised that all sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men (excepting only that resolved malicious blasphemy against the Holy Ghost) will be graciously pleased to gloryfie his mercy in the forgiveness of my most detestable errours and abominable sins. And I thank God that he hath awakened me in good measure to a just detestation of the accursed Positions asserted by me, and of all other like wicked principles.

Wherefore, I do here in the presence of God, Angels and men, cast myself down in deep dread of the just judgments and vengeance of God upon the accursed Atheism of this age, acknowledging myself to be highly guilty of the growth and spreading thereof, having contributed what my profane wit could devise, or my foul mouth express, to instill it into others or to confirm them therein. And I do profess, I believe (and judge it most reasonable so to believe) that the openly professed Atheism of some, and the secret Atheism of others, is the accursed root of all that abounding wickedness, perjury, sacrilege, debauchery, and uncleanness in this present age: That in a deep sense of that wretched part I have acted in the propagating thereof, I do now abhor myself in dust and ashes, and that from the bottom of my heart, I do disclaim, renounce, detest and abhor those execrable Positions asserted by me or any other: particularly

1. *That all right of Dominion is founded onely in Power.*

2. *That all Moral Righteousness is founded onely in the Law of the Civil Magistrate.*

3. *That the Holy Scriptures are made law onely by the Civil Authority.*

4. *That whatsoever the Civil Magistrate commands it is to be obeyed notwithstanding contrary to Divine Moral Laws.*

5. *That there is a desirable glory in being and being reputed an Atheist;* which I implied when I expressly affirmed that I gloried to be an *Hobbist* and an Atheist.

For these unhallowed assertions and expressions, I now finde such inward contrition and remorse, that I pray God his mercy may withold me from Relapse, or his judgments prevent it. But do I think that a bare Recantation can satisfie for my prodigious offences? No, let me do penance all my days, submitting myself to God's will, and the charity of pious minds: And whatsoever my portion may be in this world, let me live and die in the fear of God and the faith of Christ. Amen.

Now lest anyone should mistake or suspect this confession and unfeigned renunciation of my sinful and accursed errours, for an act of civil obedience or submission in me, performed according to my former principles, at the command of my Superiors, in outward expression of words, though contrary to my judgment and inward thoughts of my heart; or that I have not now expressed the most sincere and secret sense of my soul; I call the Searcher of all hearts to witness, that I loath and abhor such practices as the basest and most damnable hypocrisie: That from my heart and soul I detest such principles in all persons, as worse than the basest villanies and reservations, which the Jesuites are said to practice and allow. And I openly avow that I do acknowledge, that all persons so principled ought to be held by all mankinde as the most dangerous and declared enemies of the common faith amongst men. That they are not to be trusted upon any obligation of that faith, or pretention to piety, loyalty, or common honesty, in any Corporation, Colledge, University, City, Common-wealth or Kingdom: but, that by those principles, destructive to society and commerce amongst men, that they may and do delude and defeat all Oaths and Protestations, all faith given to God or man: They may and will comply, if their own Interest or Advantage prompt them to it, with any Invader or Usurper: with an Faction or growing Sect, however destructive to all order and th very being of humane society in the world. I beleeve also, an openly avouch, That no power on earth; no opinion in pretende Philosophie concerning self-preservation, can free me from the obl-gation that is upon me, in this my open profession of Repentance fo my accursed errours and grievous sins, to speak the truth i sincerity before God and man.

This Recantation and Sincere Profession I make willingly an freely, of my owne minde and choice: not in compliance with th command or will of any other; not upon design to gain a bett opinion amongst men in the world; nor for any worldly advantag profit, or self-end of my own; but out of a hearty detestation of my foul errours and sins; and I am glad of this opportunity to disburde my soul, oppressed with the weight of the shame

So help me God

DANIEL SCARGILL

For the next three years there is a tantalizing gap in the stor of Daniel Scargill. Even though he had been absolved and restored to the University after his Recantation in 1669, this very unfortunate episode would have been enough to ruin any prospects he might have of ordination and of preferment in the church at a time when the Bishops were beginning to bear hardly upon the *Leviathan*.[7] But in spite of this he managed to get ordained, and the next thing I have been able to discover about him is his ordination to the priesthood at Norwich on 28th June, 1672, and his institution to the Rectory of Mulbarton, Norfolk, on the presentation of Sir Edwyn Rich "de hospitio Lincoln", a few days later on 8th July.

When and where he was ordained deacon remains something o a mystery. I have searched the Subscription Books of th Norwich, Ely, and London dioceses without finding any trace o it. Masters, however, seems to throw some light on it by giving 1st September, 1671, as the date of the *certificate*[8] of his absolution By this time Daniel Scargill would have been just twenty three years old, the minimum age for the diaconate, and, although h had been absolved two years before, a certificate of the same wa no doubt required before he could proceed to the embertid ordination in the September of 1671.

But the fact that his ordination to the priesthood took plac very quietly—he was the only candidate—in the Chapel of th

Bishop's Palace at Norwich upon a Friday, and not a Sunday or Holy Day,[9] suggests that someone had got round that very accommodating prelate, Dr Edward Reynolds, who was renowned for his generous treatment of those suspected of opinions reminiscent of the late troublous times.

Scanty though the evidence is, I am inclined to believe that Daniel Scargill's good angel throughout all this unfortunate business was the old collegian, Thomas Tenison. Though Tenison had published in 1670 *The Creed of Mr. Hobbes Examin'd*—a book which may have contributed to the condemnation of the *Leviathan* by the University of Oxford in 1683—he himself had suffered from a rumour that he was a Hobbist, and he may have been sorry for the young man and been kindly disposed towards him. Universities in those days were not inclined to be tolerant of the excesses of some of their junior alumni, but Tenison, who was by that time outside Cambridge, may well have taken a less serious view of what may well have been no more than a very ill-timed outburst of youthful enthusiasm.

Through Tenison, Daniel Scargill may well have obtained an entry into society in the Mulbarton district. Tenison himself had been rector of the neighbouring parish of Bracon Ash, which he had resigned in 1662 in favour of his father who held it until his death in 1671. He was a man of growing influence and importance and may well have been a most valuable assistance to Scargill in obtaining the living of Mulbarton, though Scargill may also have had some connections of his own in the locality; for eighteen years later, in 1690, a kinsman Dudley Scargill presented him to the adjoining parish of Swardeston which he held in plurality with Mulbarton until his death in 1721.

A little more than a year after his institution to Mulbarton, Daniel Scargill was married in his parish church to Sarah Le Neve of Aslacton. She died in 1680, and he erected a most curious memorial to her memory in the chancel of Mulbarton Church: an iron shelf, painted to represent the binding of a Bible and let in to the respond of the chancel arch on the south side, and, above, two copper plates hinged together so that they open in the form of a book with the inscriptions on the inside. On the left hand "page" appear the arms of Scargill impaling Le Neve and the inscription:

HERE LYES THE BODY OF THE MOST RELIGIOUS
MRS SARAH SCARGILL
THE WIFE OF MR. DANIEL SCARGILL RECTR OF THIS PARISH
WITH WHOM SHE LIVED IN ALL CONJUGALL VIRTUE
NEAR 7 YEARES: AND THEN DEATH DIVORCED THEM
UPON THE 22th DAY OF AUGUST 1680.
IN THE 30th YEARE OF HER AGE.
SHE WAS THE PIOUS DAUGHTER OF A LOYALL GENTLEMAN
MR. THOMÀS LE NEVE OF ASELACTON
COSIN TO SIR WILLIAM LE NEVE WHO WAS HERAULD
TO KING CHARLES THE FIRST OF BLESSED MEMORY
SHE WAS A PERSON OF UNIMITABLE DEVOTION
OF A MOST NICE AND TENDER CONSCIENCE
OF SWEET BEHAVIOUR
AND IN ALL THINGS
SO FAITHFUL A SERVANT OF GOD YT I DARE
CONTEST THE DIVINE GOODNESS TO HAVE REWRADED HER
HAPPY SOULE, WHOSE BODY RESTS HERE!
AND MAY IT REST BY NOE PROPHANE HAND DISTRUBED
TILL HER SOULD SHALL TAKE IT UP AGAIN AT THE
GREAT DAY OF RESTITUTION.

On the right hand "page", a hand issuing from clouds and the words:

COME PILGRIM TO THY HOME
DEARE LOVE, ONE FEATHER'D MINUTE & I COME
TO LYE DOWNE IN THY DARKE RETIREING ROOME,
AND MINGLE DUST WITH THINE YT WEE MAY HAVE
AS WHEN ALIVE ONE BED, SO DEAD ONE GRAVE.
AND MAY MY SOULE *teare* THROUGH THE VAULTED SKY
TO BE WITH THINE TO ALL ETERNITY.
O HOW OUR BLOUDLESS FORMES WILL YT DAY GREET
WITH LOVE DIVINE WHEN WE AGAIN SHALL MEET
DEVEST OF ALL CONTAGION OF THE FLESH
FULFILL'D WITH EVERLASTING JOYS AND FRESH
IN HEAV'N ABOVE, AND (T' MAY BE) CAST AN EYE
HOW FAR ELIZIUM DOTH BENEATH US LYE.
DEARE, I DISBODY, AND AWAY
MORE SWIFT THAN WIND
OR FLYING HIND
I COME I COME AWAY
DANIEL SCARGILL.[10]

After her death in 1680, his "feather'd minute" lasted forty-one years, during which time he married again, and the pathos of this epitaph to his first wife is somewhat blunted by the appearance of the words *nulla secunda* (regardless of grammar!) alongside the entry of the burial of the second lady, who was also named Sarah, in the Mulbarton Register for 1718!

Throughout the period of his incumbency the Mulbarton Registers are full of examples of Daniel Scargill's somewhat cumbersome latinity.[11] He makes an elaborate entry of his seventy-second birthday on 31st August, 1719,[12] and of the burial of one of his daughters—"*sepulta est octavo die Martij* 1686/7 *et jacet ad latus matris in DORMITORIO a me PATRE subsctructo familiae meae REPOSITORIO*. But most interesting of all these entries is that for *Thomas Adams de Knapwell in Com. Cantabrigiae* (*mecum oriundus*) *hic sepults est decimo quarto Februarij* 1713/4.[13]

Daniel Scargill appears once in the Le Neve correspondence,[14] showing that he was hard up and was attempting to borrow money from his first wife's relations. He died in 1721, aged seventy-four, and was survived by two out of his family of five daughters.

[1] e.g. Section xxix of the Introduction to the Oxford Edition of the *Leviathan* by W. G. Pogson Smith.

[2] The Knapwell Registers for this year are missing but the date of Daniel Scargill's birth can be ascertained from the following note he made in the Church Register at Mulbarton, Norfolk.

> "Daniel Scargill hodie (vicesimo die Augusti) septuaginta duos annos exegi; nunc vero meo septuagesimo tertiu. 1719."

[3] William Briggs M.D. (1642-1704). Tenison's pupil at Corpus and afterwards Physician in ordinary to William III. Famous for his treatise on "The Theory of Vision". Buried at Town Malling, Kent. His son, Henry Briggs D.D. Chaplain to George II and Rector of Holt, Norfolk, erected an elaborate monument to his memory in Holt Church.

[4] E. J. Carpenter, *Life of Thomas Tenison*, p. 11.

[5] "The news that fills all mouths here is the Recantation of Sir Scargill which I have sent you in print (if you please) to read it at arge . . ."

> (John Gibson of St. John's College, Camb. to Mr. Tate. 26th July 1669. Letters of John Gibson. Camb. Antiquarian Proceedings and Communications Vol. 8, p. 73.)

[6] Robert Masters, *The History of the College of Corpus Christi*. 1753.

[7] Aubrey says "that some of the Bishops made a motion to have the good old gentleman burned for a heretique", and it will be remembered how Pepys had to pay 24/- for his copy of the *Leviathan* as he bishops would not allow it to be reprinted. Hobbes was greatly alarmed and burnt some of his papers, but nothing happened beyond his refusal to reprint the *Leviathan* and the refusal to publish his

Behemoth—his book on the Causes of the Civil War.

[8] The text of the certificate if given by Masters (Appendix p. 79): "These are to Certify whom it may concern, that whereas D.S. BA. late Fell. of C.C.C.C. was suspended of his Degree and expelled the University for asserting erroneous tenets tending to Atheisme, the said D.S. was absolved from his Suspension and restored to the University upon his Recantation in Great St. Marie's Church Jul. 25, 1669 by *Edm. Boldero,* Vice-chancellor.

Sept. 1, 1671. Hic testatur *Matt*: *Whinn. Regr.*"

[9] The entry in the Norwich Subscription Book No. 5 for 28th June, 1672, is as follows. "I Daniel Scargill, Batchelor of Arts, of Corpus Xti College in Cambridge, Borne at Knapwell in Cambridgeshire. Aged 24 yeares and upwards am to be ordained Priest this day in the chappell at the Bps Palace in the Citty of Norwich and to be Curate to Mr Christopher Hatley, Rector of Mourning Thorpe in the County of Norff. (signed) Daniel Scargill."

There is a note in the subscription book to the effect that "the Bishop was assisted in the imposition of hands upon the above said Mr Daniel Scargill by Mr Joshua Jones one of the Prebendaries of Christ's Church, Mr Benedict Riveley, Minister of St. George's Tombe Land in the city of Norwich, and Mr. John Beale his Lord's Domesticall Chaplaine."

Daniel Scargill also appears in Subscription Book No. 3 where he subscribes to the Act of Uniformity. The Consignation Book records his institution to Mulbarton in 1672, and to Swardeston in 1690.

Mr Christopher Hatley had been rector of Morningthorpe since 1637. Sequestered in 1646 (Matthews, Walker Revised, Oxford 1948, p. 268). Reinstated at the Restoration, and remained incumbent until his death in 1679. He was also incumbent of St. Mary in Coslany, Norwich, but I cannot find evidence of Daniel Scargill's having officiated in either of his parishes.

[10] For an illustration of the memorial and account of its restoration see Transactions of the Monumental Brass Society. Vol. VIII, p. 91

There is a ring about the following lines to Mrs. Esther Le Neve Daniel Scargill's sister-in-law, which suggests that he may possibly have been the author.

Sleep sacred ashes, let us onely prye
What treaures in you did involved lye
A wife so young and yet so wise. O heres
Examples's wisdom's not the child of yeares.
So full of busyness and so pious well
Devotion dwells not always in a cell.
So free, so innocent, so good, so kind
All morall virtues were in thee combin'd
And with thee took their flight unto ye sky
Joyn forces and make up one Galaxy.
    So various Gums dissolveing in one fire
    Together in one fragrant fume expire.

These lines appear in a leger stone in Wymondham Abbey Norfolk, bearing the arms of Le Neve, but omitted from Farrer's *Church Heraldry of Norfolk,* and commemorating William Le Neve (1720), his first wife Esther (1677), and his second wife Alice (1701).

[11] Daniel Scargill was in the habit of latinising the names of those he baptised and married and buried with rather deplorable results, e.g., the oft repeated name of Lightman becomes *homo lucis*!

[12] See note 2.

[13] The name Thomas Adams occurs frequently in those Knapwell Registers that are extant. A Thomas Adams, son of Thomas Adams was baptised there 25th April, 1609, and a Thomas Adams signs as Churchwarden in 1610.

[14] 19th Oct. 1693. Paid Mr. Scargill £2.10.0 three months ago as he was in need of money.

8 March, 1693/4. Will do the best I can for Mr. Scargill. £50. But people scrupulous lending on single secirity.

(Andrew Brereton to Oliver Le Neve. *Le Neve Correspondence.* W. Rye, Norwich 1895.)

The S.P.C.K. in Action

Some Episodes from the East Riding of Yorkshire

By K. J. R. ROBSON

I THE SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE

" THE visible decay of Religion in this Kingdom, with the monstrous increase of Deism, Prophaneness, and Vice, has excited the zeal of several persons of the best character in the Cities of London and Westminster, and other parts of the nation, to associate themselves in order to consult together how to put a stop to so fatal an inundation.

"The cause thereof they believe in great measure to arise from the barbarous ignorance observable among the common people, especially those of the poorer sort, and this to proceed from want of due care in the education of the Youth, who, if early instructed in the Principles of true Religion, seasoned with the knowledge of God, and a just concern for their everlasting welfare could not possibly (with the ordinary Assistance of God's good Spirit) degenerate into such vile and unchristian practices as they now generally do.

"To remedy these Evils, which cry aloud to Heaven for vengeance, they have agreed to use their best interest and endeavours to incline the hearts of generous and well-disposed persons to contribute toward the erecting of Schools in these Cities, and the parts adjacent, for the instruction of such poor children in Reading, Writing, and in the Catechism, whose Parents or Relations are not able to afford them the ordinary means of Education; and as they look upon this to be the most effectual method to train up the poorer sort in sobriety and ye knowledge of Christian Principles, so they assure themselves that the good effects which may be wrought thereby will prove a powerful argument to engage others in better circumstances to make so necessary a provision for their children.

"The success of this undertaking . . . encourages them to hope that, if the like industry and application were observed in the other parts of this Kingdom, the Children and Youth might be universally well principled, and the growing generation make a conscience of fearing God; and these hopes have induced them to use their utmost endeavours to prevail with all pious and well-inclined Christians in y^e^ several parts of y^e^ nation to joyn their hearts and purses in advancing to perfection so excellent and glorious a work".[1]

This letter, sent to the Clergy Correspondents of the S.P.C.K. in 1699, aptly summarizes the aims of the society regarding the education of children. The society, which had been founded the previous year in London, quickly turned its attention to the training of poor children because it saw in their education the cure for the ungodliness of the time. A poor child could be saved from an evil, slothful later life arising out of his ignorance by instruction in Christian principles. He should also be taught reading and writing so that he could better understand those principles.

This theory of the beneficial effects of education was not original. As early as 1642, Samuel Harmer, in his pamphlet, *Vox Populi*, had stated that lack of education among poor children led to ungodliness, vice, theft, and sloth.[2] The S.P.C.K. placed a great emphasis on the teaching of the Church Catechism and Christian principles, for it visualised the instruction of these poor children as a form of vocational training in the sense that the children were to be taught to follow their vocation in life, with a tacit acceptance of their allotted place in society, working hard and humbly in the Christian spirit. This, too, echoed earlier views such as those to be found in Samuel Gott's pamphlet, *Nova Solyma*, published in 1648. The author advocated universal education, but it was to fit all classes for their station in life. Over education of the poor might lead to discontent.[3]

It is common knowledge that as a result of the efforts of the S.P.C.K., schools began to spring up all over London for the education of poor children. They were maintained by voluntary subscriptions and by endowments. Very soon, the S.P.C.K. began to extend its activities to other parts of England and Wales. A detailed study of the society's educational work in the rest of the country still awaits a chronicler. A close investigation into the S.P.C.K.'s relations with one area—the East Riding of Yorkshire—brightly illuminates the national theme. The dawn of the eighteenth century was lit by a new educational sun, the rays of which penetrated even the gloom of a distant and backward county like the East Riding, and were not destined to fade until half the century was passed.

II THE S.P.C.K. IN ACTION IN THE EAST RIDING

The S.P.C.K. broadened its activities by enrolling people, usually clergy and gentry, as corresponding members who did all they could to further the society's aims in their locality. The society never possessed any coercive powers over members or the schools they established, but only gave advice and supplied books. From the evidence now to be examined, it emerges clearly that the advice was usually taken, and that for many years the influence of the society was potent and stimulating.

It was not until February, 1709, that the S.P.C.K. had any direct contact with the East Riding. It came in the form of a letter to the S.P.C.K. from a Mr. John Moyser[4] of Beverley, informing the society that a charity school was in course of erection there, and desiring advice concerning the best method of employing the children.[5] The letter had been sent to Robert Nelson,[6] and it was accepted and referred to the committee. On the 16th February, the committee recommended that Moyser be informed of the method used in the school at Saint Margaret's, Westminster, where many of the children were employed in spinning wool, weaving, mending and making shoes, sewing and knitting. He was also to be informed that the school at Wapping and other places near the sea, as was Beverley, were employing children in picking "Oakham".[7]

In November, 1709, the presence of another charity school in the Riding was revealed to the society. The Reverend Robert Banks of Hull was made a corresponding member, and he told the society that a charity school or workhouse was founded in 1698 by Act of Parliament.[8] The poor children of the town had previously lived in a place called the Cloth Hall, and in 1698 the Hull Corporation was authorized to pull down the ancient edifice and rebuilt it.[9] The house cost £600 and was big enough for a hundred boys and girls. In 1709 it contained only forty-five, and these had "meat, drink, clothing, washing, lodging" and were "taught to read and spin jersey, and every Sunday (were) catechised by the curate of Holy Trinity Church".[10] The children were maintained by voluntary subscriptions and charitable gifts.[11] Banks also proudly informed the society that he had a parochial library in his church which had cost £300.[12]

Banks recommended the Reverend Thomas Mease[13] as a corresponding member of the society.[14] This clergyman became closely associated with the running of the Beverley charity school for many years, and was probably the moving spirit behind its foundation. Mease revealed that it was proposed to teach the children at Beverley " to read, write, cast accounts of work, and to instruct them in the Christian religion ".[15] He told the S.P.C.K. that there was not sufficient support in Beverley to form a branch of the society, but he did recommend two new corresponding members. They were Sir Francis Boynton of Burton Agnes, head of one of the most important East Riding families, and Alderman George Davies of Beverley. Both the new members were Justices of the Peace and had taken an active part in the founding of the charity school at Beverley.[16]

The school opened on the 1st August, 1710, with an annual subscription of £190 per annum.[17] For the school building the country Justices of the Peace gave part of their public hall and the Beverley Corporation part of theirs contiguous to it. The Corporation also gave £100 for fitting up the building, and always maintained an interest in the school. Among the contributors to the school were the late and contemporary Members of Parliament, magistrates, gentlemen, clergy and others.[18] The total cost of setting up the school was £250. [19]

The school consisted originally of twenty-six boys and four girls who were wholly maintained and clothed, as well as taught.[20] In 1711, another ten children were added to the school, but they were not lodged or boarded.[21]

Every year the school put out five or six of the children to apprenticeships. The trustees usually tried to place them into husbandry or domestic service. They continued to take an active interest in these children when they left the school. Sir Francis Boynton informed the society " That such as are put out it is intended that by their Indentures the master shall suffer and oblige the children to come every Sunday to the charity school to be instructed so that they may not forget what they have learned."[22]

Sir Francis Boynton, Mease and Davies worked in close cooperation with each other and with the society. Their attitude to the instruction given by the school and its connection with the

Christian religion is amply illustrated by a letter to the society from Mease in 1713. He stated that Sir Francis, Davies and himself frequently met and discussed how they might best promote " the Interest of Piety and Vertue ". They found on enquiry that a " great many children in Beverley were never taught by their parents to say prayers in private. They would gladly apply a remedy to that evil, esteeming it one great cause of all Immorality and Prophaneness whereas if children were instructed to say their Prayers constantly and devoutly every morning and evening it would imprint an early and Awfull sense of the Divine Majesty upon their hearts and happily prepossess them with an habit of Religion ". To do this they instructed all the schoolmasters and schoolmistresses to teach their scholars to pray privately every day, the little ones to use the Lord's Prayer only, and the bigger children to add another prayer to it.[23] The society heartily agreed with their measures, promptly sending them some packets of prayers for both charity schools and families for " if prayers in family were also recommended it might be another great motive to encourage Vertue and Religion in their Neighbourhood ".[24]

The school at first used as text books the Bible with the book of Common Prayer bound together with it.[25] Later, singing was added to the curriculum for " bibles with common prayers and singing psalms " were ordered from the society.[26] In 1713, the *Whole Duty of Man* began to be used in the school, [27] and the following year the school ordered from the society twelve copies of Ostervald's *Grounds and Principles of Christianity*. [28] These books continued to be ordered regularly, and they show how the whole system of instruction was strongly rooted in the Christian religion as advocated by the S.P.C.K. It is interesting to note that the best way for these books to be delivered from London was by sending them by ship to Hull.[29]

After 1710, the London charity schools had become involved in politics. The Schism Act was designed by the Tories to prevent the Dissenters from educating their children, and Dissenting and Low Church support for the charity schools was alienated. Bolingbroke filled the churches and schools with men of Jacobite sympathies, and after the Hanoverian succession the schools continued to be attacked as being pro-Jacobite. The S.P.C.K. and successive Bishops of London made strenuous efforts to root out offenders, and the stream which flowed to cleanse the Augean stables trickled as far distant as the East Riding of Yorkshire. It resulted, in 1717, in a joint letter from all three Beverley corresponding members in which they stated that "They readily embrace this opportunity to declare their satisfacon of the Inspecon that has been made in the charity schools in London whereby all such Masters as were not firm to the Government have been turned out, and that care is taken, that neither the Masters nor Children meddle with party or political principles. They beg leave to assure the society that in regard to all the Corresponding members (which they have any knowledge of) in those parts, and of themselves, that they are all strict adherors to, and Zealous actors for, the present Government."[30]

In 1718, Mease informed the society that the school continued to flourish, and this is reflected by his order for books which included thirty Bibles with Common Prayers, thirty-six *Whole Duties of Man*, and twenty-four *Grounds and Principles of Christianity*.[31] After this time, information regarding the school becomes less detailed. The correspondents continued to receive packets of books both for the school and for distribution among the poor, but they became interested in other projects. However, in 1735, Sir Francis Boynton acknowledged receipt of a letter from the society which proposed a change in the curriculum of the charity school which he promised to discuss with his friends when next in Beverley.[32] This proposal embodied the society's new policy of urging the charity schools to be turned into working schools. It was made partly as a result of constant attacks on the charity schools by the supporters of economic nationalism who regarded as essential a good supply of cheap labour.[33] Another criticism was that the charity school children, as a result of their training, were able to enter into competition with their "superiors" in domestic service, manual trades and as shopkeepers' assistants.[34] There is no evidence of any such criticism in the East Riding, from the farmers or anyone else, but, of course, the number of children instructed in the Beverley Charity School was minute in proportion to the total labour force available. Unfortunately, there is no available evidence to pursue the interesting line of research as to whether any of the charity school children were able to better their lot as a result of their education.

The trustees had always tried to conform to S.P.C.K. policy by placing out their scholars as far as possible into husbandry and domestic service. The new instruction from the society was implemented, for in 1743, Mease, in reply to Archbishop Herring's Visitation Articles, stated that the charity school had twelve children who were taught reading, writing, arithmetic,, and, in addition spinning.[35] The reduction in the number of children shows that financial support for the school, which was now known as the Blue Coat School, had declined somewhat, and that the first enthusiasm had waned as the originators of the scheme grew old or died.

As early as 1711, the society had interested Sir Francis Boynton in their missionary work in the East Indies,[36] and he also became responsible for the planning and erection of a new workhouse for Beverley. The other correspondents also began to support the East Indies missionary work, and later busied themselves with such things as relief work for the Salzburg refugees. The society itself turned more and more to such projects which were not objects of sectional criticism like the charity schools. The policy of turning them into working schools proved a failure, and the original support and enthusiasm for the schools was never recovered. The decline spread to the maintenance of the society's letter books and annual reports which by 1740 became merely formal. The information in the annual reports was limited to the number of children taught yearly for each county, and as the same figures were repeated year after year they are of no value.

The impulse from the power-house of the movement thus lost its dynamic quality, and the failure of the central driving force was felt in the outlying parts. But, before it faded in the East Riding, at least one new correspondent of the society had the energy and enterprise to forward the old aims.

The number of correspondents had, in fact, increased up to 1728. Although several persons were recommended by the existing members and later refused to participate, the ranks were swelled by an Alderman Gee of Beverley, and the Reverend George Burghope of Burton Agnes. All the correspondents received packets of books and distributed them among the poor for many years.

Then, in 1728, the society admitted a new corresponding member whose zeal for education and good works upheld the movement for many years in Hull. He was the Reverend William Mason, Vicar of Holy Trinity Church, and father of William lason, the poet and friend of Gray. That the society carefully etted new members at that time is shown by the fact that they rote to Sir Francis Boynton for an opinion on Mason, and the eply is an adequate testimony to the character of the clergyman. ir Francis said that he was "an extraordinary good and diligent astor, of exemplary life and conversation, charitably disposed and eady to do all human good offices and well affected to His lajesty King George and the present Government in Church and tate".[37]

At the time of his admission as a corresponding member, Mason as busy with his scheme for the erection of a new workhouse or Hull.[38] As soon as he discovered that the charity school at the orkhouse had an endowment for the catechising of the children n a Sunday by his curate, he ordered one hundred books of atechism from the society.[39]

He corresponded with the S.P.C.K. unfailingly year after year. le first of all tried to interest the Hull Corporation in the aims of ne parent body,[40] and then, in 1729, set up a religious society hich included among its members "twenty-six common tradesien."[41] The society met a mixed reception at first. "The Reliious Society, being begun, it occasion'd some disputes, about their ften receiving the Holy Sacrament; But the Controversy soon nded in a peaceable Manner, thro' the Endeavours, as was said, f a Gentleman, who went under the Name of Philanthropos, This ociety is eminent for its Religious Zeal; and especially, its wellrder'd Charity, in respect to poor Peoples Children, for whose ducation they take particular Care."[42] The interest in education eferred to took practical form in the provision of a school which lason and the religious society built in 1730. The date of its oundation given by local histories and the Charity Commissioners 1734, but this is revealed to be incorrect by the correspondence f Mason with the S.P.C.K. and the annual reports.[43]

The school taught twenty poor children to read and write, ogether with the principles of the Christian religion.[44] The system f contributions for the school is interesting as a kind of early ayment by results. The honest tradesmen paid the schoolmaster vo shillings a quarter, but with typical Yorkshire parsimony only anded over the money after they had heard each child repeat is Catechism.[45]

Mason sent the S.P.C.K. a copy of the orders observed in the school, but the letter book does not record them. Fortunately, an abstract is available from elsewhere which states "The Children to attend at seven o'clock in the morning, in summer, and be dismissed at twelve; at one o'clock in the afternoon, and be dismissed at five; in the winter, at eight o'clock in the morning, and dismissed at four in the evening. The master to read every morning and evening prayers. Boys neglecting school without a reasonable cause, for the second offence shall be expelled. That they attend divine service twice every Sunday at Trinity Church, and in the evening be all catechised. That the parents of these children live orderly lives, attend divine worship, and give their children good examples at home, on pain of forfeiting every privilege they have derived from the institution." The orders were to be given to all parents "that they may do all in their power to enforce the rules contained in them".[46] Here, as usual, Christian teaching on the S.P.C.K. model played the dominant part. Another outstanding thing is the uncompromising rule regarding attendance and the rigorous insistence that the parents should live exemplary Christian lives. Such rules indicate that there must have been a great demand for admission, and many a modern teacher would wish that his school had as much influence over the parents as is implied in these orders.

By 1733, the school taught thirty children.[47] The religious society was able to admit four more by a picturesque gift. Six guineas were found in the school box on Ladyday. They were enclosed in a note which said, "Four children more for this in the school".[48] By 1743, numbers had risen to forty-five who were all maintained by the society. Like its London counterparts, the school added to its income with a collection from a yearly charity sermon.[49]

III THE SURVIVAL OF THE S.P.C.K.'S WORK

By the time the half century was reached, the energies of the S.P.C.K. had turned more to missionary work, and the schools in the country tended to be left to their own resources. Yet the work of the society in the East Riding endured.

The Charity Hall school was reported by the Charity Commissioners in 1823 to have one hundred and fifty pupils. Their education was no longer financed by voluntary subscriptions owever, but by the governors of the workhouse where they were ept.[50]

The school founded by William Mason became known in Hull s the Vicar's School, and Mason's part was acknowledged by an ıscription over the door which stated that he established the :hool "in commemoration of the blessings of the revolution". 'he schoolhouse in the vicarage garden was rebuilt in 1792. At ıat time sixty boys were taught, being appointed by the Vicar of Ioly Trinity who was the sole trustee, and provided with books, ens and paper. The master was allowed a salary of £30 per nnum together with a dwelling house and coals. He was not › teach any other scholars. The school continued to be supported by the proceeds of an annual charity sermon, preached early on the first Sunday in December, but the rest was supplied y the Hull Corporation. Like Beverley, voluntary subscriptions ad dwindled away since the stimulus of the S.P.C.K. had been emoved, and had had to be replaced by help from the local overning body.[51]

By 1850, the school had one hundred and ten scholars, and as criticized by the visiting H.M.I. as "a good deal crowded".[52] s a result of this, the school was amalgamated in 1857 with a ational School in Humber Street, Hull.[53] Many of the older ıarity schools of the S.P.C.K. survived to be absorbed in this ay, and, sometimes, to be claimed as new foundations.

The Beverley charity school was like many S.P.C.K. foundations that it boarded, lodged, clothed, taught and apprenticed its ıpils. The policies advocated by the S.P.C.K. had been followed large measure by the Beverley trustees, and had every chance success, because of this close supervision of the children. Unrtunately such a system of training was very expensive and the ımbers of scholars gradually grew less. However, partly to compense the school for the withdrawal of the parent body's pport and the decline in public enthusiasm and voluntary bscriptions, two Beverley men gave endowments. Sir Michael 'arton[54] left the school £500 in 1723, and John Green, Bishop Lincoln,[55] bequeathed to the school of his native town £1,000 three per cent Consols in 1788. By 1823, the annual income om all sources was £128, together with about £40 produced by arly charity sermons in two Beverley churches. For this sum, ı boys were lodged, boarded, clothed, taught and apprenticed.[56]

By contrast, the National School, founded in 1812, was teachin within six years one hundred and eighty-three children at a fa less cost,[57] and admission had to be refused to many. Thus th Blue Coat School, which was now managed by a Corporatio committee consisting of the mayor and four aldermen, seemed t have outlived its original usefulness, and its income could hav been put to a far better use. In 1890, the funds and endowme were devoted to the reorganization of the Beverley Gramma School.[58]

The three East Riding schools entered the new century lacki the voluntary financial support which the S.P.C.K. had original aroused for them, but all three schools were firmly establishe Moreover, twenty-five other schools, depending on charitabl endowments and educating the poor, were established in th previous century. Three of these were endowed by relatives corresponding members of the S.P.C.K., and the other schoo were no doubt indebted to the society's influence. They wou all flourish as soon as they were given a transfusion of the li blood of education—money. The two Hull schools had continuously increased their number of pupils with the support of th corporation, and the Beverley one only taught few because it wa being run on old out-moded lines. All these schools remained t play their part as schools of the National Society, that new an vigorous offshoot of the S.P.C.K., or to enter the national systen of education later. They remained as proof positive that in th East Riding at least, the educational work of the S.P.C.K. endure and that the history of elementary education in England had it roots far deeper than 1811.

[1] *S.P.C.K. Minute Book*, 16th November, 1699.

[2] W. A. L. Vincent, *The State and School Education, 1640-60*, 195 p. 31.

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 34-5.

[4] Formerly Recorder and M.P. for Beverley.

[5] *Minutes of the S.P.C.K.*, 2nd and 16th February, 1709.

[6] Religious writer and non-juror. He played an active part in th establishment of many charity schools, and was an active member the S.P.C.K. He was the friend of Tillotson and Sharp from who he eventually took the sacrament.

[7] A loose fibre, obtained by untwisting and picking old rope; use especially in caulking ships' seams.

[8] *S.P.C.K. Abstracts of Correspondence*, 19th November, 170 Banks.

[9] T. Gent, *History of Hull*, 1735, p. 192.

[10] *S.P.C.K. Abstracts of Correspondence*, 19th November, 1709, anks.

[11] *S.P.C.K. Annual Report*, 1710.

[12] *S.P.C.K. Abstracts of Correspondence*, 19th November, 1709, anks.

[13] Minister of the Minster and Town Lecturer.

[14] *S.P.C.K. Abstracts of Correspondence*, 28th January, 1710, Banks.

[15] *Ibid.*, 8th April, 1710, Mease.

[16] *Ibid.*, 25th May, 1710, Mease.

[17] *Ibid.*, 24th March, 1711, Mease.

[18] *S.P.C.K. Annual Report*, 1710.

[19] *Ibid.*, 1711.

[20] *S.P.C.K. Abstracts of Correspondence*, 28th August, 1710, Davies.

[21] *Ibid.*, 15th October, 1711, Sir Francis Boynton.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] *S.P.C.K. Abstracts of Correspondence*, 6th June, 1713, Mease.

[24] *Ibid.*, 11th June, 1713, Society to Mease.

[25] *Ibid.*, 24th December, 1711, Mease.

[26] *Ibid.*, 4th March, 1714, Boynton, Mease and Davies.

[27] *Ibid.*, 10th November, 1713, Boynton, Mease and Davies.

[28] *Ibid.*, 4th March, 1714, Boynton, Mease and Davies. Jean F. stervald (1663-1747) Swiss Protestant Divine.

[29] *S.P.C.K. Abstracts of Correspondence*, 4th March, Boynton, ease and Davies.

[30] *Ibid.*, 27th February, 1717, Boynton, Mease and Davies.

[31] *Ibid.*, 10th November, 1718, Mease.

[32] *S.P.C.K. Abstracts of Correspondence*, 2nd December, 1735, oynton.

[33] M. G. Jones, *The Charity School Movement in the Eighteenth entury*, 1935, p. 85.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

[35] Yorkshire Archeological Society, Record Series LXXI, 1929, *rchbishop Herring's Visitation Returns, 1743*, Vol. 1, pp. 101-2.

[36] *S.P.C.K. Abstracts of Correspondence*, 15th October, 1711, oynton.

[37] *Ibid.*, 1st August, 1728, Boynton.

[38] *Ibid.*, 2nd September, 1728, Mason.

[39] *Ibid.*, 14th May, 1731, Mason.

[40] *Ibid.*, 29th October, 1728, Mason.

[41] *Ibid.*, 15th March, 1729.

[42] T. Gent, *History of Hull*, 1735, p. 196.

[43] *S.P.C.K. Abstracts of Correspondence*, 26th August, 1732 and *P.C.K. Annual Report*, 1730.

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] J. Tickell, *History of Kingston upon Hull*, 1798, p. 832.

[47] *S.P.C.K. Abstracts of Correspondence*, 29th August, 1732 an 17th April, 1733, Mason.

[48] *Ibid.*, 17th April, 1733, Mason.

[49] *Archbishop Herring's Visitation Returns*, 1743, Vol. 2, pp. 76-

[50] *Reports of the Charity Commissioners*, 1823, 9th Report, p. 79

[51] J. Tickell, *Op. Cit.*, 1798, p. 832.

[52] *Report of the Committee of the Council in Education*, 1850-5 Vol. 2, p. 178.

[53] J. J. Sheahan, *History of Hull*, 1866.

[54] Of the well-known family which represented Beverley as membe of parliament for generations.

[55] Born at Beverley about 1706. He started his career as a teach at Lichfield Grammar School where he met Johnson and Garrick, a later acquired a considerably literary reputation, meetings of t Royal Society being held at his house in Scotland Yard.

[56] *Reports of the Charity Commissioners*, 1823, 10th Rep., p. 69

[57] *Annual Report of the National Society, 1818.*

[58] *Scheme of the Charity Commissioners, 1890.*

Wilberforce the Humanist

By L. E. ELLIOTT-BINNS

William Wilberforce is known to all the world for his achievements as a philanthropist, and above all for the leading part which he took in the abolition of Slavery. But it is seldom realized that he was also, so far as his limited opportunities allowed, a humanist, and like a number of other early evangelicals, a man of culture.

His busy life devoted to innumerable philanthropic enterprises and, be it not forgotten, to the political life of his country (he was a highly trusted statesman, the intimate friend of Pitt, and had he so desired it a possible Prime Minister) left him but scant leisure for indulging his tastes. He notes in his diary for September 1803 that he was too busy for reading, but did "a little Hume in dressing, also Greek Testament." The ill-health which dogged him from his earliest years was, from this point of view, not entirely an evil, for his frequent retirements for treatment to Bath, Buxton and elsewhere, provided times of comparative quiet when continuous reading was more possible.

Another defect against which he had to labour was neglect in his early education. He was sent to a variety of schools which broke the continuity of his training, and none of them attained a very high standard of teaching. But even then he was fond of English poetry and frequently learned passages by heart for his own amusement. Then at the age of seventeen he went up to St. John's College, Cambridge. Here he tells us that the principal object of the dons was to discourage any attempt to acquire learning. They seemed to wish "to make and keep me idle" and asked why in the world should a man of fortune trouble himself with "fagging". And so he spent most of his time in social activities and amusements. But in spite of this, and by virtue of his natural talents, he did surprisingly well in the college examinations. In later life he deeply deplored the opportunities he had missed when a young man and tried to make up by careful plans for self-education and reading; but he was ever conscious of that lack of mental regularity which discipline in early life would have supplied. He also recognized the need for it in others. After hearing Irving in 1823 he set him down as a man of extraordinary powers, but sadly lacking "the chastening hand of a sound classical education." (*Life* V, p. 189).

In order to illustrate this side of his nature, and his constant thirst for knowledge and deep love of culture, a series of extracts from his journals may be given. June 21, 1786: "Books to be read—Locke's Essay—Marshall's Logic." September 6, 1789 "am reading Blackstone, and Goldsmith, and Spenser—serious reading Hopkins." During 1790 he plans to read "Shakespeare, Cowper Adam Smith, Swift, Pope, Addison, Johnson, etc., English History Barrow, South, etc." In the week ending December 13, 1789 he had read "Lear, Othello, Hamlet, Macbeth, Twelfth Night Johnson's Lives, Doddridge's Sermons." On the following August 12, being then at Buxton, he records "Afternoon read Romeo and Juliet with Burgh and agreed often to meet early in the afternoon to read Shakespeare." In the summer of 1791 he read: "Robertson's India and America, Arabian Nights, Horsley's Charge and Letters, Bishop Taylor's Sermons, Aesop, Bacon's Essays, Pope's Dunciad and Essay on Man, Epictetus twice. Horace by heart etc." On August 24 and the following days he was "reading aloud English History with Babington, Fenelon's Characters, Horace by heart, Cicero De Oratore, Addison's Cato, Hume, Hudibras, Pilgrim's Progress, Doddridge's Sermons, Jonathan Edward(e)s, Owen Letters." On August 10, 1792 he read "Goldsmith's Animated Nature, Lowth's Isaiah, Owen, Thomson's Seasons, Horace by heart." In the summer of the next year he read "Butler, Barrow, Soame Jenyns", and in that of 1795 "Cowper's Letters, Blair's Rhetoric, Modern History, Jortin's Sermons, Horace by heart." And so it goes on.

No one who glances through this list—which is, of course typical and not exhaustive—can fail to be impressed by the extraordinary width of interests which it discloses; English Literature (and poetry in particular), History, Philosophy, besides that religious reading which one would naturally expect, all these find a place. His love of poetry which had been characteristic of his youthful days he never let slip, and when *The Lady of the Lake* appeared he read it at once, and in a letter to his friend, Lord Muncaster, of July 25, 1810, he wrote: "Really I did not think that I continued in such a degree subject to the fascination of poetry. I have been absolutely bewitched." But his interests were by no means confined to literature, for he had a profound sympathy with nature in all its aspects; at the close of his life he still loved flowers "with all the simple delights of childhood, and would point out the harmony of their tints, the beauty of the pencilling, the perfection of the colouring, and run all into those ascriptions of praise to the Almighty which were ever welling forth from his grateful heart" (*Life* V, p. 287). It was not therefore remarkable that he deeply appreciated Keble's *Christian Year* when it appeared in the last years of his life.

In the list of extracts from the diary printed above there are several references to his learning Horace by heart. Horace was his chief favourite among classical authors and his texts of *The Satires* and *The Epistles* are copiously annotated; Virgil was also highly valued, as an entry for March 1790 testifies: "I propose to read at least a hundred lines of Virgil daily, often more." And this came from an over-worked statesman and reformer. Wilberforce, like Gladstone, only carried on his reading by taking advantage of every spare moment, and for this purpose he always carried one or more books about with him. This habit led to one rather quaint incident. When he was at Bath in March 1797 a notice appeared in a Cambridge newspaper accusing him of gross hypocrisy because he ostentatiously carried about a Prayer Book in the Pump Room. "The real truth is that at Bath I carried sometimes a New Testament, a Horace, or a Shakespeare in my pocket and got by heart or recapitulated in walking or staying by myself in the Pump Room. I had got a Testament which had not the common dress of one on purpose."

His devotion to polite literature sometimes aroused doubts in Wilberforce's mind as to whether it did not lead to the neglect of more profitable reading. On August 24, 1802 he wrote: "I find books alienate my mind from God as much as anything," and shortly afterwards he asked himself, in an endeavour to account for his lack of progress in the religious life, "Is it that my devotions are too much hurried, that I do not read the Scriptures enough, or how is it that I leave with reluctance the mere chit-chat of Boswell's Johnson for what ought to be the grateful offices of prayer and praise?" How very human—yet how uncalled for. No man who knew him doubted his entire devotion, and the steady growth of all that was best in him. The thought of other literature turned his mind to God, naturally and inevitably. When on holiday at Lyme he said that he "had many a delightful walk along the hoarse resounding shore, meditating on better things than poor blind Homer knew or sung of." (*Life* III, p. 192).

Wilberforce retained his love for literature to the close of life. and walking in the garden at Highwood would often draw some favourite volume from his pocket, a Psalter, a Horace, a Shakespeare, or Cowper, and would read out some well-known passage. His ability to keep up his reading, however, was greatly curtailed by failing eye-sight (this had always been a handicap) and he was no longer able to indulge in long reading at a time; but his interest in all kinds of literature never slackened, he would even glance through contemporary works of fiction, such as the novels of Scott and Bulwer Lytton. He came to depend, however, more and more on being read to, a task in which his children, whom he had infected with his own love of letters, took their share. In January 1815 he noted that they read together "Blair's Lectures, Voltaire' Louis XIV, and Hume"—a sufficiently varied list, and perhaps not exactly what might have been expected in a prominent Evangelical layman.

In 1797 Wilberforce published his *Practical View of the Prevailing System of Professed Christians*, a work which had an immense vogue in its days and has still its usefulness. In it, by the double motto on the title page, he shewed his debt to humanism, for it runs as follows: "Search the Scriptures" John v. 39 and

> How charming is DIVINE PHILOSOPHY !
> Not harsh, and crabbed, as dull Fools suppose,
> But musical as is Apollo's lute,
> And a perpetual feast of nectar'd sweets,
> Where no crude surfeit reigns.
>
> MILTON.

This humanistic side of Wilberforce's manifold personality is, as I have said, but seldom realized, and it needs emphasis. It is not without significance that in the present day there are strong currents in religion which affect to despise and even to dread human learning. But human learning and culture are among the many gifts of God to man calculated to enrich and ennoble his mind and life, though like all God's gifts (including the most momentous—the power of choice) they may be abused. We need to preserve and maintain a tradition of "devout humanism", as distinct from a purely worldly outlook and culture. Such was the attitude of Erasmus. It will aid us in our endeavours if we realize that it was a valued tradition, not only in that party in the Church of which Dean Church was so conspicuous an ornament, but that it was also current among those who called themselves evangelicals.

The Tragedy of the Priest-Workmen in France

By LEO ZANDER

(From " ECKART ", Jan.-March, 1955)

NOT a question of the fate of a few French priests, but an historical question affecting the whole of Christendom. The " Mission de Paris " and the " Mission de France " are an " avantgarde " of the whole church and we must regard their successes as well as their failures as ours.

First mentioned in " Témoignages chrétiens " in 1946, where isolated instances are mentioned of heroic priests who became simple workmen in order to carry out their Christian mission in the proletarian mileu—such as Père Rutter, who had worked in a Belgian coal-mine for several years before 1939; Abbé Pesle, who worked in a factory in the Rhineland and who was released from Dachau on the petition of the workers of this factory; Abbé Bousquet, who became a secret " spiritual director " in the Resistance. These cases were symptomatic of a new and important problem, but not typical, because isolated and unorganized. After 1939 the war and the Resistance brought a difference. Here the clergy came into direct contact with the mass of the people, without the difference between believers and unbelievers, bourgeois and proletarian, agricultural workers and factory hands. Priests, monks, and seminarists became ordinary privates in the army, and therefore part of Peguy's " gran Anonimat " and Dragomiroff's " holy grey cattle ". True, the priest always has to deal with numbers, but ordinarily these consist of Christians or at least of those who have some interest in religion; in fact, he deals with the " elect ". But in barracks, battlefield, or concentration-camp, he was one with the " man in the street ". This enrichment of experience was only the first step. Then came the period of the occupation and the Resistance. Two books by the Abbé Chipier were published in Switzerland, and are quite unknown in France: " Les saints sans autel " (Ed. de la Roulotte, 1947) and " L'aube sur la Route " (Ed. de la concorde, Lausanne, 1948).

Participation in the Resistance was always a matter of individual initiative, and they were not conscripts. Their experience was intimately connected with their freedom, and their life was outside organized society, which is protected by law. Thus they learnt something that is quite foreign to " cultivated " social life: solidarity for life and death. Modern individualism is really egoism; the " I " only becomes " we " in rare hours of destiny. This solidarity of feeling can have an enormous psychological significance, and can overcome all other factors and become the one great passion of a single life or of a group. Let us call it the social *eros*. (This is probably what Plato meant when he spoke of " love " for the ideal State.) The beloved can be the people, the state, the church, the army, the party, the proletariat. The mainspring is that we find a " something " for which we can gladly sacrifice everything; life has meaning and value, and all becomes clear and unquestioned. The critical faculties of our reason are displaced by such social-ethical experience: love is blind, except as regards the beloved. This is the psychology of the Resistance—as also for the class-war; the beloved (country or class) must be liberated from the enemy at all costs. The emotional character of this complex appears plainly in the fact that no one attempts to define "liberation" except negatively; no one asks what "liberation " will lead to, what it will be used for. *Eros* is of a different nature from *logos,* and is always trying to manage without it. From this comes the disillusionment of victory: the goal has been achieved, and if no fresh goals can be found, life loses its meaning. All this will help to clarify the psychology of the priest-workers.

The heart of the problem is that we cannot understand the mission of the priest-workers unless we also understand the spiritual (and not only the material) condition of the workers and the Marxist ideology.

To go back to the historical development. In 1943 appeared " La France—Pays de Mission ", by the Abbés Godin and Daniel, which had the effect of a bomb explosion. Missionary work is the constant duty of the church, and she need never fear its difficulties, provided that she is prepared for them. Godin demonstrated that the social and psychological nature of present-day Christianity is not only unknown to the proletarian masses, but unknowable. Thus the church resembles a fortress surrounded by the enemy and can only hope to drag in a few prisoners, whose conversion can have no effect on the whole. We are faced with a totally new world, a new civilization (or barbarism), with its own social structure, made of life and morals—totally different from and hostile to the Church. This was drastically summed up by one priest-worker in a letter to the Archbishop of Paris at the end of 1953: " The working-class does not want benefactors to care for its poverty ". What do the workers then want ? The problem cannot be reduced to material terms. In many cases it *is* a battle for better living-conditions, but this is too simplist a statement of the problem, and is only the ABC of the Marxist theory which ignores spiritual and psychic facts. To divide the world into bourgeoisie and proletariat is a dated abstraction. Thousands of teachers, civil servants, clergy, and other badly paid professional workers do not belong to the proletariat although their living conditions are materially those of the classic proletariat. These make nonsense of the division, and if it is kept it is not on economic territory but on psychological. Simone Weil, who wrote of her experience as a factory worker in " La condition ouvrière ", can help us to analyse the problem.

Christian theology teaches us that man is in the image of God, and we regard as axiomatic that this image cannot belong to another. Personality cannot be bought or hired; but it can be given to work, be sacrificed, and exploited. But the initiative is personal, and that is a consciousness of the image of God. This makes the difference between the craftsman and the factory hand. The craftsman can determine his material, can "create" something, however modest, and can feel himself part of the cosmic process of the humanizing of nature. But in the factory all is abstract, and the worker is part of the machine. The worker's whole energy and consciousness is swallowed up in the aim of production (not " creation "). His personality is exploited for the end of production. He ceases to be human and degenerates into a machine. But as his personality cannot be wholly destroyed, it is transformed into resentment and bitterness. Mechanization and depersonalization are the marks of this epoch, the crisis of industrial culture. The working-class cannot escape this materialistic aim of productivity. " Industrial culture " produces two complexes: the workers have a complex of enmity against all " others ", while the " others " have a superiority complex against the class which is beyond the frontiers of " respectability ". Here lies the key-word.

The difference is not between rich and poor, educated and uneducated, leisured and workers, but between the two classes. One consists of the "respectable", the "bien-pensants", the pillars of society. The other is "non-respectable", and has its own mentality, moral code, life, and aims. The gulf between the two seems to be unbridgeable.

Even the church is affected. The church began among the "non-respectable". Later it became the religion of society, and is now identified with the "respectable". The priest, the minister, even the verger, are on the same side of the gulf as the teacher, doctor, merchant, and the protecting police; if he has dealings with the other side he is regarded as a social traitor. "Why does the Master eat with publicans and sinners?"

The Abbé Godin's real theme was not France or the "Mission" or the working-class, but the Church, which has become an empty house, and ought to be replaced by a new one: new in structure and organization, in style and form, but not in mystical content. This call for reform, even revolution, was understood by the then Archbishop of Paris, Cardinal Suhard. On January 15, 1944, the "Mission de Paris" was founded (one year after the appearance of the book), soon after that the "Mission de France". A special seminary was founded at Lisieux, later moved to Limoges. Unfortunately Abbé Godin, who prepared the statutes of the new organization, died the same year. This heroic venture proved that the young spiritual France was once again the eldest daughter of the church. It was truly heroic.

The first priest-workers were R. P. Loew, the dock worker of Marseille, P. Magmaut and Caltier in Civors, Abbé Dumont in Lille. Soon there were workers in Nancy, Autien, Limoges, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Chambeny, and of course Paris. Jesuits, Dominicans, Franciscans, Assumptionists, Capuchins, Marist, and secular priests all took part in the work. They were not a great number, only about 200 for the whole of France. But the number of towns in which they worked and the variety of Orders from which they came, proved their spiritual significance. What was the ecclesiastical status of these men who worked all day and could only do their missionary work after hours of exhausting labour? What were their canonical rights and possibilities? The Roman Church could not stomach this revolution, and called a halt. The heroic venture proved too big, too radical, and official Christianity too cautious. But the fact that the attempt was ever made, that the priest-workers worked for ten whole years is a lasting glory for French Catholicism, its young priests and its elderly bishops. The Catholic Church in France had to bow beneath the iron hand of the Roman curia. But the *whole* Church should remember that the besieged lasted out for ten years and only halted on the precipice of open revolt against Rome.

According to the statutes of the "Mission de Paris" and the "Mission de France", the priest-workers were independent of local church authorities. They were responsible only to the archbishop They had the right to celebrate Mass at any time and in any place in the French language (except the Canon). They were authorized to take any measures they thought fit in the interests of the Mission, provided they notified the bishop within a week. Thus a missionary church was to come into being, independent of the local churches, who are on the other side of the gulf. It had to have not only a different personnel, but a different psychology, different habits, in order to serve the working-class, clearly lost to the local church. Of course great difficulties were bound to arise, due more to personal than to objective rivalry. There was plenty of work for both "churches". But the organization of the church, and particularly the Roman form, cannot well stand a pluralism of methods. True, the religious Orders are a variation of organization. But they have grown up gradually and have worked themselves out through centuries. But this "missionary church" confronted historical Christianity suddenly, and it is understandable that the necessity for new methods was not apparent to all. A drastic example is provided by the French Trade Unions. The CGT is pronouncedly atheist and proletarian, and has political as well as economic aims. The Catholics founded their own organization (the C.FOC) to fight the CGT. No attempt was made to influence the whole, only individual conversions were envisaged. Even in 1938 members of the CGT were refused Communion. The priest-workers were a living condemnation of previous methods.

A still deeper difficulty appeared. The priest-workers were psychologically more akin to the CGT than the "Jocistes", who sought to influence the workers from the other side of the gulf. The priest-workers identification of themselves with the working-class was much more real; they shared the hopelessness of the lestiny of the workers, and so it is not surprising that they also ame to share their ideas and their objects. Many priests began to hink more about the alteration of external conditions than of piritual salvation. P. L. Loew, the dockworker of Marseille and eader of the St. Louis Mission, declared that his fellow-workers ıad not enough freedom in which to know God. This attitude oon ceased to be confined to individual priests, and became quasi-fficial, to the great detriment of the movement. The young heologians who conducted the paper “Jeunesse d’Eglise” took ıp Pater Loew’s appeal. (“Jeunesse” in this context does not mean Youth but youthfulness.) They were followed by “Esprit”, “Quinzaine”, “Action Populaire”, and finally by “Etudes” (Jesuit) and “La Vie Intellectuelle” (Dominican). This whole movement ecame known as “L’aile marchante”, in contrast to the “Intégrists”, who envisage the church as immovably perfect. The “Jeunesse d’Eglise” went too far: they demanded a radical reform f living conditions as the necessity before any missionary work ould be undertaken. So economics became politics, and the nissionary was to become the political fighter. The Church was o cease to be neutral and become a party-organ. This ideological levelopment had practical consequences, and eventually (May 28, 953) two worker-priests were arrested and mishandled during a olitical demonstration. When the archbishop protested, the prefect f police pointed out that the priests had taken part in the street-ighting and had been armed with iron plates with which they vounded the police. The priest-workers’ increasing solidarity vith the workers’ outlook was denounced as being infected with Communism.

There was a certain amount of truth in this. For the chief lifference between syndicalism, which carries on the social-conomic fight for the liberation of the working-class, and Communism, which leads to the political enslavement of humanity, emains almost always unnoticed. Communism declared itself o be government by the workers. And this myth of the dictatorhip by the proletariat is still firmly fixed in the hearts and heads f the workers. Only gradually and by means of painful xperience will they realize that the Communist State means the omplete collectivization of society and a dehumanizing of umanity. This disillusionment, that the Communist programmes an in no way solve the practical problems of the workers, is the first step towards a sharp differentiation between economic and political factors, i.e. between syndicalism and Communism. One can go so far as to say that the real fight for the liberation of the working-class presupposes the liberation of syndicalism from the power of Communism. But the French people have not yet got so far. The economic and political struggles are still one complex which is aggravated by the gulf between the "bien-pensants" and the "others". And so one can understand that the religious fervou of the young and inexperienced priest-workers was caught up into the social idealism and became a poltical Eros. The paradox of the Name of Christ suddenly being named within the camp of the godless even led some to speak of the priest-workers as "rootless" and "men or sorrows", those described by Isaiah.

The indignation of the conservatives was as great as the enthusiasm of the progressives. But in a closed society the conservatives always have the advantage. And they knew how to use it. P. Y. Congar wrote in "La Vie Intellectuelle", February 1954: "The division of Catholics into two parties is undeniable. It is combined with a great evil, namely that those in opposition make use of the practice of secret denunciation to Rome—which is a real scourge." P. P. Couturier, a well-known ecumenicist, ratifies this. Thus the whole problem was put before the Roman authorities in a one-sided and partisan way. The Roman authorities, as far as we can see, have only a theoretical knowledge of French conditions and do not take the secularization of the French nation seriously. Rome lives in the enchanted world of its followers and admirers: it can hardly imagine the local conditions in France (or anywhere else!). She tends to undervalue the dangers and to belittle them for public opinion. The success of the books and films of Guarechi (the "little world of Don Camillo") is a typical example of this tendency.

At first Rome was careful, if not negative. During Cardinal Suhard's lifetime it was said that the Primate and the Pope had discussed the matter. At length the curia took a hand. A secret struggle took place between the curia and the French episcopate. which ended in defeat for the latter. First the Sanctum Officium demanded the ending of the priest-workers' action in a general way. According to the French press this demand was made by Monsignor Marella. The priest-workers were accused of neglecting their religious duties. The French episcopate delivered a charge to the priest-workers, 19.3.1954, which caused such wide-spread indignation that the Archbishop of Paris felt compelled to issue a second charge stating that the demands were only for moderation and not for the abolition of the "Mission de France".

Then Cardinal Pizzardo, the Prefect of the Congregation of Seminaries, came to Paris and put an end to the Limoges Seminary. This cut both Missions off at the root. The struggle went on, the convocation of French bishops nominated a delegation consisting of the Archbishops of Paris, Lyon, and Lille, to deal with the curia and, as was widely believed, to fight for the continuation of the priest-workers. To please the conservatives the group of the "Jeunesse d'Eglise" was broken up, its leader, P. Montuclard, applying for permission to become a layman, in order to continue his work by other means. Owing to the Pope's illness the delegation could not go to Rome till November 1953, where they were met by the Cardinals Ottaviani and Pizzardo, the State Secretaries Montini and Tardini, as well as other prelates. On their return the delegation issued fresh directives for the priest-workers, which really meant the complete destruction of their work. The five rules were:

(1) The priest-workers in future to be chosen by the bishops.
(2) To have a solid preparation, both theoretical and practical.
(3) To work only for certain hours, so as to leave plenty of time for their priestly work.
(4) They are forbidden to accept any secular office, all syndicalist work to be left to laymen.
(5) They are not to live in isolation, but in company with other priests or in a parish house.

At first sight these five points seem harmless and merely technical. No one will object to the proper preparation. That is the only really harmless rule. If they are to be chosen by the bishops instead of being complete volunteers and responsible only to the archbishops, it will mean a reduction of their work to the level of local interests and standards. Worst of all is the reduction of working hours, for this means that the priest is no longer really a worker, and his work becomes a mere personal ascesis. The priest-worker has a social meaning: he is the symbol of the presence of the Church amongst the proletariat. A worker-priest has no missionary meaning at all.

The last point, forbidding the priest-worker to live alone, seems at first very sensible, considering the dangers which must surround a young and inexperienced priest. But there is also the fact that if he does NOT live like his flock, if he does not know slum-life by actual and continual contact, he will be on the other side of the gulf. As P. Boideffre wrote (in "Combat" 1.1.1954) "One cannot baptize a civilization if one does not stand in the midst of it".

The Cardinals' communiqué was followed by an episcopal charge to the priest-workers, couched in the harshest terms. The bishops wanted to " couper court", to be finished with this hard problem once and for all. They demanded unquestioning obedience, threatened the severest canonical penalties, and refused unasked any permission to return to being laymen. No compromise was to be hoped for—it was submission or revolt. The whole country was dismayed, and waited for the priests' reactions François Mauriac made a hopeless attempt to exonerate the Pope, to detach him from the curia. He published an article, "L'Absence du Père", in which he compared the priest-worker with the crucified Lord, forsaken by His Father. (My God, My God, why has Thou forsaken me). The Pope was ill, was absent, and in that sense he had forsaken his beloved children, the priest-workers, who had to be martyrs. Did Mauriac consider what part he thus assigned to the Cardinals of the curia?

But the battle was lost. A charge by Msgr. Feltin (28.2.1954) disposed of the myth of "L'absence du Père" and of any hope of discrepancy between the curia and the French episcopate. The charge declared that all the conditions had been laid down in full harmony with the Pope, and that the relations of the French episcopate with the Papacy were unconditional.

The Catholic faithful were thus faced with 3 possibilities: (1) blind obedience; (2) the attempt to justify decisions and orders which in reality went against their consciences; (3) disobedience to he hierarchy. (We do not say "to the Church" because we do not take for granted the identity of Church and hierarchy.)

The first possibility was thus interpreted by the Dominican "Actualité religieuse": We seek the light. "But we know and we proclaim that, when the Church speaks, we have no choice but to yield—although some shadows must be cast". This also was the attitude of the French bishops, although, reading between the lines of their utterances, we can realize that they were forced to act contrary to their consciences. The tragic impossibility of harkening to the voice of conscience in Roman Catholicism has been clearly stated by Sertillange: "We are submissive to the Church, and must thus be prepared not only to suffer for the Church—that goes without saying—but also to suffer through the Church; that is the last witness."

The Christian of to-day is not convinced by the monkish attitude to blind obedience; therefore the various attempts to justify theologically the Vatican's proceedings. Thus: the demands of works-discipline contradict the sacerdotium and eventually obliterate it; the priest must not be identified with his flock, but stands above it, etc.

If the priesthood is incompatible with "workerhood", why is it that it took the church ten years to realize this? Why, after being compatible for ten years, did they become incompatible in 1954? Were all the bishops who started, guided, and blessed the movement, blind? If the priesthood is incompatible with any other profession, how can there be priests who are teachers, doctors, lawyers, parliamentarians, or officers in the army? Is there not a difference being made between "proletarian" work and that of the "bien-pensants"? It all comes back to the priesthood. Is the priest to be withdrawn from everyday work and its difficulties, or is he to stand in midstream? Is the underlying principle to be "separation" or "incarnation"? As P. Carenne has said, in "Combat" (19.2.1954). In all historical churches and confessions the answer seems to be "separation". But we can see Christianity getting weaker and whole classes lost to it. Can the clergy of today "be all things to all men, so that at least some may be saved?"

The French priest-workers made the attempt. It is clear that their work was more symbolic than factually decisive—it was a "présence" not a "catechése", as P. Chenu, a Dominican, formulated it. Historical, organized Christianity has shown itself incapable of understanding and supporting this work. We must not blame only the Vatican. The orthodox synods, the consistories of the protestant church, would most probably have acted in the same way. And it is therefore that the tragedy of the priest-workers is such a searching question for us: the question whether historic Christianity is capable of leading the masses to Christ again, whether the church can be ever-young.

Editorial p.s.: Whilst this essay was being written the Mission de France has received its final form. A new seminary has been opened in Pontigny, "to form a certain number of young men to exercise their priesthood in a social, not a geographical mission field". The rules of the Vatican have not been altered. Our correspondent in Paris writes: "As far as I can see, there is no trace of identification with the 'non-respectable'. It is impossible to foresee how, or if, the workers will accept these new specialists from a central organized church action, nor whether these new messengers will succeed in bringing back the lost sheep".

Christians Against the Mau Mau

By FRANK BOUVERIE

I was in the early days of the Emergency in Kenya. At the arther end of Fort Hall District in the Kikuyu Reserve all was uiet, outwardly. The Kikuku all wore that look which we got o know so well, part sullen, part frightened, part bestial. They ever spoke to us unless we spoke to them, never volunteered even “ Jambo ” or a “ Nikuega ”. They tried not to look at us if they ould help it, but hurried past with their eyes averted. If you topped one and questioned him you always got the same answers. ‘ No, there has never been any Mau Mau here ”. “ Yes, I have eard tell of it elsewhere, but never around here”. “The young nen ? They are all working in Nairobi. There have not been ny around here for a long time ”. Always the same, and so alpably false. We had a lot to learn in those days.

The District Officer and the Major of the King’s African Rifles tood on the earth road gazing up at the hillside still swathed in he early morning mists. Above them on the banana and maize overed hillside could be caught glimpses of moving figures lodging in and out of the bomas and plantations, turning out the uts, combing the cultivated plots, searching, poking, hunting for he elusive young men. For this was a dawn sweep of an area vhere Mau Mau had been reported to be active. There had been umours of an oath-taking ceremony in the neighbourhood and he body of an unidentified African had been pulled out of the iver some way downstream.

Slowly the various groups of figures converged on the two men n the road, and with the dispersal of the mist could be identified s Askari of the K.A.R., blue jerseyed Kenya Police and a few Tribal Police in their maroon jerseys and pillbox hats. Some of he parties had civilians with them, young men whom they had aught in their huts at dawn and whom they were bringing in or screening. The prisoners were made to squat down on the oad in line and the D.O. took a good look at them. They were n unprepossessing lot. Two of them were older men, pulled in y the Askari in an excess of enthusiasm, who were allowed to go home at once. The remaining nine sat by the verge lookin sullen, angry and, yes, almost drugged. All except one, tha is. He looked very different. He looked the D.O. in the ey and, incredibly in that company, seemed almost to smil. His eyes were bright and cheerful, and they lacked in startlin fashion the doped look of the others. As the officers looked a him he caught their eye, and the District Officer spoke to him. The prisoner stood up and came forward. He turned and face the other prisoners. " The man you found in the river the othe day, Bwana", he said, "was So-and-so, son of Such-and-suc He was killed for refusing to take the Mau Mau Oath, and tha is the man who killed him. The man next to him is the Oat administrator who ordered him to be killed. You will find th Mau Mau arch, where the ceremony took place, at the end of th valley, over there ". So he went on down the line until he ha stated who were involved in the murder and who were innocent. It was astounding. There had never been information like thi before. The Police leapt into action. Finger-prints? arch? trophies? Yes, everything was found to be as he had stated. He gave evidence as he had spoken and three murderers were convicted.

I saw him as he was about to leave the camp when the trial was over, and advised him not to go back to his hut, as it would be too dangerous for him. The Mau Mau would be bound to get him. He looked me straight in the eye. " I am a Christian, Bwana, and Mau Mau is against Christ. So I must go back and help to fight them ". I stared. " But they'll kill you once you leave the protection of the boma ". " Yes ", he replied, " I know that they will kill me soon. But I shall die for God. Good-bye, Bwana ". And with that he walked out of the boma, totally unafraid, into a country where ninety per cent of the people had sworn to kill him.

They got him about a week later.

He was the first Christian loyalist whom I had met. They wer a superb crowd. I have never been so impressed with any men in my life. There was the African Pastor of a neighbouring mission, who used to pass on to us news of forthcoming oath-taking ceremonies. He was found one morning slashed to pieces outside his hut. There was the former sweeper from a mission, whose hut I used to visit barefoot in the small hours, lest the marks of my boots should be seen in the earth next day, who told us what was going on amongst the Mau Mau. It was from him that we first heard that the young men were undergoing a form of jungle training in the forests. These are tales which could be repeated by the hundred, and the one thing which all these men had in common was that they were loyalists because they were Christians. In my first post in Fort Hall district we found seven such informers. Six of them were dead within the next four months. The seventh ? I daren't even ask. There is another tale which can be repeated many times too. An army patrol was crossing a river. They noticed something which looked like an old sack caught in some rocks. It was a body, an African. Another Christian had been murdered for his faith. This story has been repeated all too often, and is still being repeated even today.

When the Kikuyu Home Guard was first formed—it was started in Fort Hall—a candidate for enrolment had to be able to convince the District Commissioner that he had not only never taken the Oath, but that he had actively resisted Mau Mau. Out of a population of about three hundred thousand in the district only fifty such could be found. But few though they were, they were the finest men imaginable. Utterly fearless, unfailingly cheerful and fanatically loyal, they were the nucleus of the thirty thousand strong Home Guard of today. It is not without significance that the first fifty were all Christians and quite outspoken about it too. In those days it was to court certain death, probably by torture, to admit that one was a Christian, and the courage of these men thus to label themselves surpassed description. They formed a hard core of resistance around which the loyalists could rally, and by their example they fanned the flickering flames of resistance into the blaze which it is today. It was a small enough beginning, but, after all, there were only twelve Apostles.

This courage was not only displayed by Africans. Out in the loneliest places in the Reserve were to be found Missions of one denomination or another, and the White missionaries displayed a similar calm fearlessness in remaining at their posts. I well remember a bad day in upper Fort Hall. A Headman and two of his Tribal Police had been murdered the day before and that morning another body had been picked out of a stream. For once we had got the names of the murderers and all the soldiers and police of the district were out on a huge round-up, with orders to pull in all the young men they could find. Right in the middle of the operations, with the hunt going on all round, I found a C.M.S. Mission. The Missioner and his young wife were quietly going about their business as though nothing out of the ordinary was happening. Although they knew that it was merely a matter of time before somebody tried to assassinate them, they had their four month old baby with them, and they had no intention of leaving. There was their duty and there they would remain. They had not even bothered to put protective wire over their windows, and they slept at night completely unguarded. Their calmness in the surrounding turmoil was balm in that place. Then there was the Roman Catholic priest in Kiambu district, who daily walked along footpaths through thick wattle and banana plantations in the worst of the troubled areas, unescorted, and alone. There was the Baptist missionary who was reported to have come upon a large Mau Mau meeting near his mission. Single-handed, and armed only with a whip, he cooled with his flagellant Christianity the atavistic fervour of the Satanic congregation and dispersed them. And there are many others like them.

The only force, religious, educational, social or political, which held out against Mau Mau was the force in the Faith in Christ. For while it is far from true to say that every baptised Christian was a loyalist—Jomo Kenyatta was baptized—yet it is a fact that every early loyalist among the Kikuyu was a Christian. And not only can the Faith hold the stalwart few, it can also reclaim. At the famous Athi River Camp and in camps along the Rift Valley are the Resistance Movement Centres, where the hard case Mau Mau are subjected to attempts to cleanse them. It is a hard job. Anyone who has tried it will tell you that the hardest thing in the world to do, is to make a Mau Mau talk when he doesn't want to do so. Bribery, threats, wheedling, physical violence, terror, they have all been tried at one time or another, and they have all failed dismally. Skilled interrogators, with a wide experience of questioning prisoners during the war, say that they have not met anything to equal the fear of the Oath for closing a man's mouth. There is a simple way of making them talk, however, and once they have given one thing away they have broken the Oath. Then, like a rubber balloon, once the oath of secrecy has been punctured the whole Oath is invalidated and out pours the confession in a ascade. The terrorist will answer any question and will tell all e knows. He is then passed on to the Witch Doctor to " cleanse ", revolting ceremony, but one necessary to the Kikuyu way of hought to eradicate Mau Mau from his system. When this is ompleted the man will usually confess to feeling " empty "; he as no outlet for his emotional cravings. He is lost, he has no urpose in life, he knows not which way to turn, and like the man the parable, he is fertile soil for the seven other devils worse han himself. The African pastor gives him the answer: " God will eplace all wickedness ", and he then reads to him words of the ible, telling him of the code of love which can replace that code f hatred and vileness, which is Mau Mau. The staff of the camps eport that they have seen tears streaming down the faces of ormer hard-bitten Mau Mau on these occasions; men who went the camp full of hate and stayed to listen to the Bible readings; nd who now hear about God with a new understanding and omfort.

The amazing thing about this rehabilitation is not that it fails in ome cases, but that it works in so many. It is a fact that many ho went in fanatical Mau Mau, leave as equally fanatical hristians. The parable of the sower is, of course, just as applicble to the Kikuyu as it is to anybody else, and there are many acksliders. But there are many who are not; men for whom ere was no other way of return to sanity and decency. And this the only way of reformation, which has been found for them p to date. Victory over Mau Mau, the true Mau Mau which lies the spirit, will be a victory for the Church, and the Church lone. It will be victory over a devilish sect who are sworn to adicate the knowledge and worship of Christ.

I returned to this country some months ago and I was horrified the line which the Church in this country is following. There, Kenya today, the Church is undergoing a persecution greater an in Communist Russia, its members are showing a superb ourage unequalled elsewhere in the modern world, and the hurch is proving itself more than anywhere else. What is more, e Church militant is slowly winning the battle. Yet all I hear bout it from the pulpits of this country are vague statements that e need more Christianity in Kenya, and sermons condoning Mau lau because of some assumed wickedness on the part of the uropeans out there. I have seen more practical Christianity in

Kenya from men of all colours in one day than I see in a month in England. Two cases of maltreatment of the African are denounced from half the pulpits of Britain, and are falsely held up as typical of the behaviour of the European. Whereas, over here cases of child neglect, thuggery, rape, embezzlement and murder pass without comment. Here I see half empty Churches, whereas in Kenya one has to reach the Church half an hour before the service if one wants a seat, and there is no colour bar. Surely it would be better to draw attention to the good in that sorely-tried land rather than to seek to publish the evil. There, the Church of God is fighting for its existence, and the Church in very truth the Church Militant, is beginning to win. Onward, Christian Soldiers !

THE CHURCH AND THE LAW OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

by Arthur T. Macmillan

HE Commission whose Report[1] has now been published was ppointed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York at the end f 1949, "to examine the laws of Nullity, ecclesiastical and civil, and uestions relating thereto, in their general and practical bearings."

A number of different events had brought into prominence the eed for the Church to re-examine the matter. In 1937 Parliament xtended the grounds of divorce to include others besides adultery, nd also added to the grounds making marriage voidable, i.e. capable f being declared null on the petition of one or other of the spouses, ut only during their joint lives. The same Statute relieved the clergy f the duty to celebrate the re-marriage of a person whose previous pouse (divorced or divorcing) was living: previously an incumbent ould refuse to re-marry only a person divorced for his or her adultery ddly enough during the whole of that person's life, whether or not e other spouse was living), but he had to allow his parish church o be used if some other duly qualified clergyman was willing to elebrate the marriage. Following on this alteration of the law, the onvocations resolved that re-marriage in church during the lifetime f the former spouse should always be refused. In cases of nullity e Church did not attempt to prevent the marriage (it would not rictly be *re*-marriage) of either party to the annulled marriage—ndeed any such attempt would have been, and would still be contrary o ecclesiastical law.

In 1947 the Canon Law Revision Commission, appointed by the rchbishops in 1939, published their Report, which included among e suggested Draft Canons, one (Canon XXXVI, 2) giving to the ishop, sitting with his Chancellor, the right to allow marriage in hurch after divorce, where he was satisfied that the party obtaining e divorce could have obtained a decree of nullity from the Divorce ourt. To a number of churchmen this proposal, though along the ght lines, did not go far enough, and an amendment was set down the Convocations establishing a tribunal to which a party could pply for a decision that his previous marriage (now dissolved by ivil law) did not create the impediment of *ligamen* (bond of existing arriage) so as to debar him from marriage to another person according to the rites and ceremonies of the Church of England.[2] This was lly debated in the York Full Synod in May, 1949, but because of e decision to appoint the present Commission, more briefly in the pper House of the Canterbury Convocation in January, 1950, when e Bishop of Exeter strongly supported the proposal.[3]

The late Bishop of Oxford had also proposed a new Canon fo bidding marriage in church where either party had been a party t a marriage which had been annulled on the ground of wilful refus to consummate the marriage—one of the grounds added by the 193 Act.

The problems, therefore, with which this Commission had to dea may be thus summarized: first whether the fixed rule that aft divorce there shall be no re-marriage in church while the other spous is living should be relaxed in any, and if so in what cases: secon whether the Church should seek authority to refuse marriage whe the apparent previous marriage of either party has been annulled c any, and if so, on what grounds.

The cases in which it was suggested that re-marriage in churc notwithstanding a divorce, might properly be allowed were, roughl the following:

(1) where the marriage was, by civil law, voidable, but for on reason or another, a civil divorce was obtained. The usual case o this is impotence or incapacity, and it can readily be appreciated th by seeking divorce, a spouse avoids having to give evidence of private and intimate character.

(2) where the canonical (though not the legal) impediment of bond of existing marriage—*ligamen*—existed to the marriage which has been dissolved. This frequently arises thus: John and Mary are married, and there is a divorce. John then marries by civil law Jane, a spinster, who later divorces him and then meets Henry, a bachelor, with whom she falls in love and wants to marry.

(3) The third class of case involved the revival of the old canonical impediment of defective consent—*dissensus.* This arises where a couple agree, previously to and as a condition of going through the marriage ceremony, on some relationship short of true marriage, e.g. that there be neither any *consortium* nor right to *consortium.* This has sometimes arisen where a man goes through a ceremony of marriage with a woman whom he has made pregnant, simply to legitimate her child, and both have immediately separated.

(4) Where the dissolved marriage had never, in fact, been consummated, and grave cause existed for the dissolution.

As to the second matter, this arose from the fact that the 1937 Act, by making wilful refusal to consummate a ground of nullity, offended against a cardinal principle that no supervening factor can be such a ground. As above stated, the late Bishop of Oxford had proposed that the Church refuse marriage in church in such cases.

The recommendations of the Commission, on page 47, can be thus summarized. Firstly it is recommended that the present rule of no re-marriage in church after divorce and during the life time of the previous spouse should never be relaxed under any circumstances, and that where a person has obtained a decree of divorce in a secular court the Church should accept that decree as decisive, apparently that the dissolved marriage was a true and valid marriage, whether by civil law or canon law is not stated, but presumably by canon law, because the whole Report is based on the proposition that, on this matter, the Church's law and English law are the same (see page 9). As a rather shamefaced attempt to mitigate the injustices which it is known occur, it is recommended that the lawyers be asked always to advise clients to seek nullity rather than divorce wherever possible.

Secondly it is recommended that the Church accept all the 1937 grounds of nullity except wilful refusal to consummate; that the State be asked to abolish this as a ground of nullity, and that if this be not done within a reasonable time, the Convocations pass a Canon prohibiting marriage in church in such cases. The Commission appear to have overlooked two matters. In the first place no such Canon would have any legal force whatever, either on the clergy or the laity, unless and until Parliament had altered the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950. It is unlikely that if Parliament refused to abolish wilful refusal as a ground of nullity, it would amend the 1950 Act so as to allow the clergy to refuse to celebrate marriage after a decree of nullity on this ground, nor is it probable that the Ministers advising the Queen would advise her to grant the necessary licence to promulge such a Canon. It seems unfortunate that this not unimportant aspect has been overlooked. Secondly the general teaching of the Western Church has been that an unconsummated marriage is capable of being dissolved for grave cause, and in view of what is stated in the Book of Common Prayer as being the second purpose of marriage, it is very arguable that, anyhow where the parties are fairly young, the persistent and unjustified refusal by one party to consummate the marriage is in itself a grave cause justifying the dissolution of the union. The Report seeks, under the guise of a disciplinary rule, to alter the age long teaching of the Church and to treat unconsummated marriages as on precisely the same footing as consummated ones. Not a word is said in justification of such a great change.

Incredible as it may seem, the second case above mentioned, that the dissolved marriage had itself been contracted after divorce, is not even mentioned; probably because the members of the Commission could not agree among themselves as to what is the true nature of a legal marriage contracted between a man with a divorced wife living and another woman. This same inability—among bishops only—is noticed by the late Dr Michael Furze in his recent book *Stand Therefore!* (p. 160).

However, since it is apparently accepted (see page 9) that marriage s both exclusive and indissoluble except by death, the conclusion seems inescapable that, in the view of the Commission, a man can be simultaneously united with several women in an indissoluble and exclusive union, each woman being similary united with several men. This is indeed a remarkable instance of the comprehensiveness of the Church of England.

Defective consent is considered in Chapter IV, and emphatically urned down. The reason given (page 27) is that "people who marry according to the forms prescribed must be held bound by what they have voluntarily said and done." The use of the word "marry" of course begs the question, but taking this as the equivalent of "speak the prescribed words", it is the most extreme application of the equitable doctrine of estoppel, an estoppel not in favour of a party deceived—in the case of a mutual agreement the other party is not deceived—but of the State or Society. It may be right that this should be so, but before the Church accepts it, the full implications of the doctrine should be realized. It jettisons completely the traditional view that consent to marriage is an absolute *sine qua non* of its formation, and further the doctrine is relatively new. It is very questionable whether the judgment of Sir William Scott in Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, if read carefully and in its entirety, supports the extreme statement in the Report, nor is it certain that if the case of Brodie v. Brodie had come before Sir William Scott or any other ecclesiastical judge of that time, and the husband had claimed a decree of nullity on the ground of absence of consent to marriage, he would not have got it. The old decision of the House of Lords in the Scots case More v. McInnes (1782) 2 Paton Appeal Cases, page 598, quoted by Sir William Scott in Dalrymple, is a strong authority in favour of such a claim. It seems worth while, for the benefit of those readers—probably the great majority—who have not access to the Law Reports, to state shortly the facts and decision in Brodie v. Brodie, Law Reports, 1917, Probate, page 271. The following is the greater part of the judgment of Mr. Justice Horridge: "In this case the petitioner, Maria Brodie, sought a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, to which the respondent has put in a plea that he relies upon a written agreement drawn up and signed by both parties before marriage and signed by them after marriage whereby it was agreed that he and the petitioner should live apart. By her reply the petitioner alleges that the agreement is contrary to public policy and therefore void in law. The facts as proved before me were that before the marriage the petitioner was expecting to be delivered of a child by the respondent and pressed him to marry her, and he agreed to marry her if, and only if, she would sign an agreement to separate after marriage, and on the day before the marriage was celebrated an agreement in writing, dated December 19, 1913, was signed whereby it was agreed that after the solemnisation of the marriage it should be lawful for the respondent at all times to live separate and apart from the petitioner as if he were unmarried, and the petitioner should not require or compel, or endeavour to compel, the respondent to cohabit or dwell with her by any legal proceedings for desertion or for restitution of conjugal rights or otherwise howsoever, and she would not take any proceedings against the respondent to obtain judicial separation.

"The parties were married on December 20, 1913, and on the same date, at the Registry office, a further agreement dated December 20, 1913, indorsed upon the previous agreement, was entered into whereby t was mutually agreed between the parties that each of them thereby confirmed the terms of the within written indenture and agreed to perform and observe the covenants and conditions thereof so far as hey were to be observed and performed by them respectively. . . . I find as a fact that the confirmatory agreement formed part of and was in no way distinct from the agreement signed before the marriage, and the two documents formed part of an agreement entered into before marriage for future separation. Such an agreement is void and against public policy. . . . I therefore hold that the plea of the respondent is no answer to the petition. . . . For these reasons there must be a decree in this case for restitution".

It should be added that the respondent husband was not represented by legal advisers, but appeared in person, also that, as appears, he did not claim a decree of nullity on the ground of absence of consent to marriage. It is however clear that any such claim by him would have failed. The decision has more than once been referred to with approval in subsequent judgments: it seems clear therefore that the law of England has so developed that the mere recitation of appropriate words makes the couple husband and wife, even though it be proved up to the hilt that they had both deliberately agreed that there should be no consortium or any right to consortium and had subsequently acted on that agreement. It is this state of the law which the Commission regards as admirable, and entirely compatible with the doctrine and teaching of the Church.

As to the proposal to establish a Church Tribunal, the actual recommendation takes a curious form, that the Commission does not "at any rate at the present time", recommend it: p. 48. The reasons given—in Chapter VI, "Church and State"—are singularly unconvincing, being based largely on the alleged difficulties a tribunal would encounter in dealing with cases. In particular the objection hat the Tribunal would have no power to summon witnesses has very little force: either the party applying would be able to prove his case, or he wouldn't. Anyhow it seems a strange doctrine that you refuse justice to all because some will not be able to obtain it.

No review of this Report would be complete which failed to draw attention to certain very serious errors. On page 15 appear the following: "Pre-Reformation Canon Law knew no distinction between void and voidable marriages", and further on, "The effect of a decree anulling a marriage on the ground of an *impedimentum dirimens* was to bastardize the offspring". The first statement is highly misleading, since from the 13th century an important division of actions for nullity had been developed, according as to whether he impediment did or did not involve the parties in sin if they continued in their *de facto* union. If it did so involve them—e.g. consanguinity—then the action for nullity could be started by anyone: if it did not so involve them—e.g. impotence or defective consent—then the action for nullity could be started only by one of he parties and only while both were alive.[4] The second statement is completely wrong, and quite overlooks the doctrine of putative marriage, by which if both, or even one of the parties was *bona fide* and ignorant of the existence of the impediment, the issue were legitimate even though the marriage was, and was declared to be null. This mistake is all the more surprising in that one of the distinguished Queen's Counsel on the Commission stated the exact opposite in his evidence to the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce in 1952 and suggested that the doctrine be restored in English law.

The Report is most disappointing: in many places appearing to prefer expediency to sound principle. Above all it is vitiated by failure or refusal to face up to the fact that the English legal conception of marriage is now wholly different in vital respects from that of the Church. Nothing could be more misleading than the juxtaposition (on page 9) of the Convocations' and Lambeth Conference's Resolutions and the dictum from the judgment of Lord Penzance in Hyde v. Hyde. By the law marriage is "for life" only in the sense that that is the period for which it is undertaken, but it can be dissolved during joint lives for many reasons. All that Lord Penzance decided—and he was careful to state that that was all he was deciding—was that because the marriage before him was potentially polygynous he could not dissolve it, but that if it had been a "voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others" he both could and would have dissolved it.

The Report in effect recommends that the Church continue to refuse to marry many couples to whose marriage there is not, and is known not to be, any canonical impediment.

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[1] The Church and the Law of Nullity of Marriage, S.P.C.K. 1955.

[2] See the present writer's article, "The Church and Marriage", in *Theology*, May, 1948. The amendment is printed in full in the York Journal of Convocation for May, 1949, Appendix, page xvii.

[3] See Canterbury Chronicle of Convocation, January, 1950, page 35.

[4] See Esmein, Mariage en Droit Canonique, 2nd Ed. Vol. I, page 451 *et seq*, and compare also the judgment of Sir J. P. Wilde in A. v. B. (1868), Law Reports, 1 Probate and Divorce, at page 562.

[5] See Pollock & Maitland, History of the English Law, 2nd Ed. Vol. II, pages 375-6, and Esmein, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pages 34-8.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE BAPTISMAL RESPONSE

SIR,—A parish priest cannot afford to play academic games with Scripture. He seeks for guidance. Any discipline enforced—I will not call it rigorism—before baptism or confirmation is bound to be unpopular. Dr Lampe and I would agree that such discipline is needed. In his view Christian initiation is complete after what we now call Baptism; he would therefore say that the strictest care must be taken to see that candidates are ready for baptism. In my view confirmation completes Christian initiation, and I still believe that St Mark's gospel supports my view; I would therefore say that we must be sure that candidates know what they are taking on before confirmation. If Dr. Lampe thinks that this is an easy way out, he should try it in a parish and see.

A small alteration in one of the sentences in his reply to my article brings us into line. He says " Christ's baptizing with the Spirit begins when his saving work of redemption is completed and not before ". I would say " The Church's baptizing with the Spirit begins when Christ's saving work is completed and not before ". But the New Age began with Christ: he received the Holy Spirit at his baptism; the signs of the Kingdom were apparent in all that he said and did. Christ's life and ministry shewed the pattern of the Christian life, for his whole life was a living through dying. How could he not have given guidance for Christian baptism in act and word ? All things past and future were summed up in him, and from him alone can we derive any authority at all. The phrase " Spirit-baptism " may not be altogether happy; it is not mine but John Baptist's. I have used it, as greater men than I have done, to describe what Jesus did for those who came with the first grain of faith to ask his help.

Until the *full response* of faith has been made, Christian initiation is not complete; we are not yet buried and risen again with Christ and filled with active life. The practice of infant baptism brings children within the family, but they are as yet inactive members, not fully responsible for themselves. But, I believe they are *safe*. And anyone who has worked among primitive tribes, as I have for many years, knows what power is possessed by evil forces in an unbaptized environment. We live in a baptized community and we do not know our luck. Read the claims of the apologists, Tertullian, Justin Martyr, Athenagoras and others, on the exorcising effect of baptized Christians. These claims were never refuted. But full and active membership of the body of Christ comes when the response of faith has been made. In the western Church this is at confirmation. In the gospels this was when Jesus said " Follow me ", and someone followed.

Having said what I believe is important, I will refer to a few details I am sorry Dr Lampe replied so hastily.

(1). From his second paragraph "Mr Blair's article . . . serves to warn us how easily the appeal to Scripture may introduce still worse confusion *into this difficult subject . . .*"

Same paragraph " . . . the danger of allowing the theologically un-satisfactory concept of Spirit-baptism . . . to produce a series of unnecessary complications into what should be *relatively simple and clear-cut*".

Italics mine. No comment.

(2). "It all rests upon a foundation of bad theology. For Mr Blai has not yet realized that baptism is the sacrament of Christ's death and resurrection and so of membership of his Body" (from Dr Lampe's reply).

" . . . germination is baptism—we are buried and risen again with Christ " (from my original article).

No comment.

(3). " fanciful allegorism ", " arbitrary use of allegory ", " twisted allegorizing", (from Dr Lampe's reply and referring to my article). In common with St. Paul, the four evangelists, the early fathers and a number of great theologians throughout the centuries, I regard symbol and allegory as a legitimate method of conveying or discovering truth. I did not use allegory in my article, except in interpreting the parable of the sower; St. Mark himself attributes an allegorical interpretation of this parable to our Lord, and I for one believe him. My only addition was to suggest that the seed on stony ground and among thorns represented the half-converted. I did not expect Dr. Lampe to agree with this. It may yet be true.

(4). "(Mr Blair's) forced exegesis", "trying to impose a pre-conceived pattern ". My article was written two years ago or so. It arose from a retreat and a later series of meditations on the Greek text of S Mark. It simply follows St Mark's order and shews the movement of his story. So far from forcing anything it takes a rather conservative view. I am fairly sure that the question of Christian baptism had no previously entered my mind in connexion with St Mark's gospel. believe a fair reading of the article will bear this out.

H. A. BLAIR.

Devizes, Wilts.

SIR,—In the October-December 1954 number of the Quarterly there i an interesting article by E. C. E. Bourne on Cranmer and the Liturgy o 1552. I think he has probably read Cranmer's mind aright. There i one small correction which should be made. On page 388 he writes " ' Those who truly and earnestly repent them of their sins ' are bidde to 'draw near with faith, etc.' ". He goes on to say: "There is no refer ence to their actual coming up into the chancel ". But in 1552 the Invitation does not read " Draw near with faith " but only " Draw near, and take this holy Sacrament, etc ". The words " with faith " were added in 1662, perhaps because the custom of the communicants coming into the chancel after the Offertory had ceased in many places. Even in 1662 the Exhortation " Dearly beloved " is ordered to be read " the communicants being conveniently placed for the receiving of the holy Sacrament " which seems to imply that they are still expected to come into the chancel before the Confession. It would seem clear that in 1552 Cranmer and the other revisers provided that the communicants come up at about the time of the Invitation. Over thirty years ago, when I had helped to build a small chapel, in a northern Ontario town, for a group of people who had come from Leeds in England, I was surprised at the first Communion Service, that when I said " Draw near with faith ", the whole band of communicants got up and came to the communion rail and remained there until they had received the holy Sacrament. They told me that it was their custom in England.

ROLAND F. PALMER.

Sault Sainte Marie, Ontario.

REVIEWS

A SHORT HISTORY OF CONFUCIAN PHILOSOPHY. By LIU WU-CHI. Pelican. 2s. 6d.

THE Ju philosophy—the philosophy of Confucius—has dominated Chinese thought for twenty-five centuries. Ju philosophy is, however, no longer the direct teachings of the sage, but since Confucius was the protagonist of the School in the Chou dynasty, it is still called by his name.

The Ju were probably the descendants of the Shang dynasty nobles, who had lost their rank and position under the Chou. In the period preceding Confucius they became very well-known for, amongst many forms of livelihood, they undertook to conduct the complicated ceremonial for their conquerors.

Confucius was one of these Ju and, faced with the problem of making a living, he first took a small post in Chou, and later became a teacher. Young men of all kinds flocked to his school, and became ritual experts, officials and courtiers as well as teachers. But in the last years of his life a new inspiration seized Confucius. He became a literary editor and anthologist—the first. The *Classic of History* and the *Book of Poetry* were put together, and the *Spring and Autumn*—annals of the state of Lu from 722 B.C. to 481 B.C. was written. This, as the first Chinese book written by a private individual, has an immense historical interest. But Confucius' real greatness lies in his transforming the feudal code of rites and etiquette into a universal system of ethics.

Among the other "Hundred Schools" of philosophy the greatest was the Taoist, founded by Lao Tzu. The *Tao tê ching* was probably not written by Lao Tzu, but much later, but these two streams of thought have run counter to each other through the centuries. Each taught about *Tao* which, according to Confucius, was the Way of Life, while, for Lao Tzu it is essentially metaphysical, and can be taken as an all-embracing first principle for all things.

The century which succeeded the death of Confucius was an age of intellectual activity as well as of political confusion. And one of the most brilliant of its thinkers was Mencius, who was an indefatigable teacher of morals and government. He elaborated Confucius' doctrines, both ethical and political, with great eloquence and courage, at the same time attacking zealously the heterodox teachings of all the other "Hundred Schools". He is honoured as the second sage, next only to Confucius. He was much more specific and advanced than Confucius in his principles of government, being concerned with improving the lot of the peoples by reforming the land tenure and by tax reduction.

After the death of Mencius the mantle of the Confucian School fell on Hsün Ch'ing, another champion of *Tao.* He had little more success than Confucius with the rulers of the states. To him are credited essays of lasting fame. They show him a master of prose, a profound thinker and, most of all, an energetic defender of the Ju dogma.

About the time of Mencius and Hsün Ch'ing there emerged the Legalist School—powerful and destined to triumph over all the others. It succeeded, however, by political force and not by strength of argument; and eventually, all the others states were overcome and the Ch'in was established. The scholars of the Ju were buried alive, and the books were burned, leaving irreparable gaps in the history of literature.

The Ch'in was followed by the Han dynasty, during which the efforts of his followers to canonise Confucius increased. In A.D. 178 they set up a likeness of the sage in place of the simple tablets, and half a century later Confucian temples rose in almost every prefectural city in the empire. His works were engraved on stone and until the invention of printing from wooden blocks (the first printed collection of the canonical books appeared in A.D. 953) this served to prevent a second time the loss of his works.

In the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960-1279) Chu Hsi established a new philosophy as a continuation of the orthodox teaching of the Ju school. His interpretation soon became a standard one, followed by all who desired to become Confucianists.

This book, by Liu Wu-chi, Ph.D., Visiting Professor of Chinese at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, is written in a style that is vital and exciting; and may be understood by the most "general" of general readers as well as by the scholar. With the exception of some Buddhist and Taoist trends in the arts and letters, Chinese culture and Confucianism are almost identical, and the Chinese are essentially Confucianist in their outlook.

What, Dr. Liu asks, was its relation to the other philosophic schools of ancient China, and how, in spite of them, did it succeed in dominating Chinese thought, the history of which is not much more than the history of Confucianism?

Read this book and see. E. D. EDWARDS.

THE EUCHARISTIC WORDS OF JESUS. By JOACHIM JEREMIAS. Translated by A. EHRHARDT. Blackwell. 18s.

THE first edition of Jeremias' *Die Abendmahlsworte Jesu* appeared n 1935. In the second edition of 1949 many improvements were made and much additional material was incorporated bearing especially on he liturgical character of the texts, on the account of the Last Supper as it appears within the framework of the Passion story especially n Mark, Luke, and John; on the indecisive nature, as Jeremias maintains, of the astronomical evidence, as well as on the points made by critics of the first edition objecting to the chronology of the Synoptic Gospels. The English translation of the second edition by Dr Ehrhardt is excellent and will be welcomed by all to whom Jeremias' arguments on this subject have been known hitherto mainly from his article in the *Journal of Theological Studies,* 1, 1949, pp. 1-10, which provides a short summary of some of the arguments used in this book. (Why is this article not mentioned in the extensive bibliographical list on pp. 177-183?).

After a statement of the problem whether to follow the Synoptic or the Johannine chronology of the Last Supper and after the assessment of the contribution of astronomy, Jeremias discusses and rejects the Kiddush and Habhura theories according to which the Last Supper was interpreted as an anticipatory meal before the Passover and striking some of its "notes" just as First Evensong in the Anglican Church still has the notes of the day to follow. He then dismisses some of the best known objections to the view that the Last Supper was indeed the Passover meal. Not all his readers will be convinced that he has explained fully why the New Testament records omit all reference to the Paschal lamb and the bitter herbs and bear out that the Eucharist in the primitive community was of frequent occurrence instead of being an annual, Christian form of the Passover.

In the new material, as compared with the first edition, in chapter ii, Jeremias makes the interesting suggestion that on the basis of the Markan and Johannine accounts an early form of the Passion narrative emerges. Few, however, will follow him in all the details of this theory, as when he argues that the cursing of the fig-tree in 11. 12-14, and the subsequent discussion, 11. 20-25, is additional material. Did not Dr W. Manson knock a nail in the coffin of some Form-critics when he showed in considering Mark 11. 20-23, that "history in unseen ways controlled the Church's tradition to a greater extent than is commonly recognized "and that" the development of the tradition was not uniformly away from history, but sometimes led back to historical starting-points."? (*Jesus the Messiah,* 29f.)

The third chapter is most valuable and one welcomes especially Jeremias' retraction of his former view on the original text of the Lukan account of the Last Supper. He accepts now the Longer Text of Luke despite all the arguments in favour of the Shorter Text advanced by scholars from the time of Westcott and Hort to Dr Kilpatrick. One welcomes also his study here of the age of the Markan tradition, concluding that Mark gives us the oldest form of the words of Institution.

The fourth and final chapter is on the meaning of the Eucharistic words of Jesus. If one mentions a few points here, it is not to detract from a valuable discussion of a vital subject. The "many" for whom Jesus' blood would be shed is interpreted rightly in terms of Isa. 52. 14; 53. 11-12 (LXX) and the references to the Ethiopic Book of Enoch and to the Wisdom of Solomon are unnecessary (p.150). To interpret "in remembrance of Me" as "that God may remember Me" is a new and striking suggestion but is not absolutely necessary, as a consultation of all the references cited by Behm in Kittel's *Wörterbuch z. neuen Testament*, i, 351f. under εἰς ἀνάμνησιν would show. And to take Jesus' refusal to partake of the Cup as a vow rather than as a mere statement of fact will seem difficult and indeed impossible to many.

There is no hint in the introduction or in the bibliography that some important contributions have been made to the whole question since 1949. The articles of C. C. Torrey (*Jewish Quarterly Review*, N.S. 42, 1951-2, 237-250) and of S. Zeitlin (*ib.* pp. 251-260) deserved mention. More valuable, Dr Kilpatrick's article (*Expository Times*, lxiv, Oct. 1952, pp. 4-8) showed the relevance of the prayers and the meal in the romance *Joseph and Aseneth* to the discussion. There may have been three kinds of Jewish religious meal to be considered, the Passover, the meal in *Joseph and Aseneth* and the Last Supper, the first standing apart from the common pattern behind the other two (cf. Jeremias' reply, *ib.* December, 1952, pp. 91f.). Even more important is the recent work of A. Jaubert both in *Vetus Testamentum* iii, 1953, 251ff on the Qumran sect and the Book of Jubilees and in the *Revue de l'histoire des Religions*, cxlvi, 1954, pp. 140-173 in which he cites evidence for the existence of an ancient sacerdotal calendar used by the Qumran sect and by others according to Jubilees, besides the Jewish legal calendar. There are citations in Epiphanius which would support the view that the Last Supper was a Paschal meal according to the ancient sacerdotal calendar, falling on the Tuesday evening in the last week of Jesus' life. His arrest followed in the night, Tuesday-Wednesday, and time is allowed for all the events before He was crucified on the Friday, the eve of the legal Jewish Passover. If Mark followed the ancient sacerdotal calendar, "John" followed the other. Dare one hope for a third edition of Jeremias' work now, relating his views to the Quartodeciman controversy and the early liturgies, and also taking into account Jaubert's contribution?

C. S. C. WILLIAMS.

RUFINUS. A Commentary on the Apostles' Creed translated and annotated by J. N. D. KELLY (Ancient Christian Writers, Volume XX). The Newman Press, Westminster, Maryland and Longmans. pp. 166. 25s.

THE series "Ancient Christian Writers", published under Roman Catholic editorship in translation and with full notes has already established itself as a valuable addition to the "instrumenta studiorum" of scholars as well as of considerable interest to the general reader who wishes to acquaint himself with some of the principal works of the Fathers of the Church. It is not perhaps as widely known as it should be that some at least of the volumes have been edited b non-Roman Catholic scholars though the “imprimatur” and “nihi obstat” of the Roman censorship is still attached to their works Although in a few of the notes some signs of stress due to thi provision may perhaps be detected, this readiness of the editors t welcome contributions to the series from outside their own communion must be warmly welcomed as a hopeful indication of genuine partnership in knowledge between the two Churches. *O si si omnia*!

Dr Kelly has already established a justly deserved reputation fo himself in credal studies by his work on “Early Christian Creeds and no author could be better equipped to edit the Commentary o the Apostles' creed of Rufinus which is the principal direct source fo our knowledge of the Creeds of the Western Church at the period It is indeed a model of what such an edition should be. The translation is accurate and runs smoothly. The Introduction tells us i reasonable compass what we need to know as background for ou study of the work and the notes make their point with admirable concision and clarity. A sound balance is held between the requirements of the specialist and the needs of the general reader who does not wish for more than is necessary to enable him to read the work with intelligence and understanding. There is learning enough and to spare but the evidence is clearly marshalled and the chief points are well and clearly made.

If Rufinus has been fortunate in his editor, it is clear that the editor has wisely chosen his author. The work represents a set of Catechetical Lectures upon the Creed of the Church of Aquileia which, so far as can be ascertained, was almost identical with the Old Roman Creed. Since the time of Archbishop Ussher its importance as one of our principal sources for the Old Roman Creed has been fully recognized by scholars. It contains an important passage which throws considerable light on the History of the New Testament Canon while the text of the Biblical quotations which appear in the work normally correspond to the old Latin Versions dependent upon the Septuagint rather than upon the Vulgate produced from the original Hebrew of the Old Testament by St Jerome, the old friend and later enemy of Rufinus himself.

The work of Rufinus belongs to a period at which the ideas and methods of thought of the Christian East were making a renewed impact upon the Western Church. The writings of Origen were made available in Latin, partly by St Jerome before he turned violently against the Alexandrine master and in forms perhaps more correctly described as editions than as translations by Rufinus himself. Dr Kelly makes clear in his notes the substantial indebtedness of these Catechetical Lectures to the similar work of St Cyril of Jerusalem and St Gregory of Nyssa. It is however somewhat curious that, despite his knowedge at least in broad outline of the doctrine of the Pneumatomachi, his comments on the article on the Holy Spirit in e Creed do not display more knowledge of the more fully developed astern doctrine on the subject which had so recently led to the troduction of additional clauses in the Creed of Nicaea. It is at ny rate clear that within the limits of his work Rufinus deserves to ke his stand with St Ambrose as one of the intermediaries between astern and Western theology.

Some of the notes are particularly good. The section on the Canon f Rufinus is a mine of succinct information. Credal comments are, aturally enough, of considerable value. The meaning of the word Symbol" (in the credal sense), the distinction drawn by Rufinus etween "belief" and "belief in", the clauses "the quick and the dead", e Descent into Hell, the Resurrection of this flesh (an Aquileian peciality), the Patristic exegesis of St Luke i, 34f, and the interpretaon of our Lord's Parables (where Rufinus has quite a modern ring) re admirably learned and lucid pieces of exposition.

It is not, however, surprising that a few weaknesses emerge from me to time. A note on the accumulated epithets descriptive of the eing of God in chapter 4 where Rufinus is undoubtedly in line with long stream of Greek theology might well have been expected. he metaphor "a whole forest of evidence" used in connexion with e proofs from prophecy could usefully have been paralleled from rigen and Tyconius. There can surely be very little doubt that the itraean desert is the present Wadi Natrun where Coptic monasteries f considerable importance still exist to-day. The epitaph of bercius may not be sufficiently representative to do much to trengthen the view that the "discipline of secrecy" extends back urther than the fourth century. The whole subject however posively bristles with difficulties and certainty seems at present beyond ur reach. The statement that "Marcellus was, in effect, a Sabellian" a misleading oversimplification. It is somewhat surprising to be ld by an Anglican scholar that the claims of the book of Baruch be considered Scripture "were finally vindicated at the Council f Trent".

Anglican scholarship may justly be proud of a distinguished conibution to an excellent series.

H. E. W. TURNER.

RIGEN. PRAYER. EXHORTATION TO MARTYRDOM. Translated and annotated by J. J. O'MEARA. 253 pages. Longmans, Green and Co. 25s.

HE reviewer of translations into English of Origen's minor works ust feel rather as Macbeth did when, seeing the enemy armies reaming up to the walls of Dunsinane, he exclaimed, "The cry is ill, They come!" Within a little more than twelve months no less than three translations of Origen's *Treatise on Prayer* have been published in this country, all annotated (that of E. G. Jay, that of J. E. L. Oulton, and now this one), and two translations, also annotated, of Origen's *Exhortation to Martyrdom* (that of H. Chadwick, and now this one). Though the market for such translations is probably now saturated, it is interesting to compare the latest production with the others.

It has one advantage over the others in that it is the best produced of the three; the printing and format are most agreeable. Further the English style used is on the whole the most smooth-flowing and readable of the three. We might put this down to the natural facility of the Anglo-Irish for writing English (Dr O'Meara is Professor of Latin at University College, Dublin), but for the fact that Dr Oulton, a rival translator, is Irish too. We marvel, however, that Dr O'Meara could, as a classical scholar, have allowed the word "protagonists" to appear (p. 26) in a context where the sense demands simply (and Dr Jay and Dr Oulton supply) "supporters".

As a translator, Dr O'Meara sometimes gives us a shock. The greatest shock is to find the word *epiousion,* the obscure word which occurs in the Lord's Prayer and upon which Origen in his *Treatise on Prayer* has a long note, regularly translated by Dr O'Meara in the many instances in which it occurs in his translation by "supersubstantial". His justification for this is, of course, that Jerome devised this word to translate *epiousion* in Matthew vi, 11, in his Vulgate, and that the Douay version at this point translates "supersubstantial", with the extremely doubtful comment that the Greek can mean either this or "daily". But Knox in his translation of the New Testament at this point renders "daily", adding an unenthusiastic footnote on "supersubstantial". Souter (*A Glossary of Later Latin,* p. 405) describes "supersubstantial" as "based on a false derivation". Jay in his translation (pp. 177-179, 220-223) and Oulton in his (pp. 362-364) and Foerster in his elaborate article on *epiousios* in the T.W.B.N.T. (pp. 587-595) produce a damning weight of evidence against such a translation. O'Meara (p. 200, n. 6) refers the reader to Daniélou, but we have failed to find any reference to the word in Daniélou's book; in his fuller discussion of the word (pp. 218-219) he does not make clear to the reader what we think ought to be made clear, that "supersubstantial" (apart from the fact that any word beginning with the extraordinary combination *supersub*—ought to revolt a Latin scholar) is a wildly improbable rendering.

Again Dr O'Meara allows several very odd translations from the LXX to appear in his work with no explanation or with inadequate explanation. In his *Treatise on Prayer* xiii, 4. Origen quotes the LXX version of Job 3. 8, which runs "Let him curse it who curses the day, who is ready to subdue the great leviathan". O'Meara (p. 209) does his best in his note to make sense of the LXX translation, but gives no hint as to the meaning of the passage in the original Hebrew. In the same work (xiv, 4) Origen quotes

Iabakkuk 3. 1, in the LXX version as "In the midst of two animals iou wilt be known". O'Meara leaves the reader to make sense of iis without comment, though on the same page (210) he has thought necessary to explain the meaning of "obelized".

As an annotator Dr O'Meara is certainly competent, but cannot uite compare with Dr Jay in the fullness of his notes nor with r Oulton and Mr. Chadwick in his knowledge of Origen's works. n some points his information is new and valuable, such as in his ote on the cult of the goddess of fortune (pp. 230, 231). But he is enerally content to refer the reader to the works of others rather ian to comment himself. A thorough comparison of the *Conversa-on with Heracleides* with the *Treatise on Prayer* would have been aluable, and especially of the corrupt but interesting passage in the *onversation* about the *synthekai* (pp. 129 and 130 in Schérer's dition), with *Treatise on Prayer* xvi, 1. But we can find only one ery slight reference to the *Conversation* in Dr O'Meara's work (there re no indices of Scriptural or patristic passages). The note (p. 222) n the passage in the *Treatise on Prayer* on unforgiveable sins (xxviii,) is very meagre, and the account (p. 224) of what O'Meara calls rigen's doctrine of metempsychosis does not do justice to Origen's octrine; Origen often protests against an unqualified doctrine of netempsychosis, and in fact he did not hold that souls experienced nore than one incarnation, though after physical death they may have o encounter disembodied existence in a number of further worlds. he reference (p. 236, n. 182) of the words of the *Exhortation to Aartyrdom* 30 "who then is the priest without blemish who can ffer a victim without blemish . . ." to Hebrews 9. 14, and 7. 26, eems misconceived. The words in the text immediately before these nake it quite clear that the "victim without blemish" means the riest (or rather, as Origen ultimately means, the martyr) himself, vhereas the references in Hebrews refer to Christ.

This book forms No. XIX in the series of Ancient Christian Vriters, edited by J. Quasten and J. C. Plumpe. Though it may not ake a brilliant, it will certainly take a respected place in that series.

R. P. C. HANSON.

COMPANION TO THE STUDY OF ST AUGUSTINE. Edited by ROY W. BATTENHOUSE. Oxford University Press. 32s. 6d.

T. Augustine's friend and biographer Possidius of Calama observed hat the works written by him were so many that "even one of those iven to study would hardly have time to read them all". Whether rofessor Battenhouse and his fifteen collaborators have each of them ead all the Father's works does not appear; but certainly they have mong them both read and digested all the major works, as well as nuch modern writing upon them. This book, they say, is directed more towards the learner than the specialist: and it is true enough that it will be useful to beginners. But such an excellent work must go further than that. It is appreciative, and withal critical, enough to interest the more expert: and it will also, we hope, attract the general reader who has no time for special study but is desirous of obtaining a sound idea of the life and works and influence of the greatest of the Western fathers and of assimilating his message for this present time, with "the continuing vitality of Augustinian wisdom" (page vi).

Not the least attraction of this book (in contrast with many of the works which come to us from over the water) is that it is written in English, and noble English at that, rising on occasion to splendid eloquence. We have noticed only one or two Americanisms (notably "back of" for "at the back of" or "behind", and the solecistic "resurrected"): there are also a few misprints, chiefly in Latin and Greek words, and on pages 371 and 376 "hast" has lost its final letter One would also question whether "maturation" (page 115) can mean "arrival at maturity": its natural meaning, if it exists in English would be "arriving early". But these are small things in comparison with the splendour of the whole. There was a time when the writings of philosophers and scholars became a permanent part of English literature: the present work is well up to that high standard, and is a pleasure to read, for the beauty of its language as well as for its contents.

The work is arranged in three main divisions. Part one (three chapters) begins with a general introduction on St Augustine's significance today, and proceeds to a freshly written narrative of his life and a description of his work as bishop and pastor. Part two (seven chapters, the main body of the work) is intended as a critical guide to the major works, and splendidly fulfils its purpose. Seven contributors discuss in order (i) the earliest writings (here the reader will find that these imitations of Ciceronian dialogues are of more interest than he suspected): (ii) the works on Christian instruction; (iii) the anti-Manichean writings (with a reasoned assessment of the Manichean doctrines and of the Christian answers to them): (iv) the anti-Donatist writings; (v) the anti-Pelagian writings; (vi) the enigma of the Trinity (one would question whether "enigma" is the right word; but this chapter is an excellent summary of Augustine's great work, with revealing observations on the doctrines involved): and finally (vii) the City of God (a chapter which, in its appreciations of Augustine's meaning and its corrections of common misconceptions, is of interest above the average).

Part three (five chapters) discusses special aspects of St Augustine's thought. These must be read, to be properly appreciated: we can here give little more than the subject-headings. They are concerned with (i) Faith and Reason: (ii) the Creation of the World (in both these it becomes clear, and that without special pleading, that to Augustine the faith, and its content of assumed fact, were a guide o deeper thought, and in no sense fetters to it): (iii) the Person and work of Christ: (iv) the Christian ethic (with a section on the ethics of marriage and sex, from which it appears—though the writer does not draw this conclusion—that, except for the New Testament itself, ensible thought on these subjects hardly emerged until at the Reformation it first became possible for professional theologians to be honourably married men): and (v) the devotional life. There is also an excellent index, and (at the beginning of the book) a dated ummary of the chief events of St Augustine's life.

It is of great advantage that to each chapter is appended a set of uggestions for further reading: and, very wisely, notes indicated by numbers in the text are printed together at the ends of the chapters. The writers thus both justify their own observations, and provide acceptable guidance to the student as well as to that general reader who through this work may well be tempted to become the student. Reference is made throughout both to translations and to the standard editions of the Latin text.

We should have wished, if space had allowed, to quote at length number of this book's most eloquent passages, such as this page 278), "So the pilgrimage of thought that began amid the debris of Rome ends at the gates of Paradise". We must be content to efer to only a few of them: on page 316, concerning "productive ruth"; pages 317-323, on time and eternity; page 343, "at each ucceeding stage of his development, his acceptance of a new half-truth brought him liberty from the bondage of an old half-truth and hus led nearer the full vision of final truth"; on page 348, a sound observation on "an important reversal of the pattern of primitive and patristic Christianity"; the discussion of *persona* on page 353; and, age 393, "Augustine recognizes pride in man's pretension to be God and in an angel's pretension to be God; but he does not see pride in man's pretension to live as an angel".

Finally, this work is the fruit not only of much individual thought nd work, but of much common study and consultation. It forms a homogeneous whole, and both the general editor and his collaborators re to be congratulated and thanked for the success of their undertaking. This is a book which all clergymen should read, as well as many others. The reading of it demands a knowledge of no language xcept English.

E. EVANS.

CHRIST AND THE CÆSARS. By ETHELBERT STAUFFER. Translated from the German by K. and R. GREGOR SMITH. S.C.M. Press. 18s.

s form a series of historical essays, this work has value in the field f theology and biblical studies. Indeed, its most abiding contribution may prove to be in that field. In spite of limitations, the author gives well-balanced eschatological background and interpretation to the course of history, as befits a scholar from a Protestant university in a region dominated by Roman Catholicism (Erlangen, Bavaria).

The connecting theme of the essays is the "imperial myth" traced from its rise in ancient Egypt through the eastern and hellenistic empires to its final expression in Rome. Most of the book, as the title shows, is taken up with the struggle between Caesar-worship and Christ-worship. Christ is the fulfiller of eschatological hopes which no human *imperium* could fulfil. His triumph, through supra-historical, was secured on the scene of this world and later worked out (partially) in the victory of Christianity under Constantine. The book ends with essays on Constantine and on the Church's subsequent rescue of the best in the Graeco-Roman heritage from the ruins of the old Empire.

N.T. scholar and numismatist, Professor Stauffer uses his wide and detailed knowledge of coins with vivid and often novel effect. Adducing evidence also from sculpture (statuary and bas-relief) he illuminates the great figures of Roman history from Julius Caesar to Constantine, including those on the borders of the Roman world such as Cleopatra, Abgar, Ardishir and Zenobia. Many are the lasting impressions which the reader will carry away: the contrast and paradox of ruthlessness and clemency in Julius Caesar: the majesty of Cleopatra, who "like Brunhilda, could love only the strongest natures": the youthful Augustus, heralded as the fulfiller of all human yearnings by the poets of his time: Nero, moulded by the "philosopher" Seneca and launched by him upon a wave of artificial advent-hope: Domitian, with "the face of a hangman", officially portrayed with the nobility of a god: Commodus, the criminal lunatic, proclaiming himself "Pius" and "Felix", and publicly honoured far and wide as "the Blessed One": Caracalla, ruining the house of Severus in fratricidal strife while continuing to advertise the "eternal Empire" as vested in himself: Gallienus, self-styled author of Nature's gifts and entitled therefore as a goddess, "Galliena Augusta": Diocletian, "father of the gods", pursuing his policy of "Common Weal" with "the icy passion of the pure doctrinaire": and in Constantine, the imperial countenance no longer revealing (as in Decius) the "flicker of an apocalyptic end" but a "visionary readiness" consonant with the famous motto "Instinctu Divinitatis" (in the sense in which the author interprets those words).

The reader who is not a specialist in ancient history may yet wonder whether the writer's enthusiasm has not at times led him beyond the evidence into exaggeration, strained interpretation and unjustified certainty. Nevertheless the broad picture carries conviction. There is much that is highly suggestive, and interest is maintained throughout. The importance of coins for political propaganda in the ancient world is well brought out, and their value as source-material for history clearly shown despite the writer's tendency to hasty conclusions.

In his treatment of the Christian resistance to the Emperor-cult the author is, of course, dependent almost entirely upon literary evidence, and he gives a good selection from the apologists and martyrs, stressing the genuine loyalty of the Church to the political power in contrast to the hypocritical fawnings of the non-Christian populace. He attributes the Church's eventual victory to its concern for truth as against lies, rather than its gospel of mercy (Holl) or its doctrine of the God-Man (Seeberg). Attention is drawn to the development of the Church in the periods of peace as a preparation for the establishment by Constantine of the "imperium gratiae".

On the side of Jewish history in the triangle Judaism-Christianity-Rome, there are noteworthy passages on Josephus and Akiba, the latter seen in relation to St Paul.

All this is valuable but, as already suggested, less so than certain other features. Chief among these is the clear witness to the necessity of "myth", in Christian thinking as in any other interpretation of human life and history. "What is myth ? Myth is the speech of religion". Dietrich Bonhoeffer stood in the same stream when he wrote: 'The New Testament is not a mythological garbing of the universal truth; this mythology . . . is the thing itself—but the concepts must be re-interpreted. . . ." (Letters and Papers, p. 149). (There are indications that Professor Stauffer has been influenced by Bonhoeffer, e.g. on pp. 121 1. 25.) As the last of the three great myths (after the cyclic nature-myth and the tragic fate-myth) the imperial myth afforded hope where its predecessors could not. This hope could not be fulfilled in human emperors, but its myth-language (evangel, epiphany, advent, parousia) was a part of the divine preparation for the Kingdom of Christ. "Jesus chose an idea with a powerful mythological content in order to describe the mystery of his epiphany" (p. 29). "The men of the New Testament speak the language of myth because they want us to hear, in the epiphany of Christ, God's final answer to the ancient myth with its problems and allusions, its concerns and demands" (p. 27). Just as the analytical work of the Form-critics was later put to constructive uses, so now (and with Professor Stauffer's help) we are learning to use the distinctions so sharply drawn by the Demythologizers in a positive rather than a negative way.

The value and necessity of the mythological language of the New Testament are underlined in the treatment of several N.T. passages. The third temptation of our Lord (Matthean) is suggestively linked with the other two temptations and with the Caesars in these words: ". . . the way of *homo imperiosus,* who . . . wins the masses by miraculous bread and games" (p. 103). What is said on the parable of the man who went away to receive a kingdom, the healing of the blind man at Jericho, and the procession on Palm Sunday, is fresh and worthy of study. This is even more true of the incident of the Tribute Money, to which a whole essay is devoted and of which the smallest details are given significance. The Apocalypse, regarded as the work of John the Apostle, the Son of Thunder, is interpreted in terms of a Messianic Games Festival, a parody of the Imperial Games as conducted by the Asiarch in the time of Domitian. This theory, though not convincing in every detail, will have to be taken into account in future studies. (To a surpassing degree this way of reading the seer's visions clears the mind of their usual bizarre effect.) The suggested influence of the eruption of Vesuvius in A.D. 79 upon the apocalyptic language of the visions is interesting. The Old Testament allusions and the Jewish liturgical motif are not forgotten. Yet another answer is given to the riddle of the number 666, and the author is somewhat complacent in according it finality.

The essays achieve a popular appeal in spite of technical words, amongst which the triad "theomachy, Christomachy, ecclesiomachy" is the hardest group to "stomach"! "Voelkerwanderung" and "Realpolitik" are left untranslated, as are many of the words and shorter phrases in Latin and Greek. The translation is adequate, though hardly Shakespearean as Professor Stauffer would like to think. Between the author and the translators lies responsibility for the transition from 'daimon" to "demon" in the course of the book (subtle or accidental?), unusual and inartistic renderings of words from the Gloria ("thou *alone* art holy . . .", p. 253) and Vexilla Regis ("The banners of the King go before us", p. 284), and the meaning "blessed" as applied to the word "pius" (p. 223). Is the word "provocatory" recognized in English (p. 288, date lists)? Commas are retained around subordinate clauses in too many cases by the translators. The printing is not entirely free from errors (p. 118 1. 31 "double abhorrent", p. 183 1. 21 "Silentarii", p. 193 1. 1 "Phil. 36", p. 265 1. 34 "Agbar"). The quotation from Shakespeare on p. 70 needs re-aligning ("upon" should be in the previous line). The date-lists at the end of the book are useful but surprising in places (Jesus aged 38 at the Crucifixion). The 17 plates are interesting and relevant in varying degrees, and such relevance as they have is not always made obvious. But these are small points in a fascinating and widely instructive book.

JOHN C. SLADDEN.

BYZANTINE STUDIES AND OTHER ESSAYS. By NORMAN H. BAYNES. Athlone Press. 35s.

THIS collection of papers has been made by friends and colleagues of Professor Baynes at University College, London, with his consent and co-operation. Church historians will regret the absence of his lecture to the British Academy in 1929, *Constantine the Great and the*

Christian Church. This and other papers may appear in a subsequent volume. They will find much in this that is of the first importance for them.

First of all there are searching criticisms of some attractive theories which, for want of such astringent attention, have been widely accepted. All who deal with the Roman Empire owe an immense debt to Rostovtzeff. But have we all paused to consider precisely where the experience of the Russian Revolution obscured his vision? Here, in three pages retrieved from the *Journal of Roman Studies* for 1929, Professor Baynes demolishes the alliance between the peasantry and the army from inscriptions and papyri, most of them cited by Rostovtzeff himself in his own notes. Henri Pirenne's belief in the economic unity of the Mediterranean before the Arab invasion receives a like trouncing in the same review. Professor Baynes analyzes the information in Gregory of Tours about the world beyond Gaul, and shows in precise detail that while he had regular news from Spain, his knowledge of Rome and the lands beyond was intermittent, and derived from particular travellers named in his text. He believed that Antioch was in Egypt. Among other material from reviews in the same *Journal* may be found a sketch for a biography of St. Athanasius, and three remarkable pages on "diplomatic silence" as a weapon of St. Ambrose.

I have put these critical accomplishments first, since the Professor's positive interpretations of Byzantine Hellenism, which naturally take pride of place in this book, are better known through his small volume on *The Byzantine Empire* in the Home University Library. Four lectures elaborate aspects of this subject in greater detail. "The Byzantine State", hitherto unpublished, is the most important. To this must be added two brief notes on "Eusebius and the Christian Empire" and on "The Imperial Cult". These are needed not only by medievalists, but by those modern historians and theologians who still offend by their use of such terms as Byzantinism and Cesaro-Papism. Two longer essays relating to Iconoclasm stand on rather more controversial ground. They are useful correctives to theories based on a priori theological judgements and on the intuitions of art history, but perhaps Professor Baynes is too pessimistic about the possibility of drawing any conclusions from the art of the catacombs, and somewhat severe in his judgements on middle Byzantine theology.

These essays lead us on to the greatest pleasure awaiting the ecclesiastical historian in these pages. Professor Baynes is an adept at retelling popular tales of sanctity, charity, and miracles. Some of the stories here retold from the *Pratum Spirituale* of John Moschus (seventh century) throw a flood of light on liturgical and eucharistic issues. For instance there was a lay monk, not a priest, who consecrated the eucharist by mistake, in all innocence. There are children who heard the eucharistic prayer recited in a loud voice, and played at liturgies, provoking celestial intervention. A note refers to another source for "a similar story dating from the Arab period". There are saints who mended shoes, ploughed fields for impoverished neighbours under cover of night, carried tired children along the roads, and one who fed dogs, birds, and even ants. "It is indeed their sheer friendliness which makes some of these holy men so attractive" and it is Professor Baynes's "natural sympathy with the man in the East Roman street" that gives to all his writing on Byzantine civilization charm as well as penetration. This sympathy extends to hagiographers, conscientiously following sources even when they are favourable to a Jewess; to those who stole and collected relics for Constantinople, the queen of cities; and to the confidence of her citizens in their celestial guardians. Professor Baynes is a rigorous critic who can yet employ "a willing suspension of disbelief" for critical ends. A good example is his discussion of a passage in Lactantius, *De Mortibus Persecutorum,* where the German scholar, Dr. K. Roller, claimed to detect a plurality of sources. Professor Baynes argues: "The implication of the narrative of Lactantius is surely that Licinius entered into an attempt at conciliation at that moment because his troops were assured of victory: otherwise his action would have dismayed his outnumbered army. The dream remains the presupposition alike of the conduct and of the success of Licinius . . . Licinius with far inferior forces had not hoped for victory: his aim was to delay Maximin's advance. Then come the vision and the consequent assurance: the army is taught the supernatural litany, and it, too, is inspired with a new courage."

Perhaps the most important contribution that Professor Baynes has made to church history is his understanding of the East Roman imperial idea. Four pages (55-8) on *philanthropia* and *eusebeia,* considered in relation to their pagan sources, should be meditated by all ecclesiastical historians who are tempted to make a whipping-boy of the imperial power. "The pity is that modern students of Greek philosophy have never troubled to trace the history of these virtues into the Byzantine period, that is to say into the age when they gain a new interest from the fact that they practically influence the conduct of rulers and when from their association with Christian faith they gain a fresh and living content". The pity is that the West in the Middle Ages knew the Byzantine state, like Byzantine art mainly through imitations. These have obscured for us not only the true character of medieval Byzantine culture, but what is more important, the nature and direction of the Christian empire in the most important formative period for the whole history of Christian civilization, the age from Constantine to Justinian.

A misprint on p. 117 requires correction. Surely not even Strygowski ascribes world-wide influence to the art of the Mandeans. He attempted to recover Mazdaean (Zoroasterian) motives from Persian carpets and curtains.

George Every, S.S.M.

ROBERT GROSSETESTE, SCHOLAR AND BISHOP. Essays in Commemoration of the Seventh Centenary of his Death. Edited by D. A. CALLUS. With an Introduction by Sir Maurice Powicke. Oxford; Geoffrey Cumberlege at the Clarendon Press. 1955. 42s.

THERE were many bishops of Lincoln in the Middle Ages but *Lincolniensis* can be almost certainly taken to mean only one of them: Robert Grosseteste. Anyone who has studied the thirteenth century at all closely will have come up against the name of Grosseteste over and over again. In an age of great men he stands above them all, as Salimbene called him " one of the greatest clerks of the world ", or, as Roger Bacon described him " perfect in divine and human wisdom ".

The things about Grosseteste which arouse our admiration were, first, his intellectual powers. He had a mind which was positively encyclopaedic, covering such subjects as theology, philosophy, mathematics, science, philology, and homiletics. Writers from Bacon onwards tumble over each other in their praise of him. Fr Callus, in this book, says that his linguistic powers "are recognised even by modern scholars as great not only for his own age but for every age", while Dr Crombie calls him " the first great English scientist and philosopher of science ".

The second point is the breadth of his vision. With such vast knowledge and a mind so clear and disciplined Grosseteste was able to see life as a whole and to get things in their right proportions. He was preeminently a scholar, and a man who spent the best part of his life in an academic atmosphere. And yet he never allowed knowledge to become an end in itself. His ambition was to reform the Church, to improve the efficiency and devotion of the clergy, to see that they were better educated, better able to exercise their ministry which was the *ars artium*, the cure of souls. This was what the Church needed before all else, and we shall understand Grosseteste only if we keep this clearly in view. In all his work this was constantly before his eyes. It comes out in his intellectual work, in his government of the diocese of Lincoln, in his preaching and writing. It was for this end that he welcomed the friars in 1221 and accepted the position of lector to the Franciscans of Oxford in 1229-30. Although Chancellor of the University and the most distinguished scholar in the place he was perfectly content to accept the invitation of Agnellus of Pisa to take over the direction of studies of a little group of very humble friars, few of whom had any academic distinction. But it was typical of him, and was due to the fact that he saw in them something which might be used to promote the object which was dearest to his heart.

The third point was his amazing vitality and energy. His vast knowledge was acquired through a stern discipline with himself. He became Bishop of Lincoln, the largest and most exacting diocese of England, at the age of about sixty-six and held it until he was eighty-four. During those eighteen years, from 1235 to 1253, he was constantly on the move, continuously coping with all the problems of a diocese which contained several hundred parishes, an exceptionally large number of religious houses, and the University of Oxford. Yet in the midst of all this, and his visits to the king and to the pope, he was able to find time to carry on his intellectual work. Matthew Paris had some reason for describing him as "the Bishop of Lincoln to whom quiet is a thing unknown".

The fourth point is his courage. He had many powerful bodies to face in his work—the Dean and Chapter of Lincoln, the great abbeys, influential patrons, the king and the pope. But Grosseteste was quite without fear. Over and over again he refused nominations if he thought them unworthy even though made by persons whom few would care to challenge. When the monks of Canterbury excommunicated him he threw the document on the ground and stamped on it in spite of the fact that it bore the image of S. Thomas on the seal. He was old enough and experienced enough to know what he thought right, and was prepared to do it. His zeal for a good, active devoted clergy was so great that he was prepared to resist even the pope when he demanded a prebend at Lincoln for his nephew, Frederick of Lavagna.

Lastly, his piety. Behind the man of action and the scholar was a very humble and simple man. In 1232 he surprised all his friends by resigning all his preferments except one; he did not want to be a pluralist or give any appearance of worldliness. Besides his works of scholarship he found time to write books of devotion and manuals for the clergy such as the *Templum Domini*. His most earnest wish was that God should be glorified and that men should come to love and worship Him.

There is, therefore, no doubt whatever of Grosseteste's greatness, nor of the justice of Sir Maurice Powicke's calling him "a portentous person, a man of universal genius". Such a man has earned a good biography based on the most up-to-date research and written by one who both understands and admires his subject. Such a work is now overdue. The only serious modern life is that by Sir Francis Stevenson, published in 1899. Since then much has been done (e.g. by Professor S. H. Thomson in his book *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste*, 1940), and Grosseteste's work and grandeur better appreciated. The seventh centenary of his death would have been an occasion for such a biography, but the opportunity was not taken. But, instead of a biography, we have now this collection of essays by a group of learned scholars each of whom has some special contribution to make.

It opens with an Introduction by Sir Maurice Powicke which immediately takes us to the heart of the matter. In a few pages Sir Maurice gives us a sketch of Grosseteste's greatness, "the range of his incisive mind, his tireless energy, and the grandeur of his character". This is followed by six essays and three appendices. Of the essays, the first four deal with Grosseteste's work as a scholar, the last two with his work as an administrator and shepherd of souls. Fr D. A. Callus writes first of "Robert Grosseteste as Scholar" and his essay is much the longest in the book. It gives us the facts of Grosseteste's early life and then goes on to discuss his work as philosopher, theologian, preacher and translator. Fr Callus discusses all Grosseteste's authentic works and tries to arrange them in chronological order; but the point is made that Grosseteste thought of all his theological work as serving an end, the cure of souls which he exercised as bishop both himself and through his clergy. In the next essay Dr Beryl Smalley, who writes on "The Biblical Scholar", goes into greater detail about his commentaries and his method of biblical study; and in the following essay Dr A. C. Crombie gives us a summary of his larger book, *Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science,* which he published in the year of the septcentenary, 1953. This is followed by an account of Grosseteste's library by Dr R. W. Hunt. Trivet, in the early fourteenth century, wrote that Grosseteste bequeathed all his books to the Oxford Franciscans, but not many of these can now be traced. Various manuscripts are, however, known to have been the property of Grosseteste, or used by him, and Dr Hunt can tell us, from these, something of his methods of study.

The next two essays—one by the late Canon Srawley on "Grosseteste's Administration of the Diocese of Lincoln" and the other by Mr Pantin on "Grosseteste's Relations with the Papacy and the Crown"—will probably be found to be the part of the book of greatest interest to the general reader. Dr Srawley (who gave us, in 1953, a delightful essay on Grosseteste, published in the *Lincoln Minster Pamphlets*) here shows us the bishop at work in his diocese, and Mr Pantin discusses some of the problems which arose between an active, determined, reforming prelate and the two powers against which he was most likely to come into conflict, the throne and the papacy. Finally, Miss Kathleen Major (who has done so much for the Lincoln archives) writes on the *familia* of Grosseteste; Canon Eric Kemp on the attempts to secure his canonization; and Dr Hill of Lincoln on the opening of the bishop's tomb in 1782 and the finds which were then made. There is, therefore, a great wealth of material in this book, all of it on a very high level. The only flaw would seem to be the absence of an index.

Throughout this book the greatness of Grosseteste is made abundantly clear. The thirteenth century was an age of great men—of saints like S. Richard of Chichester and S. Edmund Rich, of scholars like Roger Bacon, Stephen Langton and Duns Scotus, of administrators like Richard le Poore and Hugh of Wells—but Grosseteste stands out above them all for the versatility of his mind, the depth of his thought and the courage of his convictions. All who are interested in medieval England look forward to the day when they can settle down to read an up-to-date, adequate life of this "portentous person". When that day comes they will find that the author of that life has depended much upon this collection of essays, this *pignus pietatis*, written by a group of distinguished scholars on behalf of all those who respect and venerate the memory of "Saint Robert".

JOHN R. H. MOORMAN.

THE ENGLISH CHURCH IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY. By W. A PANTIN. Cambridge: University Press. 1955.

This important and eminently readable book (based on the Birkbeck Lectures for 1948) treats the history of the fourteenth-century Church as a sequel to that of the thirteenth, rather than as a prelude to Renaissance and Reformation. Mr. Pantin divides his subject into three parts, each of which embodies the fruits of long research. In Part I, he examines the social structure of the Church, from the bishops down to the parish clergy; patronage and the use of benefices; papal provisions; and Anglo-papal relations. The bishops are classified according to their previous careers and qualifications and Mr. Pantin illustrates the tendency for the proportion of civil servants among them to rise sharply at the beginning of the century and to reach its height in the second and third quarters, while the number of scholars decreases and the aristocratic element grows, as the century proceeds. It is not easy to see what significance is to be attached to these fluctuations. Some of them—the large number of civil servant bishops in 1325, for instance—seem to have been the result of purely fortuitous political developments: and Mr. Pantin's tentative suggestion that the influx of aristocrats reflects an increase of baronial as against royal power can hardly be sustained. The only clear instance of an aristocrat gaining promotion at the bidding of the "baronial opposition" is the translation of Arundel to York in 1388. All the other aristocratic bishops of the century were provided, either under Edward III, when no such opposition existed, or in accordance with the wishes of Richard II and his supporters. It is noteworthy that the number of alien bishops was negligible, of aliens holding parochial benefices very small: aliens are found most commonly in the richer cathedrals, notably in York, Lincoln, and Salisbury. On the statutes of provisors and praemunire (1351 and 1353), Mr. Pantin makes the interesting point that they represent, on the one hand, "an important survival of traditional feudal rights" and, on the other, "an extension of the existing principle of writs of prohibition". Too much originality has been claimed for them; but the author has less to say of the acts of 1390 and 1393 which went a good deal further. In the fourteenth, as in all other centuries, the Church had to find some means of adjustment to the world: the complex system of provisions and patronage was the outcome of this inevitable entanglement. Mr. Pantin regards too great readiness to compromise as the characteristic weakness of the Church in this age: but he emphasizes that she was the victim, not the agent, of exploitation and that there was no attempt at clerical domination of purely secular politics. Perhaps there should have been some. It is disappointing to find that, with the possible exception of John Stratford, no "sublime and literate person" seems to have ventured a protest against the aggressive militarism of Edward III and his sons.

Part II covers the "geography of learning", topics of controversy, and some outstanding personalities. At Oxford and Cambridge, the colleges, though small, are shown to have been of great importance: for they offered a new and attractive form of benefice which was never exploited and a congenial atmosphere for the formation of learned coteries. Merton, for instance, produced a notable group of scholars in the early and middle years of the century, among them Thomas Bradwardine, *doctor profundus,* and the less well-known Walter Burley, *doctor planus et perspicuus.* Several of the cathedrals, both monastic and secular, were also centres of learning; and the friars, who were pre-eminent in the universities, also maintained schools of their own at Norwich and York. Sojourns at the Roman Curia influenced the work of scholars like Richard FitzRalph and Adam Easton, who are among the remarkable personalities discussed in chapter VIII. Topics of controversy ranged from such purely theological issues as the Immaculate Conception, predestination and grace, to matters of practical politics, like church endowment and the rights of the state. This is the mental climate in which Wyclif's opinions were formed: and in this atmosphere of lively controversy it was some time before the English bishops awoke to the presence among the Oxford scholars of a frank and unrepentant heretic.

In the third, and, perhaps, the most illuminating part of this excellent book, Mr. Pantin embarks upon the vast topic of religious literature, including manuals of instruction for parish priests, religious and moral treatises in the vernacular, and devotional and mystical writing. These manuals and treatises represent a heroic attempt to educate the clergy in the proper exercise of their functions and to instruct and edify the laity. Here, more than in any other sphere, the disciplinary legislation of the previous century bore fruit. The treatises themselves are goldmines of information for the social historian and the extracts quoted by Mr. Pantin will whet his readers' appetites for more. We learn, for instance, that every parishoner was expected to be familiar with Magna Carta: we catch a glimpse of the inveterate superstitions of the country people, their trust in " auguries and the chattering of birds . . . in certain evil casting of lots ", and of the excessive wickedness of seafaring men, with their wives in every port. Some of the best-known among the vernacular treatises, notably *Handlyng Synne* and the *Azenbite of Inwit,* are translated, or derived from earlier works: but originality is claimed for the *Livre de Seyntz Medicines* of a layman, duke Henry of Lancaster, whose reputation as a devotional author is thus rehabilitated simultaneously with his reputation as a soldier.[1]

The relevance of preaching, wall-paintings and religious drama to the theme of popular education is also indicated. Mr. Pantin does not attempt to deal systematically with the four great mystics of the period—Richard Rolle, Walter Hilton, Julian of Norwich, and the anonymous author of the *Cloud of Unknowing*: but he rightly insists on the importance of the "great mass of anonymous mystical and devotional writings in prose and verse" as illustrating the piety of the age.

Mr. Pantin's treatment of his subject is admittedly and necessarily selective: but within his self-imposed limits, he has produced a memorable and fair-minded study of the Age of Faith, apt illustrations and shrewd comment being combined with a wealth of learning lightly carried. The book is admirably produced and furnished with a good index of proper names, though none of subjects. It is likely to prove indispensable to all students of the late medieval Church.

M. McKisack.

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[1] A. H. Burne, *The Crecy War* (1955), 101 *seq.*

THE IMAGERY OF BRITISH CHURCHES. By M. D. ANDERSON. John Murray. 25s.

Miss Anderson begins her Introduction with the question which the modern sightseer—if he has any interest at all in the subject—is certain to ask when he sees the wall paintings, sculpture, and glass of medieval churches: What does it all mean? It would be hard to find an English book which gives the answers more clearly.

As she says, the complex system of medieval symbolism had been forgotten by the 18th century; and it is no use referring to the antiquaries of the *Gentleman's Magazine* period. They were on familiar ground when they wrote about monuments and heraldry: but when they tried to explain anything else, they made the most fantastic guesses. Later, there were books like G. R. Lewis's *Illustrations of Kilpeck Church . . . with an Essay on Ecclesiastical Design and a Descriptive Interpretation.* Lewis was looking for Scriptural Edification, and found it in the most unexpected places; but it is quite certain that if the subject is to be understood, more is needed than the Bible Only. J. M. Neale was the first to study what the medieval writers had written about it, and it was he who made Symbolism a really popular subject among ecclesiologists in the 1840's. It all seemed very foolish to the ordinary Church-goer; but there is no doubt that he had found the clue.

This book would have pleased Neale. Miss Anderson would not claim to have solved every problem: even she must have stood in perplexity before some fragmentary piece of wall painting, and waited in vain for enlightenment to come from the sub-conscious memory.

But she has written a most useful handbook, scholarly, and full of out-of-the-way information.

Part 1 deals with the Approaches to the subject by the Parson, the Craftsman and the Parishioners. Part 2—on Structure and Plan—is not as interesting as the rest of the book: the chapter on Plan contains nothing new, and hardly seems to get under way. Part 3—The Picture Book of the Church—deals with the Seven Sacraments and Devotional Images, the Significance of Position, the Choice of Subjects, The Conventions of Religious Imagery, Old and New Testament Subjects, Heaven and Hell, the Life of the Blessed Virgin Mary, the Saints, the Mirror of Morals and the Mirror of Nature.

Miss Anderson makes it clear that the choice of subjects from the New Testament was practically limited to the themes that were associated with the Church festivals: the Old Testament subjects were those to which Christian teachers had given a mystical interpretation. There was no interest in the Old Testament for its own sake: the sacrifice of Abel typified that of Christ, the murder of Abel typified the Crucifixion, and so on. "Medieval scholars developed the science of typology until each important event in the Gospel story was associated with a varying number of types taken not only from the Old Testament, but also from secular history, old Jewish legends and the curious lore of the Bestiary". Almost anything is possible: even the drunkenness of Noah is a type of the stripping and mocking of Christ; and David at the court of Achish King of Gath—because he feigned himself mad *in manibus suis*—prefigures Christ bearing His Body in His hands at the Last Supper.

The New Testament pictures are more straightforward, and the meaning lies on the surface. But many of the details which were (and, indeed, still are) introduced were derived either from the apocryphal gospels or from the mystery plays.

There is a useful appendix giving the arrangement of types and antitypes from the *Biblia Pauperum*: another lists the various animals, real or imaginary, to be seen in English churches, and gives their significance, if they have any.

The illustrations are adequate, as far as they go. The Composite View of a Chancel is not very successful: the piscina and sedilia come too far west, and the whole drawing bears a strong resemblance to the plans for de-Victorianizing chancels, and rendering them chaste and correct, which come up before Advisory Committees almost every month.

There are very few slips. South Lopham is in Norfolk, not Suffolk. Are the bosses at Sampford Brett really medieval? The church was rebuilt in the 1830's: the *Ecclesiologist* (April, 1842) commented adversely on it, but praised the carving of the pews by Rex of Exeter. "We are glad to have an opportunity of mentioning this artist, as well as Webber, of Dunster: they have both formed their style by a careful study of the magnificent woodwork, of which so much still remains in our western churches, and it would require no common ecclesiologist to distinguish the new work from the old". The church is a curious specimen of Gothick, and one naturally assumes that it is all of a piece: but Miss Anderson may be right.

Basil F. L. Clarke.

A History of Worship in the Church of Scotland. By William D. Maxwell. Oxford University Press. 15s.

As a brief and readable account of the development of Christian worship in the Church of Scotland, Dr Maxwell's latest book, the Baird Lectures for 1953, is likely to become something in the nature of a classic. Much of its interest lies in a series of descriptions of Sunday morning worship in the Church, ranging from that at Rome in the late fourth century, the worship in which St. Ninian when he was finishing his education there would have joined, down to a typical Church of Scotland service in the mid-eighteenth century. These descriptions, marked as is indeed the whole book of impeccable scholarship, should be of great use to any clergyman who wants to preach a course of sermons on the history of Christian worship Dr Maxwell is most careful to emphasise what was good in the pre-Reformation services, and his account of a High Mass in a great cathedral or monastic church has the compelling romanticism of a scene in one of Scott's historical novels.

Dr Maxwell does not neglect church architecture. Unlike many contemporary writers on this subject he leaves us in no doubt that the significance of a church lies first and foremost in the faith and worship which it was built to serve, and that church architecture cannot be treated in isolation from liturgy. In his descriptions of the churches built in Scotland in the eighteenth century, which incidentally fire one with a desire to see them, he explains how their design and lay out are related to the Scottish services of the day. Particularly refreshing too, is the way he deplores the unhappy results which have come from Scotland adapting the Anglican practice of filling chancels with organs and choir stalls. "Sentimental love of the House of God", he remarks, "as the place where His honour dwelleth is not enough; it must also be informed love, born and expressed of knowledge".

The chapters on post-Reformation worship in Scotland are full of information, not readily available elsewhere, and which ought to be more widely known. Some of the features that most characterized this worship between the seventeenth century and comparatively modern times, such as the omission of the Lord's Prayer, the Creed and the Doxology and a dislike of having passages from Scripture read at the public services, are not particularly Scottish or for that matter Presbyterian. They were due to the influence of English puritanism and also a feeling that they were inseparably connected with episcopacy. The practice of communicating people in their seats, only dates from 1824. The traditional Church of Scotland way of receiving Communion was for the communicants to sit round the communion table in turn in companies of thirty or forty. Nor is it strictly accurate to describe the worship of the Church of Scotland as unliturgical. Although the prayers of the minister were traditionally not written prayers, the minister did not compose new prayers for each Sunday, but followed a set pattern and to a great extent used Sunday by Sunday the same words and phrases. The result was that broadly speaking there was an adherence to the principle of liturgical uniformity, at any rate in the matter of the prayers.

The last hundred years have witnessed a continually growing appreciation in the Church of Scotland of ancient liturgical forms and of the value of set forms of service, due to that quickening of interest in Christian worship which it has experienced along with every other body in western christendom. To date the most important outcome is the *Book of Common Order* published in 1940 under the authority of the General Assembly as a guide to ministers in the conduct of worship. But the emphasis on liturgy, represented by this service book, has real genuine roots in Scottish presbyterianism. As long ago as 1827 the prayers of the ancient liturgies were described in a document of some formality as "the divinely approved petitions of saints", and no liturgist, south of the border, has ever coined a more admirable phrase.

G. W. O. ADDLESHAW.

THE POETRY OF MEDITATION. A study in English Religious Literature of the Seventeenth Century. By LOUIS L. MARTZ, Professor of English, Yale University. Yale University Press. Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 40s.

This is an illuminating study of what is often called metaphysical poetry. The writer shows that this does not, as is often thought, derive from Donne but is already represented by Southwell. It is inspired by the technique and intentions of the systematic meditation developed in the sixteenth century, notably in the Exercises of St Ignatius, but traceable backwards to the spirituality of the later middle ages. It is therefore, he argues, better termed meditative poetry, the poetry of meditation.

The structure, Professor Martz shows, of the typical meditation, a composition of place visualizing its subject, analysis of the theme by the understanding, and the colloquy in which the will inflamed by affection elicits acts in conformity with the truth meditated and thereby is unitel to God, can be traced in much of Southwell's poetry, in Donne's Holy Sonnets, and in Herbert. It is also studied in Crashaw's hymn to the Name of Jesus, and in Vaughan's "I walkt the other day".

The reader can hardly fail to be convinced of the author's thesis and of the light it sheds on this meditative poetry. And the detailed comparison between the successive steps in the Scala Meditoria of Mauburnus' "Rosetum" (1494) and the development of Crashaw's hymn reveals striking analogies. I am inclined however to think that Professor Martz has pressed his argument too far, when he argues that Crashaw's conclusion, a threat of doom against those who refuse the worship due to the Holy Name, corresponds to the final stages of Mauburnus' scheme, resigned submission to God's will. Pioneers who catch sight of an important truth hitherto unrecognized are liable to do this. The proof is sufficient none the less.

The book reinforces a consoling truth already known but of which the significance is perhaps insufficiently appreciated, that despite the theological cleavage and the bitter polemics of post-Reformation religion, the spirituality of continental Catholicism, even of the Jesuits, penetrated into Protestant religion and united theological and ecclesiastical opponents in spirituality, the practice of prayer. As the author shows, in consequence of a rigid Calvinism the Puritans long held out against this meditative prayer. Baxter however in his *Saints' Rest* was successful in introducing it and blending it with distinctively Protestant piety so that henceforward Nonconformist pietism was warmed and enriched by it. Thus Luis of Granada's *Exercise of a Christian Life* the *Imitation of Christ,* Scupoli's *Spiritual Combat,* St Francis of Sales' *Introduction to a Devout Life* were influential in English Protestant devotion. Even the *Christian Directory* by the Jesuit Robert Persons, whose political activities were disliked by many, probably the majority of, English Catholics, was adapted by Edmund Bunny without acknowledgement for Protestant use.

The devotion to Our Lady whose principal meditation is the Dominican Rosary was indeed halted by the theological barrier. Professor Martz, however, shows its presence in Vaughan's poem "The Knot", in "The Female Glory" by the Anglican Antony Stafford and in Herbert's regret that he is not permitted to pray to Mary. But I feel sure that the only King whose command in such a matter was regarded by Herbert is Our Lord, not also, as Martz suggests, the King of England.

A detailed chapter on Southwell shows his anticipation of themes developed later by Herbert and Donne—self-analysis, the sacred parody of love poetry, and the preoccupation with devotional tears whose supreme achievement will be Crashaw's Weeper. The chapter on Donne is a detailed analysis and criticism of the two Anniversaries. The author gives strong reasons for thinking they were in fact both written on the first anniversary of Elizabeth Drury's death. Unlike the First which he finds incoherent, the second Anniversary is in his opinion unified by the central theme of the restoration by union with God of the Divine Likeness in the soul defaced by sin, the dead girl being but an example of its successful achievement.

The two final chapters study Herbert, his religious debt to St. Francis de Sales and Savonarola, his poetical to Sidney, the influence upon him of the popular metrical Psalms, the sacramental nucleus in the Temple and its unity. Here once more I am conscious of exaggeration. In a volume of poems by the same poet, concerned generally with the same department of experience and written at no very great distance of time, cross-references of theme, treatment or language do not argue that a particular poem was placed where it occurs in reference to a poem often admittedly several poems removed from it. Presumably the poems named after the Church—such as the Church Porch—were arranged in reference to each other, though even here, the author informs us, Ferrar changed the place of a poem on the Blessed Virgin interpolated in the manuscript between two " Church " poems. Otherwise the fact, here pointed out, that poems of spiritual conflict and desolation are succeeded by poems of peaceful assurance suggests that the arrangement is roughly chronological. Of particular value is the study of the relationship between mediaeval religious poetry and the poetry of the meditative school illustrated by a comparison between the Stabat Mater and Crashaw's paraphrase of the hymn. It is the elaboration of an identical theme stated more simply and directly by the mediaeval writer. As the author well puts it, " Under the impulse of the art of meditation, religious poetry of the seventeenth century resembles a universal descant upon the devout plainsong of mediaeval poetry ", as I would add, the music of Vittoria and Palestrina is a descent upon plainchant. Both exemplify the continuity between Gothic and Baroque culture with all the branches of art expressing it. Baroque is in every field the development and fulfillment of Gothic, a descant upon Gothic.

On the other hand I am unable to regard a " tense coexistence of conflicting elements under steady control moving towards a predestined end " as distinctive of any particular school of literature. Is it not of the nature of all the greatest literary achievement, of the world's great tragedies and epics? Mrs. Bennett hits more surely on the distinctive quality of this poetry: "the peculiarity of the metaphysical (the meditative) poets that the "relations" they perceive are more often logical than sensuous or emotional " (though this must be qualified for Crashaw) " and that they constantly connect the abstract with the concrete, the remote with the near and the sublime with the commonplace ".

In view of the fact that the majority was illiterate it is an exaggeration to say that the pseudo-Bonaventure's "Mediations on the Life of Christ" were "devotedly followed by millions throughout Europe and England ".

" Seely starres must needs leave shining
When the sunne is shadowed ".

One is surprised that Southwell could have written anything so obviously, so preposterously untrue.

The Index of prohibited books did not exist in 1529. It is unlikely that Crashaw's "Hymn to the Holy Name" had in view the feast of the Holy Name as kept by the Franciscans. More probably it was written for August 7 when the Sarum feast of the Holy Name is commemorated as a black letter day in the Prayer Book calendar.

To conclude, I cannot forbear quoting a quotation from Southwell's "Short Rule of Good Life" "God is delighted in cleanliness, both bodily and ghostly, and detesteth sluttishness".

E. I. WATKIN.

THE CALL OF THE CLOISTER. Religious Communities and kindred bodies in the Anglican Communion. By PETER F. ANSON. S.P.C.K. 42s.

THIS is from every point of view a most remarkable book. The author is a Roman Catholic layman but he has provided the Church of England with the fullest and the most objective account of the revival of the religious life in the Church of England that has been written thus far. If at times the book almost descends to the level of a Directory of Religious Communities in its concern to say something of every known community, where the author is really interested and has good records to work on, he tells his story quite brilliantly. He is very well read not only in the history but also in the fiction of the period with which he is concerned.

In footnotes he tells us of parallel developments in Roman Catholic communities in this country, or what happened to individuals who made their surrender to the Church of Rome. One such generous footnote is worth quoting: "Little did they guess that within eighty years these Sisters would be honoured as the foundresses of a Franciscan Third Order Regular community more numerous and wide-spread than the mother which had given it birth in pain and sorrow—the Congregation of the Five Wounds. One likes to think it was the spartan and heroic training that Sister Mary received while she was a member of Dr Neale's community that enabled her, when she became as Mother Mary first Abbess of Mill Hill, to build up her own great Congregation, whose more than four hundred members are to be found, not only in Great Britain, but in the United States and throughout the Uganda Missions" (p. 348, n. 2). But the main story is of how, after the lapse of three centuries, there has been built up in the course of just over one hundred years religious communities both of men and women, in England and overseas, whose devoted lives have become one of the glories of the Church of England to-day.

The potentiality for such a revival Mr. Anson sees in the fact that "The Book of Common Prayer retained the framework of choral worship; a method of prayer which could only find its most perfect development in communities of men and women who were free to give up much of their time to ordered worship in common" (pp. 3-4). There were movements towards such a restoration in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But it was the Oxford Movement that provided the stimulus to the revival, though "The Catholic Movement in the American Episcopal Church was not the result of the Oxford Movement in England" (p. 531), and "The first attempt to establish a community of men in the American Episcopal Church was made in 1840" (p. 532), about the same time as Newman's experiment at Littlemore. It is one of the strange phenomena of history that similar movements suddenly emerge in different parts of the world at about the same time.

The Book of Common Prayer never claimed to fulfil all the needs of the English Churchman. Its publication in 1549 had already been preceded by more than one edition of the *Prymer*: and Dr Cosin's *Collection of Private Devotions in the Practice of the Ancient Church, called the Hours of Prayer* (1627) composed for ladies of the Court and others at the royal request was in the same tradition. And Newman was in the same tradition when he introduced at Littlemore the recitation of the Roman Breviary, "a treasure which was ours as much as theirs". Yet Littlemore ended in 1845 with Newman's surrender to the Church of Rome.

This brings us at once to a problem which is implicit in the story Mr. Anson has to tell. Of the *Society of St. John the Evangelist,* that most Tractarian of the communities of the Church of England, he records that "Cut into the wooden panelling behind the stalls of the community chapel in the mother house at Cowley are the names of the brethren who have gone before with the sign of faith and who sleep the sleep of peace" (p 83), and then in a footnote adds: "Certain once very familiar names are missing from this panelling, for there were several of the brethren in the last century who left the Society and made their submission to the Roman Church" (p. 84, n. 1). Of the *Servants of Christ the King* he commented: "It was the whole-hearted adoption of Roman Catholic spirituality that led the Brotherhood to decide that its true home was not in the Church of England, but within the Fold of Peter" (p. 214). The story of the renewal of the religious life in the Church of England is the story of a great awakening, but of one bought at the price of what can only be regarded by members of the Church of England as a series of casualties. Why did so many priests and nuns decide that their true home was in Rome?

One answer we can no doubt find in Newman himself. "The Anglican said to the Roman: 'There is but One Faith, the Ancient, and you have not kept it'; the Roman retorted: 'There is but One Church, the Catholic, and you are out of it'." This doctrinal conflict is prior to the revival of monasticism. Nor need the monastic quest as such lead to the problem of Papal claims. Mr. Anson's book proceeds from the assumption that "Wherever the ascetic and mystical impulse exists, which is *natural* to man, there is a tendency to form communities, usually based on poverty and some degree of chastily and obedience" (p. xii). But, in the situation in which the Tractarians in the middle of the nineteenth century sought to revive the monastic life within the Church of England, it was inevitable that they should seek their models and their liturgical treasures either from existing communities which owed obedience to the Patriarch of the West, or from medieval sources where again the monasteries stood in a special relation to the Papacy. It is true that the monasteries of Eastern Christendom offered an alternative Mr. Anson indeed comments "It is a pity that Dr Pusey did not follow the advice given him by Dr Hook in 1840, to adopt 'Greek terms and forms rather than Latin ones, as likely to give unnecessary offence'. Had Pusey and subsequent founders of Sisterhoods adopted not only Greek terms, but also the grades of the ascetic life, i.e. the system of monastic probation found in the Eastern Orthodox Church, the bishops would have had no excuse for maintaining that religious profession was an un-Christian act, 'savouring of the worst evils of Rome' " (p. 302, n. 2). Had Pusey gone further and encouraged the cultivation of an Eastern and not a Western spirituality, the whole influence of the revived monasticism in the Church of England might have been very different. But could Pusey have done so? The Church of England has its roots in Western Christendom. The Liturgy of the Book of Common Prayer is a Western Liturgy.

What would seem to emerge from the story that Mr. Anson has to tell is that it was on the whole those communities which started as an attempt to meet, in a new and wholly devoted way, some pressing human need, that were the most successful in finding their feet in the Church of England. Such communities were free from the need constantly to check their manner of life and devotion by Roman models. They could use the experience of other communities and yet be free to meet their own problems in their own way. It is true that one after another of the women's communities, formed originally to deal particularly with unmarried mothers, tended in course of time to let their active work fall into the background or even to lapse altogether and to devote themselves with increasing singleness of purpose to the prior obligation of "the work of God". But by the time this happened most of these sisterhoods had developed their own traditions and had won a recognized place in the Church of England. And, while Mr. Anson maintains his impartiality, it is clear that he sees in these communities the true expression of the revival of the religious life in the Church of England.

In his narrative Mr. Anson gives most space to communities in England, including some which no longer survive. But he does also write of communities in the U.S.A., Canada, South Africa, Australia and Tasmania, New Zealand, India and Pakistan. And this leads me to note one field in which his treatment is so slight as to be seriously inadequate.

The last two pages of the book (pp. 588-9) are given to the Church of India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon. *The Oxford Mission Brotherhood of the Epiphany* and the *Oxford Mission Sisterhood of the Epiphany* are both Western communities though founded for work in India. But with *Christa Seva Sangha* we come to a community that in origin and character is unlike any other in Mr. Anson's book. Here is an attempt to form a Christian community on Indian lines. Whatever may be the story of that particular community, with it a new beginning has been made in the history of Christian monachism. It deserves more than a third of a page. And already other communities are being formed on similar lines. There is for instance the *Christa Seva Ashram* at Marathanamadan, Jaffna, Ceylon. The whole story of the quest to develop an Eastern form of Christian monachism would have been as fascinating to read as many of the other stories of pioneer work that Mr. Anson has told. But this development is taking place in a field that is strange to Mr. Anson. So he only tells us the bare minimum. Some other historian will have to give us the fuller story. And, when it is written, this too will be part of the astonishing development of the religious life in the *ecclesia anglicana.*

Mr. Anson's most comprehensive book includes a "List of Religious Communities and Kindred Bodies in the Anglican Communion in Order of Foundation", eleven pages of Bibliography, an Index of Communities and Kindred Bodies, and an Index of Persons and Subjects. It is clear that Mr. Anson has gone to great pains to be accurate as well as comprehensive. This is a book that no library concerned with Theology or English History can afford to omit.

J. O. COBHAM.

IRRATIONALISM AND RATIONALISM IN RELIGION. By ROBERT LEET PATTERSON. Duke University Press, Durham, N.C. Agents: Cambridge University Press. 22s. 6d. pp. 155.

THIS little book is concerned with the question: To what extent and in what sense may religion, and in particular the Christian religion, claim to be "reasonable"? "Reason must be our last judge and guide in everything": so said Locke, and so quotes the author on page 148. Even so, Locke distinguished what was "according to reason", "contrary to reason", and "above reason". Revealed truth—and Locke quotes especially the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead as an example—was said to be "above reason". Yet as the author says (p. 48) for Locke this meant broadly that reason was here provided "with data which it could not otherwise obtain . . . to indicate conclusions which reason may subsequently substantiate". On the other hand says the author (p. 46) "The central doctrines of the faith—the Trinity and the Incarnation—have repeatedly been declared to be impermeable by human reason . . . It has been found that the safest course is to remove them to a realm of faith from which reason is excluded. Their doctrines are to be believed, not because their truth can be demonstrated, but because they have been revealed." How far then, to return to our question, can the Christian religion claim to be reasonable?

There are those "irrationalists"—Christians and others—who would disparage "reason" in any case. In particular there are those whom the author would call the "naturalists", the "new realists", and the "logical positivists". The author believes that the first two positions can be shown to be unsatisfactory in so far as they claim (p. 35) "that reality consists of a flux of brute facts, basically unintelligible", and the regularity theory of causality which such a view demands, does nothing more than underline its impossibility. As for the "basic contentions of the logical positivist" (p. 45) "they are neither self-evident nor confirmed by experience. They are dogmas and nothing more." So not surprisingly the author condemns in advance those religious people—e.g. Barthians—who would "welcome all that the naturalists and the logical positivists can say in disparagement of reason" (p. 48). But he has even harder criticisms in store. He calls "sheer nonsense" language which speaks of "the breaking through of the eternal into time"; he describes "inherited guilt" as an "atrocious notion" (p. 49). Here, he would say, is irrationalism with a vengeance and his own view is that the religious man, if he would be irrational, is committed to saying nothing about anything.

Must then a religious man aim at being an irrationalist spiced with a little rationality? This possibility the author considers in chapter II. In particular, the doctrine of creation is closely examined in relation to the question, and especially in view of the neo-scholastic claim that only the doctrine of creation can eliminate "brute fact" and vindicate the "rationality of the universe" (p. 72). But the author concludes that creation *ex nihilo* is an unintelligible notion anyway, and can do nothing by way of rational spice. He then considers and rejects such a mixing of the rational and irrational as he thinks Bradley could give us; as he rejects a possible "division of labour" by which religion would consider the irrational, and philosophy the rational. Likewise he discusses, but only to reject, the hypothesis of a "finite God".

Such unsatisfactory views lead him in a last chapter to examine the case for rationalism: has religion then to be rational after all? He argues, as his own view, that "the universe with which we are acquainted constitutes a system wherein all particulars are interconnected by relations of logical entailment" (p. 119). As he has said earlier (p. 34) "mind and values are included in a logically coherent system". Alongside this contention, however, the author pleads the "inability of the human mind", as that which of necessity makes us qualify the claim that everything, and religion in particular, is "rational". There is "the sheer magnitude of certain problems which so exceed our finite capacity as to inhibit us from framing the right questions and so from finding the right answers" (p. 142). So, while the author rejects creation as too irrational, he is ready to keep God as a tribute to that element of irrationality which he is willing, indeed anxious, to allow.

Very roughly the author's position may perhaps be said to be: take reason as far as it will go, but it will never (as a matter of logical or psychological fact?) go the whole way. My main difficulty here is: according to what rules do we make the journey beyond reason's terminus? Why is creation rejected and God accepted? We need, in other words, some kind of test for "irrationality". We need to know just how irrational irrationality is. But that presupposes a link between rationality and irrationality that the author does not suggest till the last page of the book. Viewed broadly the book takes the distinction rational-irrational, as a firm distinction (see for example p. 47), but he says at the end, of the religious man, that "in the exercise of his rational powers he becomes aware of his kinship with the whole. Reason itself takes on for him a mystical significance" (p. 148). But this, from the standpoint of the book, is a novel position. Indeed it is reminiscent of some passages in Bradley, and I believe that it implies an epistemology very different from anything which the book investigates. Such an epistemology, however, might give an altogether different logical slant on such phrases as "creation *ex nihilo*" and it would further show, I should guess, how "reasonable" needs elucidation by reference to more than the five positions the author distinguishes on pp. 99-101.

The book indicates very well how varied, and how uniformly unsatisfactory, have been the positions held by those who have called themselves rationalists or irrationalists. But it only emphasizes the need to find somewhere an epistemology which would justify the concluding contentions of the book: an epistemology which would cut across traditional controversies, and across any firm distinction between rational and irrational. Only then should we be in a position to answer the question we raised at the beginning. Yet the book cannot be justly criticized as slight or superficial, for the author expressly says in a foreword that it is an attempt "merely to sketch in outline a position which I hope further to develop—or, if need be, to revise". It is a sketch which surveys various standpoints and makes important reflections about each in a traditional sort of way; which develops its own position carefully and while provocative, it is always eminently fair in its admission of difficulties. It is concerned with a central topic of contemporary interest. It is clearly and pleasantly written, and because it is not too penetrating it is suited for a general reader. But I think that its main contribution is not so much the outline of the author's own approach, interesting and important though that is, as the clear need it shows for us to take the discussion much further back before the questions which the book raises can be answered.

I. T. RAMSEY.

THE CRISIS OF OUR TIME. By SIR H. IDRIS BELL. Christopher Davies. 8s. 6d.

"CRISIS" has been a recurrent theme throughout the centuries: each age feels that it is in transition. Yet there is justification to-day for the contention, for the present crisis is different: it is not due to dynastic ambitions or the struggle for freedom or even to economic rivalries. Our age is faced with a moral and spiritual conflict: we contend about the nature of Man and his place in life, and consequently about the nature of God. On one side men have sought to banish the idea of a transcendental God, to discard any moral meaning of life, and to reduce men to a mere means to an end. On the other side is the Christian conception of the Kingdom of God upon earth, and of the value of every human individual soul, the equality of all men in the sight of God. But this conflict would not of itself constitute a crisis.

The crisis arises, according to the author, because men have lost faith. What we call western values and standards have weakened not merely in matters specifically religious, but also in art and literature and social conventions. There is a feeling af uncertainty and a loss of standards. "Man has somehow taken the wrong turning".

It is possible than the author at times takes too pessimistic a view. The 19th century was called by Marvin "the century of Hope". The hopes were not fulfilled, and in reaction we have come to regard our age as one of disillusionment. The earlier over-confident optimism led men to believe that progress was automatic; we have seen enough to realise that it is not so. But, in fact, is religion in decline? There is plenty of evidence to the contrary.

But it would be unfair to Sir Idris Bell to say that he is fundamentally pessimistic. He sees the dangers, he deplores the lack of intellectual discipline, the decline of reason and of liberal thought. But he does not feel that the situation is beyond repair: indeed he writes, from a sense of urgency, to recapture the old ideals. In them men can restore the balance and resume the conflict against the Dark Powers. Like many another intellectual he passed through a period of agnosticism to return to the Faith in which he had been nurtured. There is a cogency and simplicity in his plea for a return to religion and the old standard of thought and morality.

The book is based on a number of lectures on various subjects, but there is a consistency of thought. From the crisis and the restoration of religious faith, he turns to education. "Simultaneously with the decay of religious faith went on a movement away from the humanistic system of education". As a consequence the authority of Reason diminished. In Greek thought there was no wooliness; it was always under the discipline of reason. Everything was clear cut, and the Greeks left men a heritage, vital, rich and balanced. His plea is for a new draught of the Greek spirit, a return to the humanistic classical tradition of Western Europe.

It is when he comes to details of education, that difficulties are encountered. Granted that specialisation in science, mathematics and economics has narrowed our mental horizon, but may it not be that the classical specialist must also surrender a part of his own territory? There is no possible embracing of all the subjects which are required in our complicated society; time will not allow a monopoly of Latin and Greek. Too often as things are, the young man deciding upon the next stage in his education feels that in classics he may leave the main stream of contemporary life. He needs to know something of scientific method, something of history, something of modern literature. The problem is to recapture the enthusiasm which marked the re-birth of learning and to widen the subjects of study. But the aim will not be secured by too narrow a conception of classical education.

Sir Idris Bell makes a moving plea for the recognition of Welsh nationalism, and for those means of preserving it—the Welsh language and the Anglican Church in Wales. In his patriotism he is faithful to the Aristotelian principle of the Diversity of Interests; the world would be the poorer for the disappearance of the small nations. His theme is that of the Irishman A.E. who spoke of the "Orchestration of humanity". This is surely something which will meet with sympathy from those who recognise the vitality of the city states of Greece, of Florence in the 15th century, and of Elizabethan England.

His contention is that the survival of the Welsh language and literature is essential to the preservation of Welsh nationalism. "Wales would be immensely the poorer for the death of this language and this literature"—and not Wales only. Whatever doubts one may have of the practical nature of this plea, there can be no denial of the fatal and magnetic draw of London to men of talent and ambition, so long as the expression of Welsh nationalism is in a foreign tongue. "A writer in English is likely to be English first and foremost and only to a very limited degree 'regional' in any essential respect". Yet on the other hand, he finds a narrowness in the thought and art and literature of modern Wales, and one wonders whether a real revival of the Welsh language might not accentuate this provincialism. Is, in fact, the Welsh language essential to the survival of Welsh nationalism? It may well be so, that there is some modern evidence to the contrary.

This is a book which derives from a social and educational tradition which has passed away; it is a comment from an earlier generation and reminds the reader of the thought of men like Lionel Curtis and Lord Samuel. The view is critical but sympathetic, and is at the same time a plea for old ways to redress the new. It tells of fundamental truths, which the crisis of our time must take into account if it is to avoid the abyss.

G. F. BELL.

THE RELIGIOUS QUEST. By JOYCE KENWRICK. S.P.C.K. 15s. 6d.

THIS book has been provoked by the author's experience as a lecturer in Education and Divinity. In teaching Divinity she found not only that ignorance can often be a barrier but that the pupils' attitude was also often "a hindrance to the assimilation of the spiritual truth which they need". It was this question of the personal response in particular which she set herself to investigate, and the sub title of the book is "A Study in the Development of the Religious Sentiment". Her method has been to collect accounts from individuals of different creeds and different denominations and to base her conclusions on them. An appendix shows that her questionnaire was distributed to 338 individuals, men and women, of varying ages and creeds, including Jew, Moslem and Agnostic as well as various Christian denominations; but she shows herself properly aware of the pitfalls of mere statistical treatment and weighs her evidence and does not merely count it. Perhaps one of the chief values of the book is that the evidence is collected from normal people. So many books on religious experience deal with the sub-normal or abnormal or with the supernormal; and conclusions drawn from the psychiatrist's case-book are, for the ordinary man and for the ordinary teacher, as doubtfully relevant as those drawn from the experience of the saints. It would perhaps be unfair to expect any very startling revelations from the treatment of a subject which is in a sense the oldest subject in the world. And if one says that Miss Kenwrick's treatment is balanced and sensible and seems to bring out the essential features of her subject very well, that is meant as a judgment of real praise and not of the proverbial faint praise of condemnation. She opens with two chapters of a general nature on the religious sentiment, finding its basis in man's sense of his incompleteness and in the sense of awe. The following chapters deal with a number of particular aspects of the religious sentiment, with social attitudes and training, with prayer, with the moral problem and the problem of discipline, with beauty and worship, and with the relations of religion and knowledge, feeling and thought. The author finds, for example, in her ordinary, normal people an acute sense of the need for a religious basis for a moral code, and also the well known tension between the aesthetic and religious emotions, which are felt both as reinforcing each other and also as, in a sense, antagonistic—the prayer which she quotes from Michael Angelo seems to typify the experience not only of genius but of normality. In writing of changing conceptions of knowledge she stresses the necessity for the use of parable and story, in other words of Myth, in religious training, in addition to more strictly intellectual methods. In the matter of worship, there is no doubt a great deal in the suggestion which she takes from the late Professor Taylor of a "plurality of use" in any religious community, but the practical difficulties of catering for diversity of taste and temperament must inevitably be considerable; and though "the practical problem of achieving a common worship might seem to be insoluble", not all communities are large enough to permit of any great plurality, and it is arguable that the common elements in worship have their own particular value, which too great a variety can obscure—a liturgy has a unifying force which is in itself of importance. But these are particular points on which individual readers will have their own views. It may be said in conclusion that the book should have a particular value to teachers—which is, perhaps, what the author would wish as it springs out of her own experience as a teacher. The teacher of scripture (religious knowledge, divinity, call it what you will) is faced with greater difficulties and responsibilities than the teacher of other subjects, in that what he is teaching will, for good or ill, go very near the centre of his pupils' lives. A man's religion is, at bottom, what he is. And a teacher who by incompetence or other faults obscures his pupils' vision of religious truth does more fundamental damage than a bad teacher of Latin grammar or physics. In the last resort his own sincerity is all that can carry him through. But he must be aware of the very different approaches to the subject which he is likely to find in pupils of different temperaments and backgrounds. It is in its contribution to that awareness that this book's chief value lies.

H. D. P. LEE.

NINE TROUBLED YEARS. By THE RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD, P.C., G.C.S.I., G.B.E. Collins. 25s.

NO-ONE is better qualified than Lord Templewood (formerly Sir Samuel Hoare) to deal with the critical years, 1931-1940, of which he writes. He held high office throughout and enjoyed the close confidence of the successive Prime Ministers under whom he served. His book should be read by all who are interested in British policy during this period.

It is impossible in the scope of a short review to cover the whole of Lord Templewood's work. One must regretfully pass from the important chapters on his period as Secretary of State for India to his survey of foreign affairs, by which the value of his book will probably be judged. History alone can give the final verdict, but there has been so much misjudgement that it is refreshing to have his candid account of events.

When Lord Templewood became Foreign Secretary he found himself at once faced with the Abyssinian crisis. He has been criticised for his part in the Hoare-Laval talks, and he resigned as a result, though he very soon rejoined the Cabinet. Lord Templewood and his advisers regarded it as of primary importance, if we were to be prepared for war with Germany and Japan at the same time, to keep the Mediterranean open and to prevent the French fleet from being immobilized by a hostile Italy. If Mussolini was not to be thrown into Hitler's arms, an Abyssinian settlement had to be negotiated, but the corollary of repudiating that settlement was surely to impose effective sanctions against Italy even at the risk of war. That is precisely what the Government, after Lord Templewood's resignation, failed to do.

Lord Templewood points to the great difficulties of any Foreign Secretary "without military strength to back his policy and with public opinion set on peace". It was, in his opinion, military weakness that was "predominantly responsible for the dismal failure of much that happened between the wars". He observes that we behaved in much the same way after every great war, and he cites two examples—Walpole's Ministry after the War of the Spanish Succession and Wellington's troubles after the Napoleonic Wars. He might have cited also the events after Chatham's administration leading to the loss of the American colonies.

The vital blow to the Versailles settlement was the failure of the United States to ratify the Peace Treaties. Had it been possible for America to display the leadership after the first war that she has shown after the second, there would probably have been no second war.

An Appendix to Part II of Lord Templewood's book deals with the charge made against Baldwin of shirking the rearmament issue in the 1935 General Election. The facts seem to be that, while Baldwin regarded the previous parliament as having no mandate for rearmament, he felt that the feeling of the country against rearmament, as disclosed in the Fulham by-election was so strong that an earlier appeal to the country on that issue, would have resulted in defeat. The issue was certainly before the country in the 1935 election, but the question remains whether the new policy was pursued with sufficient vigour thereafter.

The Munich crisis is clearly described. The annexation of Austria had, in the view of the experts, made Czecho-Slovakia militarily indefensible. The United States seemed wedded to isolation, while Russia seemed unreliable—how unreliable is surely shown by her callous non-aggression pact with Germany of August 1939, which directly precipitated the war. In the late summer of 1938, Lord Templewood tells us, the Chiefs of Staff reported that we were not ready for war, that we could not fight on three fronts against Germany, Italy and Japan without powerful allies, and tha France was neither able nor willing to undertake an offensive against Germany. So Chamberlain, with his eyes fully open to the risk of failure, decided to meet the dictators in person and to make one last effort to avert war. At the time his action was acclaimed not only in this country and in Germany but throughout the Commomwealth, and even by Roosevelt .

Lord Templewood claims that when war came in 1939 the Commonwealth was united and that we then had that incomparable fighter force hich in the Battle of Britain won a victory as decisive as any victory our history—a victory which saved the world. Could we have chieved as much in 1938 or, practically alone, deterred the dictators?

E. H. Marker.

FTER THIS MANNER. Vol. 2. Compiled by AN HONORARY FELLOW OF LADY MARGARET HALL, OXFORD. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

HE BOOK is well produced, with good print and good paper. It is lso stoutly bound as a book should be which is to be used constantly. consists of "Devotions from the Holy Bible and the Book of ommon Prayer after the manner of the Lord's Prayer". These uotations are joined together with skill and imagination and are nked together by a series of "Acts" and "Aspirations" from various ources, many of them doubtless from the pen and the heart of the uthor.

A note tells us that "These Devotions form part of a series written y a member of a religious Order who has spent many years in India, here they have already proved their value. It is proposed in due ourse to issue the series in full."

The Most Reverend Bishop G. C. Hubback has contributed a oreword, eulogistic and appealing, which ends with these words: As one who has had the great privilege of using these Devotions for any years, I commend them with all my heart to my fellow members the Body of Christ. The state of the world today is a clarion call all of us to be more wholly consecrated to God so that He may se us to forward His great work of salvation. These devotions can nd may help us to this end."

Here may be quoted a prayer of Sir Thomas Browne's which the ook gives us on page 133:

"Lord make me a point of contact through which the Holy Spirit ay enter in and fill the lives I touch, whether by the word I say, e prayer I pray, or the life I live."

Appropriate Devotions are provided for the Church's Seasons and or the Holy Communion. There is too a whole section drawn from e Easter Liturgies (translation of Neale and Littledale) usefully ivided up for each day of the week.

For those who have the leisure for long prayers, yes, and the taste or such discursive prayer, this book should be of much value. But should be a value to everyone as Spiritual Reading; then now this hrase and now that, now this idea and now that will demand to be sed as subject matter for Meditation and Mental Prayer generally. Prayers can become jaded and trite; and thoughts wander till held y some fresh glimpse of the so familiar and eternal Truth. This ook should bring many such glimpses, so that a light comes into e mind which soon warms the heart and the will to action.

Cyril Tomkinson.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A notice in this selection of recent works does not exclude a subsequent review.

Fortitude and Temperance. By Josef Pieper. Faber and Faber 141pp. 10s. 6d.

That the Christian virtues are not held in great esteem today is self-evident in our society, and it would appear that in selecting the virtues of Fortitude and Temperance, Professor Pieper has chosen to discuss the two virtues least regarded of all. Our modern Welfare State has left little room for the practice of Fortitude. Such as there is still to be endured can usually be evaded; while Temperance in its widest moral sense has largely been equated with the inhibitions of popular psychology. It is good therefore that this book is available to the English reader, for through it a breath of fresh air and light ventilates and illumines much that is in danger of a stifling neglect. Professor Pieper's raising of moral behaviour to the realm of righteousness and justice which affects the well-being of the whole community, is timely. He writes as one who cannot be disregarded by the philosopher — his many references to St. Thomas Aquinas are evidence of this — nor can he be misunderstood by the general reader. The collection of all references in twelve pages at the end is valuable in that it does not intrude into the text.

Foundations in the Dust. By Seton Lloyd. Penguin Books. 2s. 6d.

Penguin Books continue to do good service to the cause of archaeology by making available to a wide public many of the standard works on the subject. Interest in archaeology has become increasingly popular of late, partly due no doubt to the visual aids of television, whereby works of great archaeological worth have been brought to the notice of millions who would never otherwise have seen them. This book is a reprint of that first published in 1947, and is concerned with the discoveries over the last twenty years in the region of Mesopotamia.

The Dead Sea Scrolls and Their Significance. By H. H. Rowley Independent Press. 2s.

The substance of two broadcast talks by Professor Rowley giving a simple account of the finding of the Dead Sea Scrolls. This is an admirable statement of the facts for the layman who, while struck by the romance which surrounds the discoveries, could not tackle the fuller works which have already been made available. In this, four photographs help greatly to convey the immense task which was involved.

Saints at Sixty Miles an Hour. By Joost De Blank, Bishop of Stepney. Faith Press. 3s.

" I have tried to write for two groups of people — those who are tired and those who are preoccupied." So writes the author in his introduction, and is there anyone in this Sixty-Miles-an-Hour age who wil deny that he is included in one or other of these groups? Within the compass of a few pages there is much wisdom and counsel as to how we may find our spiritual balance in a world which can so easily sweep us off our feet.

Episcopacy Re-asserted. By E. R. Fairweather. Mowbray. 4s.

This is a parrying stroke in the discussion on the question of episcopacy, and one among many which have been advanced since the publication of *The Historic Episcopate* (Carey and others, Dacre Press) and the even earlier *Apostolic Ministry.* Although all cannot be said to be of equal value, this short critique has the merit of being firmly based on an appeal to the Anglicanism of Hooker, Jeremy Taylor, Stillingfleet, and Maurice. Dr. Fairweather draws here more briefly on the conclusions which he arrived at and developed in *Episcopacy and Reunion* (Mowbray).

Services and Prayers for Country Use. By Paul A. Welsby. Longmans. 6s.

This small book is a vade-mecum for the priest of a country parish. Gathered together are the forms of service for Plough Sunday, Rogationtide, Lammastide, and Harvest thanksgiving, together with forms of service and benedictions for every conceivable country occasion, and including intercession for the sick and the form for laying-on-of-hands. It should be a welcome replacement of all the many separate forms of service on sheets and cards which evade discovery when they are needed.

The Primacy of Preaching To-day. By Arthur A. Cowan. 128pp. T. & T. Clark. 7s. 6d.

The substance of this work was given in the Warrack Lectures on Preaching for 1954, and is concerned with the Proclamation of the Word; Expository Preaching of the Old and New Testaments; Doctrinal preaching on the Christian Year; and the manner of preaching. This should help many who, in the light of recent evidences of the power of the spoken word, are seeking to draw the listener into closer co-operation with the preacher in the exercise of their joint ministry of the Word.

The Craftsmanship of the Preacher. By G. C. Matthews. Faith Press. 52pp. 2s. 6d.

The author of this book writes from the Anglican standpoint, and is equally aware of the need for a restoration of the place of preaching in the worship of the Church, and the difficulties which arise from the present day context. He has much helpful advice to offer.

The Key Concepts of the Old Testament. By Albert Gelin. Sheed and Ward. 94pp. 6s.

This is a translation of a French book, within the rather small compass of which the author deals with some of the problems which arise when the Old Testament is read. If these are not merely to be ignored and set aside some preparation is necessary. "Vetus Testamentum patet in novo: Novum Testamentum latet in vetere," and in the light of this some of the more important key words of the Bible are traced through from their source in the Old Covenant to their fulfilment in the New. The translation of the Bible by Mgr. R. A. Knox is used throughout.

Jesus and the Kingdom of God. By Harold Roberts. Epworth Press. 124pp. 12s. 6d.

The Fearnley-Hartley Lecture 1954. The growing recognition that the whole body of the teaching of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels concerning the Kingdom is set in an eschatological framework, is the subject of this lecture. The author is less concerned with points of exegetical controversy such as have already been thoroughly examined during recent years as with the profound influence which Gospel eschatology can have on the preaching of the Christian Faith. The index of names shows the catholicity of the author's source material and there is a useful list of Scripture references, though these are not related to the text.

A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Amos. By R. S. Cripps. 365pp. S.P.C.K. 25s.

This standard commentary was first published in 1929, and has now been re-issued as a new edition. A new extended preface takes into account the progress in the study of Amos since the first edition and an additional bibliography includes all works published since 1929.

A Doctor's Faith Holds Fast. By Christopher Woodward. Max Parrish. 168pp. 12s. 6d.

A sequel to *A Doctor Heals by Faith*, and a further account of cases in the author's own experience where prayer of faith in co-operation with medical science has been effectual in continuing the healing work of Christ in his church. There is a discerning Foreword by the Bishop of Exeter.

New Testament Treasure. By W. Gordon Robinson. Independent Press. 8s. 6d.

Fifty-two short comments on various New Testament themes which could be used by a weekly study group. Included are many short illustrative stories which could be used to advantage in sermons or addresses.

Mere Christianity. By C. S. Lewis. Collins. 2s.

The publishers are to be congratulated on their decision to include the more popular of C. S. Lewis's books in the Fontana series, thus enabling these to be introduced to a wider public than ever. *Screwtape Letters* has also appeared in this format—which is remarkable for the price—and others are to follow.

The Jung Codex. By F. L. Cross. Mowbray. 15s.

Dr. Cross has translated and edited studies by three eminent continental professors on some unknown Gnostic writings discovered at Nag Hammedi, near the Nile, and acquired by the Jung Institute at Zürich, and which are considered to be of considerable importance

On Contemplating God. By William of St. Thierry. 2s. 6d.
The Mystical Vine. By St. Bonaventure. 3s. 6d.

Two additions to Mowbray's Fleur de Lys series of translations of devotional classics.

Man on the Move. By Gordon Hewitt. 1s. 6d.
What is a Missionary ? Douglas Webster. 2s.

Two booklets dealing with aspects of the work of the C.M.S., and both published by the Highway Press.

A Book of Christian Days. By Leslie Taylor. Blackwell. 5s.

Short passages for most of the more important commemorations of the Christian year, so arranged as to be of particular use at the school assembly, or for instruction within the agreed syllabus. To this end are included notes on the lives of Christian pioneers of more recent days such as Florence Nightingale, Lord Shaftesbury, and Helen Keller. For some reason, St. George alone among the saints of the kalendar appears without the indication of his canonization.

The Salt of the Earth. By André Frossard. Harvill Press. 160pp. 10s. 6d.

A delightfully written account of the chief Religious Orders of France, for the layman who would know wherein the particular contribution of each exists. The text is liberally sprinkled with sketches characteristic of each Order, and an appendix has been added giving some account of branches of these Orders in the British Isles and United States.

Where Words Come From. By Douglas Steere. Allen and Unwin. 5s. and 3s. 6d.

The Swarthmore Lecture for 1955, an interpretation of the ground and practice of Quaker Worship and ministry.

God — Unity and Trinity. By F. J. Sheed. Sheed and Ward. 2s. 6d.

This is a reprint of chapters 1 to 9 of *Theology and Sanity* published in 1947.

Printed by Merritt & Hatcher Ltd., High Wycombe and London.

REVIEWS

H. W. Cassirer: *Kant's First Critique.* By D. M. Mackinnon.

C. A. Pierce: *Conscience in the New Testament.* By D. M. Mackinnon.

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A. Oswald: *The Church of St. Bertelin at Stafford and its Cross. Excavation Report.* By Christopher Hohler.

L. E. Elliott-Binns: *Medieval Cornwall.* By Hilda Johnstone.

The Book List of the Society of Old Testament Study (1955). By A. D. Power.

BONIFACE OF CREDITON[1]

By THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY

"We must work the works of him that sent me, while it is day: the night cometh, when no man can work." *St John* 9. 4.

THE young man whom we know as St Boniface must have had these words of our Lord in mind when in an early letter he wrote:

Currite dum lumen vitae habetis, ne tenebrae mortis vos comprehendant.
Run while you have the light of life, lest the shades of death overtake you.

And run indeed he did, most faithfully, all his days until at the age of 75 he met a martyr's death. In commemorating any great servant of Christ and of his Church, one must distinguish between his abilities, which were God's gift to him, the talents entrusted to him, and the opportunities for their use which in the providence of God the course of events presented to him; and both are to be distinguished from the spirit in which he used his abilities and matched them to his opportunities. Sometimes abilities seem to create their own opportunities: opportunities are always necessary to reveal the scope of the abilities, and sometimes seem almost to create them. It is possible to compare the records of men's work and to call one or another the greatest, as St Boniface has been called the greatest Englishman that ever was: but it is not worth doing. The interaction of opportunity and ability is so unmeasurable and imponderable that no reasonable comparison is possible; nor if it were possible would it be helpful. For if some people appear to be specially blessed in their gifts of ability and opportunity, they are God's gifts to them for which they are responsible only to him. The only true unit of appraisal is in the devotion of a man's self-dedication to the will and work of God: and there men cannot judge and our Lord did not encourage us to suppose that he would choose to judge. When the disciples disputed as to which was the greatest, our Lord's reply was really to say that in the Kingdom of God there is no such measurement as "greater" or "less", since the greatest is the least and the least the greatest. So too in the parable of the workmen, he declared that in the Kingdom of God there could not be any such thing as equal pay for equal work, since neither of these equalities exists in any spiritual sense. In the natural and proper obligation to remember and honour those who have been eminent in the service of the Church and fortunate in their opportunity, there is sometimes a danger of suggesting that the Church can successfully draw up some order of precedence in the realms of the spiritual world and even in the Church Triumphant. Natural enthusiasm and our innate tendency to classify may lead us into this danger. The Church of England may suffer some loss from not often enough nor intelligently enough recalling and reciting the names of some of its most notable servants, after the manner of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews in the lesson read to us just now. But the compilation of a list is always difficult and invidious, always inadequate, and easily becomes a piece of frozen antiquarianism or even heresy. Certainly our Lord's comments on greatness and on special places of precedence discourage serious attempts at such a thing: and the caution of the Church of England in this respect is, I think, a thing to be grateful for.

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[1] A sermon preached in Exeter Cathedral on 7 June 1955, at a service marking the twelfth centenary of St Boniface's martyrdom.

When we think of St Boniface, we must indeed thank God for the abilities and opportunities which were given to him and by which he exercised a deeper influence on the early stages of the development of European civilization than any other Englishman. Not that he stood alone. Willibrord was in what is now Holland before St Boniface got there; and their missions to the continent drew the support and life service of many people from the home Church here. There was a real "missionary movement" in operation in the English Church. St Boniface was the leader among them: and St Boniface was immensely encouraged and strengthened by the fact that he was able to evoke and receive the commission of the Pope and the support of the Frankish king. So equipped, he was able to plant a Christian civilization far across the Rhine, to subdue to the Church the untamed tribes of Germany, to establish the organized life of the Church, diocese by diocese, throughout central Germany, and to bring new order and Christian vigour to Bavaria and the Frankish Church. This was his great life work, which he accomplished from the age of about 38 till he was 74 years old—a course faithfully and strenuously and courageously run for nearly forty years.

Another continent is to-day very much in the thoughts and prayers of us all—the continent of Africa: and I have specially in mind Central and East Africa, which I have recently visited, the opening up of which to European civilization is an event as pregnant for the history of the next millennium as St Boniface's work has been for the last. There are of course great differences. The civilization of Germany was a necessity for the future peace of Europe: the opening up of Africa was the result of man's inquisitiveness. In the eighth century the Church was the only instrument of civilization in existence, and all the powers of settled and civilized life were in her hands. In the nineteenth century that was no longer so: the increased variety and complexity of civilization meant that there were many different agents for its extension, not all of them indeed compatible with a Christian idea of civilization. There was a division of labour and purpose. But both eras were eras of imperialism, and necessarily so since by no other means could the entry of civilization be effected east of the Rhine and north of the Zambesi. St Boniface was the instrument of one imperialism; men like John Cecil Rhodes were the instruments of the other.

Each man must run while it is day, doing the work to which God calls him according to the opportunities and the instruments available to his hands. And no man can tell what will come after his day or the problems which he creates for those who come after him. St Boniface was happy indeed in that he could work at a time when the Church was undivided, when central administration was still entirely a friend and not an enemy of true freedom, when the doctrine of the Church was not yet desiccated by over-definition or over-dogmatism. But because the Church is never adequate to the whole purpose of Christ and never sufficiently obedient to the teaching of the Holy Spirit, out of St Boniface's work were to grow some of the worst consequences of imperialism, a system which, however necessary for a time, is in essence always alien to the spirit of Christ and the fellowship of the Catholic Church. So the medieval Church gave birth to the grievous distresses of the Reformation and to the hideous consequences of the Wars of Religion. Only by these travails were the Church of England and other Churches in the end delivered from the evils of an imperialism, which had more than served its term, into the true liberties of the Catholic Church. So in Africa, modern Africa has been born of imperialism and by the actions of imperialists: and in no other way could it have been born. We need not debate whether development by an imperialism in the hands of the Church would have been more beneficial than development by secular imperialism. Certainly some terrible dangers might have been avoided. But this at least is true—that secular authority has shown itself much more quick to perceive the dangers of imperialism and to deliver itself from them than the medieval Church was. That means, of course, that secular authority is meeting more rapidly, and in an even more acute form, all the perils and problems which must always arise as imperialism passes, and especially when it passes too hurriedly. We can, perhaps, take some comfort from the fact that both in the Church of England, and in the Commonwealth of which England is the central hearth, our people have had a special experience of how to steer a true course from the leading strings of imperialism to the fellowship of true partnership, between Churches, between countries, and between races. But the transition is difficult enough: and Africa reveals its grave difficulties as well as its most encouraging possibilities. St Boniface was himself in the forefront not only as a missionary, but as a ruler and administrator, a teacher, an arbiter of social welfare. I have seen in Central and East Africa, administrators, educationists, industrialists, leaders African and European, in every kind of social work doing for Africa what St Boniface did for Germany, in the same desire to establish a truly Christian civilization; and doing it under far greater difficulties because the age of imperialism has passed, because their task is more complex, and because to keep pace with this turbulent world, their advance into a more difficult form of society must be far more rapid. As St Boniface was always supported by the prayers and service of many here in England in his civilizing work, so do all parts of Central and East Africa need the prayers, the encouragement, and the personal service of many here in England for the work there being done—against time and against many adverse interests—to develop a fully Christian civilization there, in which Africans and Europeans and Asians are true partners with one another.

But while the life work of St Boniface leads us inevitably to think in terms of the problems set by civilization whether in Germany or Africa, it is the spirit in which he did his work and ran his course that takes us to the heart of the matter.

The quality of St Boniface's devotion is revealed most clearly in its beginning and its end. Very early with all the enthusiasm of youth he determined to be a missionary: in his thirties he declined office at home because his heart was set on Frisia as the place where he should serve God. To Frisia he went and there he laboured until he was called to Germany. Nearly forty years later as an old man of 74, his life work done, he still heard that first never forgotten call. Surrendering his archiepiscopal See of Mainz he went back, a plain missionary, to the untamed tribes of Frisia. and there on 5 June 755 he and other clergy with him were massacred near Dokkum. So his missionary vocation to which he had dedicated himself and which he never forsook, began and ended in the same country. It was in that spirit of devotion that he did all his work and by it he gave the best things of all to Germany. And in this kind of contribution, the giving of the love of God to redeem people and social orders and civilizations, he has his counterparts in the redemption of Africa—in David Livingstone, missionary and explorer, in Johann Ludwig Krapf, in Mackay and the martyred Bishop Hannington,, and in many others. In that roll of saints and heroes, there is no before and after. All are equal in the only equality that has any lasting value, equal in the love and in the praise of God.

This commemoration comes opportunely. The opportunities, the adversities, the conflicts and perplexities which beset the Church in our day are altogether different from those which confronted the pioneers of the Church in Africa in the last century or which confronted St Boniface and his company in Germany twelve hundred years ago. But one golden chain binds us all together in a common task and in a common fellowship—to glorify God and to bring to all men the saving Gospel, that it may redeem them and their relationss with one another and their social order to Christ. And one demand Christ makes upon the Church in every age, that in the world it shall be by Christ's power and command what Christ was in his incarnate life by the will of his Father. My text says strikingly "*We* must work the works of him that sent me," thus linking us to his divine mission. Among all the possible demands.

St Boniface heard the call to Germany. Amongst all the demands of this present age, none is more urgent, more appealing, more rewarding than to do for the peoples of Africa (European and African and Asian), what only the Christian Gospel can do for them—to enable them to find fulfilment in partnership by finding one another in the love of God. May we in our day work as St Boniface did in his: may we run where Christ calls us while we have the light of this world's life, in the patient power of those whose life is hid now and for ever in Christ and in his Eternal Kingdom.

FAITH AND SOCIETY

An address to the CHURCH UNION SCHOOL OF SOCIOLOGY, 1955

By THE BISHOP OF DURHAM

CHRISTIAN "Sociology" in this country is somewhat under the weather. The tradition of thought about the bearing of the Christian Faith upon the problems of society has not in recent years been conspicuous within the Church of England. The purpose of my paper is to ask why this is so, and to consider whether there is still a sound theological basis for the work of the Christian sociologist.

1. The Welfare State has appeared to cut the ground from beneath the feet of the Christian sociologist. In the days of gross injustices in wages, and of neglect of provision for the workers' health and security and housing, churchmen were concerned with a Christianized politics and economics as a corollary of the Incarnation. Now that the State does so much to make the people well-paid, well-housed, healthy, and secure, it has become the rôle of the Christian teacher not to say, "Let us have a Christian politics", but rather to try to bring home to the people that politics is not everything and that they should think about eternal life, the worth of the soul, and the worship of God for his own sake. Let the Church keep alive the transcendental concerns which the Welfare State tends to crowd out of the minds of the people.

2. At the same time the security of the Welfare State is crossed by the radical insecurity of a world that might suddenly be blown to bits. The sense of crisis about this has set in motion some efforts at Christian political thinking. I note three trends of thought. The pacifist thesis has gained in strength, since the nature of total war has made not easily tenable the concept of a just war issuing in restraint for an aggressor. Then there is the "Churchill" thesis: the new weapons are so terrible that their very existence is a source of security against their use. This is a sort of doctrine of " the redemption of horror by horror": I suspect that it has a theological basis, though I find it hard to formulate to myself what that theological basis is. Thirdly, there is the "Evanston" thesis: that the situation calls for a new League of

Nations procedure of disarmament and control—the ideology of the 1920's is applied to the 1950's. But all these attempts at a Christian politics for an atomic age are dulled by the thought in the Christian heart that of course the world may be blown to bits, and it hardly matters whether we leave it one at a time or all together now.

So it is that one realm of our existence gives us so much security that we are driven to emphasize the other-wordly elements in our religion, and the other realm of our existence keeps us so near to a precipice that our theology is "on the edge of things". Not security, we say, but God the creator and judge of human souls. And as for present duty, there can be obedience to the will of God wherever it is known, in faith that God will gather up our fragmentary acts of obedience in the coming of his reign in ways beyond our calculations. " The world passeth away, and the lust thereof: but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever."

3. These difficulties notwithstanding, there might still be possibilities for sociology if the gospel which we preached retained its integrity as the sovereign will of God demanding and enabling the response of man *in the totality of his being*. But the disturbing fact is that in recent years the *preaching of the Gospel has gone awry*. How has this happened ? We have reacted rightly from the pragmatist panacea type of apologetic: the "if only" preaching, which is not a gospel but a sort of insurance policy—"if only" you would repent and turn to God, then peace and security for mankind would be round the corner. Rightly reacting from this perversion of the Gospel we are now eager to say that God is to be proclaimed for God's own sake and his glory, without much mention of the sort of *society* which reflects God's glory. Again, we have reacted rightly from an over-liberalized evangel which appeals to reason and assumes that unconverted human reason can perceive divine truth without conversion of the heart. So, reacting alike from a false pragmatism and a false intellectualism, we have come back to the gospel which proclaims God in his own right and calls for moral decision and submission.

When, however, such a gospel is preached by fundamentalists the mind of the hearer has either to be stifled or ignored on account of the crudity of the doctrine presented, and the appeal is made to *less than the whole man*. The act of decision and conversion, instead of being related to man's place and duty in society, abstracts a man from his place and duty in society; and society becomes the mere stage and scenery alongside which the moral decisions are made. The moral will is separated from its context, because the appeal is made to less than the whole man as a reasoning being and a social being. So it is that Billy Graham, the Inter-Varsity Fellowship, and Moral Rearmament all help to destroy the ground of a Christian sociology. It does not seem to me enough to say, "These forms of Evangelism are splendid: they win souls to Christ. Now we can go on and add the necessary complement of Christian social application." These forms of evangelism of themselves cut at the root of Christian sociology, just as they cut at the root of a rational faith. There is need for a radical critique of an evangel which dishonours man by appealing to less than the whole of him as a creature made in the image of God.

For all these reasons the tradition of Christian social thinking, the tradition of Maurice, Westcott, Holland, and Gore is at a discount: its disciples are discouraged, and some of them adopt a rôle of *laudatores temporis acti*. Their difficulties lie in the theological background, for it is in theology that sociology has its creative springs. The Incarnational theology which produced the sociology of the period from 1890 until almost 1940 was framed in the idiom of an evolutionary and progressive world which no longer exists, and its idiom no longer suffices. And much of our current theology stifles sociology at birth. It is for the sociologists to grumble until theologians serve them better than they are doing at present.

Where is the theology which can give to Christian social thinking and prophetic witness its sanctions and its impetus, the theology which can justify the Church in its attempts to say what ought or ought not to be in the social order? I offer no more than some introductory hints.

We start with the doctrine of the Church as standing over against society. "The Church is the redeemed community comprised of redeemed men and women and children. It is Christ's new creation: its life is already the life of the world to come. Ontologically, its members are reborn. Sociologically, they have fellowship with the Father and the Son through the indwelling of the Spirit, and no secular concept of fellowship means the same thing. Morally, they are able to fulfil the hardest of Christ's commandments because his grace enables them so to do. They can turn the other cheek, abandon their goods in a vocation to poverty, or retain their wealth and (only just) be safe in its possession: they can follow a vocation to celibacy or carry out the marriage vow as the heathen cannot be expected to who lack the grace which is at work within the Church. Here is a realm in which Christian sociology is possible, an island-realm amid the perishing world. But do not expect such possibilities in the world that lieth in the evil one. Any moral impact the Church may have upon the world is in God's hands and cannot be made the subject of theory. Furthermore, expect that any approximations to God's Kingdom from the side of the world may be bogus and misleading, because pride and titanism infect such efforts and bring them to grief."

I start with this doctrine of Church over against world because it seems sensible at first sight, and indeed it can claim much support in the New Testament. But we must see how it needs modification, and as it becomes modified the possibilities of Christian social action begin to arise.

1. *First modification.* God created the world. His Logos penetrates it. His light illuminates men's minds and consciences and leads them (apart altogether from conversion) to live not as savages, but in societies, bound by ethical sanctions and æsthetic perceptions and with institutions such as State and family which evoke reverence. Society or civilization has features everywhere common, even in a world as split by ideologies as in the world to-day. It is not devoid of perceptions of what is right for individual, family, community, and State, nor of certain capacities to do what is right and to expect right to be done. The State, stricken as it is by sin and operated by sinful men, is set to be a check against the ravages of sin by upholding order and justice. It is therefore possible for a Christian to talk to a non-Christian man or group about what ought to be done in the social order—not as lecturing as if to say, "If only you were Christians you would grasp this", but as saying, on the same level as the hearer, "This is what is just for us men in the nature of things to do".

2. *Second modification.* The world is a redeemed world: it is not only the Church which is redeemed. What does this really mean? Is it a rhetorical paradox of the theologian? We need to be concrete and empirical. Society since Christ, both when un-

converted as well as when converted, is affected by the presence within the universe of the risen Christ and his Church in paradise and on earth. It is subject to inroads of Christian influence. These may not be enough to make Christian assumptions to be the dominant assumptions: but they are enough to keep alive the perceptions of conscience and natural law. The pond of civilization is dirty and befouled, but it is not stagnant: movements of a cleaner water from time to time stir it. For instance, the totalitarian portion of the world in our time is not merely savage and amoral, but embarrassingly interfered with by at least some few perceptions of conscience, of the light that lighteneth—because the whole world is a world not only created but redeemed by God. So if the first "modification" provides the Christian with the duty of talking about what is right in Society, the second "modification" provides the likelihood that *someone* will listen even in the most unpromising contexts.

3. *Third modification.* This seems to me of great importance, and it is widely forgotten. The Church's own members have a double existence. They belong to the new age of the regenerate; they also belong to a race which is created and creaturely, illuminated by conscience and subject to natural law. Their possession of the new glorious status does not lead them to think themselves "above" the old status, of a child of Adam. Far from it. Being under grace enables them the more to know themselves as creatures alongside their fellow creatures guided by law. Being now the heirs of a supernatural sanctity they are the more able to stoop to ally themselves to whatsoever is good, true, lovely, of good report—if there be any virtue, if there be any praise—amongst their fellows. That is how the Christians are the salt of the earth: they season civilization to be its best in terms of justice, order, and decency.

There is thus a kind of *kenosis* or self-emptying in the Christians' witness and influence in society. They span both worlds, and their possession of the new world should enhance their power to talk to the old world—not as from a pedestal of the converted but as from alongside. Let me give a practical illustration. Suppose a Trades Union is bullying a man and sending him to Coventry because he refuses to toe the line with the party. A Christian in the Trades Union protests. What is the nature of his protest, and how can it be effective? He will not say, "You heathen fellows know nothing of justice and liberty; we converts know better, and have justice and liberty in our converted society." No, that is the kind of hot-gospelling which disallows the moral validity of the natural order. No, the Christian protests against the bullying of a Trades Union in the name of the justice and liberty which lie at the root of human association as made by God, and at the root of Trades Unionism itself. That is the true form of Christian protest; and the *ad hominem* approach is not only good tactics but the soundest doctrine. The courage and humility with which the protest is made with a power to prick the heart—these come indeed from a supernatural source, from a life hid with Christ in God. But just because the source of the courage and the humility are supernatural and from Christ, the witness has the "kenotic" power of coming down to the natural and appealing to the natural in terms of the natural.

Put it now in terms of the rôle of the whole Church over against Society. That rôle is to go both farther from the world in supernatural sanctity than is commonly seen in our present-day Church life; and in so doing to gain the power of affirming with confidence the validity of the natural order and something of its significance and its obligations. The Catholic can fail to grasp this in practice no less than the fundamentalist hot-gospeller: in going to Mass, in receiving Holy Communion, and in seeking the union of his soul with God he is doing something which should affect his impact upon the pattern of society around him—without waiting until that society is converted like himself.

Such is the outline of a theology which can make Christian sociology to be a real possibility, indeed a necessity. This theology, when stated, seems familiar enough and orthodox enough: but it has become far to seek as an effective doctrine in the Church to-day, especially the truth that the supernatural status of the Christian enhances his grasp of the natural. We have had much theology, both in Protestant and in Catholic circles, which does not take the natural order with due seriousness. And we have theology which takes the natural order seriously enough, but levels the supernatural down to it. A noble exposition of this sort of doctrine is seen in Dr Raven's Gifford Lectures: he recalls the grandeur and the significance of the natural in ways which are very moving, but—in a righteous reaction against a false *dualism*

—he so shrinks from any *duality* as to identify natural and supernatural *tout court.* A less noble exposition of this sort of doctrine can be found in the Report on the Doctrine of Man of the Lambeth Conference of 1948: here the distinction between the natural and the supernatural slips out of sight, and the inference seems to be that it is replaced by the most misleading antithesis of "spiritual" and "material". So the fog continues. Sociology will find renewal from a theology in which the concepts of the supernatural and the natural are held distinct and yet in relation, and in which the glory of the former is seen in a power to descend to accept the meaning of the latter. This means a theology which goes hand in hand with a spirituality, with a vocation of other-worldly sanctity. Do not the epochs of the apostolic age, the making of medieval Christian Europe, and the Tractarian revival in our own Church illustrate, each in different ways, the truth that when Christians have responded heroically to an other-worldly vocation there follows a power to say and to do practical things about the life of society? There is a vast difference between such other-worldy sanctity and an academic theology of the eschatological kind.

My theme has reached its conclusion. I have said nothing about the tasks of the sociologist, and indeed it would be hardly expected that I should. I have spoken only of theology; and I believe that the aberrations in theology and in evangelism which I have mentioned, together with the separation of theology from spirituality, have been enough to kill Christian sociology. Recover something like the theology of Charles Gore, not in its philosophical dress which is dated and limited, but in its fearless blending of the denial of the world and the affirmation of the world's possibilities and in its integration of dogma and spirituality. Then there may come, from a heavenly source and yet in a natural *milieu,* the power to speak about what society ought to be like and ought to do in respect of this or that. The weakness of sociology lies not in itself, but in the failure of theology to give it what it needs. There is a theology through which sociology might again run and not be weary.

TRAINING FOR THE MINISTRY

By the ARCHDEACON OF DERBY and Professor ALAN RICHARDSON

THE recent debate in the Church Assembly brought out two points of importance: the large extra sum that will be required for training ordinands, and the form which that training should take. It is a cause for real thanksgiving that the number of men coming forward for ordination has now risen from 337 in 1952/53 to an estimated number of 700 in the year 1955/56. This steady increase in the number of candidates, without any drop in quality, is one of the most encouraging signs of the turn to God and his Church which can be seen to-day, especially at the Universities. Every Churchman will thank God and do his best to see that the money required for training the increased number of candidates is raised. There will be an equal determination that no one shall be barred through lack of funds, or through any unfair "means test". C.A.C.T.M. and especially the Bishop of Southwell should be congratulated on the success of their efforts to recruit more candidates for Holy Orders, but some disquieting thoughts remain as to whether the best use is being made of the resources available to the Church.

First, it is disquieting, to say no more, that a deficit of £60,000 should suddenly be discovered by the Central Board, the more so when last year the Assembly, through the generosity of the Church Commissioners in taking over the pensions premiums of the Clergy, suddenly found itself with a surplus of £50,000. A Policy Committee was set up to examine any claims that ought to be made on Central Funds, but no claim was made by C.A.C.T.M. On a Budget of £168,000, to be £60,000 out in one year suggests either a lack of liaison with the dioceses or serious miscalculation at the centre.

As this £60,000 will, it is estimated, rise to £112,000, it is recommended that all money should be centralized and the dioceses no longer allowed to retain a proportion of the money they raise for the training of ordinands. While this is administratively tidy and will prevent any similar serious miscalculations, there are strong objections. The centralization of funds always weakens local interest and support, and is usually more extravagant. For instance the Bishop of Winchester brought out the fact that, while to the Centre the average cost per candidate is £566, in his diocese it is £260 per candidate. Local conditions vary enormously in the home circumstances of candidates, the support given by the L.E.A., and so on; but too often a centralized scheme tends to make all grants higher so as to be fair to all. Once funds are centralized a man's conscience seems to weaken. He hears that others are getting grants for this and that and so he applies too. A man must have books and reasonable facilities, but we need a spirit of realism in our grants as we remember the strain to the parishes of raising the money. A spirit of sacrifice is shown by most men and it is right to expect it of all. Local candidates will always encourage generous local support, which central giving will never inspire; and some dioceses have local trusts, the money from which cannot be paid to a central fund.

While therefore some centralization is desirable and inevitable, it seems that some local initiative should be left and that a certain agreed percentage should remain with the dioceses. This would encourage a variety of local experiments in raising money for local candidates, whether through "sponsor" or other schemes, and it would create a personal interest in and link with candidates and so help to win local support. We must avoid the Church being regarded as the "Welfare State" in which "they" pay for what "we" want, and the idea that once a man is accepted "they" will pay everything and all the money needed will be provided.

THEOLOGICAL TRAINING

One of the serious difficulties of to-day is the fact that most of the theological colleges are ill adapted to present economic conditions. They are for the most part capable of accommodating between 30 and 45 men, and this is regarded as being the ideal number from the point of view of teaching and personal relationships between staff and students. But in modern conditions such numbers are uneconomic; almost the same "overheads" are necessary as would be required in colleges of twice their size. To-day we are told that a number under 75, or perhaps even 100, is not an economic proposition for a residential school or college. If the numbers of a particular college fall by even three or four in communities as small as most of the theological colleges, there is a deficit on the year's working. Hence the concern of some Principals at any suggestion that the period of two years' residence might be reduced, even in the case of students who possess an Honours Degree in Theology. Hence also the theological colleges are understaffed and can continue only because of the devoted service of their overworked and underpaid tutors and chaplains. Economic circumstances will during the next twenty years enforce changes far more radical than anything so far envisaged by any of the groups and commissions which have discussed training for the ministry.

In view of these and other considerations we must think seriously about the form that training should take. At present the aim seems to be to send as many of our candidates as possible to Oxford or Cambridge and then to a theological college for a further two years. Most of the men going up have a School or State or L.E.A. grant, and they are advised to read the subject in which they did best in their "Advanced" or "Scholarship" level examinations. Only a small percentage read Theology for their degree. After the first World War many of us were encouraged to read a subject other than Theology "to broaden our outlook" or "in case we changed our minds". Moreover, in those days the "historical" theology taught at Oxford and Cambridge could fairly be said to be critical and negative, and it bore little relation to live theological or evangelistic issues. To-day the situation is changed, but the old inhibitions still survive in the minds of many of those who advise candidates what to read. In what other profession would this state of affairs be tolerated? Doctors and solicitors read at the University for their life's work, and so, as a norm, should the clergy. If men had already obtained an Honours Degree in Theology, their time in a theological college could be reduced to four terms and the nature of the staff required would be different. There ought to be at least one theological college catering solely for men with Honours Degrees in Theology, which could concentrate upon such subjects as Liturgy, the Prayer Book, and the doctrines of the Church and Sacraments at advanced level. A considerable saving of time and money would result, and also an increased knowledge of Theology; the men themselves would be spared the frustration which some feel at present after their University Honours course and two years in the Services.

THE MODERN UNIVERSITIES

The fact is that, since most men at the Universities are there with L.E.A. grants, the State is actually willing to pay for the basic training of the clergy. Not only at Oxford and Cambridge, but in several of the Modern Universities, there are theological faculties which cost the Church nothing. And yet the Church, which asked the Modern Universities to set up theological schools, is making little use of them, and ordinands will be found in all the Modern Universities reading Science, English, or Modern Languages. Can we afford such waste of opportunity? To ignore what the State has thus provided is surely as foolish as it would be for a poor man to contract out of the National Health Service. The report *Recruitment for the Ministry* is unfair and in some respects untrue in its description of life at the Modern Universities. Qualities of personal and pastoral responsibility and leadership are developed; in some of them—Nottingham, for example—the proportion of those who live in lodgings or at home is the same as it is at Cambridge. There is real social life and real community. It is most important to strengthen the theological schools and to develop their influence in the Modern Universities by sending them the right kind and quality of ordinands; the latter would find that they had a field for their "ministry" in such a situation, and they would be encouraged and guided to take a full part in the rich and complex life of the student body. In many of the Modern Universities a Church of England Chaplaincy has already been established; the Chaplain would be the ideal person to act as the director and friend of the ordinands. Moreover, the theological schools in the Modern Universities are in no sense mere replicas of the faculties at Oxford and Cambridge. There is nothing in the ancient Universities which corresponds to the small Honours School in the Modern University; the latter is an entirely new educational achievement, and it has developed a remarkable fellowship between teachers and taught, an intimacy of daily corporate life, to which there are no parallels elsewhere. Furthermore, in many of the Modern Universities, the theology which is taught is not "historical" theology in the old-fashioned, near rationalist sense; it is concerned with living issues in theology, philosophy, apologetics, literature, and ethics. It must be stressed that if the Church does not use these new schools of Theology, for which it asked, they will die. If they are used, ordinands will be mixing with, influencing and learning from the large number of men, especially on the science and technical sides, who are at these Modern Universities and who will later become leaders in their different careers.

THE NEW SITUATION

The Church needs to examine very carefully the training given to ordinands to see that it meets the needs of the twentieth century, and not to be content simply to continue the training suitable 50 years ago to produce "English gentlemen in Holy Orders". No one wants to change our present system completely, but are we making full use of the facilities now available? Or are we just continuing the same pattern there was when all boys learnt Latin and Greek? Are we making the mistake of trying to mould all our candidates into the same pattern? We must at all costs see that there is a real variety of types of training and so of types of candidates. Is the gap between the Church and the Laity to-day due at least in part to the fact that few clergy understand the background and training of the ordinary layman in the workshop?

There is not space to go into the question whether the Church should have the right to choose the theological college to which men receiving its grants go, nor whether some form of direction of ordinands, perhaps similar to that used in the Medical profession, could be introduced. What is asked is that, while we thank God for the increasing number of ordinands, we should make full use of *all* the openings available, especially in the Modern Universities, and that fresh thought be given to the best means of training men and raising the money required.

DR JOHNSON AS A CHURCHMAN

By S. C. ROBERTS

In Overton & Relton's work on *The English Church from the accession of George I to the end of the eighteenth century* two pages are devoted to a sketch of Samuel Johnson as a Churchman. From these I extract the following passages:

> "He is even a more valuable witness to the good qualities of the Church of his day than Edmund Burke, for he was more of a representative man. His manliness and robustness of intellect, his strong common-sense, his firm and unwavering conviction of the truth of Christianity, combined with a vivid interest in the affairs of this life, his sturdy independence both of thought and action, his real piety without a tincture of cant or 'enthusiasm' were all characteristic of the eighteenth century at its best . . . .
>
> "He was not bound to the Church by any ties. His attachment to it was purely one of conviction and all the more valuable on that account . . . .
>
> "The eighteenth-century church arrangements quite satisfied him. He was very comfortable in his seat in St Clement Danes, and the somewhat secular character of his clerical friend, Dr Taylor, does not seem at all to have shocked him . . . Johnson's devotional writings . . . show him to have been a man of profound personal religious character and conviction, deeply attached to his personal Saviour . . ."

It is a pleasant, cosy picture—and profoundly misleading. By way of commentary, it may be well, in the first instance to recall very briefly, the background of his birth and boyhood.

Johnson was born over his father's book-shop at the corner of the market-place at Lichfield. Across the cobbles was St Mary's Church in which he was baptized. His father, Michael Johnson, though not prosperous as a bookseller, was a prominent citizen, serving as sheriff, magistrate, and senior bailiff. Politically, or at least sentimentally, he was a Jacobite and a High Churchman, but in common with other holders of office in the city he regularly abjured the Pretender and subscribed to the declaration that there was not any transubstantiation in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. He worshipped regularly at St Mary's. Johnson's mother, on the other hand, came from an evangelical family and it was from her that at the age of 3 he received his first introduction to theological dogma:

> "Being in bed with my mother one morning, I was told by her of the two places to which the inhabitants of this world were received after death; one a fine place filled with happiness, called Heaven; the other a *sad* place, called Hell."

It was a warning which Johnson never forgot. Meanwhile, at about the age of 9 he was troubled by doubts and became a lax talker against religion. His mother gave him *The Whole Duty of Man* to read on Sundays, but it brought him no conviction; Grotius' *de Veritate Religionis,* which he picked up in his father's shop, was too difficult for him; but Low's *Serious Call,* which he read at Oxford, had a totally different effect. He expected to find it dull or even ludicrous. On the contrary, it was, in his own words, "quite an overmatch for him", and from that time forward religion, as Boswell says, was "the predominant object of his thoughts".

It is one of Boswell's merits that he gives us the gloomy, as well as the gay, side of Johnson's temperament and, whatever may be thought of Boswell's morals, his interest in, and his desire for, a stable religious faith were genuine. In particular, he frequently asked Johnson to arm him with a concise apologetic. "Sir", was the reply, "you cannot answer all objections"; and then he went on to say that while it might be demonstrated that the First Cause was good as well as powerful, there stood over against it the unhappiness of human life. It was only "a positive revelation" which had made it possible to hope for a future state of compensation and a perfect system.

It was seldom, indeed, that the introduction of a religious topic did not lead Johnson to the contemplation of death and the judgement it would bring, and there are few more brilliant pieces of reporting in literature than Boswell's account of a dinner-party at Mr Dilly's on 15 April 1778. The talk ranged over Free Will, the Americans ("I am willing to love all mankind," roared Johnson, "except an American"), the limits of feminine freedom, William Mason, and cookery books. Boswell himself appears to have introduced the subject of death—no doubt with deliberate purpose—and Johnson and Mrs Knowles, the Quakeress, were quickly plunged into a discussion of first and last things:

> "I expressed," writes Boswell, "a horrour at the thought of death. MRS. KNOWLES 'Nay thou shouldst not have a horrour for what is the gate of life.' JOHNSON (standing upon the hearth rolling about,

with a serious, solemn and somewhat gloomy air) 'No rational man can die without uneasy apprehension.' Mrs. KNOWLES 'The Scriptures tell us "The righteous shall have *hope* in his death".' JOHNSON 'Yes, Madam; that is, he shall not have despair. But, consider, his hope of salvation must be founded on the terms on which it is promised that the mediation of our Saviour shall be applied to us—namely, obedience; and where obedience has failed, then, as suppletory to it, repentance. But what man can say that his obedience has been such, as he would approve of in another, or even in himself upon close examination, or that his repentance has not been such as to require being repeated of? No man can be sure that his obedience and repentance will obtain salvation.' Mrs. KNOWLES 'But divine intimation of acceptance may be made to the soul.' JOHNSON 'Madam, it may; but I should not think the better of a man who should tell me on his death-bed he was sure of salvation. A man cannot be sure himself that he has divine intimation of acceptance; much less can he make others sure that he has it.' BOSWELL 'Then, Sir, we must be contented to acknowledge that death is a terrible thing.' JOHNSON 'Yes, Sir. I have made no approaches to a state which can look on it as not terrible.' Mrs. KNOWLES (seeming to enjoy a pleasing serenity in the persuasion of benignant divine light) 'Does not St Paul say "I have fought the good fight of faith, I have finished my course; henceforth is laid up for me a crown of life"?' JOHNSON 'Yes, madam; but here was a man inspired, a man who had been converted by supernatural interposition.' BOSWELL 'In prospect death is dreadful; but in fact we find that people die easy.' JOHNSON 'Why, Sir, most people have not *thought* much of the matter, so cannot *say* much, and it is supposed they die easy. Few believe it certain they are then to die; and those who do, set themselves to behave with resolution, as a man does who is going to be hanged. He is not the less unwilling to be hanged.' Miss SEWARD 'There is one mode of the fear of death which is certainly absurd; and that is the dread of annihilation, which is only a pleasing sleep without a dream.' JOHNSON 'It is neither pleasing, nor sleep; it is nothing . . . .' "

And when Boswell took up the argument, Johnson concluded:

> "The lady confounds annihilation, which is nothing, with the apprehension of it, which is dreadful. It is in the apprehension of it that the horrour of annihilation consists."

More and more, as he grew older, Johnson was disturbed by this apprehension. Some people, he said, looked upon salvation as the effect of an absolute decree. Others, and those the most rational, looked upon salvation as conditional. "And those the most rational". Here we come near to the heart of Johnson's mental agony. His reason told him that the sinner must be punished. His religion told him that sinners could be saved by the sacrifice which

Christ had made for the sins of the whole world. But what of the sinner himself? Johnson could not throw himself in an airy optimism upon the mercy of God. He had conditions to fulfil—obedience, repentance, reformation. Conscious that he had not fulfilled them, he was afraid. So when the amiable Dr Adams, the Master of his old college, suggested that God was infinitely good, Johnson agreed, but feared that not having fulfilled the conditions of salvation he might be one of those who would be damned. "Dr ADAMS 'What do you mean by damned?' JOHNSON (passionately and loudly) 'Sent to Hell, Sir, and punished everlastingly.'"

Apart from Boswell's testimony, Johnson's recurrent anxiety about the problems of sin and salvation is evident in his *Prayers & Meditations,* posthumously published in 1785. In the catalogue of his sins Johnson emphasized sensual thoughts, idleness, late rising, neglect of Bible-reading, and irregularity in public worship. Year after year he recorded his shortcomings, his failure to keep his resolutions of a year ago, his determination to do better in the future. On Easter Eve 1761, for instance, he wrote:

> "Since the communion of last Easter, I have led a life so dissipated and useless and my terrours and perplexities have so much increased, that I am under great depression and discouragement; yet I purpose to present myself before God tomorrow, with humble hope that He will not break the bruised reed.
>
> *Come unto me, all ye that travail*
>
> I have resolved (I hope not presumptuously) till I am afraid to resolve again. Yet, hoping in God, I steadfastly purpose to lead a new life. O God, enable me, for Jesus Christ's sake."

And then follows the regular list of resolutions.

"O God," he prayed at another time, "make me to remember that the night cometh when no man can work." Always he reflected on the fact that his love of good talk at a good dinner-table had stolen the hours that should have been spent in methodical study. Our chief delight in Johnson comes, of course, from the record of these stolen hours and we tend to forget that for Johnson life was an unending struggle. It was at the Mitre or at the Club, not in St Clement Danes Church, that he was truly comfortable. Did he not describe a tavern chair as the throne of human felicity? But when he returned to the solitude of his study, he wrote:

> "To strive with difficulties and to conquer them is the highest human felicity; the next is, to strive and deserve to conquer; but he whose life

has passed without a contest and who can boast neither success nor merit, can survey himself only as a useless filler of existence; and if he is content with his own character, must owe his satisfaction to insensibility."

This is the true Johnson—*Johnson Agonistes,* to quote the title of the most penetrating essay of recent years.[1]

To modern readers, as they contemplate the *Dictionary of the English Language* and the dozen volumes of *Collected Works,* Johnson's doubts and fears and discontents may well suggest the morbidity of a spiritual hypochondriac. But Johnson had inherited a vile melancholy from his father and a certain element of Calvinism from his mother and his pre-occupation with his sin of slothfulness was constant and fundamental. Religion was for him the only alternative to despair, but it brought him no easy comfort. Speaking of one of Hugh Blair's Sermons, of which he had a profound admiration, he remarked: "There is one part of it which I disapprove, and I'd have him correct it; which is, that 'he who does not feel joy in religion is far from the kingdom of heaven!' There are many good men whose fear of God predominates over their love."

Johnson was one of those good men. He feared God not perhaps as a criminal might fear the sentence of an implacable judge, but as a wayward and lazy sixth-form boy might fear the end-of-term interviews with his headmaster. He praised Law's *Serious Call* as the finest piece of hortatory theology in the language, but such a comment as that of Law that "the innocent Christ did not suffer to quiet an angry Deity, but as cooperating, assisting and uniting with that love of God which desired our salvation" seems to have brought him little comfort. On the other hand, the divine who gave him most satisfaction was the heterodox Samuel Clarke, in spite of the fact that he felt bound to exclude him from the *Dictionary* on account of his Arian views. But he frequently read and commended his preaching. Clarke's sermons fill ten substantial volumes, and without making too arbitrary a choice one may conjecture that a passage such as the following from a sermon *Of the Love of God towards Sinners* may have renewed Johnson's hopes:

> "Most unjustly therefore and with great injury to Religion, is God sometimes represented as an implacable and cruel Judge, delighting in the destruction of Sinners, till they were taken (as it were) out of his Hands by the Interposition of Christ; This (I say) is a very injurious

Representation of the Great God and Father of Mercies: For, the Coming of Christ was not the first Cause of the Goodness and Love of God towards us; but the essential and eternal Goodness of God was the cause and reason of the Coming of Christ."

On his death-bed, happily, Johnson's fears were calmed by "the prevalence of his faith, and his trust in the merits and *propitiation* of Jesus Christ". He urged his doctor to read Clarke's Sermons, and when he was asked why he thus pressed the work of an Arian, he replied: " Because he is fullest on the *propitiatory sacrifice*".

So much for the gloomier side of Johnson's theology. But even Johnson realized, on occasions, that cheerfulness was a religious virtue. The late Bishop of Swansea and Brecon was, I think, the first to point out that on Easter Day 1778, two days after Oliver Edwards had made his immortal remark about cheerfulness breaking in, Johnson added to his usual Easter resolutions: "To serve and trust God and be cheerful". It is refreshing too, to note that occasionally he revolted from the contemplation of death and judgement. When Boswell once pressed him with the question "May we not fortify our minds for the approach of death?", he broke out angrily: "No, sir, let it alone. It matters not how a man dies, but how he lives", and certainly no one of his own or any other age practised the virtue of Christian charity more consistently than Johnson.

As a Churchman, Johnson never wavered in his allegiance to the Establishment. All his prejudices were on the side of the Tories and the High Churchmen but in his religion, as in his politics, there was plenty of liberal thinking. Macaulay's view that Johnson was a Tory "not from rational conviction but from mere passion" will not hold. Of James II, for instance, Johnson wrote: "He was not ignorant of the real interest of his country; he desired its power and its happiness and thought rightly that there is no happiness without religion; but he thought very erroneously and absurdly, that there is no religion without Popery." Johnson's passion was for order, and he hated the Whigs because they continually threatened to upset the order of Church and State, just as the first Whig, the Devil, had upset the order of Paradise.

It was this passion for order which made him distrust the Methodists, though he had a warm personal regard for John Wesley and George Whitefield (whom he knew "before he began to be better than other people"). It was the claim of the Methodists to the "inward light" which irritated him: "If a man pretends to a principle of action of which I can know nothing . . . how can I tell what that person may be prompted to do? When a person professes to be governed by a written ascertained law, I can then know where to find him." Similarly, while he could admire and enjoy a Presbyterian sermon, he deplored the lack of an ordered liturgy:

> " 'Why, Sir, the Presbyterians have no church, no apostolical ordination.' BOSWELL 'And do you think that absolutely essential, Sir?' JOHNSON 'Why, Sir, as it was an apostolical institution, I think it is dangerous to be without it. And, Sir, Presbyterians have no publick worship; they have no form of prayer in which they know they are to join. They go to hear a man pray and are to judge whether they will join with him.' "

So, when Johnson was in Sir Robert Chambers' garden in Oxford and Sir Robert was gathering snails and throwing them over the wall into his neighbour's garden, Johnson reproached him very roughly for being unmannerly and unneighbourly. "Sir," said Sir Robert, "my neighbour is a Dissenter." "Oh," said Johnson, "if so, Chambers, toss away, toss away . . ." Towards the Church of Rome Johnson was more sympathetic. "A good man," he said, "of a timorous disposition, in great doubt of his acceptance with God, and pretty credulous, might be glad of a church where there are so many helps to get to Heaven. I would be a Papist if I could. I have fear enough; but an obstinate rationality prevents me."

Here, again, we come back to *Johnson Agonistes.*

As to particular Catholic doctrines, he was willing to attack or defend them according to his mood and the circumstances of the argument. He was prepared to support the doctrine of Purgatory but condemned the "lucrative imposition" to which it led in practice. He denied that the Mass was "idolatrous", but regarded the giving of the sacrament in one kind as criminal. In short he concluded: "In everything in which they differ from us they are wrong."

"A steady Church of England man." Such is Boswell's description of Johnson. It might have been more accurate to call him "a steady Prayer Book man". When he was still in petticoats Johnson was told by his mother to learn the Gospel for the day by heart. This he did in a few minutes, and throughout his life the Book of Common Prayer was the principal source of his religious instruction and refreshment. "I know of no good prayers but those in the Book of Common Prayer," he said, and in his own compositions the influence of the book is evident. His very last poem, written eight days before his death, was a paraphrase in Latin elegiacs of the collect of the Communion service, beginning *"Summe Deus cui caeca patent penetralia cordis. . . ."* The Prayer Book, in fact, was the mainspring of his meditation and his worship. He went to Church on Sundays with reasonable regularity and if he missed a Sunday, he tried to make it up in the week. In general, he worshipped more frequently when there were prayers only and not a sermon—not that he despised sermons, but he had written a good many himself and he was an exacting critic.

For the office of clergyman he had the highest respect, so high that when he was invited to take Holy Orders and accept a country living in the gift of his friend Bennet Langton, he had scruples which he could not overcome. "I have not," he said, "the requisites for the office and I cannot, in my conscience, shear that flock which I am unable to feed." Having so high a respect for the clergy, he demanded a high standard of seemly behaviour and also of seemly dress. From bishops he expected the very highest degree of decorum, and an episcopal invitation to dinner in Holy Week put him into a serious state of embarrassment; his bow to an Archbishop was described as "such a studied elaboration of homage, such an extension of limb, such a flexion of body as have seldom or never been equalled". His sense of fun was, of course, far too keen for him to deny to the clergy the pleasure of a joke. What he hated was a clergyman who assumed the "lax jollity" of a man of the world. It was this that provoked his famous comment: "This merriment of parsons is mighty offensive." Similarly, for all his affection for, and gratitude towards, his old friend Dr Taylor, he deplored the way in which the Squire in Taylor tended to predominate over the Parson:

> "Sir, I love him . . . but my regard for him does not increase . . . His talk is of bullocks . . . His habits are by no means sufficiently clerical."

To Anglicans of to-day Johnson's habit of partaking of the Holy Communion only once a year may seem strange. One might expect that he would have attended at each of the great festivals of the Church, and late in life one of his resolves was "participation of the Sacrament at least three times a year". But his *Prayers and Meditations* show clearly how agonizing was his mental preparation, combined with fasting and the reading of Clarke's sermons, for his Easter communion.

> "By this awful festival," he wrote at the age of 71, "is particularly recommended newness of life; and a new life I will now endeavour to begin, by more diligent application to useful employment and more frequent attendance on public worship."

Johnson wrote many sermons for Dr Taylor and from one of them (on the text "But let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of that bread and drink of that cup") we may get a clear picture of his considered view of the meaning of the Sacrament:

> "This sacrament is a representation of the death of our Saviour, appointed by himself, to be celebrated by all his followers, in all ages; to the end that by commemorating his sufferings in a solemn and public manner, they might declare their confidence in his merits, their belief of his mission, and their adherence to his religion . . . By partaking of the communion, we declare, in the most solemn manner, in the presence of God and man, that we hold the faith of Jesus . . . We are therefore not transiently and carelessly, but frequently and seriously, to ask ourselves whether we firmly believe the promises of our Saviour—whether we repent of our sins—and resolve, for the future, to avoid all those things which God has forbidden and practise all those which he has commanded. And when any man is convinced that he has formed real resolutions of a new life, let him pray for strength and constancy to persevere in them; and let him come joyfully to the holy table, in sure confidence of pardon, reconciliation, and life everlasting."

"Not transiently and carelessly"—here is the explanation of the infrequency of Johnson's participation in the Sacrament. Here, too, is evidence that in the last analysis, Johnson's mind and conscience were concentrated not on the doctrines of a particular Church but on the central facts of the Christian religion. For all his prejudices, his intolerance in argument, and his devotion to the Anglican liturgy, Johnson's Christianity was ultimately free from sectarian taint:

> "For my part, sir, I think all Christians, whether Papists or Protestants, agree in the essential articles and that their differences are trivial, and rather political than religious."

[1] B. H. Bronson, *Johnson Agonistes and other essays* (Cambridge, 1946).

CHRIST AND THE PATTERN OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IN THE GOSPEL TRADITION

By E. J. TINSLEY

THERE is urgent need to-day for a restatement of the distinctive features of the Christian life, and this for the following reasons:

(1) The Christian's mode of life is part of the Gospel, and it cannot be separated from what theology has to say about the nature and function of the Church. The shape of the Christian life, determined as it is by the vocation to "witness" and to "walk in the way"', is in essential relationship with the Church's activity of evangelism. The amorphous character of the Christian life as it has sometimes been expounded in the modern period, equated so often with the English idea of "being a gentleman", is partly the result of a failure to integrate Christian spirituality and ethics into the doctrine of the Church, and this tendency has been accelerated by western notions of individualism. The Church, as "Body of Christ", is messianic in status and function, and this means that she is called first to consider, not her popularity or "success", but her obedience to the Way of the Messiah. The temptation of the Church is his temptation, to turn from the path of obedience, to seek to put God to the test rather than to trust him, to seek self-authentication instead of allowing herself to be "sealed" by God. The Way of the Son of Man, as we shall see later, must be the Way of his Church, and this implies, among other things, that the Church's distinctive mode of evangelism must be his. The two aspects of the Church's life are, like his, the "kerygmatic" proclamation of the Gospel of God in work and word, and the "didactic" ingathering of the responsive.

(2) The most dangerous blurring of the Christian pattern of life in these days, as in the second and third centuries, comes from "gnosticism". The significance of the revival of

gnosticism, which aims at "improving" Christianity by making it more "universal" and "spiritual", lies in the implicit challenge which it makes to the non-religious character of much contemporary Churchmanship. Modern gnosticism, with its denial of the Christian doctrines of creation, incarnation, and atonement, its attempted dichotomy between the "spiritual" and the "unspiritual", and its eclecticism and esotericism, as exemplified by such writers as Aldous Huxley, Gerald Heard, Christopher Isherwood, would seek to lead the Christian into the ways of oriental mysticism, and would change the Christian life of grace into a yoga of self-endeavour.

(3) The influence of "liberalism", especially in the form which it assumed in nineteenth-century England, has had the effect, in popular thought at least, of turning Christianity into a moralism. More and more liberalism tended to interpret sin primarily in terms of imperfection and ignorance, and this consequently involved a reinterpretation of redemption along the lines of evolutionary progressivism or enlightenment. Christ now became either a forerunner of a type of humanity which will become the norm as human evolution proceeds, or the supreme enlightener—a kind of "Buddha" whose teaching, taken in isolation, would save. The pattern of Christian living suggested by liberal humanism naturally approximated to that of the virtuous man of classical culture: aesthetically sensitive, "rational", "open-minded", civilized. It was essentially a non-eschatological pattern, and furthermore, not closely related to christological doctrine. Liberalism failed to integrate Christian ethics and spirituality with Christian eschatology.

(4) Then there is the vigorous polemic against mysticism in Niebuhr, Heiler, Brunner, and others. Mysticism is relevant to our subject because it is really concerned with the pattern of the religious life, and the Christian mystics seek to establish the shape of Christian prayer and worship in relation to the implications of the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement. Niebuhr and Brunner, however, make no attempt to distinguish types of mysticism. For them the only authentic type would seem to be the neo-platonic mysticism of Meister Eckhart and his school, which is

similar in kind to Aldous Huxley's "vedanta". There is however in the Christian tradition a mysticism which stems not from Plotinus and pseudo-Dionysius, but from the New Testament, and is firmly rooted in the doctrines of the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Church, and the Sacraments for its possibility, meaning, and relevance. The distinguishing feature of the mysticism which is distinctively and uniquely Christian is the delineation of the Christian life as the *imitatio Christi*, and it is the central place given to this idea which preserves Christian mysticism from degenerating into a merely vague amorphous spirituality. We need to stress here that the "imitation of Christ" in the New Testament and in authentically Christian spirituality is not the imitation of him in the sense of crude literal mimicry or emulation of historical incidents, but imitation in the sense of becoming united with him mystically through the action of the Holy Spirit who takes of the things of Christ and reveals them unto those who are his. As we shall see later, men are to imitate the attitudes of patience, humility, charity, compassion, obedience, self-giving in suffering, because thereby the Gospel of God is being proclaimed through his Christ in union with those who will to be used for this purpose. The doubtfully authentic types of mysticism which we find in Christian history are always those which sit loosely to the fact and implications of the historical Incarnation. The strictures of Niebuhr and Brunner are oversimplified and unfair, and they seem to suggest that the pattern of the Christian life for to-day should take the form of a return to an individualistic " prophetic " type of piety.

(5) Lastly we are confronted with the pattern of human living which is being more and more clearly traced out by our modern industrial and urban age. The classical forms of the pattern of Christian living all belong to the pre-industrial era. One of the strengths of Marxism is that it does present itself as fully integrated into the modern industrial age. The great need of our time is for a clear articulation of the pattern of Christian living which is firmly rooted in the context of modern society. But while restatement is thus obviously necessary, the form which emerges must, of

> course, be recognizably Christian at the crucial points. It is a question of a real re-translation, and not of complete re-writing with but slight reference to the original.

All these factors point to the urgent necessity for restating the form of the Christian life in close association with that which alone renders it possible and valid, namely Christian theology. This article is an attempt to make clear, from an examination of the Gospel tradition, what must be the constants in any formulation of the Christian life which is to remain distinctively and authentically Christian.

(i) **The Mission of Jesus to fulfil Scripture in the Synoptic Gospels**

The early Christian preachers and interpreters of Jesus were intent to emphasize that in him the "Scriptures had been fulfilled" (cf. Acts 2. 16ff.; 3. 18, 24; 10. 36; 13. 32-3; Romans 1. 1-2). Here we must ask first whether this is an interpretation of their own, absolutely peculiar to them, or whether it has any relation to the mind and purpose of Jesus himself, so far as we can discover this.

There is considerable evidence in the early Gospel tradition that the first Christians felt themselves obliged to interpret Jesus in this way because he had himself first done it for them, not only in teaching, but, and perhaps primarily, in action.[1]

(*a*) There are first the explicit words of Jesus which indicate that he believed himself to be under a supreme obligation to "fulfil the Scriptures", and these passages are significantly connected with the "Son of Man" theme:

"For the Son of Man goes his way, as the Scriptures say of him." (Mark 14. 21, cf. Matt. 26. 24)
"For the Son of Man goes hence, as is decreed." (Luke 22. 22)

This means at least that the Way of the Son of Man (to death?) has been indicated in Old Testament writings, and that in the life of Jesus there is taking place a reproduction of that Way which he who wills may see.

"It is written of the Son of Man that he should suffer many things and be set at nought." (Mark 9. 12)

Here there is the same awareness of a previous setting forth of what must now be fulfilled in his own time.

"I have been among you day after day in the Temple teaching and you never seized me. But let the Scriptures be fulfilled!" (Mark 14. 49)

"How then should the Scriptures be fulfilled, that it must be so?" (Matt. 26. 54)

The arrest indicates that all is going according to the forewritten plan. One more stage has been reached along the Way of the Son of Man.

"We are going up to Jerusalem, and everything that was foretold for the Son of Man through the prophets is going to be fulfilled." (Luke 18. 31)

Once again it is here suggested that another stage has been reached along a Way previously set forth in the Old Testament. These sayings make no explicit reference to any particular Old Testament passages, although it looks very likely that the Servant Songs of Deutero-Isaiah are being referred to. Further considerations which greatly strengthen this probability will be discussed later. One passage referring to the fulfilment of Scripture which does make explicit reference to the Servant Songs is Luke 22. 37:

"For I tell you that the Scripture which says, They numbered him among the criminals, is due to be fulfilled in me. Indeed for me the course is run."

The authenticity of this saying has sometimes been doubted, but the reasons given for doubting it are not compelling.

(*b*) With these passages which refer to a written foretelling of what is taking place in Jesus we must consider the frequent and characteristic references in his teaching to a mysterious but unmistakable compulsion lying behind the progress of his mission. These passages indicate that the fulfilment of Scripture is not merely for purposes of illustration, but an urgent necessity laid upon him. He *must* fulfil, not merely "may" nor even "will". The imperative necessity is once again associated with the Way of the Son of Man. There are first the predictions of the Passion:

"And he began to teach them that the Son of Man must suffer many things, and be rejected by the elders and the chief priests and the scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again." (Mark 8, 31: cf. Luke 9. 22)

"From that time Jesus began to show his disciples that he must go to Jerusalem, and suffer many things." (Matt. 16. 21)

"First he must suffer many things and be rejected of this generation." (Luke 17. 25)

"Everything that was foretold for the Son of Man through the prophets is going to be fulfilled." (Luke 18. 31)

The authenticity of these predictions has often been questioned, but their theme is so central to the purpose of Jesus himself that this insistence on the unconditional obligation of the Son of Man to suffer is not an historical problem, even though the actual wording of these predictions may reflect in some cases the tendency to fill in details after the event.

The sense of urgent necessity is clearly seen in the following passages:

"I have a baptism to undergo; and what constraint I suffer till that has been achieved!" (Luke 12. 50)

with which may be taken:

"Are you able to be baptized with the baptism that I am baptized with?" (Mark 10. 38)

The figure of baptism is frequently used in the Old Testament, especially in the Psalms, for being plunged beneath the waters of suffering and sin. Jesus seems here to have the figure of the Servant in mind: like him, he wills to be identified with the human situation, because it is the Father's will that he should. St Luke especially brings out the urgency and necessity of the going up to Jerusalem as a part, in fact the crucial part, of the Way of the Son of Man:

"When the days drew near for him to be received up, he set his face to go to Jerusalem." (Luke 9. 51)

"I must go on my way to-day and to-morrow and the day following: for it cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem." (Luke 13. 33)

A very early sense of being under the Paternal compulsion lies behind the episode in the Temple, recorded by St Luke: *ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρός δεῖ εἶναί με* (Luke 2, 49). In the Gospel of St Luke, in fact, there is almost a timetable for the Way of the Son of Man, although this theme is not as prominently displayed as in the Fourth Gospel. There is a divine "must" about the departure of Jesus from Capernaum, since he is sent to preach the Gospel to all the cities of Israel: "It is my duty to proclaim the

Kingdom of God to the other cities also. I was sent forth for that." (Luke 4. 42). Again, Jesus *must* enter the house of Zacchaeus, even though it causes offence. If the Father has indicated that through him salvation comes to this house this day, he must go (Luke 19. 5, 9). There are similar sayings in the post-Resurrection narratives in St Luke's Gospel (Luke 24, 24, 44).

As Ethelbert Stauffer puts it: "The 'must' of divine predestination covered every step that Jesus took."[2] He must go a certain way because a previously announced intention of God will be seen to be completed therein. Is it possible to go further and make more precise the nature of this necessitated way which Jesus believes he must walk? Is it possible to discern from the tradition the Way of the Son of Man as Jesus himself saw it? The supposition that Jesus believed himself called to walk in the Way of Israel, and thereby to be himself Israel in one sense, throws light on so much of the Gospel material and on certain major problems of the Gospels as to call for the most careful consideration. *The Way of Jesus as Son of Man is the Way of Israel and constitutes the Sign of the times, discernment of which turns on repentance and humility.*

(ii) **The Sign of the Son of Man**

It is necessary first to recall the significance of "signs" in the Old Testament. The words used there (*'oth, mopheth*) denote clear indications, to the eye of faith and humility, of the purpose of God in history, and of his presence in historical situations. God gives signs which are self-authenticating for those who will to do his will. Pharaoh fails to recognize the signs which are being given to him because his heart is "hardened". A drastic humbling of the pride and self-confidence of Pharaoh would be necessary before he could discern the signs being given. All along the Way in which Israel has to go as People of God there are signs, but they are not of such a character that their recognition is inevitable. Israel is in fact rebuked for not recognizing them, because this is not a matter of some excusable natural defect, but of a wilful moral turpitude or perversion for which the people are accountable: "And the Lord said to Moses, How long will this people despise me? and how long will they not believe in me, in spite of all the signs which I have wrought among them?" (Numbers 14. 11). The trouble seems to have been that Israel was willing to derive comfort in a self-regarding way from what were "miracles" in the modern sense, whilst wilfully ignoring the moral demands which these events, as *signs* and not mere *wonders,* made upon them. The sign is a trial or "temptation" of faith; only in faith will it be seen as a sign making demands, and not only a wonder giving satisfaction. Israel was in fact "hardened of heart", "stiff-necked", accepting these signs as deserved confirmations of a permanent status, rather than indications of a vocation to obedience. That signs by their very nature constitute trials or temptations for Israel is suggested by the close association in Old Testament usage of "sign" (*'oth*) and "temptation" (*massah*). In signs God tests his Israel, and therefore these signs are experienced by Israel as temptations. For man to tempt God in the Old Testament is to seek for more and more satisfying "proofs" of one's own choosing, rather than to accept in trust those which God in fact gives—in his own way. This was Israel's temptation at Massah: "And he called the name of the place Massah and Meribah because of the striving of the children of Israel, and because they tempted the Lord saying, Is the Lord among us or not?" (Exodus 17. 7). Especially instructive for an understanding of the relation between sign and temptation is Deuteronomy 13. 1-3:

> "If there arise in the midst of you a prophet or a dreamer of dreams, and he gives you a sign or a wonder, and the sign or wonder which he tells you comes to pass, and if he says, 'Let us go after other gods', which you have not known, 'and let us serve them', you shall not listen to the words of that prophet or to that dreamer of dreams; for the Lord your God is testing you, to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul."

The sign is, in other words, a possible stumbling block (cf. Isaiah 8. 15). It may be interpreted and received as a token of merited approval, and not a gratuitous confirmation of a vocation. The sign which easily and spontaneously satisfies may do these things because it is a trial of obedience, a temptation to turn aside from the hard realities which walking in the Way of the Lord involves. True obedience is the criterion for recognizing the signs whether they be of God or not.

There are two well-known examples in the Old Testament where we find the prophet called to be a sign to his own generation. The first is that of Isaiah who believes that he and his children are called to be a sign for the times:

> "Behold I and the children whom the Lord has given me are for signs and wonders in Israel from the Lord of hosts who dwells in Mount Zion." (8. 18)

For those who obey and therefore believe (belief and obedience being practically synonymous in the Old Testament), the prophet and those around him will be a sign of perfect trust and waiting upon the Lord—but to others, escapist visionaries or the like.[3] More important, especially for an understanding of Jesus, is the book of Ezekiel. It is Ezekiel who specially stresses the divine imperative of the prophetic calling, a calling which must be obeyed, come what may in the shape of success or failure:

> "And go, get you to the exiles, to your people, and say to them, 'Thus says the Lord God'; whether they hear or refuse to hear." (3. 11) "You shall say to them, 'Thus says the Lord God'; he that will hear, let him hear, and he that will refuse to hear, let him refuse." (3. 27)

The prophet is to go forward in absolute obedience, confident that God will see to it that the signs are efficacious to those who are willing to turn to him. We are reminded here of the refrain of Jesus: He who has ears to hear, let him hear. Ezekiel is requested to do certain actions which God will constitute signs to the house of Israel (14. 1; 12. 6.) He is to say "I am your sign" (12. 1):

> "Thus shall Ezekiel be unto you a sign; according to all that he has done you shall do. When this comes, then you will know that I am the Lord God." (24. 24)

The sign is a revelatory event, a mode of knowledge for those who do not cause themselves to "stumble" through pride, arrogance, or self-sufficiency. It is these hindrances which at first prevent the "nations" from seeing in the life and work of the Servant of Deutero-Isaiah a sign of God's redemptive purpose for the world through Israel (Isaiah 53. 4-6).

To turn now to the Gospel material. All four Gospels give prominence to John the Baptist's movement as a precursor of Jesus. This interpretation of the mission of John the Baptist as a heralding of the near approach of the Kingdom of God was not first the work of the early Church but was central to the thought of Jesus himself. Certainly for Jesus, recognition of who he is turns on recognition of who John was. They are both key figures in the coming of the Kingdom for those who know the Scriptures intimately as the record of God's saving acts, and not merely by casual acquaintance.

The question "By what authority do you do these things?"—a request for direct self-authentication—is returned to the questioners in the form of a demand for identification of John the Baptist. Inability to face the moral demands of John, and turn in repentance and thus recognize John's movement as of God means, all the more, inability to recognize and identify the work of him who succeeds John, because this too is of God, but God's action come to a head. Inability to perceive the movement of God in its final stages means, inevitably, inability to see the movement when it has come to fruition. There is in fact considerable evidence in the Gospels that Jesus recognized John as a "sign" of the Kingdom of God, a "sign" that the kingly action of God had reached its penultimate stage. To have rejected the mission of John the Baptist, he is to say later, would have been tantamount to the rejection of the will of God (*βουλὴ τοῦ θεοῦ*) for his time and generation (Luke 7. 30). Jesus hearkens to the "sign", and identifies himself with John's call to Israel, and is baptized. He explicitly interprets John as a "sign" in the conversation after the Transfiguration: "I tell you that Elijah has come" (Mark 9. 31). Upon Jesus there is the obligation to recognize the signs which the Father gives to Israel, a recognition which comes from willingness to obey the directives of the Father. This is specially brought out in the presentation of this conversation in St Matthew. The "signs" are there for those who want to recognize them! This is true for Jesus himself, and it will remain true for his disciples: "If you are willing to accept it, he is Elijah who is to come. He who has ears to hear, let him hear." The imprisonment of John the Baptist seems to have been taken as a "sign" for his own ministry to begin and perhaps the death of John the Baptist which is given in such unexpected detail in Mark was accepted as a "sign" that the final journey to Jerusalem must begin. The "Elijah" has come, and "they have done to him whatever they pleased". How much more likely it is then that a similar fate awaits him who comes after the "Elijah"—the Messiah himself!

Having willed to receive the "sign" of John's movement, Jesus at the Baptism is finally and completely aware that God is Father to him in a unique intimate sense: "Thou art my beloved Son". Now as a vocation in history, as a commission, being Son would suggest being Israel, sonship being the task to which Israel is pre-eminently called in the Old Testament. The Way of Israel is the Way of Sonship, and this means the way of obedience to the will of the Father of Israel which has been set forth in Torah. Jesus accepts this vocation to Sonship: all that the Father has said he will do. He will be himself Israel, and the Way of Israel, especially as it has been presented in the Servant-Songs, will be his Way, the Way of the Son of Man. This will be the Sign of the Times which the Father will make clear. His is the obedience, and the rest (e.g., vindication) is not his business, but the Father's. At the Baptism the Father has given another "sign", and the obedient Son recognizes it.

But, as we have seen in connection with the Old Testament Israel, "signs" by their very nature involve temptation. As Israel-Son Jesus is tempted to ask "signs" of his own choosing, rather than receive those which in fact the Father has given, and will give, just as the contemporaries of Jesus will be tempted to ask from him signs to their own liking, rather than to accept those which he gives. Jesus is tempted therefore to put the Father to the test, rather than to trust in him, and men are going to be tempted to put Jesus to the test, rather than to follow him. That Jesus himself accepted these trials as temptations of God's Israel is indicated by the nature of the replies given in the narrative of the Temptations in the Q tradition. They are all from that book in the Old Testament where the relationship between signs and temptations is specially prominent (Deuteronomy), and their context is, significantly, the temptation of Israel to depart from the Way which God has set forth in Torah. As Son—we can say from the account of the temptations as a whole—Jesus will go forward, confident in the faith that the Father will remain true to his promises, and that it would be an act of filial disobedience to ask for advance confirmation. He is tempted as Israel was tempted at Massah, "saying, Is the Lord among us or not?" but this Israel does not stop nor ask the Father "When?"

This is the fundamental messianic temptation of Jesus which St Luke insists was a continuing one (Luke 4. 13; 22. 28). The words of St Peter at Caesarea Philippi rebuking Jesus for his insistence on the necessary rejection and suffering of the Son of Man constitute the same satanic temptation to turn from the path of filial obedience to which he has committed himself as Israel. To succumb to this would be to reject the "things of God" (τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ). Therefore, "Get thee behind me Satan". (Mark 8. 33)

The same temptation, in another form, recurs in the request for "a sign from heaven". In the Markan version Jesus answers simply: "No sign shall be given to this generation"—because the very fact of the request declares that the Pharisees are rendering themselves incapable of seeing the sign which is in fact being given —Jesus himself. In the Q tradition the reply of Jesus is differently worded: "An evil and adulterous generation seeks after a sign. There shall no sign be given to it but the sign of Jonah." (Matt. 16. 4; Luke 11. 30; cf. Mark 8. 12). Here the meaning would seem to be that Jonah was indeed an evident sign of the working of God for those who were willing to accept the moral demands of his message, and turn in repentance—but not for others who, "not needing any repentance", would therefore not see the sign demanding it. So it is with the Son of Man in this generation: "The men of Nineveh will arise at the judgement with this generation and condemn it; for they repented at the preaching of Jonah, and behold, something greater than Jonah is here." (Luke 11. 32). St Matthew (12. 40) makes the sign of Jonah a reference to the Resurrection which, although less likely, would make no difference to the point we are considering.

At the Baptism Jesus gave himself, in an act of entire self-effacement, to be the "Sign" of the Kingdom to come, to let his light so shine before men that they might see his good works and glorify his Father which is in heaven. The messianic method of Jesus is to be that of the "sign". The words and works of Jesus point to the completion of the Israel purpose of the Father—for those with eyes to see, and ears to hear. The nature of the replies which Jesus makes to direct questions about himself suggest that he regarded such questions as temptations to make unambiguous verbal self-identification, and thus violate the nature of his works and teaching as a "Sign". The Father alone will authenticate them:

> "I thank thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hidden these things from the wise and understanding and revealed them to babes; yea, Father, for such was thy gracious will." (Matt. 11. 25; Luke 10. 21)

The question of his identity could not be asked as a mere point of information, but had to be faced by the questioner himself as a summons to faith and obedience. In all such questions Jesus is on trial as obedient Son; the Israel vocation is at stake.

If the mode of the historical Sonship of Jesus is that of the "Sign", the content of it is the *imitatio patris*. In Hebrew thought sonship is much more than a mere physical relationship. True sonship comes into being with the obedience of the father. The son must imitate the father, and this in Hebrew thought is primarily a matter of obedience.[4] The Way of the Son of Man, for Jesus, is a Way of absolute obedience in a path which the Father has determined and whose direction he will indicate. The "signs" which will be given along the Way will be clear enough to the eyes of the obedient Son. Our Lord's Way of the Son of Man is his *imitatio patris*, what Stauffer calls the Doxological Way, whereby the Father is glorified. Jesus deliberately set about to reproduce in the manner of his life and teaching a pattern which he believed the Father, in his own time and way, would reveal and vindicate as the "Sign" of the presence of the Israel of God, walking obediently in the way of sonship. His words and his works are in a real sense an *imitatio patris*. In an act of complete self-donation he accepts the endowment of the Spirit to walk in the Way of the Lord, and those who are willing to receive the "signs" which indicate, will receive the "Sign" which vindicates and ratifies—the Resurrection.

Jesus intended that his Way should be that of his disciples also. Their mission as bearers of the Gospel was to be expressed in the deliberate walking in his Way. If his life was the *imitatio patris*, their life as disciples is to be the *imitatio filii*. Thereby in fact they will attain sonship: loving their enemies as he did, and praying for their persecutors they will become sons of their Father who is in heaven. They are to be perfect as their Father in heaven is perfect, and there is a quite concrete way in which this is to be done: walking in the Way as it had been given in the life of their Lord. Their Way of Discipleship is the Way of the Son of Man himself, and he gives it the character of a "sign".

(iii) **The Way of the Disciple**

The disciple of Jesus is called to "follow" him. The summons "Follow me" became a *terminus technicus*[5] with Jesus. When used by others there is every indication that it reflected a usage characteristic of him. The phrase occurs either in actual calls to discipleship, or in descriptions of it. Now this following of Jesus was of course much more than a matter of physically accompany-ing him. The term as used by Jesus—especially when we relate it to the theme of walking in the Way of Israel—is seen to reflect the Old Testament use of *halak ahere*. Israel in the Old Testament is summoned to "walk after" the Lord, and this is done by obeying the Torah. Imitation of the Father of Israel takes the form, in the Old Testament, of walking in the way of his commandments. The call of Jesus to "come after" him is primarily a summons to commit oneself to him, as Israel in covenant committed herself to the Lord, to walk in his Way. Quite specially it means imitation of him as he walks in the Way of the Son of Man. The Way he goes needs copying because it is of ultimate significance. Just as the disciples perceive in the Way he goes the presence of the Kingdom of God, so men will perceive in the Way they go the presence of Christ's kingdom. The summons to follow is a "messianic summons",[6] a summons to give oneself to share the fate of him who goes as it has been written of him, and to remain confident, as he does, that there will be the end in glory, there will be the coming of the Son of Man in triumph.

The disciples are to do as he did and say what he did. "The Kingdom is the future breaking into the present, and manifesting itself in the things which the disciples are to do in addition to their preaching. This combination of preaching and beneficent activity is their task as it is the task of their Master."[7] In Mark 3. 14-15 the disciples are "ordained" to "be with him" and they are sent out to "proclaim", and to have authority to cast out demons—the two things which he has been doing. Mark has no hesitation in describing the mission of the disciples in the same terms as the mission of Jesus himself:

> "And they went out, and preached repentance, and they cast out many devils, and anointed with oil many that were sick, and healed them." (Mark 6. 12-13)

Nor is there hesitation in the early Q tradition in ascribing the characteristic pronouncement of the Master to the disciples:

> "Heal the sick that are therein, and say unto them, The Kingdom of God is come nigh unto you (ἤγγικεν ἐφ’ὑμᾶς ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ)" (Luke 10. 9)

They are to say to the place which does not welcome them:

> "Even the dust from you city, that cleaveth to our feet, we do wipe off against you: howbeit know this, that the kingdom of God is (ἤγγικεν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ) come nigh." (Luke 10. 11)

Compare with these sayings the summary of the proclamation of Jesus in Mark 1. 15:

> "The time is fulfilled and the kingdom of God is at hand (*ἤγγικεν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ*").

The actions of the disciples on the proclamation tours are his *dynameis.* The cities visited by the disciples are judged in the same way as those visited by him. In them, as in him, the kingdom comes:

> "But into whatsoever city you shall enter, and they receive you not, go out into the streets thereof and say, Even the dust from your city, that cleaves to our feet, we do wipe off against you: howbeit know this, that the kingdom of God is come nigh. I say unto you, It shall be more tolerable in that day for Sodom, than for that city." (Luke 10. 10-2)

Compare this with the language which Jesus uses about the cities which had refused to receive him:

> "Woe unto thee Chorazin! Woe unto thee Bethsaida! For if the mighty works had been done in Tyre and Sidon which were done in you, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. Howbeit I say unto you, it shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgement, than for you." (Matt. 11. 21-2)

In the mind of Jesus himself, to be confronted by a disciple of his is tantamount to being confronted by him, and it is fraught with eternal consequences:

> "He that receiveth you receiveth me, and he that receiveth me receiveth him that sent me." (Matt. 10. 40)
>
> "He that heareth you heareth me; and he that rejecteth you rejecteth me; and he that rejecteth me rejecteth him that sent me." (Luke 10. 16)

As T. W. Manson puts it: "The messengers are, in a sense, the Kingdom of God itself. The solidarity is impressive. The disciple represents in the fullest sense Jesus, and Jesus represents in the fullest sense the Kingdom of God. What they offer is God's offer and what they claim is God's claim."[8]

What are the basic characteristics of the Way of the Christian disciple? They are self-denial (Mark 8, 34; Luke 14, 33); obedience (Luke 6. 46) and loyalty (Mark 8. 38); and especially *diakonia.* In Mark 10. 42ff. there is a direct exhortation to imitate in discipleship the *diakonia* of the Son of Man:

> "Whoever wishes to prove great among you must be your servant (*diakonos*), and whoever wishes to be the first of you must be the slave (*doulos*) of all. Look at the Son of Man—*he* did not come to be served (*diakonethenai*), but to serve (*diakonesai*), and to give up his life in redemption for many."

Jesus here indicates himself as the true *diakonos,* and discipleship is an imitation of his *diakonia*:

> "And he sat down, and called the twelve, and he said to them, If any man would be first, he shall be last of all, and minister (*diakonos*) of all." (Mark 9. 35ff.)

St Paul is to give this feature of the Christian life quite special emphasis. Even though *diakonos* and *doulos* seem to be used interchangeably, it is significant that it is *diakonos* and *diakonia* which appear most frequently in St Paul. This was the essential characteristic of the disciple's life as *imitatio Christi.* It is focused in the "cup" and "baptism" element in their "following" of him:

> "The cup that I drink you shall drink, and the baptism that I am baptized with you shall be baptized with." (Mark 10. 39)

Their whole manner of life in fact will be, like his, an actualization of the life of the Servant in Deutero-Isaiah:

> "You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth'. But I say to you, Do not resist one who is evil. But if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also; and if any one would sue you and take your coat, let him have your cloak as well." (Matt. 5. 38-40)

W. Manson has pointed out[9] that no less than five words here—the Greek words for "resist", "smite", "cheek", "turn", "sue",—correspond to those of the LXX version of the third of the Servant-songs. We ought to infer, comments A. G. Hebert,[10] "that the hearers are not being given merely precepts of the spiritual life, clothed in picturesque oriental language, but are being told that they must reproduce in their lives the pattern of the Servant of the Lord".

In fact, if we compare the biography of the Servant as it is given in the poems of Deutero-Isaiah with the biography of the Son of Man as it is sketched in third-personal terms in the teaching of Jesus, and then with the way of discipleship as he indicates it—there is the same basic pattern, and the key-notes are those which are clearly discernible in his own life. And it seems most likely that Jesus was himself conscious of all this.

The biography of the Servant

i. He is *called*, in the eternal purpose of God, and endowed with the *Spirit* (Isaiah 49. 1; 42. 1).
ii. His life is to be one of *humiliation* and *obscurity* (Isaiah 42. 2).
iii. He must *proclaim*, come what may (Isaiah 49. 2; 50. 4).
iv. He is *tempted* to doubt and disobedience, but he remains faithful (Isaiah 49. 4).
v. He *suffers* patiently and obediently (Isaiah 50. 5ff.; 53. 7).
vi. His work is redemptive, and there is *vindication* (Isaiah 53. 10-12).

The essential marks, then, are: *Call*, endowment with *Spirit*, *proclamation*, *temptation*, *suffering*, *glory*.

The biography of the "Son of Man"

i. His mission is not his own. Upon him lies the divine "must". He is *called* of the Father.
ii. His life is to be one of *humiliation* and *obscurity* (Luke 7. 34; 9. 58).
iii. He *suffers* (Mark 9. 12, etc.).
iv. His work is redemptive and there is vindication in *glory* (Mark 10. 45; 14. 62, etc.).

The biography of a Disciple

i. He is *"called"*.
ii. He is *tempted*.
iii. He must *proclaim*.
iv. He will be in *humiliation and obscurity*.
v. He will *suffer*.
vi. He will be *endowed by the Spirit to speak*.
vii. He will be vindicated in *glory*.

The biography of Jesus

i. He is *Spirit* endowed. The accounts of the Baptism and Temptation at least imply this.[11]
ii. He is *called*.
iii. He is *tempted* to disobey the "heavenly calling".
iv. His life is one of humiliation and obscurity.
v. He is patient in *suffering*.
vi. He must *proclaim*.
vii. There will be the *Glory;* there is Resurrection.

These "biographies" exhibit all the main features of the 'biography' of Israel as it is presented in the Old Testament:
Israel is *called, tempted* to reject the covenant vocation, must walk in patient *obedience* and humility, will *suffer*, but there will come the vindication of Israel in *glory*.
To quote T. W. Manson again: "If we now make the further comparison between the theoretical requirements for entrance into the Kingdom or discipleship of Jesus on the one hand and the actual lot of Jesus himself on the other, the command 'Follow me' takes on a new significance. It begins to appear that an essential part of the Messianic office as Jesus conceived it was not to bring the Kingdom of God to men but to bring men to the Kingdom of God. This is clearly realised by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews when he calls Jesus 'the pioneer and perfecter of faith'. He leads the way into the Kingdom and the call to his disciples is a call to follow in his footsteps, drink his cup, and be baptized with his baptism".[12]

It would seem clear, then, that Jesus intended that the life of the disciple *qua* disciple must be an evident reproduction of the main elements of his own life as the Son of Man, since the life of the disciple is a constituent element of his Gospel. That the Kingdom of God has come to a head in Jesus means that the life of Israel as *imitatio dei* is being demonstrably lived for the eyes which can see and the ears which can hear. God's Israel is here, and the redemptive work of the true *imitator patris* makes possible the life of the true New Israel. The marks of his life will be recognized in the community which he brings into being. It is significant that in the Fourth Gospel's presentation of the earlier tradition it is just these features: Jesus as the *imitator patris* and the disciples as *imitatores Christi* that he specially draws out, and these remain the essentials of the spirituality and ethics which are distinctively and authentically Christian.

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[1] Cf. C. H. Dodd, *History and the Gospel*, pp. 61f.: "There has been some principle of selection at work by which certain sides of the Messianic idea are held to be fulfilled and others are set aside. What was that principle of selection? Surely the simplest explanation is that a true historical memory controlled the selection of prophecies. Those were held to have been fulfilled which were in general consonant with the memory of what Jesus had been, had said, had done, and had suffered."

[2] Ethelbert Stauffer, *New Testament Theology* (*E.T.*), p. 26.

[3] G. Ostborn, *Torah in the Old Testament.* p. 158, Note 2: "Bentzen maintains (by reference to Mark 4. 11ff.) that Isaiah's circle constituted a model for Jesus' circle of disciples: that Jesus saw his work in the same light as Isaiah had looked upon his mission".

[4] Cf. W. F. Lofthouse, *The Father and the Son.*

[5] Cf. J. W. Bowman, *The Intention of Jesus,* p. 147.

[6] Cf. Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament,* Article on *ἀκολουθέω,* p. 214.

[7] T. W. Manson, *The Teaching of Jesus,* p. 180.

[8] T. W. Manson, *The Sayings of Jesus,* p. 78.

[9] W. Manson, *Jesus the Messiah,* p. 31ff.

[10] A. G. Hebert, *The Authority of the Old Testament,* p. 126.

[11] Cf. C. Kingsley Barrett, *The Holy Spirit and the Gospel Tradition.*

[12] T. W. Manson, *The Teaching of Jesus,* p. 206.

NOTE

It may be noticed that one section of this article is very similar to a section of an article contributed by the same author to the September issue of the *Scottish Journal of Theology.* Had this fact—due to an oversight of the author's, which he regrets—come to the Editor's knowledge earlier, he would have asked that this section should be re-cast. But since this issue of the *Church Quarterly Review* was ready for printing and the above article uses the material in a much wider context than does the article in the *Scottish Journal of Theology,* it has been decided, after consultation with the Editors of the *Scottish Journal of Theology,* to print it as it stands, and to ask any readers of both periodicals to overlook the coincidence.

LANCELOT ANDREWES AND THE NATURE OF KINGSHIP

By PAUL A. WELSBY

"ALL persons having souls . . . do owe, of bounden duty and even in conscience, obedience, submission, and subjection to the *high powers which be set in authority by God;* forasmuch as they be God's lieutenants, God's presidents, God's officers, God's commissioners, God's judges, ordained of God himself, of whom only they have all their power and all their authority. And . . . St. Paul threatened no less pain than *everlasting damnation to all disobedient persons,* to all resisters against this general and common authority; forasmuch as they resist not man, but God; not man's device and invention, but God's wisdom, God's order, power, and authority."[1] This concluding paragraph of the Homily, "appointed to be read in Churches", concerning "good order, and obedience to Rulers and Magistrates", sets out in no extreme form the typical sixteenth- and seventeenth-century conception of kingship. The tremendous importance attached to the upholding of this high view of monarchy is underlined in the Homily against Disobedience, which has no less than six parts, and contains the uncompromising assertion that "a rebel is worse than the worst prince, and rebellion worse than the worst government of the worst prince that hitherto hath been".[2] The sentiments of these Homilies, issued in the time of Elizabeth, may be compared with those uttered by Dr Robert Sibthorpe in his notorious sermon in 1627, when he stated that "if princes command anything which subjects may not perform, because it is against the laws of God, or of nature, or impossible, yet subjects are bound to undergo the punishment without either resistance or railing and reviling; and so to yield a passive obedience where they cannot exhibit an active one." Archbishop Abbot, for having the temerity to refuse to license this sermon, was forced by royal authority to withdraw from the Court. Finally, the first of the proposed Canons of 1640 ran as follows: "The most high and sacred order of kings is of divine right, being the ordinance of God himself, founded in the prime laws of nature, and clearly established by express texts both of the Old and New Testament."

This Canon was to be read aloud in the Churches four times a year, and thus Convocation formally affirmed the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings.

This doctrine had developed in reaction to the Roman Catholic and Presbyterian theories of government, and the practical tactics based on those theories. For several centuries Rome had taught that if a ruler abandons the Faith, or is a menace to it, the Pope has a deposing power and can release his Christian subjects from their allegiance. This was aggravated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the Papal Bull of 1570, the Jesuit Mission, the Confessions of Tyrrell and Parry in 1581 and 1584, the publication of Juan Mariana's *De rege et regis institutione* in 1599, the Gunpowder Plot of 1605, and the actions of the Catholics on the continent. For the Presbyterian point of view we have Robert Sanderson's observation that "the Presbyterians claim to their *Consistories* as full and absolute Spiritual Jurisdiction over the Princes as the Papists challenge to belong to the Pope".[3] Thus, if the sovereign were, according to Presbyterian standards, an idolater, as Mary of Scotland was, he could be dethroned. It is no wonder than James I, after the lectures and scoldings he had received at the elders' hands in Scotland, where he had been called "God's silly vassal", should in England stand so firmly on his divine commission. "If you aim at a Scotch presbytery", he said at the Hampton Court Conference, "it agrees as well with monarchy as God and the devil." The judgement of a modern historian is "that both Papist and Presbyterian were at least agreed in this. They believed that Christ had instituted a Church which was endowed with a right to command the secular authority, even were he a king, to impose its own religious pattern on society, and, if necessary, to use for that purpose the sword of persecution".[4] The antidote to both was sought in the doctrine of the divine right of monarchy, as having a direct divine sanction independently of any ecclesiastical authority. Most Anglican divines proclaimed this doctrine, in which they were joined by the majority of the lesser clergy.

It is often suggested that Bishop Lancelot Andrewes (1555-1626), while upholding the Divine Right theory, was less thorough-going and submissive than his brother divines. The following well-known anecdote, recorded in Waller's life, is often quoted as evidence of this. Andrewes and Neile, Bishop of Durham, visited the King at dinner. James asked them, "My Lords, cannot I take my subjects' money when I want it without all this formality in Parliament?" Neile's reply was, "God forbid, sir, but you should; you are the breath of our nostrils.' Then the King turned to Andrewes, "Well, my Lord, what say you?" "Sir", replied the Bishop, "I have no skill to judge of Parliamentary cases." The King remonstrated, "No put offs, my Lord, answer me presently." "Then, Sir," said he, "I think it lawful for you to take my brother Neile's money, for he offers it."[5] We do not know whether this conversation ever in fact took place, and it is surely a most tenuous piece of evidence to put against the Bishop's other actions and his writings. It may be said that the great moral mistake of his life—his attitude in the Essex Divorce—was due almost entirely to his exaggerated respect for monarchy, both in theory and in the person of James I. His Sermons and other writings bear unmistakable evidence that in his political outlook he was completely a child of his age. Andrewes has left to posterity an unmatched collection of *Preces Privatae,* and a series of Sermons, many of them of great beauty and merit, and his contemporaries bear witness to a gentleness and saintliness of personal character. But these things must not blind us, as they have so many of his panegyrists, to the grave weaknesses of his character, chief among them being a lack of moral courage, particularly in any matter connected with royal authority. Yet we know that he prayed, "Deliver me from making gods of kings".[6] Dr Alexander Whyte has written: "As David's heart came back to him from adultery and murder in the fifty-first Psalm, so did Bishop Andrewes' heart come back to him from the servility and sycophancy and the sale of justice in many a confession and in many a commendation of his Private Devotions."[7]

The chief sources of Andrewes' views on the nature of kingship are his *Sermons,* especially those preached on the anniversary of the Gowrie Conspiracy and of the Gunpowder Plot, the *Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine,* and *Tortura Torti.*[8] Preaching on 5 November 1623, his text was, "By me kings reign" (Proverbs 8. 15).[9] Upon these four syllables, he says, "depend all kings and kingdoms of the earth".[10] Kings and kingdoms are not by chance; their cause is God, who does not merely permit kings to reign, but commissions them to do so. They reign by his Word, by his deed, "given by Him, sent by Him, placed in their throne by Him, vested with their robes by Him, girt with their swords by Him, anointed by Him, crowned by Him".[11] In the *Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine* he sets out the reasons for their appointment.[12] Governors are appointed "to deliver us from unreasonable and evil men", government is instituted "for resisting of outward foes" and "for quieting of inward strifes". The ruler, in his governing, will himself be upright, not affected to false religion, not given to pleasure (such as wine and women), and not contentious, and he will thus be an example to his people. A ruler's duties are: 1. To acknowledge that his power is from God and that he must therefore so rule as God would rule. His subject's response is to acknowledge him as God's deputy and to reverence him accordingly. 2. Not to break into God's right and demand anything that is against a man's conscience. Andrewes immediately qualifies this. Those whose consciences are uninstructed must be rectified, and, if they be obstinant and refuse to yield to religion then the ruler must compel them. That is to say, consciences should not be forced, but if people are wrong their ideas must be compulsorily rectified! The ruler must provide for his people's souls, by sending preachers into all places, and for their bodies, by laying up provisions against famine and sending ships abroad for imports. He must provide judges to redress wrongs at home, and soldiers to avoid wrongs abroad. His subjects on their side must render to him tribute, subsidy, and tax. 3. In cases of appeal he must do justice, that the righteous may flourish and the evil be cast out. In response, the subject must fear him. 4. In his ruling he is to be humble and meek—i.e., he must be no tyrant. The subject in return is to fear lest any hurt should befall his ruler, and to bear with any of his infirmities.

In matters of religion the King claims the right and power of doing whatever the Kings of Israel did without blame, such as enacting laws by Royal authority against blasphemy, appointing fast days and days of thanksgiving, calling assemblies on matters religious, and delegating judges to decide religious causes. Commenting on 2 Chronicles, 19, 8, Andrewes wrote in *Tortura Torti*: "Of his royal authority he set up in Jerusalem of the Levites, the Priests, and of the Chief of the fathers of Israel, for the judgment of the Lord . . . What greater proof of Authority can you have than that of appointing, delegating Judges for Sacred causes? . . . The same King set the Chief Priest to preside over those whom he has so constituted Judges."[13] The Church and the State may have different courts, but both are under the King. "Church and State ought to be united, not confounded: as they have different causes, so they ought to have different courts, in either case under the King, by whose authority and will Judges sit, and that Amariah presides here, Zebadiah there; each takes cognisance of the causes pertaining to his own court, but still under the command of the King; so that in either case the saying holds, If you are Judge, try the cause; if you are King, order it to be tried."[14] Again: "The question is whether the King may have the government of the Church. But if the King may appoint Judges in ecclesiastical causes, determine who shall preside over the Judges; do away with abuses and corruptions in religion; bring back the ark . . .; dedicate Temples, and call assemblies for the purpose of doing so; after the reciting of the book of the law order the high priest to cleanse the worship of God; . . . go into the Temple and break the brazen serpent; send priests on missions; dismiss the chief priest so that he be no longer chief priest. How little is wanting from the whole of government. . . . Let the King do these things that I have said and he will require no more to make up his supremacy."[15] On the other hand, the King does not possess what belongs to the priest's office. He does not usurp the preaching function, neither does he minister in matters priestly. "Neither our King, nor any other king is allowed to minister in sacred things or to handle anything which belongs to the merely priestly power, such as liturgies, sermons, keys, sacraments."[16] Finally, the true position of the Royal Supremacy is stated thus: "We assert this is a Supremacy in governing, not in teaching; and we call the King the chief Governor, not Doctor, so that the dispute between King and Priest can be resolved: the Priest may be chief in the function of teaching which properly belongs to his Supremacy: the King in governing which is all that he claims as his own, and he will never invade the priestly function of teaching."[17]

It is interesting to note that in the early work, the *Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine,* Andrewes at one point adopts much the same view as the Roman that temporal government was a consequence of the Fall and a declension from the original institution of God. "The power ecclesiastical would have been sufficient to have governed the world, but that Cain building a city, Gen. 4. 17, made the ungodly first take order for their defence; and so city against city was the occasion of civil government, because some men, like the horse and mule, Ps. XXXII 9, would still be offering violence and injury, if there were not a power to bridle them."[18]

In his later sermons and works, Andrewes contradicts this view of the origin of government.

Since it is by God that Kings reign, then obviously they do not reign by the will of men. Therefore Rome can claim no right to appoint Kings, for the Pope is a man. The Pope used to anoint the Emperor, and "because he was master of the ceremony he would be master of the substance too". As a result he claimed also to depose Kings. But the ceremony does no more than declare what is already done. It declares what the person was already and would have been still even if the ceremony had not been performed.[19]

Neither do Kings reign by public acclamation. They are not "the anointed of the people", but "the anointed of God" — "by whose appointment they be made men . . . by his appointment and no other they are made princes".[20] "They are no human invention . . . neither 'chosen' nor 'exalted' by the people, but by God out of the people."[21]

There is a distinction between kingship and reigning. Some men are Kings by right but, because they have been defeated by others, they do not reign. Others reign but are no Kings—they are usurpers.[22] Kings, being appointed by God, cannot forfeit their tenure and cease to be his. Some people have fallen into the error of this false opinion. "If after he is anointed he grow defective, to speak their own language, prove a tyrant, fall to favour heretics, his anointing may be wiped off, or scraped off; and then you may write a book *De justa abdicatione*, make a holy league, touch him, or blow him up as ye list. This hath cost Christendom dear." But a King's anointing is not a religious and spiritual grace, for there are heathen Kings (e.g., Cyrus) who are God's anointed, and if religion does not make them Kings, heresy cannot unmake them. In any case royal unction gives no grace, but a just title. It is the administration to govern, not the gift to govern well—"the right of ruling, not ruling right" — and "allegiance is not due to him because he is virtuous, religious, or wise, but because he is *Christus Domini*."[23]

The corollary of this is that subjects have no right of rebellion. Wicked rulers are to be honoured because "the wickedness of a man cannot take away the force of God's commandment, nor make void God's ordinance . . . It is God that set them up, though it were in his wrath . . . Paul commands to 'pray for kings' though they were heathen and wicked . . . Peter bids 'honour the king' . . . when as then Nero ruled . . . and even the hearts of ungodly rulers are in the hands of God." There is only this distinction—that "what honour we give them, we do it not to man, but to God himself, in reverence to his ordinance". Finally, "be a government never so bad, yet it is better than none at all".[24]

Preaching on the text, "My son, fear thou the Lord, and the king, etc." (Proverbs 24. 21-3),[25] "the sum and substance" of which is "that seditious persons come to ruin and destruction", Andrewes says, "The text is short, but full, in this point. For *Time Deum,* that is, Be a good Christian; and *Time Regem,* that is, Be a good subject. And the better Christian the better subject. For indeed I have not done well in speaking of them . . . as of two fears. There is but one *Time* in the text. If you strike it out from *Regem* you strike it out from *Deum* too; for there is but one in all, and they consequently to be feared, not with two but with one and the same fear both."[26] There are some who rise against the very state of Kings, like the Anabaptists, who deny all secular jurisdiction. Some rise against particular Kings, if not against kingship, like the Independents, who are "but bustling themselves to rise . . . They that seek to bring parity not into the Commonwealth by no means, but only into the Church . . . But this once being had, do we not know their second position? . . . The Church is the house, the Commonwealth but the hangings. The hangings must be made to fit the house, that is the Commonwealth fashioned to the Church."[27] As for the Catholics, Andrewes refers to the assassination of Henry III and of Henry IV of France, and to the view that they who do such things are God's agents, "whereby God's 'anointed' are endangered, men's soulds are poisoned, Christian religion is blasphemed as a murderer of her own Kings, God in His charge is openly contradicted, and men made believe they shall go to Heaven for breaking God's commandments."[28]

"They that rise against Kings are God's enemies; for God and the King are so in a league, such a knot, so straight between them, as one cannot be enemy to the one but he must be to the other . . . In His place they sit, His person they represent . . . They are gods . . . Then must their enemies be God's enemies."[29] But seditious persons are not only God's enemies; they are, secondly, the enemies of mankind,[30] for rulers not only come from God, but they come for the good of men and for the avoidance of anarchy. Thirdly, seditious persons are the enemies of the Church, and "they that persecute her, persecute Him; they that touch her, touch the apple of his eye", for King and Church "stand upon two tops of one and the same hill."[31]

Kings must not "be touched" to their hurt by violent weapons, poison, virulent tongues, and pestilent pen ("Satan's weapon"), or by "an indecent and over-familiar touch, void of the reverence that is due to them."[32] Moreover, all the foregoing applies not only to their individual persons, but also to their States, their consort, and their family.[33]

Sufficient has been written to show that Bishop Andrewes' theory of kingship was fully in line with that of the other divines of the day and that expressed in the Homilies and the proposed Canons of 1640. Indeed it may well be said that at times he went even further and, like some others, carried his identification of the King with God to a point little short of blasphemy, while some of his teaching on passive obedience is not unlike that in the sermon of Dr Sibthorpe. So Andrewes must take his place with those whose doctrine was destined to bring upon England a civil war and a reaction against all they taught about the divinity of Kings and the enormity of rebellion. It may be true that many men honestly believed that the continuance of Church and Nation depended on the upholding of the doctrine of divine right. But, in point of fact this doctrine led, because of the extreme form in which it was held, to the disruption of both. And it is sad that a man of Andrewes' learning and personal sanctity should not have voiced a more moderate and truer theology of the matter.

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[1] *Certain Sermons or Homilies* (1851), pp. 112-13.

[2] Op. cit., p. 594.

[3] *On Episcopacy*, xvi, p. 41.

[4] G. Kitson Clark, *The English Inheritance* (1950), p. 53.

[5] Quoted, *Andrewes Minor Works*, p. xii; R. L. Ottley, *Lancelot Andrewes* (1894), p. 49.

[6] *The Preces Privatae of Lancelot Andrewes*, ed. F. E. Brightman (1903), p. 243. Cf. *Sermons*, V, 388: "As we may not usurp God's honour for ourselves, so we may not deify princes."

[7] *Lancelot Andrewes and his Private Devotions* (1896), p. 12.

[8] Published in the *Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology* (1841 onwards).

[9] *Sermons*, IV, pp. 277ff.

[10] Op. cit., p. 279.

[11] Op. cit., p. 284.
[12] Pp. 175, 181, 199-204.
[13] *Tortura Torti,* p. 447 (free translation).
[14] Ibid.
[15] Op. cit., p. 457.
[16] Op. cit., p. 449.
[17] Op. cit., p. 454.
[18] Op. cit., p. 198.
[19] *Sermons,* IV, p. 51.
[20] Op. cit., p. 53, quoting Irenaeus.
[21] Op. cit., p 79.
[22] Op. cit., p. 287.
[23] Op cit., p. 56-9.
[24] *Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine,* pp. 182f.
[25] *Sermons,* IV, pp. 296ff.
[26] Op. cit., p. 304.
[27] Op. cit., pp. 11f.
[28] Op. cit., p. 66.
[29] Op. cit., p. 14.
[30] Op. cit., pp. 15f.
[31] Op. cit., pp. 16f.
[32] Op. cit., pp. 59-61
[33] Op. cit., pp. 61f.

A DIOCESE IN TRANSITION

By S. VAL GREEN

ONE hundred and fifty years ago there were only eighty-four parish churches in the Diocese of Durham, where to-day there are two hundred and seventy-one. In the fifty years up to a century ago a further thirty-nine were built. Up to 1800 the people of the Palatinate sought their living by sea-fishing and rural pursuits. In fact it was not until the twenty years' episcopate of Bishop Maltby (1836-56) that the first period of transition for the diocese got under way.

The economic cause of that first transition from rural to industrial Durham was the closing of the tin-mines in Cornwall and the lead mines in the Yorkshire dales coinciding with the discovery of rich coal seams in the Bishoprick. From the far south and across from the Yorkshire moors whole families trekked, on foot or with pony and cart, to camp round the newly sunk shafts. From one kind of mining to another was no great change, and to-day Cornish and Yorkshire names are still prominent in Durham villages.

Round the new pit heads sprang up hamlets, and later towns, which could lay no claim to beauty, and were built according to no plan. They possess to-day nothing of great architectural value, not even their parish churches: as the new towns spring up at Newton Aycliffe, Peterlee, and elsewhere, with their equally new industries, and the populations of these ephemeral pit communities move out to them, whatever regrets they may have, they will not be aesthetic. There used to be a saying in the county, "Owt's good enough for't pit", and a visit to any one of the scores of such colliery villages will disgust the inquirer with what, in those not-so-far-off days, the employers thought good enough for their employed.

A brief sketch of the history of one such parish, typical of all its neighbours, will help to a fuller understanding of the fungoid growth of such communities.

Between one hundred and ten and one hundred and twenty years ago, the parish of Holmside was completely rural, with its farms, woods, and rolling fells. Then a rich deposit of coking coal was discovered, and almost overnight people started moving in. Rapidly the shoddy slums sprang up, shoddy in the material of which they were built, and shoddy in their lack of all aids to decent living. The population during the next few years grew to two and a half thousand, and the slag heaps grew also. Eighty-eight years ago the parish church came into being, and in 1912 the population was such that two independent daughter parishes were formed, whose populations to-day are eight thousand and ten thousand respectively. But the growth was rapid. Tall chimneys reached up into the smoke-laden sky, and the community life clustered closely round them. By this time three collieries were functioning.

But let us return to the early history of the mother parish. A railway was laid and pit head gear erected. As the years passed an energetic local council built more and more up-to-date houses, though many of the original houses still stand and are inhabited. Life went breezily along with intermittent strikes and economic doldrums adding their hazards. Then, seven years ago, came the first rumours of approaching doom. To-day the tall chimneys are down, the railway torn up, all the pit-head gear has been dismantled and moss is gathering over the derelict slag-heaps. In just over a century, in which it has only been an independent incumbency for eighty-eight years, this parish has been born, has grown, come to full maturity, and is now declining. Old inhabitants in the Yorkshire dales point out to visitors vestiges of what once were hamlets created by the need for lead: within another half-century such vestiges will be a common feature of the Diocese of Durham.

The Pepler Report, which has dealt with the County Palatine section by section, sees no future at all for North-West Durham or South-East Durham. The county's planning officer, Mr William A. Geenty, dealing with this latter section, has a constant theme running through his findings for many village communities: "Any new housing required for present residents should be built elsewhere."

Ten such hamlets are listed for gradual extinction, none of them independent incumbencies. This is going to make for more compact and less strenuous country livings. And that should result in shorter vacancies and longer incumbencies. The strain in a northern winter of serving two and possibly three churches, often without benefit of private transport, does not tend to a long occupation.

The coal is fast becoming exhausted in North-West Durham, and has largely ceased altogether in South-East Durham. Within a very few years, in the former area, it is expected that there will be over 12,000 miners redundant. Small factories which produce plastics, clothing, gloves, etc. have sprung up, but have had a negligible effect on male unemployment. They employ mostly women and girls. I have seen it nowhere suggested that new factories will ever be able to absorb anything but a minority of these redundant men. All of which adds up to the fact that, speaking largely, the population of the Diocese of Durham is on the move, for man must go where his work lies. The movement is from the centre to the coastal fringe. For some of these fringe parishes, like the Hartlepools, a static population is forecast. The population of St John's, Stillington, built originally to house the work people of the now defunct Carlton Ironworks, has been established by the introduction of a sufficient number of small industries to occupy the present population. Other town parishes, like St Cuthbert's, Billingham, and the new satellite towns of Newton Aycliffe and Peterlee, are to have phenomenal growth.

But on some parts of the north-east coast there are mines with longer prospects, stretching long tunnels under the very sea-bed itself. Here there will be a demand for more and more miners. The resultant expansion in these coastal parishes is creating problems. Sunderland is but one town which has put forth large shoots—three of them the size of any normal town; and three new utility churches have been built and parish life established. It is, however, a parish life that requires on the part of the parish priest a different psychological approach from that of the established urban or rural parish. There is a strong tendency on the part of the inhabitants to cling to the churches, clubs, and other community institutions of the main town from which they have moved out into the new suburbs, a tendency to use the new suburb merely as a dormitory. The establishing of a community life in them is very difficult, and such a community life is essential to corporate worship.

This clinging to the old and familiar is also true of the dwellers in the dying pit villages. For as long as they can they travel out to the pit to which they have been transferred. This travelling often involves them in anything up to a ten mile journey each way every day. This adds considerably to the hours spent away from home; and in our northern winter there are often days lost through the roads being storm-blocked. The result is that soon the travelling miners see the necessity of getting a house near or nearer their new sphere of work, and the old village loses yet more of its inhabitants.

A further suggestion was made some little time ago by the National Coal Board—that certain of the old villages should be kept as exchange villages. When a couple reached retiring age in a live colliery village they would be asked to change with someone in a defunct colliery village who was travelling in to the pit of their village. The result in a very few years, if this policy was pursued, would be that the village where the pit was finished would be a village of old people only.

Two points seem to emerge from our consideration of this problem. First, many of the coastal parishes are growing so rapidly that they are fast becoming unwieldly for a single-handed incumbent. This in its turn may change the whole character of the town parson's ministry, and bring it more into line with that of the non-established bodies. As in the Episcopal Church of Scotland, he will deal only with "members" of his Church, because he will not have the time or the strength to do more.

The second point is a question: In this age when we are ruled so nearly by economics, is this diocese of Durham unique at this time in entering upon such a period of transition? If not, then should the possible effect of such population trends upon pastoral reorganization not be studied on a national basis?

DIARY OF A COUNTRY CLERK

By C. L. S. LINNELL

READERS of *The Diary of a Country Parson* will be acquainted with the town of Reepham where James Woodforde did his shopping, attended "Generals" or archidiaconal visitations, and once presented candidates for Confirmation—the only occasion during the twenty-nine years of his ministry at Weston Longueville.[1]

It is also apparent from Woodforde that matters were a little complicated at Reepham in that there were two parishes in one small country town, Whitwell and Reepham, with their churches standing cheek by jowl so that the chancel of Whitwell Church overlaps the nave of Reepham. Originally there were two more parishes. Hackford, where the remains of the church can still be seen in the same churchyard adjoining Whitwell Church, and Kerdiston where all traces of the church have long since disappeared. In Woodford's time it was Reepham-cum-Kerdiston under the Reverend Richard Priest, brother of Woodforde's wine merchant and a member of his "rotation" or dining club, and his son the Reverend St John Priest who succeeded his father in the living and also acted as curate to the adjoining church of Whitwell-cum-Hackford for a non-resident Mr Buckle.

The two parishes remained separate until very recent times. About eight years ago Whitwell and Reepham churches were joined by opening a door into the vestry of Whitwell Church from the south-west corner of Reepham Church so that one can walk from the chancel of one into the nave of the other without going outside, and the benefices were consolidated under one incumbent of Whitwell-cum-Hackford-cum-Reepham-cum-Kerdiston.

Recently in examining the documents belonging to all four parishes, now in the Reepham Chest, I came across an interesting little MS. book, 6½ in. by 4 in. and bound in parchment, which was evidently the Diary, Account, and Commonplace Book of Mr Watson, Clerk of the Parish of Reepham-cum-Kerdiston, in the sixties of last century. It reveals the two churches complete with their own incumbents, curates, clerks, and sextons and interchangeable in all things except congregations which were then, and until long afterwards, tenacious of their rights and loyalties to their own particular parish church.

It is also interesting as showing how in Whitwell-cum-Hackford and in Reepham-cum-Kerdiston all things were much the same as they were in Woodforde's time. Choirs and village bands perform in the galleries of both churches; and when a harmonium was introduced into Reepham Church and "Mrs Suckling played two hymns and two chants upon it" this was evidently regarded as a rather dangerous proceeding; again when Mr Watson was charged with the distribution of copies of the first edition of *Hymns Ancient and Modern* it is clear that he did not approve of it.

The Communion was celebrated about once a month, but the number of communicants is not impressive and never more than thirty even on Easter Day. But for the other services the attendances, which are carefully recorded during the ten years (1859-69) covered by the book, are frequently in the region of three to four hundred, especially in the afternoon and evening. On every Good Friday there was a morning congregation of over four hundred, which is impressive until one remembers that, in Norfolk at any rate, farm labourers got a holiday on Good Friday, with pay *provided* they went to church. Such are the figures for Reepham-cum-Kerdiston and doubtless they were much the same for Whitwell-cum-Hackford.

For the rest. Tithe frolics at the Rectory, liberal entertainments of one sort and another, "Generals" and other such meetings of the clergy, are going on exactly as they did sixty and seventy years before. Confirmation is administered a little more frequently. Whitwell and Reepham with the two churches were a convenient centre for such services, which appear to have been just as crowded as they were a century before. It is interesting that on the three occasions between 1859 and 1869 when Bishop Pelham confirmed at Reepham exactly the same procedure was followed as when Bishop Manners-Sutton confirmed there, when Woodforde presented his candidates, in 1794.[2] Tickets were issued to the candidates, who were placed in the nave; and the Bishop confirmed first in the one church and then in the other.

Like Woodforde, Mr Watson had a gift of concise expression; and on occasions, after the tithe-payers' dinners to which he was invited at the special request of the churchwardens, he enters that essentially Woodfordian phrase "felt very indifferent". At Weston Longueville one gets the impression that no church service was complete without the Squire and his lady (Mr and Mrs Custance) and Mr Watson is careful to record every attendance of the Reverend Sir Edward Repps Jodrell and Lady Jodrell, and once—and this was evidently the highlight of his life and underlined in red in the book—he actually "spoke to Sir E. R. Jodrell and his lady at Salle Park House".[3]

The book begins with a fragment of a letter stuck on to the first page which I take to be a somewhat unusual request to put up the banns. "Mr Watson—you may tell the clergyman to talk about William Nash and Elizabeth Clements." From then on it is a record of Sunday services, baptisms, weddings, and funerals for which he is careful to enter his fee; and every Easter he receives his yearly salary (£7 10s.) and presents a bill for the various things he was expected to provide during the year. Altar linen, "washing the surplice", "bread for the Sacrament" (the wine appears to have come from the rectorial sideboard), "dwiling and scrubs", pulpit candles, and so on. He stands sponsor to all those children, and they were many, who were brought to baptism unprovided with godparents; and he often acts as deputy for his opposite number, the Clerk of Whitwell, Mr Hawes. In return Mr Hawes did duty for him as when "I and the boy Job went to Norwich with Lewis, to Yarm: by rail, and by wain to Lowestoft", and once for services rendered Mr Hawes gave his fellow clerk an entertainment when "it was all hands at Hawes to dinner on Rabbit Pie".

During the ten years covered by the book Mr Watson served under three Rectors. Dr Field, who was none other than the editor of Origen's *Hexapla* and a member of the committee appointed in 1870 for the revision of the Authorized Version of the Old Testament. He resigned Reepham in 1862 and retired to Norwich where he wrote a learned work concerned with the exegesis of certain passages in the Old and New Testaments called *Otium Norvicense*.[4]

His successor was a Mr Smith who became very ill only a few months after his institution. A week later Mr Watson records "Rev. Smith worse" and in a few days he is dead. Mr Watson "toll'd the bell one hour" as was the custom at Reepham. He is buried with all the splendours of under-bearers and pall-bearers, hat bands, gloves, and "clergymen in gowns", and "the church was put in mourning three months and hung with black cloth".

He was succeeded by a Mr Wilkinson, who built a new rectory and was lavish in his hospitality. For him the clerk had the greatest respect, for while his predecessors are recorded merely as "Rev. Field" and "Rev. Smith"—incumbents but indistinguishable from the numerous clergy, curates, or visitors (Reverend Suckling, Reverend Freeman, Reverend Norris, Reverend Holley, and Reverend Elwin[5]) who officiated in Reepham church from time to time, Mr Wilkinson is nearly always referred to in all his fullness as "The Reverend Michael Marlow Umfreville Wilkinson M.A.".

Mr Wilkinson was an innovator, and if Whitwell-cum-Hackford Church remained much as it had been in Woodforde's time with its Jacobean pulpit, western gallery, and early nineteenth-century fittings, at Reepham the gallery was hewn down, the great rectory pew (from which according to Mr Watson the archdeacon delivered his charge at the visitations) was banished from the chancel, and the usual galaxy of stained and "cathedral" glass windows and encaustic tiles provided, together with new seats in the nave. In all this Mr Watson's admiration for his new rector evidently overcame his dislike of innovation. At any rate he contributed as much as £1 towards the very drastic refurnishing of Reepham Church.

Under Mr Wilkinson there was a flourishing Sunday School and shortly after the building of the rectory seventy-five children were entertained there with "tea and cake". Mr Watson also attended this function "but I had wine and cake". On the following Sunday, however, Mr Wilkinson "come over all queer while reading the Collect for Grace" and had to be supported to the vestry where "Aud of Cologne and a glass of water" were administered and he was taken home by his father-in-law. Such misadventure was especially unfortunate as "Sir Edward and Lady Jodrell were present" and Mr Watson was kept busy "sending Jane Ann to and fro between the Rectory and Salle Parke House" with letters of explanation and condolence.

Mr Wilkinson "preached 2 sermons" most Sundays—his immediate predecessors had been content with one—and during his incumbency missionary sermons became common, the visiting preachers coming from very far afield, and collections were taken for the S.P.G. on frequent occasions, Mr Watson himself making an annual subscription of six shillings. Mr Wilkinson also instituted Penny Readings and at one of these the clerk collected as much as £5 9s.

As in Woodforde, there are entries in Mr Watson's book which cause surprise, especially as they are within living memory. As for instance "2nd Sept. 1869. Sarah Wyce died this morning of Starvation and Scarlattina" and was hurriedly buried the next day; and during the following winter, when there was a very dreadful epidemic of scarlet fever and many children died, the bodies was not brought into church. Then the entry early in 1863 to the effect that "William Dyball and Thomas Wright made a very *very* great disturbance in church" reminds one of the difficulties that Woodforde experienced as curate of Castle Cary with a gallery full of insubordinate singers.[6]

At the beginning of the book Mr Watson left room for a table of all the burials that took place in the new cemetery that was laid out in his time, and for the years 1860-4 he kept a careful record of all the sermons preached in Reepham Church, preachers and texts, which is interesting; and one hastens to consult it for the afternoon when "a young woman had a shrieking fitt during sermon time". Mr Wilkinson was preaching from Daniel 3. 16, 17, 18, and 19. Perhaps she was overcome at the thought of the burning fiery furnace being heated "one seven times more than it was won't to be heated". On the day in question Mr Watson records that "it was very *very* hot weather!"

The Reverend H. B. J. Armstrong's recently published *Norfolk Diary*[7] shows that in the nearby parish of East Dereham Tractarian customs had appeared as early as 1850. But this cannot have been the experience of many places in the Diocese of Norwich, which had acquired the name of "The Dead See" during the long episcopate of Woodforde's friend and fellow collegian Bishop Bathurst (1805-37), once non-resident rector of Great and Little Witchingham which adjoin Reepham.

Methodism was only just appearing in Norfolk in Woodforde's day. He dismissed its devotees as "impertinent".[8] Mr Watson treated them and all their doings with the utmost contempt. "Ranters's Meetings." Such meetings seem to have been well supported but they do not appear to have affected church-going very much. People went to church in those days. But even here we must pause to reflect as Mr Watson evidently did; for alongside one of his record attendances he writes:

"Come to the Church the parson cries.
To Church each fair one goes.
The old go there to close their eyes,
The young to eye their clothes."

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[1] In justice to Woodforde one must remember that he did on one occasion remonstrate with the Bishop of Norwich about there being no confirmation within reasonable distance of his parish.

(Diary for 20 May and 1 June 1787. Vol. ii. p. 322 and note p. 325.)

[2] Diary for 7 Oct. 1794. Vol. iv. pp. 139-140.

[3] The Revd. Sir Edward Repps Jodrell, Bart., M.A., of Salle Park, of Lewknor, Oxon., and Portland Place; has the unusual distinction of having twice as many monuments as he had places of residence. He is commemorated at Salle and at Letheringsett in Norfolk where both churches were restored by his grandson, Sir Alfred Jodrell, 4th and last baronet, who succeeded him in the title. The monument at Letheringsett by Messrs Gaffin and Gaffin of Regent St has an exact duplicate at Lewknor. At Lewknor there are two more and exceedingly grandiose memorials by the Florentine sculptors Pietro and Niccolo Bazzanti. Sir Edward died in 1882 and is buried at Lewknor but the most remarkable of all his monuments is the cenotaph at Reepham by another Florentine, Raphael Romanelli, which is of the eighteenth century style and might well pass for the work of Sir Henry Cheere. It has a bust showing the baronet in his nineteenth century clerical attire.

[4] "Otium Norvicense sive Tentamen de Religionis Aquilae, Symmachi, Theodotionis e Lingua Syriaca in Graecam Convertendis." Oxon. 1864.

Dr Field's epitaph in the chancel of Reepham Church is perhaps worth recording.

In loving memory of
FREDERICK FIELD M.A., L.L.D.
Honorary Fellow of Trinity Coll. Camb.
20 Years Rector of this Church.
Editor of Origen's Hexapla and other learned works.
Also one of the company appointed in 1870 for the
Revision of the Authorised Version of the Old Testament
Scriptures which was completed in the year of his death.
Born 20th July 1801 in London
Died in Norwich 19th April 1885

[5] Rev. Whitwell Elwin, Rector of the neighbouring parish of Booton, where he entirely rebuilt the church in the decorated style and in imitation of Temple Balsall in Warwickshire, and Editor of the *Quarterly Review*.

[6] See Diary Vol. i. p. 95 and 101. Entries for 17 December 1769 and 15 July 1770.

[7] *A Norfolk Diary*. Passages from the Diary of the Rev. H. B. J. Armstrong, Vicar of East Dereham 1850-1888. London, 1949.

[8] 1 Oct. 1777 (Vol. i. p. 212). "Harry Dunnell behaved very impertinent this morning to me because I would not privately name his Child for him, he having one Child before named privately by me and never had it brought to Church afterwards. He had the Impudence to tell me that he would send it to some Meeting House to be named etc.—very saucy indeed."

References to Methodists are infrequent in Woodforde but by 27 April 1801 they are very close at hand. "A Methodist Meeting we heard to day is held at Whisson's house on Sundays—very near us." See also Vol. iii. p. 93 for 29th March 1787 concerning a Methodist Meeting in the adjoining parish of Mattishall.

Convocation of Canterbury

In accordance with ancient constitutional procedure, the Convocations are dissolved by the Archbishops at the Royal Command when Parliament is dissolved. Consequently as a result of the dissolution of Parliament in May the Group of Sessions of Convocation fixed for May had to be cancelled; a general election of Proctors to the Lower House was held in June; and the new Convocation—the Second in the reign of Queen Elizabeth II—was opened according to ancient tradition with a Service in Latin in St Paul's Cathedral on Monday, 4 July. The form of Service used was that which has been in use since the time of Henry VIII. The Latin Sermon, preached by Canon E. W. Kemp of Exeter College, Oxford, was a brief but splendid discourse, which was important because it set the tone of all the proceedings which followed. It was an exposition of the true spirit of Anglicanism. He described how first the Church of England was rescued by the reformers, such as Ridley and Latimer who were being commemorated this year, from corruptions of doctrine and discipline, and brought back to the Scriptures; how then the Puritans attempted in the name of Scripture to shackle the Church, a danger from which she was rescued by the work of Richard Hooker (also being commemorated at this time) with his recognition that Scripture must be interpreted in accordance with reason and with tradition. Thus the Church has three strands, Scripture, reason, and tradition, forming together a rope which it is very difficult to break. He then pointed out that the Church of England is exposed to three dangers—the first from its own efforts towards unity with others, the second from the attempts of the Church of Rome to disrupt it, the third from the revival of Puritanism in the form of fundamentalism by sectarian societies which refuse to recognize anyone but themselves as true Christians. Therefore it was essential to preserve all three elements in Anglicanism—evangelical faith, rational theology, and apostolic order. But in defending our heritage we must not neglect our other duty—that of spreading the Christian Gospel among the unbelieving, of which the work of St Boniface, again being specially commemorated this year, is a superb example.

This Sermon, with its reminder of the three-sided and characteristic inheritance of the Church of England, formed an ideal background to the debates which occupied the main part of the Sessions, on relations with other Churches.

After the usual formalities and the election of a new Prolocutor by the Lower House had been completed, a meeting of the Full Synod followed. The Archbishop delivered his Presidential Address, pointing out that on account of the dissolution and change of date of the Sessions the Convocation was meeting at Lambeth Palace, for the first time since 1500, instead of at the Church House. He then spoke of the two possible policies of separation and partnership, as exemplified in Africa, the first in South Africa and the second in Central Africa, and suggested that in ecclesiastical as in political affairs the second was better than the first.

On the Tuesday morning a meeting was held in Full Synod again, and the Bishop of Chichester presented the Report of the Joint Committee on Relations with the Church of South India, and the United Report prepared by the Committees of the two Convocations. His opening speech was followed by a speech from Canon E. W. Kemp as seconder, and a debate ensued which extended into the afternoon.

The question of relations with the Church of South India is one which has aroused serious controversy, much high feeling, and great anxiety, though some of this has been due to ill-informed and contentious press-campaigns. In 1950 the subject was discussed by Convocation, and a series of interim Resolutions was passed, one of which included the proviso that the matter should be re-examined in 1955.

Some apprehension had been felt both about the temper and about the results of the present debate. But in fact a most unexpected thing happened. The Committee which had prepared the Report, under the wise and statesmanlike guidance of the Bishop of Chichester, had been a large, very representative, and very authoritative one, and their conclusions had been unanimous. Partly on this account, but also because of what many of those present felt to be a remarkably clear sense of the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the debate produced an astonishingly degree of unanimity. Speaker after speaker who had been expected to oppose the Resolutions, or had opposed those of 1950, rose to support them. The second Resolution was very vital, since it stated that:

> "This House . . . is now agreed that it is no longer necessary to postpone a definite judgement concerning the status of the bishops, presbyters and deacons consecrated or ordained in the Church of South India at or after the inauguration of that Church, and acknowledges such bishops, presbyters and deacons as true bishops, priests and deacons in the Church of God."

Since the Church of South India was formed by the union of four Anglican Dioceses in South India with two non-episcopal Churches, the question of the validity of the Orders in that Church has always been a difficult one. But now it is declared that the Church of England recognizes the validity of the Orders of all in that Church who have been episcopally consecrated or ordained. This decision was defended by several expert theologians on the Anglo-Catholic side—Canon E. W. Kemp, Dr. T. G. Jalland, and the Bishop of Exeter among others—so effectively that no argument was raised against it.

The debate in Full Synod was mainly on Resolution 2 and on the general subject. On its conclusion both Houses separately debated the Resolutions. In each House regret was expressed that the Committee had not found it possible to agree that bishops and priests of the Church of South India in England might be allowed to celebrate the Holy Communion in Anglican Churches *unconditionally;* this point of view was expounded in the Upper House by the Bishop of Birmingham, and in the Lower House by the Archdeacon of Aston who expressed bitter disappointment with the Report and Resolutions, and thus introduced the only real dissentient voice. But both Houses by an overwhelming majority accepted the Resolutions, including that which insisted that while any bishop or episcopally ordained presbyter of the Church of South India might at the invitation of the incumbent and with the permission of the bishop of the diocese celebrate the Holy Communion in a church of the Church of England, this must be subject to his willingness, while in England, to celebrate in Anglican Churches only.

Several of the other Resolutions merely repeated the corresponding ones of 1950, sometimes in a less rigid form; but Resolution 3(e) stated:

> "The bishop of a diocese may at his discretion authorize the loan of a parish church in his diocese from time to time for the celebration of

the liturgy of the Church of South India by a bishop or episcopally ordained presbyter of that Church."

This is a new decision; but the Archbishop made it quite clear that such celebrations would be normally intended for Church of England congregations and must not be made into demonstrations for Christian unity or occasions for interdenominational communion, or as a way round the proviso requiring bishops and priests of the Church of South India celebrating in Anglican churches not to celebrate also for Free Church congregations.

The last Resolution emphasized the need both for prayer and for financial help for the Church of South India, and indicated that those who had previously hesitated to assist it financially, on the ground of theological scruples, were now satisfied that they should help it in this way.

After devoting almost all of Tuesday to the debates on the Church of South India, which resulted in both Houses accepting all the Resolutions without amendment and almost unanimously, the Full Synod on Wednesday morning was mainly concerned with the Report of the Joint Committee on Church Relations in England, presented by the Bishop of London and seconded by the Reverend H. Riley. This Report examined the issues raised by the proposal to hold discussions on closer union with a Free Church; and after recognizing certain difficulties and certain precautions which would have to be borne in mind, the Committee recommended that "His Grace the President be respectfully requested to consult with the President of the Convocation of York with a view to opening conversations with the Methodist Church on the lines of this Report." The Report, which emphasized that the Methodist Church had made particularly friendly replies to suggestions of talks on Christian unity, was warmly received, and met with no opposition from any quarter, the Resolution being passed without dissent in both Houses.

Thus the result of the two main debates was the achievement of a most impressive agreement and a real step forward, both in relations with other Churches and in mutual understanding and goodwill within the Church of England itself. By contrast the other matters discussed were of secondary importance. The Upper House spent a long time considering the recommendations contained in the Report on "Baptism and Confirmation To-day", and passed most of them, though in some cases in an amended form. They prefixed to the Recommendations a statement that:

> "No Minister has authority to refuse to baptize any infant of one of his parishioners brought to his church for baptism: nor should he delay such baptism beyond the period necessary for the observance of the following recommendations."

The Recommendations covered various pastoral questions arising in connection with baptism—length of notice to be required from parents, suitability and instruction of godparents, post-baptismal supervision and commendation of children and young people on removal from a parish, and other matters. Forms of Service for Adult Baptism, etc., suggested by the Committee, were referred to the newly appointed Archbishops' Liturgical Commission. A Resolution was also passed asking for the appointment of a Joint Committee of Convocation to consider the revision of the Church Catechism. All these recommendations and Resolutions will be considered by the Lower House, if possible, at the next Group of Sessions.

In addition, the Loyal Address to Her Majesty the Queen, customary at the first Session of each new Convocation, was agreed, as was also the Petition to the Crown for a renewal for this new Convocation of the Royal Licence to confer and agree upon new and revised Canons. Finally Canon A. F. Smethurst formally presented the Report of the Joint Committee on Canon 83, which deals both with the Canon concerning the life of the Clergy and their extra-professional activities, and with the law regulating what gainful employment they may engage in, and also discusses much wider questions, including the possible development of a part-time parochial ministry, a permanent diaconate, and two different types of non-parochial ministry: one consisting of professional men who may continue in their professional avocations after ordination (e.g. doctors, schoolmasters, social workers, etc.), and the other of industrial workers to continue in industry after ordination. This Report will be discussed at the next Group of Sessions, and meantime, having been presented, can be studied outside Convocation.

The only other matter which may be mentioned was a reply given by the Upper House to two *Gravamina* from the Lower House presented at the last Group of Sessions, asking the President to see if the dates of Remembrance Sunday and Empire Youth Sunday could be changed, so that they did not fall within the Octave of All Saints' and Ascension Day respectively. The answer given was that conversations were taking place with the Home Secretary with a view to amending the date of Remembrance Sunday as suggested, but that there was no possibility of altering the date of Empire Youth Sunday, in which the Dominions were chiefly concerned.

In conclusion it may be noted that the Report on the Church of South India and that on Church Relations in England are both on sale to the general public through the Church Information Board, while the speeches in Full Synod on the Church of South India are published by the S.P.C.K. in a small booklet.

A. F. SMETHURST

CORRESPONDENCE

"DRAW NEAR"

Sir,—May I supplement Mr Palmer's letter by a reference to the Visitation Charges of the late Bishop John Wordsworth which were published under the title *The Holy Communion*? The charges were given in 1891, and on pages 403, 404 the Bishop refers to the custom as being usual in Westminster Abbey when he was a boy. Also he refers to a letter from his brother Christopher Wordsworth in *The Guardian* for 10 December 1890, where many other instances were given. He had himself so instructed the Theological students at Salisbury, and adds "I cannot think that it is right for people to scatter themselves all over the church, kneeling sometimes almost ostentatiously at the end of the nave."

Maurice Frost.

Deddington Vicarage, Oxford.

REVIEWS

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

KANT'S FIRST CRITIQUE. By H. W. CASSIRER. Allen & Unwin. 30s.

MR CASSIRER has written a first-class book on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and has added further lustre to the great tradition of Kantian studies associated with the University of Glasgow. It is difficult to praise his achievement too highly: the beginner in Kant will find it a fascinating guide into the very *arcana* of the critical philosophy, the specialist will continually be provoked to argument, if he is not won to agreement. The man whose interests are primarily philosophical will have his sense of the importance of Kant's contribution to his subject renewed.

There is boldness and clarity of outline in Cassirer's approach. For him Kant is before all else a man who has faced, at the deepest level, the problem of the *a priori* element in human knowledge. He is perhaps a little over-conscious of the extent to which Kant has been invoked in Britain as *le grand sauveur* from the dragons of psychological atomism, sensationalism, and the rest. Yet the legend that Kant was on the side of the angels in the battle against the wicked Mr Hume dies hard: as, of course, also among scholastics, his reputation as the arch-subjectivist, a kind of idealist *à l'outrance*. For any who would turn aside from these intellectual fables, Mr Cassirer's book will surely prove invaluable; to him, although he does not explicitly say so, Kant stands in the following of Socrates, helping men to know themselves, particularly in respect of their claim antecedent to experience, to be able to determine the pervasive character of the world with which they have to do. It is into this reaching out of intelligence in accordance with its own immanent nature towards the real, with this assurance that we are able, antecedent to experience, and independent of its disclosures, to deploy to ourselves the very forms of being that Kant is concerned with in the *Critique*: and no book in English makes this so clear as Mr Cassirer's. He would in modesty, I suspect, say that if he succeeds here he does so because he is prepared to devote adequate space to consideration of the arguments of the Dialectic as well as to those of the Analytic of Principles!

The phrase "Copernican Revolution" does not occur in Mr Cassirer's index: but if he had discussed Kant's introductory material, he would have insisted that the revolution Kant effected consisted less in the development of an idealistic standpoint than in the more remarkable suggestion that a man's claim to make valid synthetic *a priori* judgements was justified precisely because in those judgements he expressed not our insight into the fundamental laws of all things in heaven and earth so much as the inherent limitations of our intellectual faculty. Mr Cassirer seems to be in profound sympathy with Professor Paul

Tillich's evaluation of Kant's doctrine of categories as a doctrine of human finitude and limitation.

The reader who would penetrate to the heart of this approach ought to turn first to Mr Cassirer's chapter on phenomena and noümena; for there he elaborates his views convincingly on Kant's distinction between the intuitive and discursive understanding which posits its own objects, and the understanding which demands a matter on which to work which it cannot supply out of itself, even though the formal principles in accordance with which it interprets what is presented to it, are its own. For an understanding in which the mere positing of a notion is sufficient to guarantee the reality of what corresponds to it, there is no *problem* of knowledge, no necessity of self-discipline by acknowledgment of the authority of fact. The duality of the roots of human knowledge, the sensuous and the intellectual factors present in it, give to that knowledge its peculiar ambivalence; whereby the knower is at once conscious of the conditions its form must take, yet wholly bound to experience in respect of its material details.

It is paradoxical that Mr Cassirer, whose approach to Kant displays a somewhat austere disdain for the latter's excursion into the psychology of cognition (in the "transcendental deduction of the categories" in the first edition, for instance), is at the same time so sure that Kant is altogether wrong in the undertaking of the "metaphysical deduction". Certainly Kant's table of laws of judgement, from which he derives his categories, has been an Aunt Sally for modern logicians for a good while now: yet I am not sure that in terms of his theory, which, like Mr Cassirer, I believe of lasting philosophical importance, his attempt to display the moments into which the activity of discursive understanding is differentiated, was simply wrong-headed. It seems to me that Kant *had* to do something like that. No doubt here, as later in the way in which he characterized the metaphysician's enterprise, he was too much the slave of the sort of logic and ontology he had learnt in the schools. Yet if we are to speak, as Mr Cassirer's book continually does, of discursive understanding as such, we must surely go some way towards sketching its *modi operandi* in their difference and their unity alike; when Mr Cassirer comes to deal with Kant's treatment of the principles of substance and causality, especially the former, he does seem, almost *malgré lui-même,* to give some weight to Kant's enterprise in the "metaphysical deduction"; and it is my view that his whole approach to Kant demands it. No doubt his general hostility to Kant's architectonic has an apologetic purpose; but he is sometimes in danger in his anxiety to commend Kant's greatness, of preventing his readers doing justice to the sort of logical braces whereby Kant gives his work a structural firmness.

Again Cassirer seems to me to fail partly through an unwillingness to owe anything to the psychologists, to bring out clearly enough what Kant is after by insisting on the passivity of sensation. An almost obstinate unwillingness to give examples is unfortunate here: so too is a refusal to discuss whether Kant is right in finding the paradigm of sense-awareness in such experiences as those of dazzlement or being "coshed" rather than in visual consciousness of surfaces with its seemingly more obvious intentional character. It was surely Kant's assumption that it was only the interrelation of the discursive understanding (and imagination) that, as it were, converted the former style of experience into the latter. If the logician can ignore such references to the details of sensation, the epistemologist cannot; and Kant surely was an epistemologist, for whom intellectual self-criticism rested less on logical techniques in the abstract than on a correct appreciation of the factors involved in objective knowledge.

Further, it is only in discussion of the *Antinomies* that Cassirer, in my judgement, really does justice to Kant's treatment of time, a continually recurrent theme in the *Critique* even if one in respect of which Kant seems sometimes to double back on his steps. The Schematism of the categories is more or less ignored, doubtless because the "metaphysical deduction", which it presupposes, has been judged unworthy of sustained treatment. Yet both alike are perhaps nearer to the heart of Cassirer's approach to Kant than he will allow.

But enough of criticism: this is a most valuable book, and not simply because it advertises its subject's philosophical mastery, as displayed, for instance, in his beautifully decisive criticism in the Paralogisms, of speculative metaphysical argument based on the supposed transparency of spirit. It is valuable as a re-appraisal and re-presentation of a great piece of philosophizing.

Kant is usually accounted an enemy of the *philosophia perennis*, whatever those solemn Latin syllables convey. But, as Cassirer presents him, he is the friend of the truly Socratic style of philosophizing; that is, he carries out a tremendously thorough operation of criticism directed on the most fundamental notions employed by human beings in their description of the world about them, and their efforts to reach its meaning and its secrets. His fundamental principles, although established after a great intellectual struggle, are comparatively simple, although it is not always easy (to put it mildly) to follow the use he makes of them. Yet he goes on, twisting and turning towards his goal, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, primarily the evaluation of our confidence that the basic form of the world of fact is within our grasp. His mistakes are legion; yet even where his philosophy of mathematics is concerned, the advent of non-Euclidean geometry leaves something, if only his sense of the polarity of matter and form in description involving the application of mathematics. No one wants to defend his claim to finality: we have gone beyond him. Or have we? Some have retreated from his questioning; or sidestepped it by suggesting that a proper understanding of the "analogy of being" will bolster our confidence in ontology. In the present reviewer's judgement that understanding, in spite of Pénido, Gilson, and others, is something for which we are still waiting.

Few theologians will use Cassirer's book: a fact which the editor of

Crockford may, or may not, regard as regrettable (I do not know how seriously *he* takes Kant!). Yet it is surely a pity that it will only appeal to a few among them: for the "limitations of human knowledge" is the name of a fundamental theological as well as philosophical problem. Men like Gore, Scott Holland, and Weston knew that in their generation: so did H. R. Macintosh and P. T. Forsyth. If the Kenoticists are *vieux jeu* these days (except where the more enlightened Roman Catholics like R. P. Louis Bouyer acknowledge the depth of the issues they faced; see his *Le Mystère Pascal*), that may be because, as we are continually told, their "philosophical basis" has gone out of fashion: or it may be because they faced problems that any deep engagement with the *mysterium Christi*, an engagement which does not shrink the purgation of an intellectual "dark night", must face up to. Certainly there is meat for the theologian, and not least for the Anglican theologian, who in this respect has a great inheritance (the late Professor J. M. Creed was surely unfair to the Kenoticists in his Hulsean lectures on the *Divinity of Jesus Christ*), in Cassirer's uncompromising presentation of fundamental Kantian themes.

D. M. MACKINNON

EXAMINATION OF "CONSCIENCE"

CONSCIENCE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. By C. A. PIERCE. S.C.M. Press. 8s. 6d.

THIS short book is an admirable example of the way in which scholarship can serve both theology and philosophy. Mr Pierce offers a very thorough account of the New Testament usage of such words as *sunoida, to suneidos, suneidesis;* he prefaces this exploration with an account of their usage in the classical Greek and in the Hellenistic worlds. He is concerned to defend the thesis that Paul got these words, not out of the writings of the Stoics, but out of everyday vulgar usage. In fact he argues that Paul first started talking about conscience as such in connection with a controversial issue at Corinth with which he had to deal; and that, in what he says to the Corinthians on this subject, he brings out something very important about the limitations of conscience as a moral authority. It is no use for the Corinthians to tell him that their consciences are clear; his own, he adds, is clear too. But the judgement under which he must stand is that of God.

Mr Pierce brings out in a very impressive way how Paul has to make the language of conscience his own, and almost to correct its use by those whom he is addressing and whose language it peculiarly was. The word "comes" (to Paul), "complete with its own connotation, as, basically, the pain suffered by man, as man, and therefore as a creature involved in the order of things, when, by his acts completed or initiated, he transgresses the moral limits of his nature" (p. 54). It is not the name of a faculty or capacity of man so much as the whole man in reaction against acts that transgress these limits; almost one wants to say that for Paul, as much as for those from whom he was borrowing it, it was the name of a kind of pain. Mr Pierce brings out well the different nuances which accompany the references to conscience in the discussion of the effects of Christ's sacrifice in the epistle to the Hebrews; but it is part of his central purpose to bring out the quite definite and limited force of the idea of conscience in the New Testament. Of course there is such a thing as conscience; when Paul said what he did say about it he was saying something, and his hearers would have understood him; but what he said when he spoke of conscience was not always at the heart of his message, and certainly he meant it to be understood in relation to that message as a whole, particularly perhaps in relation to his theology of "wrath".

Mr Pierce writes as a scholar; he would wish his account of the origins and sense of New Testament usage to be judged by scholars in accordance with their own canons. He acknowledges that sometimes the language is very obscure, the Greek hard to interpret; he may well have made mistakes. But he would claim that if the general lines of his thesis are secure, consequences follow of great importance for contemporary ascetic theology, and indeed for our understanding of the relation of the "rights of individual conscience" to the authority of the Church. For if conscience is the name of a sort of pain, something fundamentally negative in that its action is the bringing home to a man of a breach of the divine law, how can we speak of it as having "rights"? Is there not something like a sin against the proper separation of logical types here; or perhaps is there not a taking for granted that the values, e.g. of John Stuart Mill, and those of the New Testament are the same? Is not conscience something very different for the men of the Enlightenment and for Paul?

These points are very important; philosophers who are increasingly aware of the source of problems in unnoticed and unacknowledged shifts of language, will be grateful to Mr Pierce for these interesting suggestions. Certainly he does shock in a salutary way by his quotations on this topic from Kirk and from Rashdall; but it is surely a pity that he does not refer to Butler, a greater moralist than either. For Butler perhaps showed that just as Paul conversed with the Corinthians of his day, so the Christian moralist, who inherited and accepted Paul's own transformation of the Corinthians' language, could speak with, and to, the men of the Enlightenment, and their heirs. That conversation must continue; it must continue with understanding of the difference between the world of the New Testament and our own world, a difference shown always crucially in language, but also with understanding of an estrangement which is in part the Church's own responsibility. To understand the "rights of conscience" of which the men of the Enlightenment spoke, one must never forget the historical reality and tragedy of a persecuting Church.

Mr Pierce has proved that it is logically impossible to speak, e.g. of the "rights of *suneidesis*"; he has also shown that the word *suneidesis* has been properly used to speak of something in the Christian's world; it is the name of something. But does that imply that when for instance, Kant wrote of the "sovereignty of conscience", he was talking about nothing? I think not; and I would myself claim an important place in the Christian *ascesis* for the difficult task of bringing together the world of Paul and the world of Kant, the language of Paul of the language of Kant; "a language is a way of life" (Wittgenstein). The task is one, however, which will only be seen in its proper context if it is seen first as part of the proper Christian *ascesis;* and in the importance of a true renewal of ascetical theology, I heartily concur with Mr Pierce and thank him for the valuable contribution he has made thereto by his book.

D. M. MACKINNON

MYSTERY AND MORALITY

ENGLISH RELIGIOUS DRAMA OF THE MIDDLE AGES. By H. CRAIG. Clarendon Press (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege). 42s.

THIS book, intended to be complementary to the allied works of Chambers and of Young, is weighty with scholarship—perhaps even overweighted. Yet it is welcome, as any book which reminds us of the existence of our medieval plays must be welcome, for English Literature is so sadly lacking in drama of spiritual value; and our mysteries and moralities, as Professor Hardin Craig persistently shows, fulfil dramatically Wordsworth's basic requirement for a poem—they have a worthy purpose.

We are told that "this book attempts to cover all parts of the subject", and indeed its ten chapters look promising: they deal with origins, the early liturgical drama, the transition to the medieval religious drama and its staging, first inside and then outside the church; they deal with the great surviving cycles of mystery plays one by one, and then with fragmentary cycles and single plays; miracles and moralities have a chapter, and finally the period of the Reformation is covered, with the last struggles for survival of the medieval dramatic spirit.

Having actually read these chapters, however, the reader emerges satiated but ungratefully dissatisfied: "*all* parts of the subject"? Knowledge, historical, liturgical, textual, stylistic, and philological, has been displayed before him, but yet the play's the thing—and a sense of the freshness, liveliness, good humour, and vivid charm of the best plays has somehow been lost by the way. We get a glimpse of the reason for this on p. 297, when the author speaks disapprovingly of the "bad pre-eminence in low comedy" of certain Herod scenes. "The cultural level is low", he complains. But what fun!

What good theatre! . . . Professor Craig's stated aim is to eschew "the application to the mystery plays of the principles of drama as an art form. This yields little satisfaction" (p. 2). So literary appreciation is almost entirely missing from this book, of deliberate intent. He is at pains to show that "the medieval religious drama existed primarily to give religious instruction, establish faith, and encourage piety" (p. 15). This he re-states in different ways on pp. 42, 96, 152, 158, 195, 198, and 363—amongst others! One begins to see that in his scholarly desire to find out as much as possible about the earliest and more truly religious forms of these plays, Professor Craig almost resents the later forms as they have come down to us: he adjures us not to "confine our interests to the decay of a noble form, whether that comes from the intrusion of farce and worldliness or from the verbose tendencies of a slowly awakening, although still ignorant, Renaissance" (p. 15); nor to "admire them [the plays] for wrong or accidental or sporadic things . . . . The mystery plays after they fell into secular hands were not of course by any means faithful to their simple religious beginnings" (p. 158).

One great aim of the book, then, is to emphasize the purity of purpose of the early drama, when "the people who played it and saw it might in some sort believe that they were honouring God" (p. 195). Whilst respecting the author for this aim, and for the careful scholarship with which he backs his point of view, one cannot help wondering whether human nature has steadily changed for the worse as much as he appears to think. He is so sure of "the pious feelings of the spectators" (p. 8); he considers "how these plays passed into the hands of very simple, medieval people—authors, players, managers and all" (p. 9). Were they indeed so much more pious, more simple, than their successors? Even Professor Craig has one moment of doubt: two pages later he says, "Let us get rid of the idea that the Corpus Christi cycles were written, managed, and acted by ignorant peasants and townspeople of low class." It is possibly significant that the author draws not at all upon Chaucer for his background picture of medieval man: the three brief references to him are all concerned with his writer's craft, not with the turbulent humanity depicted in his pages, so little demonstrative of "the innocent and reverent simplicity of the fourteenth and earlier centuries" (p. 114).

The writer's manner does not help to enliven the reader: possibly American usage justifies the oddly sounding "primitivity" (p. 347), or "degenerate" as a transitive verb (p. 163), but the frequent use of a qualifying "rather", of "so-called", and of "of course" would irritate any ear, as do uncomfortable phrases like "the hand of a superior person" (p. 194).

Professor Craig can also be platitudinous and repetitive, knowing perhaps as an experienced teacher the difficulty of making the simplest idea sink in. Thus: "One might think it done once for all, and it is" (p. 2); "Medieval people preferred quite naturally things that were interesting to things that were dull" (p. 3); "The symbolism of the [church] service was of course religious symbolism" (p. 4); "The obvious and inescapable characteristic of such reworkings is that in general later revisions are farther from original sources than are first versions or intermediate versions" (p. 164). "There needs no ghost, my lord, come from the grave, to tell us this" . . . . He is deliberately repetitive, and the heart sinks as the eye meets "as before said", "we have seen that", "as we have seen".

Despite these infelicities of style, this volume deserves a place on the library shelf, with its learning, its thoroughness, its useful bibliography, and its full index. It is for reference rather than for continuous reading: though it is unlikely to inspire the ordinary reader to try the plays, the scholar certainly will turn from their perusal to consult such a mine of knowledge, and he will not usually turn in vain.

R. R. RYLANDS

A WARNING FROM THE KIKUYU

MAU MAU AND THE KIKUYU. By L. S. B. LEAKEY. Methuen. 7s. 6d.
DEFEATING MAU MAU. By L. S. B. LEAKEY. Methuen. 8s. 6d.

NO PRAISE can be too high for the tone and temper of these two books. Dr Leakey, himself in the fullest sympathy with the true Kikuyu, neither stands on a pinnacle of superior knowledge to say, "How easily this could have been avoided if only . . . "; nor is he concerned to find fault with the counter-measures taken against Mau Mau. He does not pretend to know all the answers; but he points out the reason for the appearance of Mau Mau in the beginning, acknowledges the reality of the difficulties, and uses the experience of this demonic cult to give constructive advice for the future.

The primary cause, he finds, was the breakdown of the structure of the tribe. The background of all tribal life is religious: and because the spirit of the tribe is a real and corporate entity the social life of the tribe grows from this religious background at every point. The individual grows within this background. As Dr C. G. Jung has pointed out, the individual is supported by the tribe at every turning-point in life: his need to detach himself from the environment of each stage of his growth is recognized, and provided for by the tribe; he is in the fullest sense being continually educated within the tribal framework throughout his life, and at death his spirit survives within that live and multiple personality which is still the tribe. There is much in this religion which needs enlightenment. It is full of fear at times, and open to petty tyranny. There is not space enough in it for the human spirit to find its full development. Spiritually, aesthetically, and intellectually the African needs Christianity and the culture which has sprung from it to reinforce his own religion and culture. He needs the gospel of the one Mediator, Jesus Christ; for none of the

African's own mediators have given him any real sense of access to the Supreme God whom he fully recognizes.

At first when missionaries came, they had a close personal contact with their converts. As converts grew in number, personal contact grew slighter and their quality deteriorated. There simply were not enough white missionaries; nor had they the facilities to draw Christians together into a new community, which could give social support comparable with that of the tribe. Similarly, the D.C. (the administrative officer) was at first in close contact with his people; he trekked his district and in each small village he met the people, heard their troubles, and learned their way of life: a refugee from injustice could come and clutch the Union Jack, and no man would stand between him and the D.C. But as the colonies developed, paper work increased, formal law-suits took longer to settle than "palavers" or complaints, and red tape slowly wound its tentacles round the D.C., until he became something of a prisoner in his own office and court. In those earlier days a man knew his own people and their customs, and probably could "hear" their language if he could not speak it much. He was bound by no official presuppositions about "the African system of land tenure"—as if all tribal systems were alike!

Failure to understand the land and its method of transfer from tribe to tribe was probably the original grievance against the white man among the Kikuyu. It is not surprising that Government should not have understood the way in which the Wanderobo sold their land to the Kikuyu, involving a spiritual unity between buyer and purchaser and their spirit ancestry. It is the first time that I have myself come across that system, in spite of eleven years work among and study of African tribes on the western side of Africa. The regrettable thing is that the popular presupposition that "land is not owned in primitive society" should have been accepted, and our policy based on that presupposition.

Dr Leakey insists upon the value of a true common channel of communication between white and black. Knowledge of a *lingua franca* by both parties is not enough, whether it be Swahili (in the east) or Hausa (in the west). Certainly for the last thirty years it has not been for lack of opportunity that political and educational officers have remained ignorant of genuinely native languages. Much time was given to cadets for language study—and nothing else—as early as 1928. Some few of them made use of the opportunity, and went on to earn the generous grants offered to those who went on from the lower standard to intermediate and higher standard tests: and those who did will testify to the difference it made to one's work. Very little valuable information is given through an interpreter: what is given is generally what the speaker and the interpreter think that the D.C. would like to hear. Long and quiet sessions with elders of the tribe, five minutes listening to the children at their games, a morning in the bush with an old hunter looking for "bushmeat", a couple of hours listening to the tribal history recited to the throb of drums—in these ways a little can be learnt of the African. But one of the most important things learnt will be that the African likes the white man to be himself: he has no use for the D.C. who thinks he knows all about the African from the inside; but he appreciates one who knows enough about him to understand his troubles—and once the African's troubles are understood, it is amazing how well he is prepared to understand the corresponding difficulties of the administrator.

It is unlikely that Englishmen will ever be heaven-sent linguists. Dr Leakey faces this, and says that the sooner the African learns to speak and think in English the better. For what he fears is not the victory of Mau Mau, for Mau Mau is losing; but the spread of the movement to other tribes. Even so he is sure that there will be no recurrence as long as the miseries endured by the Kikuyu are remembered; but in as little as ten years, or no more than twenty (for African memories are short), the miseries may be forgotten while the grievances and the demonic influence still remain.

For Mau Mau, at first the secret instrument of political and social grievance, has now become a religion. It began with mutual misunderstanding between Government and the Kikuyu: it was exploited by Africans whose injured pride demanded vengeance on the race who treated them as inferior beings. Just grievances about European land acquisition in Kiambu were magnified by the false claim that the highlands had once belonged to the Kikuyu. A rapidly increasing population needs room and needs security. The squatters on European estates and the wage earners in towns alike lacked security and title: wages were too low, prices were rising and their standards were rising too. Tribal discipline meant little to the emancipated youth; its sanction had chiefly been social ostracism from the tribe, or at least from the age-group: nor had the religious taboos any greater force—education had taught them too much and too little. What began as the Kikuyu Central Association, soon banned, sprang to new life as the Kenya African Union; and the control of this came more and more into the hands of unscrupulous Mau Mau leaders. Propaganda of an increasingly religious nature was employed. Hymn-singing began by being a means of inflaming grievance but soon became more and more religious in tone. Jomo Kenyatta, at first celebrated as a social liberator, was soon identified as a new Messiah whose sufferings were redemptive. The Mau Mau oath, cunningly moulded on the old initiation pattern, was imposed on simple Kikuyu men and women, but secretly and forcibly and clean contrary to traditional usage. The second oath was more drastic, and the third and later oaths increasingly loathsome and debasing; there is no doubt that they were designed to produce gangsters and atrocity hunters who would stop at nothing—though only a small minority went further than the first, and even fewer beyond the second oath. But the very atrocities were their undoing, and the Lari massacre shocked all but the very extremists. There is no doubt that Mau Mau is now losing ground everywhere.

Both Dr Leakey's books end on a constructive note. The defeat of Mau Mau must be followed at once by measures to prevent the same thing happening again. Already the emergency has brought together parties who are all seeking better things, but who were formerly suspicious of each other, politicians under Mr Harry Thuku, chiefs of the old Kikuyu religion, and native Christian clergy. These are now meeting regularly, not only to plan short term measures against Mau Mau but to prepare schemes for the positive progress of their country by peaceful negotiation with Government.

On what lines should these schemes go forward? Dr Leakey makes a series of radical suggestions—not all of which may commend themselves to us. First (and most controversially) as regards religion: Christianity must be on scriptural principles, and not take account of later western developments. Monogamy Dr Leakey would include among the inessentials; he can find no veto against polygamy in the teaching of Christ. Marriage with a deceased wife's sister should be allowed; it was the Jewish practice and is a Kikuyu custom. Female circumcision should be supervised and made safe, rather than forbidden. The true value of the tribal religion should be recognized. Second, as regards education, care should be taken and much money spent to ensure the proper training and payment of teachers. As the old tribal education taught respect of elders, forbade adultery, murder, theft, and drunkenness among the young, so the new education should teach true principles of behaviour as well as the three Rs. Native journalists should be properly trained, and a responsible native press encouraged—partly as a safety valve. Third, as regards economics, unsuitable crops should not be grown—there would then be less need of anti-erosion measures. There must be better urban housing, and tenants should pay an instalment rent so as to gain permanent homes; similar steps should be taken to enable squatters to become freehold owners. They should be formed into villages, on the system of the English village with its community spirit. There must be an old age pension scheme and health insurance. Marriage customs must be reorganized in accordance with social progress, and the old "marriage insurance" (which has become almost bride purchase) reformed. Fourth, scientific investigation must produce a form of birth control *of a kind suitable for a primitive community*: at all costs the population increase must be checked; and Dr Leakey is sure that the Kikuyu themselves are anxious for smaller and more economic families. I would myself recommend a greater emphasis on continence; it is practised in primitive tribes in West Africa during the taboo period before the previous child has been weaned—often a period of more than two years. It is a fallacy to suppose that continence is impossible to the African. Finally, the colour bar must be broken down, not by legislation, but by greater contact and mutual understanding between white and black. This will only be possible when genuine communication is possible, and there is a well known common language. When this happens, there can be a real European and inter-tribal consultative organization.

However difficult some of Dr Leakey's suggestions may seem, there is no doubt that he knows what he is talking about; and that he is one of those rare birds, a man who has learned sympathy with the African without losing sympathy with his own people. His proposals must be taken seriously in other places than Kenya, if inter-racial tension is to be resolved.

H. A. BLAIR

THE QUESTION OF COLOUR

THE COLOUR PROBLEM. By ANTHONY H. RICHMOND. Penguin Books. 3s. 6d.

THE general reader has come to expect that a "Pelican" on any subject will provide him with a picture of it which is comprehensive yet concise, readable and balanced. Mr Richmond's book is "A study of colour prejudice, racial discrimination, and social separation, with an account of racial relations and the 'colour-bar' in Britain and Commonwealth territories in Africa and the West Indies". He does not attempt to cover the whole field of racial relations throughout the world, although one would have wished for a more adequate reference to the inter-racial situation in such countries as Brazil, which has an important bearing upon the problem—and the results—of miscegenation. One would have welcomed also a closer examination of the " colour problem" existing between the non-White races. The author has, however, in view of the territorial limitations of his inquiry, adhered to his opening definition of the "colour problem" as resolving itself into one fundamental question: "How will the economically and politically dominant 700 million people who call themselves 'White' respond to the pressing demands for advance from the 1,700 million who are called 'Coloured'?"

After a valuable introduction in which the author examines racial differences and distinguishes three elements in the colour-bar—colour prejudice, racial discrimination, and social separation—he sets out the political background of the racial tensions in the areas under review.

The author's first regional survey is concerned with the struggle to maintain White supremacy in South Africa. There, in his opinion, racial relationships are bound to deteriorate until the pressure on non-Europeans becomes so great that a major upheaval ensues, the only alternative appearing to be a widespread change of attitude on the part of Europeans. But, as even a few of the leaders of the Dutch Reformed Churches have stated, a radical "change of attitude" is bound to involve the European community in sacrifices, social, economic, and political. Mr Richmond sees clearly that, if time would allow, probably the most effective obstacle to the increased application of Apartheid would present itself in the economic field. Industrial and commercial interests are awakening to the need for promoting the social and material (and educational?) welfare of the African.

On the "crisis in British Colonial Africa", the author comments that the dominant European minorities in East and Central Africa appear to be willing to give Africans some opportunity in the future of improving their own status relative to that of Europeans. He regards the whole future of racial relations in these territories as depending upon the answer to the question: " What use will be made of the political and economic power now possessed by the dominant European minorities?" He makes a strong case against the policy of creating native reserves as any solution of the African problem. He also reminds uninformed critics of Apartheid in South Africa that "a social colour-bar still exists almost everywhere in East and Central Africa".

The author attributes the racial conflict in modern Africa to three main factors which were also responsible for bringing about the "colour problem" in the British West Indies. In each case there is social disintegration resulting from culture contacts, rapid social change, and the subordination of the several ethnic groups to the dominant European minority. Of particular interest is his examination of the close relation both of colour and class in the West Indies, and of economic and social problems.

The study of racial relations in Britain in this book deals mainly with the "Negro" group as the largest ethnic minority in the country, and only incidentally with people of Asian origin. In his assessment of the present position in regard to colonial immigrants, the author emphasizes three factors which determine the success of their adjustment to life in this country. The first is the extent to which the immigrant's pre-emigration experiences have prepared him for life in a highly urbanized and industrialized country like Britain. Secondly, his initial expectation about life in Britain and what he hopes to do here. Thirdly, his success in obtaining a reasonable measure of economic, social, and psychological security in his relationships with other people in Britain.

In his conclusion, Mr Richmond stresses that "so-called 'White civilisation' will only be preserved by sharing its fruits with non-Europeans, not by depriving them of its benefits". The various ethnic groups in the territories concerned must find a way of living together, in an integrated and not a separated society. Prejudicial attitudes must be dealt with by the removal of fear and insecurity as well as by effective educative measures. Economic, educational, community, and political developments must advance together, towards the ultimate goal of the elimination of differences of social, political, and economic status between the members of different races.

Mr Richmond's effective summary of the colour problem in the areas with which he is concerned has, however, one somewhat surprising deficiency. This is in regard to the religious implications of the problem. Barely a page on "The Churches and other Bodies" on page 132, and a single paragraph in the Postscript referring to the effect of the Bantu Education Act on the Mission Schools, cannot be described as an adequate presentation of the religious element in the South African situation, particularly in regard to the heritage and outlook of the Dutch Reformed Churches, which have had and still have so great an influence on the policy of the Nationalist party. The same omission characterizes the section on Kenya, where the author makes no reference to the part played by the Revivalist and other Kikuyu Christians. His Postscript contains one brief reference to the work of Rehabilitation, but again without any indication that there are any other workers engaged in Rehabilitation besides those sent out by the Society of Friends and the Save the Children Fund.

Similarly, in his section on Colonial students in Britain, there is a singular omission of any reference to the work done among these and other overseas students by the Churches, the Missionary Societies, and such organizations as Rotary.

But, allowing for this gap in the total picture, the reader will find this book a valuable summary of the main factors in the problem of Race Relations which is a major issue before the world in this second half of the twentieth century.

FENTON MORLEY

AB ORIENTE PAX ?

FOR PEACE. By NICHOLAS, Metropolitan of Krutitzy and Kolomna. Moscow Patriarchate. n.p.

THE Metropolitan of Krutitzy has been an indefatigable worker for the World Peace Council and the Soviet Committee of Peace. This recently published volume, running to 150 pages, contains fifteen of his speeches. It is said that Archbishop Nicholas is a devout man, and that his sermons on the spiritual life attract large crowds. Readers of this book may be inclined to wish that he would limit his writings to pastoralia!

In 1952 the Patriarch of Russia summoned a large conference at Zagorsk monastery. People of many faiths—Orthodox, Catholic, Jew, Mohammedan, Buddhist, attended. The Archbishop of Krutitzy was a star performer. He adhered faithfully to the party line, "When the American cannibals resorted to bacteriological warfare . . ."; "The designs [i.e. of the Western powers] are prompted by such a hatred of mankind, by such malice, as has not been witnessed since the world was created"; "vigilant are his eyes; strong is his hand; rhythmically beats his all-embracing heart; he will not permit mankind, whom he but recently saved, to be subjected to new torments. Glory to the great Stalin!" And so on, *ad nauseam*.

The more recent speeches are less offensive, and show signs of the "new look". The vocabulary lays more stress on co-operation and co-existence than on war criminals, bacteriological warfare, and mad dogs. And yet, in a curious sort of way, Archbishop Nicholas conveys an impression of ardent sincerity and personal goodness. He is passionate for peace, and he really believes that the Communist governments are blameless. The clouds of war are manufactured only by the Western capitalists.

It is easy to pour ridicule upon him, but we have to remember he is the victim of propaganda. Like the rest of us, he bases his opinions upon the evidence in front of him. His evidence is provided by the Kremlin. He knows nothing else. And as he really believes what he is told, we can hardly criticize him for taking the line he does.

But surely the Moscow Patriarchate must know better? I cannot believe that the astute Alexis is without his own channels of information, and he must realize that this latest effusion of his metropolitan must cause dismay among Christians in other countries, and hinder the efforts of the genuine peace-makers. In fact it is not too much to say that the most constructive thing the Patriarch could do would be to impose a ban of silence upon Archbishop Nicholas.

Western readers will be interested to observe the Archbishop's reason for concerning himself with international politics: "The Christian doctrine is not a collection of dry dogmas. The Christian Church is inseparable from life; it draws nourishment from life and passes on to life its vast vivifying and radiant experience. Everything in life is near and dear to the Church; nothing leaves it indifferent. And, in our stormy, arduous, decisive, heroic and glorious time, the Christian Church plays a particularly responsible role." Splendid! This might be a quotation from F. D. Maurice or William Temple. But the Archbishop will appeal more strongly to the West when he learns to check his facts and when he applies political judgements, based on Christian insights, not only to what happens in the international field, but in the domestic arena. Christian sociology, like charity, should begin at home!

MERVYN STOCKWOOD

ANGELIC DOCTOR

ST THOMAS AQUINAS. THEOLOGICAL TEXTS. Selected and translated with Notes and an Introduction by THOMAS GILBY. Oxford University Press. 15s.

IN 1951 the Oxford University Press published Fr Thomas Gilby's collection of 1124 passages illustrating the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas. The companion volume of 670 theological passages which has now appeared should be of even greater usefulness, for, although the Angelic Doctor's philosophy has been made the subject of a vast number of reliable and readable works, it is almost impossible to find a concise account of his theology. Now we have this in manageable bulk in his own words.

The arrangement followed is that of the *Summa Theologica*, but the texts are drawn from a variety of sources including some less known and not very easily available works. From an introductory discussion of the nature of theology, we pass to consider the Holy Trinity, Creation, the Fall, and the New Creation. Next there follow three sections on the Theological and Cardinal Virtues and Holiness, and finally three sections on the Incarnation, the Church, and the Last Things. References are given in detail, and there are useful cross-references.

Those who know Fr Gilby's previous compilation or his own writings will not be surprised to know that the translation in which he presents his chosen passages is readable, modern, and lively. Frequently, by some colloquial turn of phrase, he brings out a nuance which is missing in the more literal English renderings with which the public is familiar. The general reader whose main purpose is to get a broad and at the same time accurate impression of St Thomas's thought will find that this is just what he needs. But for this very reason the scholar who wants a more precise and detailed knowledge of the text will, if he is wise, refer to the original Latin and not take the risk of making his own back-translation; this is, of course, as it should be, for Fr Gilby is not in this volume concerned with him. One or two examples will suffice to show the felicity of Fr Gilby's rendering. Take this, on the various senses of Holy Scripture: "One event may be figurative of so many others; if you start chopping and changing without taking care you may easily find yourself with a fallacious conclusion" (*Quodlib*, vi. 14). Or this, well known in more dignified guise: "Grace does not scrap nature, but improves it; reason subserves faith, and natural love runs through charity" (*Gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat . . . S. Theol.* I, i, 8 *ad* 2). ". . . are essentially the same; they differ merely as different topics for study" is a refreshing rendering of "*una per essentiam est . . . et . . ., sed differens sola ratione*" (III, viii, 5 *ad* 3). In places Fr Gilby even rivals the concision of the Angelic Doctor's Latin, as when he renders "*Aliud est mutare voluntatem, et aliud est velle aliquarum rerum mutationem*" by "To will change is not the same as to change will" (I, xix, 7). Space will not admit of further instances, but one final remark must be made. The inclusion of passages from St Thomas's less academic writings shows how false is any notion that his mentality was mechanical or unimaginative. Let these two examples suffice: "Eve sought the fruit, but did not find there what she wished for. In her fruit the blessed Virgin found all that Eve had wanted." "A word uttered is heard by ear, but is not read until set down in letters. The Word of God could be both seen and felt, being written in our flesh."

E. L. MASCALL

A LIVELY FAITH

CHRISTIAN FAITH TO-DAY. By STEPHEN NEILL. Penguin Books. 2s. 6d.

WORKS on apologetics have mostly been written on the assumption that, for all practical purposes, organized religion can be identified with Christianity. It is one of the strongest points of Bishop Neill's book that on the very first page this assumption is repudiated. No doubt this is very largely the result of the author's experience as a missionary in India; he could not in honesty treat Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam as if they were either non-existent or contemptible. But from a practical point of view his decision is equally to be commended. The modern Englishman is not perhaps likely to become a Hindu, a Buddhist, or a Mohammedan, but the public library, the radio, and very likely national service overseas have familiarized him with the fact of the great non-Christian religions as formidable competitors with Christianity for the allegiance of the human soul. Bishop Neill is therefore at pains to emphasize not only the reasonableness but also the uniqueness of Christianity and, while arguing that it *is* fundamentally reasonable, in the sense that it wholly satisfies the ultimate moral and intellectual needs of man, he frankly faces the fact that its central assertion—that God has become man and has died for man's salvation—is marked by a *prima facie* unreasonableness, in the sense that it embodies a unique exception to the general run of our experience. Step by step he builds up his case, with a scrupulous determination at no stage to press the argument further than it can legitimately go; and the result is very impressive indeed. There is an eagerness to admit the failures and crimes of historic Christianity which is not invariable in works of Christian propaganda. But perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of the book is the testimony which it bears to the personal experience of its author; like the Apostles he is speaking of the things that he has seen and heard. When it is added that his style has a liveliness and a lucidity that are all too rare in popular books on religion it will be apparent that the publishers are to be congratulated on having made such a book available at such a moderate price.

Nevertheless, the book has its defects, and they are those of the author's theological position, namely an evangelicalism which is liberal without being undogmatic, which is traditional without being fundamentalist; but which, while holding fast to the Incarnate Son of God and his saving work, has a somewhat tenuous and limited character. Thus, in spite of its Christocentricity, the book never clearly asserts the ontological reality of divine grace; with all its warmth of devotion, it fails to recognize that Christians share in the very life of God himself. The Church is movingly described as the fellowship of Christ's disciples, but it does not appear as the very body of Christ. Nowhere is there recognized the fundamental fact, which is the basis of traditional mystical and ascetical theology alike, that by grace man, while his creaturehood remains, is nevertheless deified. In consequence the final chapter, which discusses eschatology, is the weakest in the book. Bishop Neill's religion is Protestantism at its best, but it is none the less Protestantism; and, for all the realism with which he looks on the contemporary world and the missionary situation, he never explicitly faces the fact that half the Christians in the world are Roman Catholics. It is perhaps significant that the Holy Communion is only discussed as a manifestation of Christian fellowship and discipleship; nowhere is there made plain its central and constitutive function in the Church, as the means by which the Church's very existence is assured by the perpetuation in her midst of the saving act of Christ which re-made her as the New Israel. By this neglect, as will be clear to any reader who remembers the first chapter of Dom Gregory Dix's *Shape of the Liturgy*, justice fails to be done to the New Testament itself. The Church and the Sacraments have more basically *theological* significance than Bishop Neill allows them.

I do not wish, however, to end on a critical note. No Christian, whatever his outlook, need fear to give this book to his non-Christian friends. It is written with clarity, sincerity, and penetration, and—what is not the least important quality in a book of this kind—with persuasiveness.

E. L. MASCALL

G. O. M.

GLADSTONE. A BIOGRAPHY. By PHILIP MAGNUS. John Murray. 28s.

GLADSTONE'S political life almost spanned that period of great change from the first Reform Bill to the Boer War. He moved with and influenced his times longer than any other statesman. It is Sir Philip Magnus's achievement to show how he did so with a singular consistency of purpose despite alterations of opinion, and to describe at the same time the affections and personal foibles of an essentially simple individual.

Gladstone began his intellectual voyage believing that the British State only expressed its necessary moral purposes in the Anglican Establishment. He came to support the admission of Jews to Parliament, to promote undenominational education, to carry Irish disestablishment, and to favour Welsh disestablishment. His first parliamentary seat was a pocket borough, and he feared a popular constituency. But he won the "admiration of the masses" in fighting the Lords over the Paper Bill. By 1864 he had asserted the right of every man to vote, and by 1865, exchanging the Oxford University seat for South Lancashire, he had come to find "in the response of popular audiences in provincial towns" the support which he was henceforward most to trust. Entering politics in the age of aristocratic patronage and amateur administration, he began, during the Crimean War, to reform the Civil Service. He came to formulate ideals of economical, efficient, and professional administration, which he later successfully applied, while still abhorring "construction" or the intrusion of the State into what he regarded as the proper business of the individual. He radically changed, under Peel, Aberdeen, and Palmerston, the nation's fiscal system. He wished to leave the nation's wealth "to fructify in the pockets of the people", but in the Succession Duties of 1853 he suggested an instrument which the twentieth-century State was to use to redistribute wealth. He began by opposing Palmerstonian interference abroad, but in the sixties came to see foreign policy as the means to fight oppressive and alien rule wherever it existed and to pursue "objects which are European by means which are European, in concert with the mind of the rest of Europe and supported by its authority". Sir Philip Magnus might also have shown how, beginning his parliamentary career by supporting the West Indian planters' interest, Gladstone formulated, in a despatch of 1846, the principle of reciprocity of obligation and mutual consultation of wishes upon which new relationships in the Empire were later developed.

The second half of the book discusses the four great administrations in which Gladstone reached and passed the peak of his career. The author does not attempt any reassessment of Gladstone's Irish legislation, his treatment of education, or the three great foreign questions of 1868-74. But he adds to the accepted story of the first ministry an important discussion of the "Royalty question". The second administration was launched in 1880 by Gladstone's determination to reverse Disraeli's foreign policy. But Cyprus was not restored, Russia was not conciliated, and in the Transvaal Gladstone at first fumbled too. Ireland and occupied Egypt both proved disastrous liabilities. The ministry ended in 1885 with a muddled colonial quarrel with Germany, which is outside the scope of this book, the disgrace of the disaster at Khartoum, and a fresh quarrel with Russia. Yet changes in the franchise, in electoral divisions, electoral practices, and parliamentary procedure were important achievements. Sir Philip Magnus is probably right in suggesting that failure was caused, as in the later administrations, by Gladstone's "unworldliness" and unhandiness in dealing with individuals, his mistake in himself administering the Exchequer until December 1882, and the hostility of the Queen—a legacy from the first administration strengthened by the subtlety of Disraeli's practice in the interval. He could also have shown how Gladstone failed to find in foreign, imperial, or domestic policy that clear succession of practicable, constructive tasks which would have induced order and stimulated agreement among the discordant personalities of his cabinet. He was of course ill and much absent from the autumn of 1882 until the early summer of 1883. But his mental weariness was the consequence of failure as well as its cause. Chamberlain's presence was also important. He never acknowledged Gladstone's mastery and he upset the precarious balance between the radical and Whig, or even Tory, elements in

Gladstone's own opinions. Gladstone thus lost his assurance in giving weight to all sides of a discussion which had helped him to produce a common mind in the first cabinet. He attempted to run the second like the first by methods perfected by Peel and inherited from Grey's cabinet of 1830-34. They were unsuited to a much busier and more deeply divided body of men.

The last two administrations provided "the spectacle of a great man's unconquerable mind triumphing until the last in the highest sense over hostile and uncongenial circumstances". Sir Philip Magnus attributes the failure of the first Home Rule Bill to Gladstone's reliance on the good sense of the masses and disregard for the legitimate ambitions of possible colleagues. Events from the Pigott forgeries, the fall of Parnell, the Newcastle programme, and the return of the Liberals to the failure of the second Home Rule Bill, the quarrel over the naval estimates, and Gladstone's final resignation show that he had "become a little negligent . . . about the means which he employed to achieve his ends". Only the force of his conviction and character gave dignity to a situation that had in it both pettiness and folly.

If those who know Morley's *Life* and older and more reticent biographies may not always recognize the familiar Gladstone in the new *Life*, there will be many to welcome this more intimate, human, and less political story. All must enjoy the skilful composition of the picture and the remarkable way in which the movement of the narrative is sustained through the intricacies of large and controversial subjects.

AGATHA RAMM

DISSENTING ACADEMIES

THE BIRTH OF MODERN EDUCATION: The Contribution of the Dissenting Academies, 1660-1800. By J. W. ASHLEY SMITH. Independent Press. 19s. 6d.

THE Puritan movement was by no means Philistine—witness John Milton, Colonel Hutchinson, and many other notable figures of Cromwell's time. Under the Protectorate much was done to save and reinvigorate public and grammar schools. When at the Restoration Oxford and Cambridge cast out all nonconformists there was no inconsiderable cultural loss to the universities, an impoverishment which continued until the ban was removed two centuries later. Mr Ashley Smith's detailed and illuminating study shows how the dissenters not only carried into their exile their traditions of learning and teaching, but also improved upon these and in the long run brought new life to the universities themselves.

Harvard and Yale had been founded by the Pilgrim Fathers and their successors with the primary purpose of ensuring the continuance of an educated ministry. No corporate effort of that kind was possible in the mother country because successive Acts of Parliament scattered and isolated, far from the towns, the ejected tutors and the little congregations to which many of them ministered. They were not disposed to give up their vocation to scholarship and teaching. They were deeply concerned for the higher education of the young men now shut out of the colleges. They began therefore to gather about them in their own houses the sons of nonconforming families and to instruct these in all the studies which they would have pursued at a university—a feat not less admirable though specialization was then little practised and the range of the university curriculum was relatively narrow. It was only later in the history of these academies that two or more tutors shared the work in one place. More than seventy academies came into existence, and Mr Ashley Smith tells us about some seventy tutors, listing also another seventy not considered in the body of the book. Among the most famous names are those of Philip Doddridge, John Wesley, Joseph Priestly, and Isaac Watts, whose educational influence, however, was through his published works and not as a tutor.

A few of the academies were set up primarily to prepare young men for the ministry, but most had the three professions of Church, medicine, and law in view. It seems that all students, whatever their intended calling, followed at least part of the theological course, for all three vocations were regarded as Christian. On the other hand young men proposing to be ministers were well advised to read some law or medicine also, since they would probably not be able to live upon such stipends as small congregations could afford. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries some of the academies developed into Free Church theological colleges, certain of which are now affiliated to universities and contribute outstandingly to the membership of the faculties of Divinity therein.

Mr Ashley Smith, for his particular purposes, classifies the tutors into those trained at Oxford and Cambridge, those who were without English university training but continued the traditional education, and those who constructed their own curricula. Two concepts prevailed among them all—the idea of a liberal education and that of integration. To the traditional Latin, Greek, and Hebrew studies were added modern languages, modern history, and politics, and the experimental approach to science, together with a variety of other subjects. "Natural philosophy", it is true, was studied largely because it was regarded as one of the ways by which the truth about the Creator could be more fully understood, but the great scientists of the time worked in that conviction too. The integrity of the academies, was manifest in their departure from the traditional Aristotelian, theoretical approach and in their sitting down to see what the facts would reveal, doing their work in laboratories and not libraries. The academies outdid the universities in the range and quality of their intellectual activities, and were in many ways the pioneers of modern higher education.

A distinctive characteristic of these scholarly, adventurous tutors, animated by their love of God and freedom, was that in literary, philosophical, and theological studies they were not content, as their universities had been, to take a prescribed text and comment upon it. Doddridge is perhaps the outstanding example of insistence that his students should hear all sides of an argument. In lectures therefore, many authorities, representing different or even opposed points of view, were quoted, and students were encouraged to follow this up by reading more deeply in the works mentioned, and others, so that they might develop not only independence of judgement and convictions that really were their own, but also tolerance and catholicity, breadth as well as depth of knowledge and thought. The "spirit of fearless enquiry" was inculcated. As one student wrote of his tutor, "In all controverted points he never offered to impose upon the judgement of the pupil." The academies were not seminaries, with a narrow outlook and a propagandist purpose. The "critical and comparative attitude" was fostered by them. Yet they were neither superficial nor indefinite in aim. John Wesley claimed that in three years his students achieved as much as they would have done in seven at his own University of Oxford. Hard and constant work was exacted. Nevertheless there was leisure which the students knew how to use with enjoyment. Above all, personal and corporate religion was enriched and disciplined. Neither tutor nor students ever forgot that they were committed to the worship and service of God.

The value of this thorough-going and almost exhaustively documented study is more than historical. It does indeed show the transition from classical and philosophical preoccupations to an education in which science, modern history, and the theory of politics, English and modern languages, play their due part. The academies were creative because they exercised an untrammelled freedom of thought and judgement, and the universities owe no small part of their cherished independence to the new way of teaching practised by these courageous dissenting tutors. But all the work of the academies was informed and inspired by a philosophy of education—a Christian philosophy. All truth was for them God's truth and ultimately part of the many-coloured wisdom of God, as the apostolic phrase describes it. As John Locke held that "theology is every man's duty" so these keen, disciplined teachers maintained that it was the Christian man's privilege and obligation to add to his faith knowledge in every major field open to him. This gave zest and relevance as well as purpose to their strenuous studies and forthright discussions. Mr Ashley Smith's fruitful inquiry stimulates us in many respects, but in none more important than with regard to the need and quest for a Christian philosophy of education in our own time.

BASIL A. YEAXLEE

INVERT AND PERVERT

HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE WESTERN CHRISTIAN TRADITION. By DERRICK SHERWIN BAILEY. Longmans. 15s.

DR Sherwin Bailey, who is an Anglican priest and now Study Secretary of the Church of England Moral Welfare Council, has in this book published an excellent and valuable piece of historical research. He has set out to discover what exactly the Christian tradition in the West has been with regard to the abnormality of sexual behaviour between persons of like sex. He has been prompted to undertake this enquiry for three reasons. First, in order to provide the historical material needed for a review of the law, and for an assessment of the Church's attitude to the question to-day—such as has been provisionally attempted in the Council's report entitled *The Problem of Homosexuality*. Secondly, Dr Bailey has felt bound to inquire why this practice has aroused so much horror and severity, not only in the Church but also in society. And in the third place he has been led to find out what the Church has actually said officially about it; in this he has shown that writers like Havelock Ellis, Westermarck, and Kinsey who have accused the Church of being obsessed with the evil and of inhuman harshness towards it, have prejudged the case contrary to the evidence. In the main Dr Bailey shows that ecclesiastical measures more often took a moral and rational attitude than did civil society, though he holds that both powers have been reprehensibly ignorant and severe.

In the preface the author points out that homosexual behaviour may be practised by two kinds of people, by the genuine "invert" who is emotionally directed to those of the same sex (though many inverts live chaste lives), or by people of heterosexual type who are then known as "perverts". The book is about homosexual practices by both types. Inversion, as such, is not a sin.

The body of the book contains evidence for the moral, ecclesiastical, and legal treatment of this evil, up to the end of the Middle Ages, and there follows a chapter on the Law in England. The very interesting summary of the Biblical evidence leads to the conclusion that homosexual acts were relatively uncommon in Israel; in the N.T. they are regarded as evidence of a "reprobate mind". Dr Bailey criticises all modern versions of the N.T. (except Moffat's) for not translating properly the two technical words used in 1 Cor 6. 9. This valuable Biblical section is preceded by a long discussion of the Sodom and Gomorrah story and kindred O.T. passages. This is more argumentative, and it is obvious that Dr Bailey needs to find some tremendous influence to account for the Western tradition's horror of the practice, which to him needs some explaining. He thinks it is due to the effect of the story of the Lord's destructive judgement upon the city of Sodom which has lent its name to the abominable vice. But, argues Dr Bailey with the support of some Semitic authorities, this is a complete misrepresentation, and the men of Sodom have been gravely slandered. The argument turns on whether the Hebrew verb "to know" has in Gen. 19 and elsewhere a sexual meaning. He denies that it has, in spite of the heterosexual offer in v. 8. I find that Hebrew scholars are not generally convinced of this argument. The question is important and tricky, but it is a pity that Dr Bailey has to put so much weight upon a controversial issue; he traces in fact the whole subsequent attitude to terror of the divine condemnation, and maintains that the homosexual interpretation of Gen. 19 and Judges 19 began much later under Greek influence and is not original. He therefore feels confident that he has shaken the main foundation of what he considers the extreme Western attitude.

This doubtful procedure, however, does not detract from the value of the carefully documented chapters which follow. Dealing with Roman Law until the time of Justinian, he mentions the severe penalties inflicted, but exposes as false "the picture, conjured up by certain writers, of panic-stricken imperial religious fanatics obsessed with the fear of the consequences of sodomy and committed by their Faith to an implacable persecution of the 'love' which the Greeks had esteemed". There is a useful examination of the Canons of Ancyra (314) and evidence that civil enactments were often more severe than ecclesiastical ones. In fact by treating homosexual acts as sins rather than as crimes, the Church encouraged a moral and pastoral outlook. Hence the treatment of this evil in the Penitentials and in the Scholastic teaching. Dr Bailey makes out a convincing answer to the accusations that the evil was rife in the Middle Ages. He shows that where it existed it was largely associated with certain of the catharist heresies, but this does not mean, as many critics assert, that the Church was obsessed with it and persecuted it under the cover of extirpating heresy.

The short chapter on the law in England points out the anomaly by which homosexual acts committed in private by adult males (that is, where there is no corruption of minors or offence against public decency) are criminal offences, while the same practice by women does not come under the law; nor do fornication and adultery which do more social injury.

In a conclusion assessing the tradition he has examined, Dr Bailey lists its defects (again Sodom carries much of the burden) and its positive features. He then suggests reforms in social attitude and legal enactment, which deserve serious consideration. I incline to think, however, that the conclusion is weakened by a certain doctrinaire egalitarianism which does not recognize that sex is something different in men and in women; and by a too hasty attribution of the defects of the Western tradition to the sociological factors alleged to belong to a patriarchial social structure. But the wisdom of this book may be epitomized in the author's own words: "The so called problem of homosexuality which confronts us to-day is really a problem arising from the decay of moral standards and the abandonment of moral responsibility in the field of heterosexual relation—both, in their turn, the result of false or imperfect conceptions of the nature of sex, and of ignorance or rejection of the will of God for man and woman."

V. A. DEMANT

LIMITATIONS OF FREUD

INTEGRATION OF RELIGION AND PSYCHIATRY. By W. EARL BIDDLE. The Macmillan Company, New York. 26s.

DR BIDDLE, an experienced psychiatrist of the Philadelphia State Hospital, Pennsylvania, and a convinced and practising Christian of Catholic orthodoxy, tells us in his Preface that he has spent sixteen years in working out this "framework of a new psychology . . . erected upon the foundations which were already laid". These foundations are, in effect, the factual and scientific aspects of Freud's analytical observations, coupled with the ethics and metaphysics of Christian theology. Freud's materialistic philosophy is rejected as obviously untenable, widespread though its influence has been. As Dr Biddle says, Freud is clearly responsible to a great extent for the materialism of modern medical psychology. But that was in any case implicit in his attempt to develop the study of human personality on lines appropriate to the restricted ends of the empirical sciences. The necessarily different approach of those who are concerned with religion allows for, and includes in its ministry of what in America is widely known and practised as "counseling", aspects of human behaviour not amenable to normal scientific hypotheses and techniques.

The theories of the unconscious and of dynamic symbolism are here taken over from the psycho-analysts more or less as they stand. A dream as analysed by Dr Biddle would be very like a dream analysed by any of Freud's followers. He even goes a long way, further than many psycho-analysts, in the direction of a dictionary of symbols. Thus any male figure in a dream, even an infant, is a father-figure, and since the father-figure, developing in the imaginative processes of the unconscious, is the ground of the concepts whereby we speak of God, we have the surprising, but exceedingly interesting, suggestion that the Christian tradition wherein the Infant Jesus is also worshipped as God has as its background a pattern already shaped by the normal processes of human development. Incidentally the familiar Oedipus-complex comes in for some very sound and even rough handling, and Dr Biddle points out what many of us have noticed, namely the unfairness of what he calls Oedipal theories to the tragic figure of Oedipus himself, a victim not of his unconscious motives but of sheer accident involving him in a doom which only the supreme genius of Sophocles could invest with any gleam of light.

The psychological theory which Dr Biddle develops consists in the main of a new emphasis upon the imagination. He draws a careful and sustained distinction between phantasy, the constructive symbolic process, conscious and unconscious, and fantasy, the distortion whereby this process is based upon illusion. He thus seeks to reverse the emphasis of much modern psychology upon the emotions or affects as primary, though he fully recognizes that the work of the imagination always carries an emotional tone. But the dynamic energy is conceived as inherent primarily in the imagination.

It is obvious enough that this makes comparatively easy the rehabilitation of dogma which Dr Biddle seeks. He is concerned to show, as others have done, that Freud's attack upon religion is rather an attack upon religious dogma than upon religious principles. Dr Biddle can even say that "Freud discovered that man is by nature religious and that the concept of the Supreme Being is *experienced* in childhood". Here he is following, apparently quite independently, a line which has been opened up by various writers from the side of the Church, notably Father Joseph Nuttin of Louvain and Dr R. S. Lee, Vicar of the University Church at Oxford. In some ways he is even nearer to Erich Fromm with his claim both for Freud and for himself of a truly religious outlook upon naturalistic and humanist lines. Dr Biddle apparently accepts this estimate of Freud, but goes much further, indeed the whole way, in seeking the fulfilment of the pattern of personality in a supernatural order, infusing and giving meaning to the natural order.

In the issue the technique worked out involves a psychological theory and practice based upon the fundamental nature of personal relationships, coming to their fullness in man's conscious relationship with God. Here too Dr Biddle's work seems to fall into line with much that is being said elsewhere. In particular his emphasis upon personal relationships closely resembles the very similar views of Dr W. D. Fairbairn, who, also starting from the theory and practice of Freudian analysis, has come very much to the front in this country with his stress upon the view that healing in psychiatry depends for its completeness upon the establishment of "good object" relationships within the patient, by the establishment of healthy personal relationships with and through the analyst.

Dr Biddle's work, coming from the side of the doctor and not the parson, is clearly a significant contribution to this development. It is a pity that the very high cost of American books is reflected in a price which will be a stumbling-block to many who might otherwise buy it. Though well printed and very pleasant to read it is little longer than a volume in the Home University Library, one of which recently published separately in America cost more than three times as much there as in England. But this is not the place for the discussion of what has become a very serious problem for the comity of scholarship.

L. W. GRENSTED

PSYCHOLOGY AND MORALS

MAN, MORALS AND SOCIETY. By J. C. FLUGEL. Penguin Books. 3s. 6d.

PSYCHOLOGY is often both the friend and the enemy of religion. It is religion's friend because it explains so much, enabling, for example, a priest to have a better understanding of his own nature and that of the puzzling people who look to him for guidance. It is religion's enemy when—through some at least of its exponents—it proceeds to "explain away" religion as little more than the product of wishful thinking, a support which is still of value to the unsophisticated but which mature minds must, perhaps regretfully, cast aside.

This book illustrates both these facets. It is important, not least because of the series in which it appears, making it readily available to great numbers of readers. When it first appeared, in 1945, it was something of a pioneer because it examined the relationship of psychology to morals, the author being convinced that the existence of something corresponding to conscience could be demonstrated by the most precise methods available, but that conscience was a factor capable of doing harm as well as good. For the late Dr Flugel the importance of the Ego-Ideal could hardly be overstated; but it needs to be restrained, as "there is little doubt that a vast amount of psychogenic misery is caused by this setting of too high a standard for one's self, and the fact that those who suffer in this way have never called in question, or indeed explicitly recognised, that they expect more from themselves than they do from others shows both the extent of their primitive narcissism and the degree to which this narcissism has been displaced from the real ego to the ego-ideal." What he desiderates is an "experimental science of the 'goals of life' ".

A choice of chapter headings will give some idea of the wide reach of this book: "Conflicts in the Ego-Ideal and some Attempts at their Solution"; "Narcissism (Aggression Turned against the Self)"; "The Infantile Origins of Aggression"; "Taboo and its Equivalents"; "Punishment and the Polycrates Complex"; "Wishful Thinking, Autism and Unrealism". Throughout there is revealed a mastery of the extensive literature of the subject; though the dependence on Freud is greater than on any other writer. There is a deep understanding of the many needs of man, not least of the "need to be needed". "Permanent and universal disapproval is a condition that is wellnigh unthinkable and unendurable, and no more appalling calamity can befall a human being than to feel himself utterly outcast and alone." These things need to be remembered in the disorderly society of to-day in which "individual neurosis is the price that society has to pay for the greater diversity of thought and outlook that is characteristic of civilisation".

The writer soon comes up against what, in chapter XVIII, is called "the problem of religion". Indeed, he displays an understanding of Christian doctrine as well as of the language and intention of the Prayer Book. He does not hold that supernatural religion has been disproved: it is enough that it has been undermined. Men are thrown back upon themselves and must rely upon their own efforts to improve their lot. Human beings can be intensely interested in "the romance of reality" and "the religion of humanity is surely the religion of the nearer future".

It is not the purpose of a book review to enter into argument. But Dr Flugel, perhaps unintentionally, conveys the suggestion that psychologists are agreed in this "mature" attitude to religion. In reading Dr H. G. Wood's lectures on *Belief and Unbelief* I have come across the following quotation from William Brown, the Oxford psychologist:

"One would expect, according to the Freudian theory, that deep analysis would leave the patient less religious than he was before. My own experience has been the exact opposite. The analysis had indeed a purifying effect upon my religious beliefs, freeing them from much that was merely infantile and supported by sentimental associations or historical accidents. But the ultimate result has been that I have become more convinced than ever that religion is the most important thing in life, and that it is essential to mental health; although emotionalism and religiosity are diminished, the essentially religious outlook on life remains unimpaired."

Oddly enough the name of Dr William Brown does not occur in the ample index of this book.

H. G. G. HERKLOTS

SONGS OF SION

THE CHRISTIAN USE OF THE PSALMS. By HENRY DE CANDOLE. A. R. Mowbray. 6s.

FEW misunderstandings of the Christian religion are more unreasonable, yet few are more prevalent, than the belief that it is possible to take part properly in the services of the Church by the light of nature and without taking any trouble at all. And this belief is usually supplemented by the notion that the services ought to be attractive to and fully intelligible by the casual visitor, however ignorant he may be. The result of this misunderstanding is that when anybody chances to attend divine service and finds it difficult to follow or not exactly to his taste, his reaction is to condemn the services and to stay away rather than by study and practice to make himself capable of appreciating them.

This reaction is the more surprising in that it would not be tolerated by the critic for a moment in any other department of life. If a priest, for instance, who had played only Rugger in his youth, turned up at a village Soccer match and complained that this was a feeble game which he could not possibly continue to honour with his presence until the rules were amended, he would be laughed at or resented. Yet if the same priest ventured to suggest to a critic of the Church services that someone who had in the past entered public buildings only in search of entertainment needed to *learn* to take part in what goes on in Church, he would be told that he was out of date and out of touch.

No part of the Prayer Book has suffered more from such misunderstandings and mistaken efforts to remove them than the Psalms. And any assistance that can be given to those who are seeking to learn and to those who are trying to teach them is warmly to be welcomed. Such assistance is most ably given by the Bishop of Knaresborough in his new book. If it is studied, as it should be, by every literate worshipper, it will surely improve the life and worship of every church in the country. It may even bring nearer the time when a revised translation of the Psalms can be introduced into the Prayer Book services; for that time can only come when the Psalter is the object of a more intelligent affection than at present. The book is written in language intelligible by anyone who can read at all, but mercifully without any "told to the children" pose. The Bishop deals in turn with the Psalter as the Hebrews wrote and used it, with the use of the Psalms by our Lord and the early Christians, and (three chapters out of five) with the understanding and use of the Psalms to-day. He thus provides in an attractive and inexpensive form one part of the essential "homework" for anyone who attends or aspires to attend Morning and Evening Prayer. The rest he has already given us in his earlier book: *The Church's Prayers.*

The most difficult matter to be discussed is, of course, the use of those portions of the Psalter which call down unpleasant punishments upon the enemies of God and seem to delight in doing so. While the treatment of this question is all that is commonly given in the pulpit and in commentaries, it is doubtful whether it will be found wholly convincing. It is not sufficient to justify by "hatred of sin" something which looks very much more like "hatred of sinners". Some further treatment of this matter is to be wished for; and we hope that the need for a second edition of the book will soon provide the opportunity.

Another criticism that may be made is to express surprise that the author appears to support the practice of reading short explanations before each psalm (he provides a set of these for the 1928 "proper psalms"). Such aids are surely of very little value to the worshipper at the time of service; and they can hardly avoid being either platitudinous or interruptive of the service. Moreover, surely the whole lesson of the Bishop's book is that the time for such aids is at home before you go to Church—as part of your Bible-reading programme. Communicants prepare their souls by self-examination and confession, and the choir prepare themselves by practising the chants. How then can any member of the congregation expect to join properly in the common worship without his own proper preparation? Only if he is among those who think of the services of the Church not as worship but as ecclesiastical entertainment. And if that is his standpoint he will not read this book. It must also be admitted that such introductions to the psalms and lessons are as great an interruption and complication of the service as the antiphons which Cranmer ejected, while they are seldom as beautiful or as helpful.

Having made these criticisms, however, let them not in any way detract from the welcome which has been given to the book above, a welcome which will be echoed by that happily increasing number of the Christian people who are coming to realize that to become a good worshipper requires at least as much patience, discipline, and practice as the improvement of one's game at golf.

Bernard Wigan

RETREATS FOR ALL

A Retreat For Priests. By Ronald Knox. Sheed & Ward. 10s. 6d;
A Retreat For Laypeople. By Ronald Knox. Sheed & Ward. 12s. 6d.

These two books, separated by eight years, sparkle with the characteristics which we have come to associate with Mgr Knox's spiritual writing. The first is the more formal, and perhaps deeper work; the second is less systematic but even more exciting.

In both books we find that necessary synthesis of theology and devotion which retreat conductors find so difficult to achieve. Here is neither dull doctrine nor shallow piety but living religion; and this because the subject of the addresses is always the person of Christ vividly alive. In fact these meditations are precisely what all meditations ought to be—devotional studies in Christology; the babe in the manger, the angry man in the temple, the boy lost in Jerusalem, are all primarily glimpses of the person of the Son of God. And despite a warm pastoral appeal, we are never allowed to forget that God is majestically transcendent. On the other hand Mgr Knox is boldly anti-Apollinarian. Despite traditional ascetic, with its time honoured "methods" and meticulous detail, the business of prayer remains encounter with the living Christ—it is adventure—and no means are illegitimate if they help to attain this end: not even the rather frightening trick of not only looking at Christ, but of actually putting ourselves in his place—"so far as reverence will allow it".

The author seems rather to enjoy the unconventional, but he is never the mere rebel. His occasional thrusts at the scholar are delightful, but the more casual reader must realize that he is nowhere attacking scholarship—only that particular brand of it which is apt to divorce theology from religion. Some eyebrows may be raised when the Psalms (which are the Psalms of David—whoever wrote them) are called "the Church's nursery rhymes"; but in the context of the Divine Office, and the priest's daily recitation of it, what a richly constructive definition this is.

In the preface to *A Retreat for Lay People*, the reader is invited to choose from the whole just those points which most attract him—rather after the manner of the Salesian "nosegay". My personal choice would be Chapters VIII and X as presenting some of the great eternal truths of the faith but in new and exciting words. The second Holy Hour in this book is a much needed ascetical—in the strict sense—treatise on the Mass. Here again is real religion, not simply eucharistic doctrine, which explains precisely how by attitude, attention, and volition, the layman may take his essential place in the Church's supreme act.

If the analogy is not too fanciful, I would summarize by setting Mgr Knox's addresses against the background of the best steel and concrete "new-housing-estate" church that the modern architect can devise: Coventry cathedral if you wish. Those whose religion is embedded in Victorian Gothic will be slightly shocked by both. Yet the unassailable truth expressed by both is that Christianity lives and moves; that it is naturally relevant to the age of nuclear power and television. Here is orthodox Christian spirituality in the best modern idiom.

More general questions necessarily arise from comparing the books side by side. I still find myself searching for the author's particular retreat technique, for his views on the difference and similarity between priests' and lay retreats—even for his idea of synthesis of lay and clerical spirituality within the One Mystical Body. A sermon may sometimes be read as profitably as it may be heard, retreat addresses must lose considerably by being lifted out of their proper context of liturgy, silence, confession, and direction, and I feel that all these questions would be satisfactorily answered only by the experience of the retreat itself.

How, then, should these books be used? I suggest that they are worthy of forming the basis of a fairly long private retreat. Failing that they might be used in daily private prayer over a considerable period of time. Simply to read them through would hardly do them justice.

MARTIN THORTON

LAST PRAYERS

SANCTA SANCTORUM. PRAYERS FOR THE HOLY OF HOLIES. W. E. ORCHARD. J. M. Dent. 12s. 6d.

THE recent death of the author of this book makes it even harder to review than if he were still living. Dr Orchard, as is well known, started as a Congregationalist: in his famous ministry at the King's Weigh House, through his devotional book *The Temple*, he introduced not only his own communion, but all the Free Churches to the historic forms of prayer and worship in the early and medieval Church. His own submission to Rome has not stopped the growth within those bodies of a richer and wider understanding of Catholic piety.

His power in the pulpit increased his influence. His sermons were thoughtful, well-arranged, concise, and challenging. He preached on central matters and directly to the point.

His last work is presented both by himself and by his publishers as the crown of his life work, when age has made prayer "his main means of religious expression, the chief concern of the day's business, and more rewarding than anything else". These are his own words, and arouse both sympathy and expectation. The jacket goes on to commend these *Prayers for the Holy of Holies* "in their length, in the intensity of their devotional approach, in the degree of concentration which they demand, in the completeness of their awareness of the Divinity and the sense of nearness thereto which they convey".

Some of these claims are too well justified, though, alas, not in the sense intended. "Their length": this book of 210 pages contains fifteen prayers. "The degree of concentration which they demand" is indeed inordinate. Dr Orchard has jettisoned the conciseness of his early days. His sentences are of extraordinary length. Chapter VIII, *A Prayer for Priestly Coronation,* is typical: its second sentence is eleven lines long; its third, 17; its seventh, 27; its eighth, 20; its ninth, 18; its tenth 17; and so on. Parenthesis, subordinate clause, simile, adjuration, apposition, strings of nouns or adjectives, tumble one upon another between two full stops. The great spiritual writer is never wordy. For all his gifts and his devotion, Dr Orchard has never learned the secret of the Psalms or of the *Imitatio Christi.*

"The intensity of their devotional approach". The prayers are indeed addressed to "the Divinity" most fervidly; but in that most dangerous of forms, a monologue before God. They supply clearly enough an autobiographical record of the writer's spiritual consciousness at the end of his pilgrimage. Yet something besides conciseness seems to have disappeared from the Orchard of earlier days, the old vigour of thought, the old skill of arrangement, above all, the joy of hope and the opening of new windows. We are offered the unbareing of a soul which, if it has found its heavenly peace, has lost in the process its earthly sparkle.

"Introspective honesty", which the jacket lauds, does not necessarily give guidance or inspiration in the field of prayer. Let us leave it at that, with sympathy but with disappointment.

E. MILNER-WHITE

SEVEN SAINTS

SPARKS AMONG THE STUBBLE (Seven Anglican Saints). By MARGARET CROPPER. Longmans, Green & Co. 12s. 6d.

THESE short lives of seven holy Anglicans of the eighteenth century are written by the sympathetic and understanding pen of a writer whose affinities enable her to enter into a type of Christian holiness which despite diversities of doctrinal outlook is substantially identical in them all. I must, however, express doubts as to one of the seven, Hannah More. Was she indeed as holy as those others among whom she is placed? Though Augustine Birrell never attained a doctrinal faith he was temperamentally religious with a sensitive appreciation of Christian sanctity. This is evident in his treatment of the Non-jurors and Wesley. But he could not see true holiness in Hannah More. Her religion struck him as smug, self satisfied, patronizing, and comfortable. She was "the first and I trust the worst of a large class . . . the well-to-do Christian." Who is right, her critic or her admiring biographer? Without a knowledge of her life and work to which the reviewer can lay no claim, it is impossible to decide with assurance. Nevertheless the facts here told of her devoted work for the Christian education of the poor continued in the face of calumny, indeed her widespread influence embracing even "two Buddhist priests from Ceylon and a nobleman from Persia", indicate that a personal distaste led Mr Birrell into unfair depreciation. On the other hand her piety, however sincere, does appear to have possessed unpleasing qualities, the fault perhaps rather of her environment than of herself. I find it, however, difficult to agree with Miss Cropper that "Hannah is readable, has style". Though without first-hand knowledge of her books the universal neglect into which they have fallen suggests that Mr Birrell's judgement that she is "one of the most detestable writers that ever held a pen, an encyclopaedia of all literary vices" is nearer the truth. Exaggeration nevertheless. For the quotations made by Miss Cropper prove that from the vast mass she has left us a selection of valuable excerpts could be made. If her critic had been confronted with a single volume of selections instead of the nineteen he finally buried in his garden, he might not have pronounced such indiscriminate condemnation.

No such reserves or doubts arise in connection with the other six. Robert Nelson, the Non-juror who returned to the Church of England on Queen Anne's accession, did much to assist the movement to spread an instructed Anglican Christianity among the people. To that end he wrote *The Practice of True Devotion* and *Fasts and Feasts of the Church*. His eirenic temper is most attractive, the more so that it was then so rare. A quotation here given, unfortunately too long to be requoted, pleads eloquently for understanding, fairness, and charity towards those who differ from us in religious belief. That Nelson practised what he preached is proved by the fact that his wife's conversion to Roman Catholicism did not ruin an ideally happy marriage. Thomas Bray was Nelson's friend and fellow worker in the cause of Christian education. It is to him that two great Anglican Societies, the S.P.C.K. and the S.P.G., owe their origin. The latter was the fruit of his experience as the Bishop of London's Commissary in Maryland. His attitude towards the negroes then regarded generally as mere human tools is admirable. "If you can instruct and prepare some of the poorer negroes, that they may join with you at the Supper of the Lord methinks the diversity of complexion will add a beauty to the spiritual Entertainment." ("Hooper" on p. 41 must surely be Hooker, and Bray's correspondent, Gilbert White of Selborne, cannot have been the naturalist.)

Though under Boehme's influence, Law in his later years seems to have moved in the direction of an undenominational mysticism and no longer attached the importance he formerly did to the Eucharist, he never ceased his regular attendance at the services of his parish Church. In the compass of her short study Miss Cropper shows her readers the distinctive qualities, value, and beauty both of Law's earlier and his later writings. In particular she brings out his insistence that there can be no anger in God, nothing but love, the wrath being, as an earlier mystic said, only on "man's part".

Newton's dramatic conversion from an irreligious and blaspheming seaman on a slaver to the Evangelical parson of Olney and St Mary Woolnoth, Cowper's friend and his helper when the dark clouds of mania enveloped him, is well told. What surprises us is that even after conversion Newton could command a slaver even though he treated the slaves with unusual humanity. Later he made ample amends by the support he gave his disciple Wilberforce in his struggle against the slave trade. Wilberforce's successful campaign against slavery, which cost him years of patient, disappointed endeavour, ranks among the greatest achievements of practical Christianity. The author shows us how it was sustained by an inner life of prayerful communion with our Lord. It is unreasonable to blame Wilberforce for his acquiescence in the practical slavery of masses of his fellow countrymen. He could not have liberated the negroes had he dissipated his efforts and enlarged the number of his enemies.

The book concludes with a brief sketch of a Cumberland parson, a farmer's son who worked with his farming parishioners, "one of the best shearers in the district". After a devoted ministry celebrated in Wordsworth's *Excursion*, Robert Walker died in 1802 at the age of ninety-two. He went to the door with the help of his daughter's arm, the night before he died, to look out once more on the fells where he had spent his life. It was bright moonlight, so that he could see every rock and bush unearthly in the still shining. "How clear the moon shines to-night", he said gently, and went to bed, to awaken in the glory of the Everlasting Light.

E. I. Watkin

HEAL THE SICK

A Priest's Work in Hospital. A Handbook for Hospital Chaplains and others of the Clergy who visit Hospitals. Edited by J. Gordon Cox. S.P.C.K. 10s. 6d.

It may well be the case that men find it more difficult in our day to answer the questions about themselves posed in Ecclesiasticus—"What is man and whereto serveth he? What is his good and what is his evil?"—while at the same time they are more aware of the fact that such questions need to be answered. But there are signs, and this book is one of them, that professionally we are leading more "examined" lives, endeavouring to discover what our job really is and where it fits into the whole pattern. It is not only because the status of a hospital chaplain has been profoundly affected by the Government Health Service that this book has been written—though that is partly the cause. It is also because the clergy in general are experiencing the need to define their task. The "clerical manner", once more common than it is to-day, was due in large measure to an interior uncertainty about what a priest is, its affectations being assumed to conceal this ignorance.

In the second chapter of this book an important distinction is drawn between the work of the parish priest and that of the hospital chaplain. In most parishes one of the greatest obstacles the priest has to face is the disappearance of any natural community life. His people have lost the sense of being united by common concerns and even the family may have lost its organic continuity. "The parish priest, therefore, cannot as a rule act on the principle that first comes that which is natural, then that which is spiritual. He cannot hope to see grace redeeming and redirecting existing natural associations to the glory of God, for the natural associations are not there to be redeemed." So he has to try as best he can to create a supernatural community first.

How different is the lot of the hospital chaplain! For here is a community which is bound together by a common and most godly purpose, and he has a recognized place in it. Could any priest ask for more? And yet it is just at that very point that his troubles begin and misunderstandings arise. For the very acceptance by all of a worthy temporal end makes it harder for the community to understand that such ends by themselves are not enough, and that good works must be referred to man's final end, the glory of God. A good hospital is not a Christian hospital unless its life is offered to God in sacrifice. The chaplain must understand this about the hospital and himself, and teach it, otherwise he will either think of himself as the least effective member of the hospital team in its pursuit of its temporal end, or, worse still, be someone who provides an "extra" for those patients who feel the need of it.

It is their perception of this difficulty which is probably the explanation of a point which may well strike the reader who has had some experience of this work. There is not as much emphasis as one might expect on the vital importance of pastoral work with the staff of the hospital. There is indeed much sound advice on this subject, including a most valuable syllabus for the chaplains' lectures to nurses in training, but it is almost the last of the subjects treated in the book and it is clearly subsidiary to the main theme throughout, which is the spiritual care of the patients. Sound strategy might well suggest that the chaplain should spend a very large part of his available time and energy on work among the staff, the only "permanents" in his parish. It is through them that so much of his work can best be done, or even done at all. Moreover young nurses and young doctors, coming to this work which confronts them with such grave theological problems, need a lot of help. What may restrain him, however, from using this strategy and observing this order of importance is, that he would then be doing something which is contrary to the great purpose of the society he serves. The hospital exists for the sake of the patients. That is the natural foundation on which he must work. The book makes it clear that the good chaplain must wholly share the preoccupation of the hospital staff.

The book has been written for the use of the professional—the whole or part time chaplain. From the long and admirable theological chapter with which it rightly opens to the last appendix on "organizations relevant to the chaplain's work" it is assumed that the reader is thus employed. Its pages are not lightened by illustrative examples from hospital experiences and often, particularly in that first chapter, need close attention. One may be tempted to ask "could it not have been written with a wider appeal so that it could help to dispel the general ignorance about the real nature of the ministry"? But that would have been a mistake. If doctors, matrons, and ward sisters can be persuaded that they ought to know something about what the Church has to teach about a hospital and what the chaplain is for, they will give at least respectful attention to a book which treats this profession in the same way that they would have their own profession treated.

It should be read also by the parish priest, first for its teaching on the theology of suffering and death; secondly, because it will help him when he visits his parishioners in hospital; and thirdly because it is evident that the work of a hospital chaplain will be strengthened if his brethren know what he is trying to do.

C. P. Hankey

ANATOMY OF SCHISM

Neuf Cents Ans Apres. Notes sur le "Schisme oriental". By Yves Congar, O.P. Editions de Chevetogne, Belgium. 300 Fr, French, 40 Belgian.

This brochure of ninety pages is part of a larger work[1], two volumes of essays and studies by various contributors in celebration of the eightieth birthday of the founder of the monks of union, Dom Lambert Beauduin, and in commemoration of the disaster symbolized by 1054. To Père Congar this date is "symbolical rather than exact". He accepts, and takes as his starting-point, the modern view of the schism as a gradual process, which in so far as whole Churches, and the Eastern Church as a whole are concerned, cannot be ascribed to any particular date.

He is a theologian, not an historian. It is no part of his aim to make a new contribution to the elucidation of this as an historical thesis, although at many places he throws light by reference to much older authorities, for instance the *Opus Tripartitum* of Humbert de Romans, prepared for the Council of Lyons, and the old *Ecclesiastical History* of the Abbé Fleury, too often neglected by modern historians. He accepts a new task: "celle d'une interprétation théologique des grandes données d'histoire, des situations concrètes", to be distinguished from "the theology of schism in itself", which can settle who is personally and formally in schism, but not the status of schismatic communions, a much less simple problem.

It is in this part of his task that Père Congar reveals his real originality. His history is taken largely from other writers whose works receive a generous amount of reference in the footnotes. I am flattered to find my own *Byzantine Patriarchate* cited at the outset, and five times thereafter, twice on critical issues. I think it would be fair to say that readers of my three last chapters will be aware of the historical problems to which Père Congar's theological analysis is addressed.

He divides the factors making for "estrangement" (an English word which he uses in English throughout) schematically into three groups, political, cultural (religious), and ecclesiological. In his treatment of the political factors he discards, with a little hesitation, the term caesaro-papism, and prefers to speak of an imperial (ecumenical) Church, inheriting from the pre-Christian world the conception of State authority in religious matters. This was at first practically identical with the universal Church, but increasingly distinguished, both in East and West, from the time of the Moslem conquests. It is not enough to speak of an arrest in ecclesiological development in the East through concentration on the mystical aspect, as Père Congar himself did in *Divided Christendom*. He would now prefer to speak of two ecclesiologies, developing on different lines in different circumstances. The heart of the matter lies in the liaison in the Eastern Christian mind between faith and rite, while in the West scholastic developments produced a change "from symbol to dialectic", and a distinction between the content of faith and the rites of worship in which it is embodied, a new piety in which the faithful of the fourth and fifth centuries would have been very much less at home than in the Latin piety of the ages before scholasticism. For this reason, he maintains, the preservation of Eastern rites in the Uniate Churches in communion with Rome "appears to the Orthodox as being . . . the caricature and even the contradiction of unity".

The East is tempted to make an absolute of rite, the West of discipline. This difference arose from the absence of the idea of satisfaction from the vocabulary of Greek theology, while the Latins interpreted μετάνοια entirely in terms of *poenitentia*, therefore of *poena*. Their difference on the point of purgatory seems to Père Congar at least as important as the *filioque;* and, if I do not mistake his meaning, closely aligned to the Greek reluctance to distinguish the infallibility of the Church from her holiness, and therefore to comprehend a distinction between the infallibility of the Pope and his impeccability. Père Congar's discussion of the evidence for the acceptance of a Papal primacy in the Eastern Churches before and after the beginnings of estrangement seem to me just and objective. He allows (p. 74) that "the Papacy has tended to govern all the Churches as if they belonged to its own metropolitan province, and to align them, from the liturgical and the canonical as well as, obviously, the dogmatic point of view, upon itself; in the West with success (except indeed in the countries that went over to the Reformation—England is a particularly interesting case), but never in the East." The contribution of the Gregorian reform to precipitate the break "by its willingness to use violence (*façons volontiers brutales*) and by its ecclesiological tendencies" is "not only a polemical thesis" of Paul Sarpi, but "an explanation admitted" by modern scholars among whom Bréhier is cited approving my own account in *The Byzantine Patriarchate*.

Père Congar's conclusions are perfectly loyal to Rome. In a quarrel between a father and his children, the wrongs cannot be equal. "There are not just two parts of Christendom separated from each other, but a collection of local Churches separated from the Apostolic see of Peter, from the centre which exercises, with the primacy, the role of moderator of the universal Church, of guide for her life, of touchstone for her communion." But the estrangement of the oriental Churches did not begin with their formal separation from Rome, and is not complete so long as there are men on both sides "who do not take part in the estrangement", Orthodox who find themselves speaking for Rome at ecumenical gatherings, and Roman Catholics whose respect for the Eastern Churches goes beyond respect for their liturgies, who "take account of the proper *ethos* of the oriental Churches, of their *pietas*, let us say, to evoke the like case of the Anglicans, among whom this word represents so much, and precisely those things that cannot be defined, and that are, in the religious order, the analogy of culture, if it be true that . . . culture is what remains when everything is forgotten." It is not enough to tell the Orthodox that they believe more Catholic doctrine than they have defined, if Roman Catholics do not recognize that the Easterns "have not and do not desire the need" for definitions. "Autant les Latins en général, Rome surtout—dont, après tout, c'est la vocation et le charisme propres—ont besoin de définir, autant l'Orient a besoin de ne pas définir."

At this point, I think, the key turns in the door. A need to define and a need not to define are always there. Can both be there together? If they can, the door is not closed for ever between Rome and the rest of Christendom.

George Every, s.s.m.

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[1] *L'Eglise et les Eglises.* 2 vols. 1800 Fr. French each.

DISCOVERIES AT STAFFORD

THE CHURCH OF ST BERTELIN AT STAFFORD AND ITS CROSS. EXCAVATION REPORT. Edited by A. OSWALD. Contributions by the Archdeacon of Stafford, M. Farr, J. S. Horne, A. Oswald, C. A. Raleigh Radford, R. J. Sherlock, R. H. M. Dolley, N. Davey. City of Birmingham Museum and Art Gallery. 4s. 6d.

OF the church of St Bertelin at Stafford, secularized in the 16th century and destroyed at the beginning of the 19th, not one stone was visible above ground and not one piece of carved work survives. Its site is dotted with modern graves and incorporates two large post-reformation bone-holes. A more unpromising subject for investigation could hardly have been imagined, but the 1953 excavations, admirably conducted, have turned out to be among the most rewarding of recent years. The results, set forth by eight contributors in the little book under review, are of quite outstanding interest; and it is extremely gratifying to find them so well and so conveniently published.

The dedication to St Bertelin arouses immediate attention. The local saints of the Midlands are liable to fall into one of three categories; either we know nothing about them whatever, like St Hardulf of Breedon; or it is clear from their legends that they are wholly fictitious, like the Huntingdonshire St Ives; or else, like St Aldate, their medieval "Lives" are so preposterous that it is unsafe to conclude they have any basis in the truth at all. St Bertelin is one of the last kind. It is nevertheless fortunate that his legend, which was probably never current outside Stafford and of which no manuscript is known, should have found a place in the printed *Nova Legenda Anglie;* for the story of this seducer of Irish princesses who employed an angel to win a judicial duel on his behalf is definitely entertaining. The interest of his church does not, however, lie principally in the oddity of its dedication but in the fact that, though immediately adjacent to the church of St Mary (already collegiate at the Conquest) and without endowments, advowson, or incumbent of its own, it was never regarded as a dependent chapel. This kind of arrangement carries us straight back into the Dark Ages, when bishops' sees and monasteries alike were commonly provided with several churches, all quite small and all of comparable importance. The excavation showed in the first place that there was a small Saxon stone church on the site of St Bertelin's which could be dated to the 11th century by the discovery under its floor of a portion of a farthing of Ethelred the Unready. Beneath this were the soil marks left by an earlier timber structure; and buried in the middle of it the passably well preserved remains of a large, rough, wooden cross. The view that Saxon stone crosses derive from earlier ones in wood, and that their primary purpose was to mark the place of worship before the provision of a building with a roof, had been gaining ground ever since Collingwood proposed it. But that we should actually find the identifiable remains of such a cross, reverently interred in the building which replaced it, was a thing not to be dreamed of. It is difficult to describe this discovery with any other word than thrilling. It seems fair now to conclude that the Legend was right in making Bertelin the evangelist of Stafford, and that he raised this cross. The Legend may possibly also have been right in identifying him with a personage who plays a minor rôle in the relatively trustworthy "Life" of St Guthlac who lived around the year 700.

Twenty pages, a third of the report, are devoted to a very different subject, whose interest, though considerable, is of another kind. The excavation produced an extensive collection of late-medieval paving tiles. These objects are of no religious and rarely, certainly not in this case, of aesthetic significance; but they are almost the only form of church furnishing from which, given further study, it will be possible to derive concrete evidence of how local and industrial production interacted during the last three medieval centuries. Tiles are no more or less imperishable than any other sort of pottery, but they can be classified much more exactly on account of their elaborate stamped designs. The bulk of those from St Bertelin's are unattractive specimens of the "line-impressed" type, in which the tile surface is of one colour and the pattern is essentially linear. Mr Sherlock exaggerates when he says such tiles are confined to the West Midlands: the term will hardly cover Prior Crauden's chapel at Ely, the Priory of Bolton in Wharfedale, or the churches of the Irish Pale. But it is a region in which they are particularly plentiful, and the lack of any published corpus of midland designs has been a source of great inconvenience for some time. An excellent start has now been made and it is much to be hoped that it will inspire further work. It will be interesting to see how the really fine "line-impressed" tiles, such as the Ely and Bolton ones or the angel-tiles at Basingwerk in Flint, are related to the more commonplace productions popular in Shropshire and in Ireland.

CHRISTOPHER HOHLER

CORNWALL

MEDIEVAL CORNWALL. By L. E. ELLIOTT-BINNS. Methuen. 35s.

FOR this comely and interesting book, the credit must be shared between author and publisher. Chronologically, the survey starts with the earliest facts ascertainable about the land and people of Cornwall in the Middle Ages, with a reminder of a background far more remote. It closes at the outbreak of the Wars of the Roses, without going on to trace their course. Dr Elliott-Binns explains in his preface the practical reasons which led him to begin and end where he does. His plan of arrangement, however, is in the main not to proceed by time sequences, but to consider in turn general topics of interest. Among these, he suggests, some may feel that ecclesiastical matters bulk too largely. But no apology is needed for giving full attention to factors so important in building the fabric of medieval civilization. Much advantage derives from the fact that Dr Elliott-Binns in his clerical career has been so long and intimately associated with the diocese of Truro, its cathedral chapter, and its late Bishop, J. W. Hunkin, to whose memory the book is dedicated. Cornwall was not the author's native land, but by combining observation, patient work in abundant available material, notably the great Henderson collection, and constructive imagination, he has made himself thoroughly at home there. That is evident throughout the book, and is epitomized in the charming concluding word-picture he has painted of what he saw when, poised in imagination over medieval Cornwall on "some clear, quiet evening" between dusk and dark, he took his last glimpse of the land and those who lived and worked in it (pp. 440, 441).

No bibliography is supplied. This seems a pity, for undoubtedly some readers, stirred to interest by the story so sympathetically unfolded, will wish to explore further this or that aspect. They deserve to be helped by systematic bibliographical guidance. As it is, they must be content with what they can glean from entries relating to books in the short prefatory list of abbreviations. But they will not find dates of publication there.

HILDA JOHNSTONE

BOOKS ON THE OLD TESTAMENT

THE BOOK LIST OF THE SOCIETY OF OLD TESTAMENT STUDY (1955).

THE *List* contains brief notices of books published since last year's *List* was issued, divided into those on general and educational subjects, archaeology, history, geography, law, religion, philology, exegesis, modern translations, literary criticism, the Apocrypha, and Post-Biblical Judaism. The *List* is not confined to English books, but includes those in French, German, Israeli, Italian, Scandinavian, etc. It is a wonderful compilation describing a couple of hundred books in over 70 pages, and reflects the greatest credit on that indefatigable Editor, Professor H. H. Rowley, assisted by a galaxy of international scholars. Such a list cannot be obtained elsewhere and is priceless to all who wish to keep up to date with present day Old Testament Scholarship. It can be obtained by those who are not members of the Society for 6s. from D. R. Ap Thomas, Llansadwrn, Menai Bridge, Anglesey.

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